

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

15

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Action

Control: 16371

NEA

Rec'd: SEPTEMBER 30, 1955

Info

11:54 AM

RMR

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 611, SEPTEMBER 30, 1 PM

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 611, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY TEL AVIV 85,
PRIORITY JERUSALEM 38, PRIORITY LONDON WQWQW PRIORITY PARIS 53.

IOP

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AIR

DEPARTMENT PASS USUN PRIORITY 21.

GOHAR HAS TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT HE RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM BURNS
LSKHNL HQMOYGREE# POSTPONEMENT WITHDRAWAL FROM AL AUJA TO
6 PM LOCAL TIME OCTOBER 2. GOHAR AGREED.

GOHAR STRESSED TO EMBASSY WITH MUCH AGITATION THAT THIS WAS
FOURTH POSTPONEMENT OF WITHDRAWAL DATE BECAUSE "BURNS STILL
HAD SOME MATTERS DISCUSS WITH ISRAELIS". HE RECALLED EGYPT
HAD FROM BEGINNING AGREED UNCONDITIONALLY WITHDRAW TROOPS
(WHICH HE SAID WERE REINFORCEMENTS OF CHECK POSTS FOLLOWING
ISRAELI ENTRY INTO D/Z). HE FEARED POSTPONEMENTS WERE LEADING
TO CONSOLIDATION OF ISRAELI FORCES IN AND AROUND D/Z AND
NOTED THAT SIMILAR ISRAELI DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING BURNS REQUEST
HAD BEEN FOLLOWED BY ISRAELI ACTION AT KHAN YOUNES.

BYROADE

MEM

NOTE: PASSED USUN, 9/30/55, 12:25 PM HJP
AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

Handwritten signature/initials inside a circle

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16-D
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Control: 16321
Rec'd: September 30, 1955
10:28 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 311, September 30, 7 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 311, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 117, LONDON 103
PARIS 66, JERUSALEM 34, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, JIDDA UNNUMBERED

DEPTEL 218.

Foreign Ministry informally advised Embassy that it had reached
satisfactory "understanding" with Burns September 29 and evacuation
of Nitzana demilitarized zone would be undertaken Sunday.

LAWSON

SW:CRH/16

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *pm* *Decho* Department of State

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Control: 1143
Rec'd: October 4, 1955
4:12 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 314, October 3, 7 p.m.

SENT JERUSALEM 35; REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 314, LONDON 105, PARIS 67, CAIRO 120, USUN 5.

Reference Department telegram 82 and Jerusalem's 98 to Department.

Please inform Burns that in view apparent Israeli-Egyptian compliance October 2 with his call for evacuation D/Z, Embassy contemplates no approach to Israeli Government pending further word from him.

British and French Embassies here are in agreement, and will not now approach GOI.

LAWSON

MAM

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Control: 813
Rec'd: October 3, 1955
12:58 p.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 102, October 3, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 102, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 68, TEL AVIV 86,
LONDON 50, PARIS 50

Re my telegram 101

Withdrawal of Egyptian and Israel forces from El Auja DZ finally completed by dusk October 2. Israelis had requested postponement allegedly view October 1 being Sabbath and first day of seven day feast of tabernacles. UNTSO source states all barbed wire and mine fields previously laid by Israelis in DZ have been removed with exception of mine field and wire around Kibbutz Ziot which served as headquarters for Israel military while in DZ. E-I MAC chairman has requested that these defenses also be removed and Israel delegate says he has asked for instructions from higher authority. At Israel request Burns agreed, in absence ruling of MAC on definition of term "armed forces" as used in GAA, to permit stationing of approximately 30 Israel police in DZ for stated purpose of protecting "settlers" of Kibbutz from Negev Bedouins. Egyptians have not yet made known to UNTSO their views on matter of Israel police in DZ.

Understand periphery of 2 of 3 Egyptian check point positions remain up to 13 yards across international frontier into DZ.

Burns now in Beirut, proceeding Cairo probably October 5.

COLE

AB:MDM

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4-B
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Control: 944
Rec'd: October 3, 1955
4:03 p.m.

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FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1507, October 3, 6 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1507; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 210, CAIRO 17.

Margerie expresses belief that recent developments in Egyptian efforts to secure arms from any quarter, including Nasser's speech yesterday, indicate Egyptian dictatorship tending rapidly toward military showdown with Israel and that latter may well take preventive action before arms reach Egypt. In view of recent lack of coordination in policy of three western powers on furnishing arms to Egypt and other Near Eastern countries and seriousness of situation created by active entry of Soviet influence in Near East, he has made personal suggestion to British and ourselves that tripartite meeting at senior civil servant level would be desirable in time to permit coordinated recommendations to Ministers before or during Geneva meeting.

DILLON

VHD/6

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Name Rm

Date 10-10-55

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AIR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 103, October 4, 4 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 103, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 87,
CAIRO 69

Re MYTEL 102 .

UNTSO source states Egyptians have not removed all portions of
one, and possibly of other, check point position which, according
to Israel survey of international frontier, projected up to 13
yards into El Auja DZ.

COLE

SW: MEB/15

Control: 1370
Rec'd: October 4 1955
9:59 a.m.

1955 OCT 4 AM 4 05
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Control:1910

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Rec'd: October 5, 1955
6:19 a.m.

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 323, October 5, 9 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 323 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 125, BEIRUT 87.

IDF Foreign Liaison Office this morning confirmed press report that tractor guard at Gilat settlement was killed and two workers who came to his assistance wounded by automatic fire last night. Settlement is nine kilometers east of Pattish 20 kilometers from Gaza Strip and about 15 kilometers north-west of Beersheba.

Embassy comment: GOI will study this incident carefully particularly in view of deep penetration from border to ascertain whether it presages new series of retaliatory measures following Khan Yunis similar to series of raids on (#)

WHITE

TT/6

(#) Omission of approximately 50 characters. Correction to follow.

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10-7-55 8:37 a.m.
CORRECTED COPY LMS

Control: 1910

Rec'd: October 5, 1955
6:19 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 323, October 5, 9 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 323 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 125, BEIRUT 87.

IDF Foreign Liaison Office this morning confirmed press report that tractor guard at Gilat settlement was killed and two workers who came to his assistance wounded by automatic fire last night. Settlement is nine kilometers east of Pattish 20 kilometers from Gaza Strip and about 15 kilometers north-west of Beersheba.

Embassy comment: GOI will study this incident carefully particularly in view of deep penetration from border to ascertain whether it presages new series of retaliatory measures following Khan Yunis similar to series of raids on settlements which followed Gaza incident February 28.

WHITE

TT/6

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Department of State *RM*

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Control: 2594
Rec'd: OCTOBER 6, 1955
7:25 AM

FROM: JERUSALEM

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 105, OCTOBER 5, 5 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 105; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 70, TEL AVIV 88

UNTSO SOURCE CONFIRMS ISRAEL PRESS REPORTS KILLING OF 1
GUARD AND WOUNDING 2 OTHERS AT ISRAEL SETTLEMENT OF GILAT,
15 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST BEERSHEBA NIGHT OCTOBER 4. ISRAELIS
ALLEGED MURDERERS CAME FROM GAZA STRIP. SOURCE STATES TRACKS
COMING TO SCENE INCIDENT HAVE BEEN TRACED NEARLY TO GAZA
D/L. THOSE INVOLVED EVIDENTLY CONTINUED TOWARD JORDAN
AFTERWARD.

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28

Action

Control: 2141
Rec'd: October 5, 1955
12:58 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Damascus

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 318, October 5, 5 p.m.

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Reference: DEPTTEL 463 to Cairo.

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When informed U.S. position as set forth reference telegram
Foreign Office made no comment.

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AB:MEB/15

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Note: Passed USUN 10/5/55, 5 p.m. AB.

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Control: 2863

Rec'd: October 6, 1955
1:27 p.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 106. October 6, 1 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 106, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 40, CAIRO 71,
LONDON 51, PARIS 51, TEL AVIV 89

Burns gave me following details October 5 current UNTSO matters.

On basis oral report just received from Chairman EI-MAC he described situation El Auja D/Z substantially as reported CONTEL 102 and 103. Second Egyptian check post now moved back from frontier, with exception possibly of some barbed wire. With regard 30 police personnel whom Israelis have established in D/Z Burns said Israelis argued that their need for police to prevent infiltration into area was equal to Egyptians need maintain the check posts near frontier for same stated reason. Burns has agreed presence these police on condition they are not equipped with arms heavier than rifles and submachine guns. However, unit reportedly has one or more Bren guns as well. Burns hopes soon start survey of International frontier by UN personnel. Some delay is bound to arise over this matter since there are only two qualified surveyors with UNTSO and both are now ill. There were no especial developments respecting Israeli insistence on observance 1949 agreement concerning MAC office arrangements. As Egyptian guard personnel have not endeavored return matter evidently in abeyance.

Burns said Israeli had evacuated their military people from the D/Z without any especial resistance to his call for such action. He thought IDF might have sent military units into D/Z without prior consultation Foreign Ministry September which evidently not interested in maintaining situation thus created in absence Egyptian intransigence over position its check posts etc. Israelis allowing observers move freely within the D/Z. Burns unaware extent Egyptian compliance with article VIII paragraph 3 GAA since Egyptians have restricted movement observers within area opposite D/Z.

Regarding Gaza strip problems Burns has made several requests for interview with Nasser. In absence reply situation remains substantially as reported CONTEL 89. He has therefore cancelled tentative plan proceed Cairo October 6. He understands Egyptians have moved

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-2- 106, October 6, 1 p.m., from Jerusalem

have moved their posts some 500 meters back from D/L. They have provided no clarification their professed willingness erect fences along certain parts of D/L, since they have not indicated where they would agree build such fences. Israelis on other hand have expressed approval of concept of continuous fence vicinity D/L, but maintain their earlier position that erection fence should render creation 500 meter neutral zone each side superfluous.

Burns assumes Nasser too preoccupied with other more urgent matters to grant interview. He said Gohar is likewise involved in wide variety of duties assigned him. As result Gohar is paying insufficient attention border matters. Burns said he will continue for limited time his endeavors clarify attitudes each party toward Security Council resolution of September 8. If, as he now expects, he can make no progress he will report status of matter to Security Council.

He added that while Gaza area has been relatively quiet his forecast developments there remains substantially as outlined last paragraph CONTEL 89. In this connection he referred incident at Gilat October 4 (CONTEL 105). He agreed that present moment does not appear propitious for further attempts powers support his efforts implement September 8 resolution.

COLE

AB:LJ/11

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Control: 3711

Rec'd: OCTOBER 7, 1955
6:32 P.M.

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 675, OCTOBER 7, 7 P.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 675, REPEATED. INFORMATION MOSCOW 7, PRAGUE 3,
USUN 28.

AL MUSAWWAR (CAIRO WEEKLY) TODAY QUOTED "EMMINENT RUSSIAN
SOURCE AS FOLLOWS:

"RUSSIA DIFFERENTIATES IN ITS MILITARY PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN
AGGRESSIVE WAR LAUNCHED BY IMPERIALIST OR AGGRESSIVE COUNTRY
AND LIBERATION OR DEFENSIVE WAR LAUNCHED BY PEOPLE FOR ITS
FREEDOM OR BY COUNTRY DEFENDING ITSELF. RUSSIA WHILE STANDING
FOR PEACE CANNOT HOWEVER BUT SUPPORT LIBERATION OR DEFENSIVE
WAR. INDEED SHE HOLDS THAT PEACE CAN NEVER BE ESTABLISHED
IF A PEOPLE IS DENIED ITS RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST
COLONIALISM OR IF EGYPT WERE DENIED HER RIGHT TO REPEL ZIONIST
AGGRESSION.

"THE PROVISION OF ARMS TO EGYPTIAN ARMY IS BALANCING FORCE
OF MIDDLE EAST SECURITY RATHER THAN BEING AN UPSETTING
(ELEMENT) TO THIS BALANCE. WEAKNESS OF A COUNTRY OR ITS MILITARY
UNPREPAREDNESS ENCOURAGE AGGRESSION AGAINST IT. GENEVA
CONFERENCE FOR INSTANCE SUCCEEDED ONLY AFTER BALANCE ARMAMENT
HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED AND WESTERN POWERS HAD REALIZED THREAT
ATOMIC BOMB WAS NO (RPT NO) LONGER FEARED".

BYROADE

VHD

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RMR**FROM:** TEL AVIV**TO:** Secretary of StateSS
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GLI**NO:** 337, OCTOBER 7.SENT DEPARTMENT 337, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 37, BEIRUT 95,
BAGHDAD 11, JIDDA 5, DAMASCUS 58, JERUSALEM 37.

GOI THIS MORNING RELEASED FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO PRESS:

OCB
OSIA
CIA

"EGYPTIAN ACTS OF WAR IN COURSE OF PAST WEEKS REPRESENT FURTHER STAGE IN HER HOSTILE POLICY AIMED AT DESTROYING ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SAID IN JERUSALEM THIS MORNING. THEIR ACTS AMOUNT TO INITIATION OF WHAT IS IN FACT GUERILLA WARFARE. EGYPT MUST REALIZE THAT IF SHE DOES NOT RPT NOT PUT IMMEDIATE AND TOTAL END TO THESE ACTIONS SHE WILL THEREBY FINALLY DISRUPT CEASE FIRE OF 4 SEPTEMBER AND WILL OBLIGATE ISRAEL TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS FOR PROTECTION OF HER CITIZENS.

"SPOKESMAN DISCLOSED THAT GOI IS IN POSSESSION OF INFORMATION THAT EGYPT HAD DECIDED, EVEN AFTER CEASE FIRE OF 4 SEPTEMBER, TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS FROM GAZA STRIP OF SABOTAGE AND MURDER GANGS, KNOWN AS THE FEDAYEEN, AND TO ORGANIZE GUERILLA ATTACKS ALSO FROM TERRITORIES OF OTHER ARAB STATES. EGYPT HAS RECEIVED ASSISTANCE IN THIS CONNECTION FROM OTHER ARAB STATES NEIGHBORING ISRAEL, AND IN PARTICULAR FROM SYRIA.

"FOR SOME TIME PAST GOI HAS HAD KNOWLEDGE OF FACT THAT UNITS HAD BEEN ORGANIZED ON SYRIAN, JORDANIAN AND LEBANESE TERRITORY FOR PURPOSE OF ATTACKING OBJECTIVES IN ISRAEL. THESE GANGS HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED BY SYRIA AND EGYPT WITH SOME FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM SUADIA ARABIA. IN COURSE LAST FEW DAYS IT HAS TRANSPIRED THAT ATTACKING 7 SEPTEMBER IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF TIRAT-ZVI, ON JORDANIAN BORDER, WHEN WATER INSTALLATIONS WERE DESTROYED, DYNAMITING ON 13 SEPTEMBER OF HOUSES IN VILLAGE OF ALMA, NEAR FRONTIER, AND ATTACK OF 22 SEPTEMBER ON BUS NEAR MERON, IN EASTERN GALILEE, WHEN TWO ISRAELIS WERE KILLED AND NINE

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-2- 337, OCTOBER 7, FROM TEL AVIV.

WOUNDED WERE ALL CARRIED OUT UNDER EGYPTIAN DIRECTION. OF PERPETRATORS, SOME RECEIVED THEIR TRAINING DIRECTLY FROM EGYPTIAN INSTRUCTORS WITHIN EGYPTIAN TERRITORY. THENCE THEY WERE SENT TO LEBANON, SYRIA AND JORDAN WHICH SERVED AS HOST COUNTRIES TO THE GANGS.

"IT MUST BE STRESSED THAT ALL THESE OUTRAGES WERE (#) EGYPT SOLEMNLY UNDERTOOK ON 4 SEPTEMBER TO CEASE ALL HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST ISRAEL, INCLUDING ACTS OF SABOTAGE, MINE LAYING, ETC. SINCE THEN INCURSIONS FROM GAZA STRIP HAVE CONTINUED. THUS ON 15 AND 17 SEPTEMBER TWO PARTIES OF ARMED MEN SENT OUT BY EGYPTIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN GAZA WERE CAUGHT IN ISRAEL TERRITORIES, AND 25 SEPTEMBER FRESHLY PLACED MINE OF EGYPTIAN ARMY MANUFACTURE WAS FOUND ON REGULAR PATROL ROUTE NEAR BEERI. FINALLY THIS WEEK THEIR OPERATIONS WERE MARKED BY NEW OUTRAGE WITH MURDER OF VILLAGE GUARD AND WOUNDING OF TWO OTHERS NEAR GILAT.

"FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE ACTS, SPOKESMAN CONCLUDED, LIES INESCAPABLY AT THE DOOR OF EGYPT AND THOSE ARAB STATES WHICH COOPERATE WITH HER IN THESE MURDEROUS ACTIVITIES."

LAWSON

HER

(#) APPARENT OMISSION. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION
is assigned to

8263 Vista Dr.
La Mesa, Calif.
Oct. 7, 1955

Herbert Hoover, Jr.
State Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Like many other people my husband and I are upset about the role of our country in the current difficulties between Israel and Egypt--indeed, we are ashamed. I hasten to assure you that we have five very good Jewish friends of the finest kind, but none of them is Zionist in his outlook; generally speaking, we cannot be called anti-Semitic. Yet we cannot ignore the fact that the Zionist Jews were not interested in Palestine until there was the hint of oil and other mineral wealth in that area. After the last war the press in the United States never gave the Arab cause a true hearing, so successful was the campaign of the Zionist Jews to play down the offers of such countries as England, Belgium, Canada, Brazil, and others that opened their doors to displaced Jews. Palestine was the land of the Arabs for more than 1500 years and should be to this day; such was the aggression and grab of the Zionists that they convinced the United States in 1946 and 1947 that it was all right that large amounts of American money should finance this aggression at a time when Palestine was a British protectorate and Britain our greatest ally and true friend. Today the aggressive tendencies of these people continue and our nation sinks deeper into the mire that such tendencies perpetually create. Egypt must get arms where she can, if we will not sell them or send troops to police the situation. In the meantime we play directly into the hands of the Communists.

I beg of you, do all you can to rectify the American position in regard to Israel and Egypt. Peace must be guaranteed to Egypt, a guarantee backed up by force if necessary. It is no good crying "Peace, peace!" when there is no peace; the peace must be fought for on mental levels as long as possible; when it is no longer possible we must be ready to risk our skins for what is right, first working through the U.N. to hold the line as it now stands.

Sincerely yours,

Mary Lee Theobald

Mary Lee Theobald
(Mrs. John Richmond Theobald)

288659

1955 OCT 18

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John
Department of State

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Control: 4461

NEA

Rec'd: October 10, 1955
11:07 a.m.

Info

FROM: Jerusalem

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 108, October 10, 3 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 108, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 73, TEL AVIV 91

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UN observer assigned E-I MAC has informed officer Consulate General that Israelis have built landing strip near Kibbutz Ziot in El Auja DZ. He states further that Israel police in DZ have machine guns. Observer noted group of Israel civilians in DZ who claimed that they were Lapidot employees engaged in prospecting for oil under concession granted by Israel day before

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SW:MEB/12

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Tel 109

Date

11 Oct 55

From

Jerusalem

To

Sec State

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

5860
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October 11, 1955

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S *ps*

FROM : NEA - George V. Allen *gva*

SUBJECT: Call on you by American Jewish leaders, Wednesday, October 12 at 11

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374.041/10-11-55

Discussion

The presidents of sixteen major Jewish organizations in the U.S. have delegated six men to represent them on this call. They are:

- Rabbi Maurice Eisendrath, Union of American Hebrew Congregations (Reform)
- Rabbi Philip Bernstein, Chairman, American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (political arm of the Zionist movement in the U.S.)
- Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Co-Chairman, Jewish Agency for Palestine
- Mr. Philip Klutznick, President, B'nai B'rith
- Dr. Israel Goldstein, President, American Jewish Congress (*Ill - will not attend*)
- Mr. Adolph Held, Chairman, Jewish Labor Committee

They can be expected to raise the following points:

1. Nasser's action in signing an arms agreement with the Soviet bloc proves that he is no longer worthy of U.S. trust.
2. Egypt's action threatens Israel. The U.S. should take steps to see that the balance of power in the Near East is maintained by supplying Israel with arms.
3. Egypt's action renders obsolete the conditions you set forth in your speech of August 26 and the U.S. should now act favorably on Israel's request for a security guarantee in advance of an Arab-Israel settlement. In any case, Israel should not be asked to cede territory as a price of a settlement.

There is attached (Tab A) a press release issued by the Jewish presidents on October 5, 1955.

Recommendations

That you express the following views:

1. The Egyptian-Czech arms deal carries implications which cause the grave concern for all Western interests in the Middle East. We can not at this moment predict the degree to which our efforts to limit the scope of this transaction in Egypt and prevent Soviet achievement of similar arrangements in the area will be successful.

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- 2 -

2. For some months to come the balance of real military power in the area will remain unaffected by this transaction. If during this period, Israel should attempt to resolve this problem by use of the superior force at her disposal, the effect might well be to stimulate the entire Arab world toward entry into the Soviet bloc.

3. Despite the complications which have arisen, we maintain the view that no lasting security arrangement for the Near East can be created in any context except that of an Arab-Israel settlement. We are continuing our efforts to promote such a settlement and count on the support of American Jewish groups in this endeavor.

Attachments

Tab A - Press release by heads of
Jewish organizations, 10/5/55.

Cleared in draft FHR
DAB
NEA:NE:DCBergus:bm

F-11

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Dept
Department of State

ACTION COPY

16

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Action

Control: 5722

Rec'd: October 12, 1955
8:03 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 347, October 12.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 347, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 114, AMMAN 40, BAGHDAD 13, BEIRUT 98, CAIRO 138, DAMASCUS 62.

Foreign Ministry spokesman announced October 10 that Israel has lodged complaint with Egyptian-Israeli MAC in which Israel demands that Egypt honor Article V-I of GAA, which prohibits presence of defensive positions in area between international frontier and Egyptian villages El Quseima and Abu Aueigila.

According press, spokesman said that while Egyptian forces which had crossed into Israel side of frontier were withdrawn to Egyptian territory, Egypt continues maintain forces in excess those authorized to man three Egyptian check posts which were permitted to remain in Egyptian territory following agreement between Egypt, Israel and UN concerning withdrawal of armed forces from Nitzama area.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

674-842/10-1455

FROM : Amembassy, Tel Aviv

270

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

October 14, 1955

DATE

REF : Embtel to Dept. 337, Repeated Info Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda, Damascus, Jerusalem.

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	NEA* 4	Rn/R-2 021*6 P-1 IO-4
	10/18	USIA* 10 CIA* 7 ARMY* 4 NAVY* 3

SUBJECT: Government of Israel Statements Regarding Egyptian Guerilla Activities.

On October 7 the Foreign Ministry announced to the press a "stern warning" that Israel will be obliged to take all necessary steps for the protection of her citizens in Egypt if Egypt does not put an immediate and total end to her guerilla warfare. The text of this "stern warning" was transmitted to the Department and other addressees in the referenced Embassy telegram.

On the same day Colonel Y. Harkavi, Chief of Israel Army Intelligence, in a press conference stated that "Egypt's guerilla war against Israel had shifted to the North and East and is directed from centers lying in Jordan and Lebanese territory."

Colonel Harkavi alleged that "the Egyptian intelligence service had taken over a Syrian-sponsored group of marauders stationed at Irbid, Jordan. Similar centers for directing sabotage activities in Israel have been established in Marun er-Ras and Bint Al-Gubeil in the Lebanon. The Lebanese authorities rounded up some of the Egyptian agents, announcing officially that 'Israel spies' had been arrested. The most recent center is in the Hebron hills, sponsored and directed by the Egyptian Minister in Amman, Brigadier Ibrahim Salah-e-Din, who was a member of the Egyptian mission to the Rhodes armistice talks. In the Lebanon and Syria, the Egyptian Military Attache directs the operations."

The full text of Colonel Harkavi's press conference, as carried by the State of Israel's News Bulletin, October 11, 1955, and as reported by The Jerusalem Post and the Hebrew and foreign language press, is transmitted as part of Enclosure 1. For the sake of convenience of reference, the Foreign Ministry's press statement of October 7 is transmitted also as part of Enclosure 1.

Enclosure:

As stated,
cc. Amman, Beirut, Baghdad,
Jidda, Damascus, Jerusalem.

SAKoczak:td

REPORTER

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

William L. Hamilton
First Secretary of Embassy

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674-842/10-1455

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Enclosure No. 1
Despatch 270
Tel Aviv.

October 11, 1955
Vol II, No. 32

STATE OF ISRAEL
WEEKLY NEWS BULLETIN
Government Information
Service

Stern Warning to Egypt to Stop Guerilla Warfare

A stern warning that Israel will be obliged "to take all necessary steps for the protection of her citizens", if Egypt "does not put an immediate and total end" to her guerilla warfare was issued by the Foreign Ministry spokesman in Jerusalem on 7 October.

Egyptian acts of war in the course of the past weeks represent a further stage in her hostile policy aimed towards attacking Israel, the spokesman said. These acts amount to the initiation of what is in fact guerilla warfare.

Egypt must realize that if she does not put an immediate and total end to these actions she will thereby finally disrupt the cease-fire of 4 September, and will oblige Israel to take all necessary steps for the protection of her citizens.

The spokesman disclosed that the Government is in possession of information that Egypt had decided, even after the cease-fire of 4 September, to continue the operations from the Gaza Strip of the sabotage and murder gangs, known as the Fedayeen, and to organize guerilla attacks also from the territories of other Arab states. Egypt has received assistance in this connection from other Arab states neighbouring Israel, and in particular from Syria.

Units in 3 States

For some time, past the Government has had knowledge of the fact that units had been organized on Syrian, Jordanian and Lebanese territory for the purpose of attacking objectives in Israel. These gangs have been maintained by Syria and Egypt with some financial support from Saudi Arabia. In the course of the past few days it has transpired that the attacks of 7 September in the neighbourhood of Tirat Zvi, on the Jordan border, when water installations were destroyed, the dynamiting on 13 September of houses in the village of Alma, near the Lebanese frontier, and the attack of 22 September on a bus near Meron, in Eastern Galilee, when two Israelis were killed and nine wounded, were all carried out under Egyptian direction.

Of the perpetrators, some received their training directly from Egyptian instructors within Egyptian territory. Thence they were sent to the Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, which served as host-countries to the gangs.

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch 270
Tel Aviv.

October 11, 1955
Vol II, No. 32

STATE OF ISRAEL
WEEKLY NEWS BULLETIN
Government Information
Service

Coase-Fire Ignored

It must be stressed that all these outrages were perpetrated after Egypt solemnly undertook on 4 September to cease all hostile acts against Israel, including acts of sabotage, mine-laying etc. Since then, incursions from the Gaza Strip have continued. Thus, on 15 and 16 September, two parties of armed men sent out by the Egyptian military headquarters in Gaza were caught in Israel territory, and on 25 September a freshly placed mine of Egyptian army manufacture was found on the regular patrol route near Be'eri. Finally, this week these operations were marked by a new outrage with the murder of a village guard and the wounding of two others near Gilat.

Full responsibility for these acts, the spokesman concluded, lies inescapably at the door of Egypt and those Arab states which cooperate with her in this murderous activity.

Israel Army Intelligence Chief Reviews Egyptian Guerilla Activities

Egypt's guerilla war against Israel had shifted to the North and East, and is directed from centres lying in Jordan and Lebanese territory, Colonel Y. Harkavi, Chief of Israel Army Intelligence, told the press on 7 October. The names of many of the Egyptian ring-leaders are known to the Israel Defence Forces, who are keeping a watchful eye on the new Egyptian activity.

The Egyptian intelligence service had taken over a Syrian-sponsored group of marauders stationed at Irbid, Jordan, Colonel Harkavi said.

Similar centres for directing sabotage activities in Israel have been established in Marun er-Ras and Bint Al-Gubeil in the Lebanon. The Lebanese authorities rounded up some of the Egyptian agents, announcing officially that "Israel spies" had been arrested. The most recent centre is in the Hebron hills, sponsored and directed by the Egyptian Minister to Amman, Ambassador Ibrahim Salah-e-Din, who was a member of the Egyptian mission to the Rhodes armistice talks. In the Lebanon and Syria, the Egyptian Military Attaché directs the operations.

Since the Khan Yunis raid, saboteurs leaving the Gaza Strip are ordered to cross into Jordan after carrying out their mission. Once in the Hebron Hills, they are cared for, and in due course are transferred back to Gaza. The Jordan authorities have done nothing to stop Salah-e-Din's activities, which include tours of the Hebron area in order to gain local mukhtars' support for the Egyptian schemes.

This guerilla warfare, Colonel Harkavi said, was part of the Egyptian design to wage a full-fledged war of annihilation against Israel when circumstances and military means appear to warrant it.

The Czechoslovak arms deal might very well shorten the waiting period for the Egyptians who, on the whole, are not in a hurry. The Arab theory of the annihilation of Israel is that it should be attempted when this country reaches its lowest ebb economically and as to weapons.

"It should, however, be borne clearly in mind", the Chief of Intelligence said, "that the idea of wiping out Israel is not just a catchword intended for Arab-local consumption, but an obsession to be tried out in practice by some Arab government or another. The slogan has been in use for too long not to have wrought a deep impression on the Arab mind".

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Enclosure No. 1
Despatch 270
Tel Aviv.

October 11, 1955
Vol II, No. 32

STATE OF ISRAEL
WEEKLY NEWS BULLETIN
Government Information
Service

The guerilla warfare by the Fedayeen is part of the Arab plan, which at present is being sponsored by the Egyptian Government. In Cairo, the responsibility for the Fedayeen has long been acknowledged publicly. The term originally applied to the 50,000 irregular troops known also as the National Guard, raised during Cairo's struggle against the British, now loosely denotes any group engaged in unofficial warfare, but they are all directed by regular Egyptian Army officers.

The Fedayeen operations in the Negev are directed from Gaza by Major Mustafa Hafez, who was recently raised to the rank of Lt.-Colonel for his successes.

In the Gaza Strip, where the 333rd battalion of the National Guards is stationed, the Fedayeen are Egyptians or locally recruited Palestinians. In Jordan and the Lebanon, they are locally recruited, but the cadres are all Egyptian. Some of the local recruits are taken to Egypt for a brief course in sabotage, but mostly they are given instruction on the spot by Egyptian officers.

The murder at Gilat last week, Colonel Harkavi said, was clearly an act of the Gaza Fedayeen, who had taken refuge in Jordan. The bullet retrieved from the body of the victim is from a Karl Gustav submachine-gun, a Swedish-made weapon in use only by the Egyptian Army in this part of the world.

According to the evidence of an Egyptian soldier who deserted to Israel in the Nitzana area last month, it was an Egyptian officer, Bahajat Nur e-Din, who had ordered him to enter Ktsiot, the Kibbutz which is closest to Nitzana, and blow up an arms store which he thought was there.

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AIR

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 755, October 17, 3 p.m.

Control: 8457

Rec'd: October 17, 1955
11 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 756, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 102,
JERUSALEM 44, LONDON 140, PARIS 64, USUN 31.

GOE spokesman charged today Israeli force accompanied by 2 UN
representatives approached Egyptian outpost on international
boundary side of Al Auja D/Z afternoon October 16. Egyptians
warned force to halt but it crossed border and Egyptians opened
fire.

Spokesman said Israelis still maintain armed forces in D/Z in
guise Kibbutniks and police in violation GAA and Burns' appeal
for their withdrawal.

Spokesman October 15 had made long statement reviewing Al Auja
situation beginning with Israeli eviction Bedouin from DZ Septem-
ber 1950, installation in September 1953 of "settlement" which
found by MAC to be para-military, and continuing through in-
cidents in May, June and September this year.

Gohar prior his departure UNGA reviewed extensively with British
Embassy Officer Egyptian views re Al Auja. Gohar said that as
long as Israelis maintained "forces" including "police" in DZ
Egyptians would not cooperate in border survey and "would shoot
anybody" found in vicinity international border. Gohar then
referred Burns' report SY (Jerusalem's 109) about which he pre-
sumably informed by GOE delegation to UNGA, adding he had re-
ceived letter from Burns saying Egyptian attitude placed on
Egypt gave responsibility of provoking Israeli attack. Gohar
failed comprehend Burns' position. Burns' job was to prevent
violations of GAA. Did he now view "retaliatory" violations as
excusable if either party felt it was justified in doing so?

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NEAControl: 8173
Rec'd: October 17, 1955
9:55 a.m.Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 360, October 17, 11 p.m.

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USARMA has given me an account of his conversation last weekend with USARMA Amman in which latter was quoted as follows: "Last week he (MILLATT) had very frank discussion with Major Friend, G-2 of Arab Legion, who stated that he has confirmed evidence that Egypt continues to send Feda' In to various Arab countries from whence they depart periodically continuing terrorist activities in Israel, crossing country and infiltrating into another Arab country. He stated that Jordan has two such Feda' In in prison where it is intended to keep them. They were captured infiltrating into Jordan after conducting unspecified terrorist activities in Israel.

"Major Friend stated that he would be pleased to have this information brought to attention of Israeli Government."

Embassy comment: Embassy believes that request re transmitting information to GOI was probably motivated by Jordanian fear, arising from Israel's threat (EMBTTEL 337) of retaliation, that Jordan would be held responsible for and subject to retaliation for future Feda' In activities which they anticipate will occur.

Department will recall that last spring, Glubb Pasha gave message to White which I later passed on to Sharett that Jordanians had arrested and were holding in prison murderers of Ajur shepherds. Embassy believes that this message had good effect in moderating Israel reaction to this incident and in contributing to relatively good relations which prevail between two countries along their borders.

In view of foregoing, I am disposed, unless Department perceives objection, to passing on informally to Sharett that portion of Major Friend's message relating to detention of two Feda' In and indicating that Jordan is not participating in and implicitly does not approve of these activities. I would not plan, however to use that portion of Friend's statement re evidence that Egypt continuing these Feda' in activities. Department's guidance would be appreciated.

SW:WVC/16

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6:25 a.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

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RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 114, October 17, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 114; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 44, BEIRUT 25,
CAIRO 77, DAMASCUS 30, TEL AVIV 95OCB
USIA
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NAVY
AIR

Probably most flagrant example of deliberate endangering life
UNTSO personnel by one of parties since signing of GAA's
occurred shortly after 2:30 p.m. October 16 when machinegun
fire from Southern Egyptian check post position opposite El
Auja was directed at Belgian Captain De Gellinck and Swedish
radio operator, each in white UN jeeps. Observer and radio
operator were proceeding to investigate Egyptian complaint and
had stopped 100 meters in front of Egyptian position when burst
of machinegun fire riddled their vehicles. Both dismounted
but were pinned down by rifle fire until nightfall permitted
their return to El Auja on foot about 8 p.m.

UN observer repeating above details to officer Consulate General
stated that MAC chairman had asked both parties for information
as to whereabouts of observers when they were unreported by
radio an hour after their departure from MAC office at El Auja.
(Usual procedure calls for observers in this area to make
radio call to MAC office every quarter hour.) Egyptians
replied that observers had not been seen and that there had
been no firing in area. MAC chairman has protested this incident
in vigorous terms to Egyptian delegate.

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1955 OCT 17

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SENT TO: AmEmbassy TEL AVIV 260

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Info:

Embtel 360. Dept has no objection your informally passing on
to Israelis substance Friend's message accordance last para
urtel.

*Dulles
(WCB)*

DULLES

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Drafted by: NEA:NE:DCBergus:bm
10/17/55

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: NEA:NE: William C. Burdett

Clearances:

S/S-CR
OCT 17 1955 P.M.

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AmEmbassy JERUSALEM "

674 84A/10-1755

Jerusalem's 114. Understand UNSYG has expressed concern to Egyptian Delegation over firing at clearly marked UNTSO vehicles and personnel. Suggest in your ~~xxx~~ discretion, taking into account inter alia possible effect timing such approach on SC elections, you express similar concern to head Egyptian UNDEL over such irresponsible act. British and French Dels may wish to take similar action.

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*H. H. HOOVER
(Acting)
S. B.*

HOOVER

674.84A/10-1755



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10/19/55

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

IO - Mr. Bond

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Burdett

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Rec'd: October 19, 1955
7:05 a.m.

1955 OCT 19 PM 2 20

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 366, October 18, 4 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 366; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 147, PARIS 77, LONDON 119, USUN 12, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

GOI Foreign Ministry spokesman reacted with official statement to incident of Egyptian fire upon 2 UN observers in D/Z afternoon October 16. Report carried most newspapers, following from JERUSALEM POST October 18:

"Commenting on shooting Foreign Ministry spokesman in Jerusalem said yesterday that incident provides 'further example of persistent refusal of Egyptian authorities to abide by general armistice agreement and understanding under which armed forces were recently withdrawn from demilitarized zone.'"

Thus, Egyptians are still maintaining on Egyptian side of international frontier forces in excess of those permitted under general armistice agreement. They also persist in refusal to allow investigation of Israel's complaints on this matter.

"With reference to surveying and demarcation of frontier, it will be remembered that on October 13 armed Egyptian soldiers interfered with work of Israel and United Nations surveyors. Since then Israel surveyors have continued with survey on Israel side of international frontier'.

"Spokesman recalled that 'under arrangement reached prior to withdrawal of armed forces from demilitarized zone, Israel reserved her right to resume and complete marking of international frontier on her own, should arrangements made by chairman of Mixed Armistice Commission fail to take effect'."

LAWSON

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FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 371, OCTOBER 18, 6 PM

Control: 9376

Rec'd: OCTOBER 19, 1955
6:54 AM

1955 OCT 19 PM 12 22

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67434A/10-1855

DEC 12 1955

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SENT DEPARTMENT 371, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 150, DAMASCUS 68, BEIRUT 107, AMMAN 7.

ISRAEL PRESS REACTED VIOLENTLY TO NASSER'S STATEMENTS IN INTERVIEW WITH PAUL SANN OF NEW YORK POST. HIS DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST "INTERNATIONAL JEWRY" AND "WEALTH OF JEWS" DREW INEVITABLE COMPARISONS WITH HITLER. TYPICAL COMMENT FROM OCTOBER 17 PRESS FOLLOWS: DAVAR (MAPAI) "NASSER'S SHOCKING STATEMENT HAS COMPLETELY UNMASKED HIM AND HIS VILE PURPOSES. PERHAPS HIS STATEMENT WAS NOVELTY TO SOME NATIONS BUT IT WAS NO SURPRISE TO ISRAEL. AND NOW, NASSER HAS SHOWN HIMSELF TO ENTIRE WORLD FOR WHAT HE REALLY IS-- A MAN OBSESSED WITH BLIND HATE, WITH NAZI, HITLERITE AND ANTI-JEWISH VENOM, AND WITH DEMENTED PASSION FOR DESTRUCTION AND ANNIHILATION WITHOUT RHYME OR REASON.

"AND NOW, SINCE HIS AMBITIONS AND SCHEMES ARE CLEAR AND OBVIOUS, HIS END LIKEWISE IS CLEAR AND OBVIOUS. IT WILL BE THAT OF ALL JEW-BAITERS AND MISANTHROPISTS IN HISTORY.

"STATE OF ISRAEL AND ALL THOSE WHO WISH HER WELL. WILL DO ALL IN THEIR POWER TO FOIL NASSER'S PLANS".

LAMERCHAV (ACHDUT AVOFA) "HIS STATEMENT SETS NEW TONE IN ARAB DEMAGOGY. EGYPTIAN RULER HAS PICKED UP DISCARDED HITLER CLOAK AND WRAPPED IT AROUND HIS SHOULDERS...HAD ISRAEL NOT BEEN AWARE OF EXTENT OF DEMAGOGY IN NASSER'S STATEMENT AND SPEECHES, SHE WOULD HAVE HAD TO VIEW IT AS A NEW PHASE, THE MOST ACCUTE IN RELATIONS AMONG TWO NATIONS, SIGNIFICANCE OF WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN CALL TO ARMS. BUT STATE OF ISRAEL WILL NOT BASE HER PLANS AND HER FUTURE IN NASSER'S DEMAGOGY;

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-2- 371, OCTOBER 18, 6 PM, FROM TEL AVIV

ISRAEL WILL BE READY FOR DEFENSE AND SHE WILL AIM BLOW AT ENEMY WHEN IT ATTACKS".

HATZOFEH (MIZRAHI) "JUST LIKE OTHER DESPOTISM WHOSE TEMPORARY SUCCESS HAD MADE THEM DIZZY NASSER TOO HAS REACHED STAGE WHICH SHOULD START WORRYING THOSE WHO REGARD HIM AS AN EMANCIPATOR. A DESPOT DECLARING WAR ON JEWS IS A NAZI AND ANY ARMS ENTRUSTED TO HIS CARE CONSTITUTE DANGER TO PEACE OF WORLD. AND IF SOVIET BLOC DOES NOT SHOW ANY DISCRIMINATION SO LONG AT THIS DESPOT SERVES AS TOOL AGAINST WEST, THEN AT LEAST MORE VETERAN WORLD DEMOCRACIES WHO STILL REMEMBER NAZISM AND FASCISM IN ALL THEIR RAGING FURY SHOULD PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THIS REPETITION OF HITLERISM".

HAARETZ (INDEPENDENT) "IT IS NOT ISRAEL'S DUTY TO REPEATEDLY EXPLAIN TO US GOVERNMENT GRAVITY OF ITS MISTAKE IN TRUSTING ARABS WHO NEVER WERE AND NEVER WILL BE LOYAL ALLIES TO WEST. BUT EVEN IF ALL ASSUMPTIONS ARE CORRECT, ISRAEL CANNOT AFFORD TO CONSIDER THESE GLOBAL INTERESTS. ARMS RACE CONSTITUTES AN INTOLERABLE SITUATION FOR HER. IN PRESENT SITUATION SECURITY PACT WITH US IS NOT ENOUGH EVEN IF FAINT HOPES THAT US MAY SIGN SUCH PACT WITH ISRAEL ARE FULFILLED. IF SECURITY PACT IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY LARGE SUPPLIES OF ARMS SIMILAR TO THOSE GOING TO EGYPT AND IRAQ IT WILL MEAN THAT ISRAEL WILL SIT BACK AND WATCH HER ENEMIES ARMING THEMSELVES TO TEETH WITH ONE AND ONLY PURPOSE OF ANNIHILATING ISRAEL AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

"A SECURITY PACT OF THIS KIND UNACCOMPANIED BY ARMS SUPPLIES WILL ENABLE ARABS TO POSTPONE THEIR ATTACK UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEY ARE STRONG ENOUGH TO OVERCOME ISRAEL IN SUCH SHORT PERIOD OF TIME THAT US WILL NOT EVEN MANAGE TO INTERVENE BEFORE WHOLE COUNTRY IS CONQUERED".

SEVERAL OTHER PAPERS CARRIED COMPARABLE COMMENT AND INCIDENT WAS GENERALLY SPOTLIGHTED IN COVERAGE AND EDITORIAL COMMENT.

LAWSON

BD/MEM

DEC 7 - 1956

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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26
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Control: 15403
Rec'd: October 29, 1955
10:52 a.m.

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FROM: Tel Av

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 432, October 19, 3 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 432 REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 101, GENEVA 15, LONDON 135, AMMAN 61, BEIRUT 123, CAIRO 171, DAMASCUS 88.

PARIS FOR LAWSON

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL

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IDF Foreign Liaison Office has informed USARMA that at 1800 hours 28th and 0130 hours 29th Egyptian force attacked in attempt to take village of Nirim near Gaza Strip border. Egyptian force supported by mortar and machinegun fire. Both attacks were repelled. Egyptian casualties unknown. No (repeat no) Israeli casualties.

There were no (repeat no) reports of an Israel action last night against Egyptian position D/Z near Nitzana subject Jerusalem's 1332 to Department. Israel does not (repeat not) customarily initiate actions on Shabbath. However it would be uncharacteristic Israelis to permit Egypt to occupy any of their territory for an extended period. In view of fact substantial Egyptian forces are known to be proximity Nitzana area, it is believed Israelis will approach this problem with full recognition that units designated to expel Egyptians may require prompt reinforcement from main body IDF forces in the south.

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TT:GWL/6

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NAVY

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 118, October 19, 3 p.m.

Control: 9916

Rec'd: October 20, 1955
3:27 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 118, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 47, BEIRUT 27,
CAIRO 79, DAMASCUS 32, TEL AVIV 98

Burns reported to SYG on October 17 incident described MYTEL 114 requesting strong protest be made Egyptian UN delegate. No (repeat no) reply yet received by E-I MAC chairman to his letter of protest to Egyptian MAC delegate but UNTSO interrogation Egyptian officer command position has produced explanation given in first paragraph Cairo's 756 to Department. Officer also claimed that UN jeeps were mistaken for white Israeli ambulances which had previously been used in DZ for purposes other than evacuation wounded. UNTSO source states no (repeat no) foundation Egyptian charges except that Israelis had used white ambulances in DZ but their use this area has been stopped two weeks ago.

UNTSO source also states belief Egyptians have approximately 30 men in each of check post positions opposite El Auja DZ but no (repeat no) inspection has been permitted by Egyptians.

Re MYTEL 102, Israelis reportedly removed October 18 all mines around Kibbutz ziot in DZ. UNTSO has no (repeat no) information as to whether barbed wire has also been removed.

COLE

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1955 OCT 20 PM 221

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26
ActionControl: 10133
Rec'd: October 20, 1955
10:01 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Jerusalem

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 119, October 20, 11 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 119, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 48, CAIRO 80,
LONDON 54, PARIS 53, TEL AVIV 99.

British Consul General, Wikeley, is reporting comments made to him by General Burns October 18 with reference remarks recently attributed to Gohar along lines Cairo's telegram 756 to Department. Gist Burns comments follows.

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The Egyptians provoked Israeli military influx into D/Z by establishing Check posts on frontier. The question of the establishment of the Kibbutz in the D/Z is an old one, referred at instance of Egypt to the Security Council in October 1953, where it is still pending. It pertains to the legality of establishing an Israeli civil population in the zone. Until the SC makes a ruling there is no (repeat no) reason why Israel should withdraw the Kibbutz personnel. Meanwhile, the need for police protection and maintenance of law and order would justify the presence in the zone of Israeli police.

Egyptian check posts are still partly on the wrong side of the frontier according to verification made by UNTSO surveyors. Gohar did not (repeat not) (as he has evidently alleged) tell Burns that anyone approaching frontier would be shot. It is not (repeat not) true that Israeli personnel accompanied UNTSO observer and radio operator when fired upon by Egyptian post, and there were no (repeat no) Israelis in the vicinity. Similarly, it is not (repeat not) true that observer was warned by Egyptian officer or that he and radio man crossed border. In fact they remained 100 yards east of border. Such allegations evidently able fabrication made up by Egyptian officer responsible for shooting.

COLE

BSP:WJB/JK

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OCT 21 AM 9 43

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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 121, October 21, 5 p.m.

Control: 11386

Rec'd: October 22, 1955
6:48 a.m.SENT DEPARTMENT 121 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 81, LONDON 55,
PARIS 54, TEL AVIV 101, AMMAN UNNUMBERED.

General Burns told me at social gathering yesterday that he intends proceed Cairo during the coming week. He hopes see American and British Ambassadors, as well as Egyptian Chief of Staff. Purpose is to work out some new approach to Egyptians with view furthering UN objectives in area. Burns said that such a trip was futile in his estimation prior Gohar's departure. He hopes with latter out of the way it may be possible make a fresh start.

Burns added that he had made visit Gaza day before, primarily see chairman EIMAC. While there Egyptian officer sent message that UN observers should retire from area where they about launch attack on Israeli unit which had crossed D/L. Chairman insisted observers investigate this allegation. "Israeli unit" turned out to be Bedouin woman and child, who were in any case on Israeli side of border. Burns said Egyptians giving out such wild misinformation, apparently with no (repeat no) attempt ascertain facts.

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1955 OCT 24 AM 7 44

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : U. S. Mission to the UN

330

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

October 21, 1955


REF :

35 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION IO-4	DEPT. IN OF OTHER
	REC'D 10-24-55	REMARKS, NEA-4

SUBJECT: Palestine: Communication From the Secretary-General to the Permanent Representative of Egypt

There is attached, for the information of the Department, a copy of a communication from the Secretary-General to the Permanent Representative of Egypt, concerning the incident on October 16, 1955 at El Auja, which was provided to the U.S. Mission by the Secretary-General.

John M. McSweeney
John M. McSweeney
Senior Adviser



674.84A/10-2155

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1955 OCT 24 AM 9 11

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John M. McSweeney
REPORTER

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BUREAU OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS

OCT 27 1955

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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NOV 18 1955

MC

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The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the following incident about which the Secretary-General has been informed by General E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine.

General Burns reported that on 16 October an oral complaint was lodged by the Egyptian Delegation to the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission with the Chairman of the Commission, alleging that four Israeli trucks loaded with twenty soldiers armed with heavy weapons were in the Demilitarized Zone at Map Reference 0964-0225. The Egyptian Delegation pressed several times for immediate action to be taken.

As soon as radio contact could be established with Captain de Ghellinck (Belgium), the observer on duty in El Auja, he was instructed at 1350 hours GMT to proceed with the investigation of the Egyptian complaint. This United Nations military observer and Radio Officer Malmo, a member of the Secretariat of Swedish nationality, patrolled the area in question in separate white jeeps, both flying white flags. General Burns states that they saw no Israeli soldiers. When within the Demilitarized Zone, one hundred metres from the international frontier, they were fired at in broad daylight at 1440 hours GMT with automatic weapons and rifles by the Egyptian checkpoint at Map Reference 0966-0216. The United Nations observer and the radio officer took cover outside their cars and fortunately escaped injury. Both vehicles were hit and immobilized by heavy fire which continued for twenty-five minutes. After dark the military observer and the radio officer escaped and returned

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on foot to El Auja camp, a distance of approximately nine kilometres.

General Burns reports that following a strong protest by the Chairman of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission against this attack on unarmed United Nations personnel responding to an urgent Egyptian request for an investigation, the Senior Egyptian Delegate replied alleging that an Israeli truck full of soldiers had been with the military observers, that the military observers had crossed the international frontier, and that they had been warned to stop by the Egyptian officer in the position. General Burns has denied these allegations.

There is no need to stress how seriously the United Nations must consider an incident of this kind. United Nations military observers and personnel are entitled at all time to the protection of all authorities in carrying out their functions.

The Secretary-General would be grateful to receive the explanation and comments of the Egyptian Government on this incident and must ask for such disciplinary action against the Egyptian military personnel responsible as an investigation of the incident may warrant.

18 October 1955

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

21 October 1955

Dear Sir:

Enclosed herewith, as a matter which can be more appropriately handled by your office, is a letter from Mr. Charles E. Kessler, 15070 Schafer Highway, Detroit 27, Michigan, concerning his plan or solution to the Egypt-Israel situation.

We have informed Mr. Kessler of this referral.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas M. Davis

Thomas M. Davis
Public Inquiries Section

Enclosure

Public Services Division
Department of State
21st Street & Virginia Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

674.84A/10-2155

CS/E

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JAN 25 1956

674.84A/10-2155

EO/R

101

Rev

CHARLES BERNARD KESSLER
INDUSTRIAL MERGERS NEGOTIATOR
15070 SCHAEFER HWY.
DETROIT 27, MICH.

10/11/55

Hon. Sec. of Defense
Dear Mr. Wilson

If a man can come up with
a plan - solution - once and for all United
Egypt - Israel - and all concerning have
troubled, that part of the world for "Peace"
absolute guaranteed - formula.

I sure would like to lay the
plan before your Committee - brief
after complete explanation I would
like ten days to be the good will re
presentations - You'll grant me that -
sometimes a layman, idea
present the sure solution - no more guns,
but unity for all civilization =

Am. so sure I can do it - I'd wager
my life against a cup of coffee with you.

Please - I want no publicity ever
if it works - or ever any glory.

- Thank You -

Most Sincerely Yours

Charles B. Kessler

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 25 AM 11:53
PUBLIC SERVICES DIV
Draft
File
11/30

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

27

Public Services Division
Department of State
21st Street & Virginia Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

January 13 1956

Dear Mr. Kessler:

The Department of Defense has forwarded to us for reply your letter of October 11 to Secretary of Defense Wilson concerning your plan for a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. I am sorry for the inadvertent delay in sending you this acknowledgment.

We are always glad to receive the carefully thought out views of Americans concerning the problems which confront us in carrying out our foreign policy. I am sorry that it is not possible at the present time to arrange an interview for you with an official of the Department. Should you care to submit your views and suggestions to me in writing, however, I shall be glad to see that they are brought to the attention of appropriate officers of the Department.

Perhaps you will be interested in the enclosed statements concerning United States policy in the Middle East.

Sincerely yours,

John P. Neagher
Chief
Public Services Division

Enclosures:

✓ Selected material.

DE/R

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Rev _____

Cat _____

Mr. Charles B. Kessler,
15070 Schaefer Highway,
Detroit 27, Michigan.

P:SEV:L:Campbell:NRW:dlo

1/10/56

S/S-CR
JAN 12 1956 P.M.

See 674.842/10-2155

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Department of State

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28
Action
NEAControl: 11657
Rec'd: October 22, 1955
8:42 a.m.Info
RMR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

SS
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NO: 124, October 22, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 124, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 74, LONDON 56, PARIS 55, AMMAN, TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED.

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Burns telegraphed on October 20 report along following lines to UNSYG with regard survey frontier El Auja area.

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Marking of boundary was resumed by UNTSO survey team on October 11, but shortly thereafter Egyptians prevented continuance this work. Despite Burns protest Egyptians refused permit work to be resumed. Chairman EIMAC postponed further UNTSO efforts until solution difficulties with Egyptians. In a letter of October 15 Gohar indicated that Egypt would not cooperate in marking boundary until GAA obligations of Israel fulfilled. Burns assumes Gohar referring presence Israeli police in DZ.

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Israeli survey party, without UNTSO observers, continued survey on October 13. Burns stated that Israelis would be responsible for any incidents arising this activity, against which he protested as being contrary to the arrangements earlier agreed upon, as well as being a provocative act. In ensuing correspondence with Israelis Burns maintained the MAC chairman's right to control surveying along international frontier constituting boundary of D/Z. Although anxious continue, Israelis have agree to defer such work until October 24.

Egyptians are taking upon themselves right to fire at anybody in vicinity of international frontier, including UN observers. They thus prevent marking of western boundary of D/Z, contrary to the decisions arrived at by Burns and chairman in the light of their responsibilities regarding the zone. Burns wrote to Gohar on October 19 recalling written statement of May 28 from Egyptian MAC delegate to effect that Israelis may mark the Egyptian-Palestine frontier. Burns said that if Egyptians unwilling acced proposed arrangements regarding UN survey before evacuation Israeli police they should give assurances that they will not interfere with placing of markers by Israelis on own side of frontier. He pointed out that observers would be on hand to ensure that Israelis would not cross border and to be available should incidents occur.

According

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-2- 124, October 22, 1 p.m., from Jerusalem, CN 11657

According Burns estimate, Israel may at the least again send military force to occupy D/Z should Egyptians fire on Israel surveying party.

COLE

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Action
NEA

Control: 12802

Rec'd: October 25, 1955
12:05 p.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS
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NO: 125, October 25, 11 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 125 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 85 DAMASCUS 36
LONDON 57 PARIS 56 AMMAN BEIRUT TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED

Hommel gave me following details October 24 regarding UNTSO matters:

Burns now en route New York at request UNSYG, who wishes discuss primarily Egypt-Israeli problems--especially situations with respect Gaza and El Auja. Understand UNSYG will include Fawsi, Egyptian Foreign Minister now at UNHQ, and presumably Israeli officials in certain these discussions.

Israeli MAC delegate has given UNTSO names of Syrian officer, sergeant, and 4 enlisted men captured in Syria October 22. (Damascus telegram 399 to Department). Eytan addressed letter to Vigier October 22 containing assurance that Israel does not (repeat not) now "desire to take any further action" -- presumably against Syria. Letter states Israel will cooperate with MAC but points out that the best means of clearing up the existing situation would be for Syrians to release the "5 Israelis they hold illegally in prison, 4 of them for close on a year in defiance of the MAC." Letter concludes with statement to effect that if Syrians do not (repeat not) release these men they will continue to bear "entire responsibility for situation along their frontier with Israel."

Above reference to fifth Israeli soldier doubtless means the soldier allegedly kidnapped by Syrians October 18. According Hommel observers have developed very little evidence bearing on this matter, while Syrians state they know nothing whatsoever about it.

With reference CONTEL 124 regarding situation El Auja (or Nitzana) D/Z Eytan has addressed a letter to General Burns dated October 23 in which he "confirm" that Israelis will postpone marking frontier for a week to ten days, provided Egyptians refrain from any action in the area. Letter continues by stating that after above delay Israelis will resume marking either with Egyptian participation or by Israel alone.

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-2- 12, October 2, 11 a.m. from Jerusalem

In the presence of UN observers "as confirmed in your (Burns) letter of October 19." Letter concludes with assertion that in latter case resumption surveying would (repeat not) require consent of Egyptian Government which would be superfluous with respect to activities carried out on Israel side of frontier.

However said so far as he aware Burns had not (repeat not) urged upon Israelis to cease building or to remove dam below Lake Hula, although dam could possibly constitute "military advantage" under Article 11 GAA, nor (repeat not) had Israelis approached UNESO on subject before commencing build dam (Damascus telegram 383).

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Department of State

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 412, October 26, noon

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 412, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS 87,
CAIRO 161, LONDON 125, AMMAN 53, DAMASCUS 79, JERUSALEM 43.

PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR.

PARIS FOR RUSSELL.

FLO informed USARMA that at 6:30 a.m. today Egyptian force
attacked and captured Israeli police control post in El Auja
area D/Z (M.R. 986/199). FLO reports that one hour later
Egyptians withdrew and post was reoccupied by Israeli police
reinforcements. Israeli casualties four wounded, one seriously,
and two captured--accounted for post's entire complement.
Egyptian casualties unknown.

Comment: This is type incident likely to provoke prompt
retaliation on similar or much heavier scale. Both IDF and
Foreign Ministry see action as possible implementation new
Egyptian-Syrian pact, with Egyptian raid being counter-retali-
ation for Israeli reprisal in Syria October 22 (EMBTel 403).

WHITE

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Note: Passed Army, Navy, Air 10-26-55, 10:25 a.m. HJP

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Control: 13384

Rec'd: October 26, 1955
10:15 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RNR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 414, October 26, 2 p.m.

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PASS ARMY NAVY AIR

PARIS FOR RUSSELL

OCB

USIA

Re EMBTEL 412.

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

Foreign Minister reports that Egyptians made second assault with heavy machine gun fire on same Israeli police post at 10:15 a.m. today but failed to retake it. FLO confirmed incident but was unable supply further details immediately.

Casualties first incident this morning now (repeat now) reported as one dead of wounds, one seriously injured, two slightly injured, two captured.

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SW:LNC/1

Note: Passed Army, Navy, Air 10-26-55, Noon HJP

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Control: 13209

Rec'd: OCTOBER 26 1955
6:56 AM

NEA
Info

FROM: JERUSALEM

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 126, OCTOBER 26, 10 AM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 126, REPEATED INFO PRIORITY CAIRO 86,
TEL AVIV 104, AMMAN 51, BEIRUT 31, DAMASCUS 37.

UNTSO OPERATIONS OFFICER HAS JUST TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT
ACCORDING PRELIMINARY REPORTS FROM EL AUJA, EGYPTIAN FORCE
ATTACKED AND OCCUPIED ISRAELI CHECKPOST IN D/Z NEAR BEIR
EIN EARLY TUESDAY MORNING. NUMBER CASUALTIES UNCLEAR
BUT OBSERVER COUNTED 4 ISRAELIS WOUNDED AT TIME OF REPORT.
FIGHTING POSSIBLY STILL IN PROGRESS. UNTSO NOT SURE
WHETHER ISRAELIS IN QUESTION ARE IN FACT SOLDIERS OR
"POLICE", SINCE SOME ISRAELI MILITARY PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN
SEEN IN D/Z RECENTLY.

UNTSO SOURCE ALSO REPORTS ISRAEL ARMORED CAR ENTERED CENTRAL
D/Z OCTOBER 25 AND FIRED INTO SYRIAN TERRITORY KILLING
1 WOMAN AND 2 HEAD CATTLE.

COLE

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Control: 13247
Rec'd: October 26, 1955
7:02 a.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 127, October 26, 11 a.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 127, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 87,
PRIORITY TEL AVIV 105, AMMAN 52, BEIRUT 32, DAMASCUS 38.

UNTSO has now received Israeli complaint that four police
wounded and two captured in fighting reported CONTEL 126.
Egyptians have filed complaint with MAC to effect that their
checkpost was attacked by Israelis. It is not clear who
started fighting, which according reports has now stopped.

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Department of State

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18

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Action
NEA

Control: 13421
Rec'd: October 26, 1955
10:44 a.m.

Info
RMR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 129, October 26, 4 p.m.

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PRIORITY

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OLI

SENT DEPARTMENT 129, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 88,
PRIORITY TEL AVIV 106, AMMAN 53, BEIRUT 33, DAMASCUS 39

Reference MYTEL 127.

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

Israel radio announced at 1:45 today Israel casualties in incident El Auja DZ are one policeman killed, three wounded, two captured. According to Hommel, Egyptians had evacuated Israel check post in DZ when observer first arrived on scene. They have since reoccupied it and are presently (3:45 p.m.) engaged in a fire fight with Kibbutzniks from Ziot settlement. Hommel has addressed appeal to Egyptian and Israel authorities for cease fire.

COLE

SW:LMC/1

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1955 OCT 26 PM 2 24

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Action
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Control: 13601

Rec'd: October 26, 1955
3:24 p.m.Info
RMP

FROM: USARMA Israel

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: MAI 828, October 26 (Army Message)

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SENT NIACT DEPTAR G-2 REPEATED INFORMATION USARMAS AMMAN
BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS USNMR PARIS USCINCEUR,
USDOCOLAND AND USDOCOSOUTH, STATE DEPARTMENT.

Two separate Egyptian attacks on Israeli police check post
El Auja area today, resulting loss of life one Israeli,
wounding three others and capture two policemen will almost
certainly lead to substantial IDF retaliatory action soonest.
Only question my mind is scale of such attack and possible
results if Egypt offers strong resistance. As always, any
IDF retaliatory action will be backed by forces sufficient
for any eventuality. Estimate IDF strength immediately avail-
able as one armored infantry division and over one infantry
division - probably two. Two or three paratroop battalions
also in Ekron (Aqir) area with substantial lift capacity for
personnel and materiel. Separate Embassy telegrams this
subject following to State and Defense.

AB:AAL/14

11
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File Designation

674-84A/10-2755
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Date

27 Oct 55

From

Cairo

To

Sec State

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☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

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Authority

12/30/82
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(41)

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CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 14694

Rec'd: October 28, 1955
10:23 a.m.

1955 OCT 29 AM 7 29

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674.34A/10-2755

DEC 12 1955

FILED

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 418, October 27, 6 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 418, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 90, CAIRO 163,
LONDON 127, AMMAN 55, DAMASCUS 81, JERUSALEM 45

PARIS FOR RUSSELL

Reference EMBTEL 412.

IDF spokesman announced that Egyptian Force which occupied check
post later evacuated it but is believed still to be in Israel
territory nearby El Sabbha check port.

Foreign Minister spokesman announcement October 26 denounced
latest Egyptian attack and characterized it calculated violation
GAA. Spokesman recalled that Burns on eve his departure for
New York, called upon Israel and Egypt to avoid any act that
might disturb peace of D/Z. "Both sides responded to Burn's
appeal, but within 48 hours Egyptian Army positions had opened
fire on Israel police patrol, and October 26 launched unprovoked
attacks with deliberate attempt maintain and aggravate
inflammatory situation." Spokesman concluded that Israel
views with utmost gravity this renewed attack which has assumed
character of fullscale military operation. GOI has requested
UNTSC to make "immediate and urgent on the spot investigation".

Editorially, Israel press attacked UN communique of October 26.
HAARETZ reported that Foreign Minister spokesman complained
UN communique did not (repeat not) sufficiently underline
unprovoked aggression and obscured Egyptian guilt by endeavoring
make both sides culpable.

JERUSALEM POST editorial, believed government inspired, declared
it is perhaps too early to say with any degree of certainty
whether Egyptian attacks are undertaken in support recent series
of Syrian provocations, and whether these are first fruits of
Egyptian-Syrian military alliance. Little doubt however that
both Egypt and Syria determined to stretch border tension to
as near breaking point as possible. They have been encouraged

by persistent

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-2- 418, October 27, 6 p.m. from Tel Aviv

by persistent Foreign press reports which speculated Israel might undertake preventive war. This speculation spiked emphatically by Sharett in Knesset, in Paris October 25.

Editorial continued: No (repeat no) shadow of doubt as to who started shooting October 26, nor as to who invaded whose territory. Nevertheless, UN report appears to have been worded to read like tortured attempt avoid placing blame squarely on aggressors; such reports do not (repeat not) promote confidence in UN observers. Editorial concluded with allegation that UNTSO observers reports have recently been generous to a fault in tendency overlook Egyptian and Syrian breaches of armistice. No complaints was made to Syria by UN, when observer, trying to trace path taken by kidnappers of Israel soldier near Gonen last week, were fired at and prevented from crossing into Syrian territory to continue their investigation. Nor was anything further published by UN when, two days later, tracks were followed across border as far as Syrian position. Similarly, no (repeat no) protest was made to Egypt when observers, working together with Israel representatives, were fired at in the Nitzana frontier area, and the protest only came belatedly when two observers traveling in jeep, and not (repeat not) accompanied by Israelis, were again attacked.

WHITE

SW:DT

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DEC 7 - 1956

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2 *from* Department of State *Sub 1015*

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12-D

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Action
NEA

Control: 14043
Rec'd: October 27, 1955
11:43 a.m.

Info

RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 421, October 27, 4 p.m.

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PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR.

PARIS FOR RUSSELL

Re EMBTELS 412 and 414

OCB

USIA

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OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

Israel defense force Foreign Liaison Office has informed Embassy that this morning Egyptian force penetrated one kilometer into the D/Z vicinity of Nitzana and entrenched themselves where they remain as of present time.

Comment: In previous cases where FLO showed similar zeal keeping Embassy informed border developments, these reports have been followed by Israel defense force military action.

WHITE

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CIA

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ARMY

AIR

NAVY

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 14602

Rec'd: October 28, 1955

7:30 a.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 130, October 27, 4 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 130 REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 54, CAIRO 89, LONDON 58, PARIS 57, TEL AVIV 107, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS UNNUMBERED.

Re CONTEL 129

UNTSO reports Egyptians still in position some 200 meters inside El Auja D/Z. Israeli personnel (either kibbutz members or police) still manning post established nearby, but situation has evidently remained quiet today.

Officer in charge Egyptian position told UN observer that he will not withdraw from D/Z as long as Israeli forces are located there.

Hommel addressed letter to Gohar October 26 appealing Egyptians withdraw their troops from D/Z, and referring assurance given Burns by Fawsi to effect that should Burns proceed New York GOE would commit itself to period of quiet during his absence. Hommel also sent letter to Eytan alluding similar commitment on part Israelis and appealing withdrawal kibbutz personnel from Bir Ein area, "which is far from their kibbutz." In addition, letter asks that Israeli police in D/Z remain at least 500 meters from international frontier.

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2003, October 27, 2 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2003, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY TEL AVIV 30, LONDON 342.

Reference: Tel Aviv's 415 and 419 to Department.

Deridan informed us this morning Quail D'Orsay has as yet had no information re call up of reservists in Israel. It has, moreover, had no indication that Israel is contemplating any military action at this time.

DILLON

LMS:JS/1

Control: 16431

Rec'd: October 27, 1956
1:21 p.m.

674.84A/10-2756

HBS

1956 OCT 29 AM 6 42

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 827, OCTOBER 28, 6 PM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 827 REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA PRIORITY 7,
TEL AVIV PRIORITY 113, JERUSALEM PRIORITY 47, LONDON 149,
PARIS 77, USUM 32

GENEVA FOR BYROAD.

EMBASSY PRESENTLY UNABLE OBTAIN DEFINITE INFORMATION RE-
GARDING ISRAELI ATTACK AT EL KUNTILLA NIGHT OCTOBER 27
TEL AVIV 423, OCTOBER 27). PALESTINE AFFAIRS SECTION WAR
DEPARTMENT TRYING GET INFORMATION BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS SO
FAR. WE UNDERSTAND EL KUNTILLA IS IMPORTANT CENTER OF ANTI-
SMUGGLING CONTROL IN SOUTHERN SINAI ON TRADITIONAL HASHISH
ROUTE. ATTACK MAY THEREFORE HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST
FRONTIER FORCE POST. HOWEVER WE HAVE ALSO HEARD THAT
EGYPTIAN ARMY MIGHT HAVE TROOPS (PERHAPS AS MUCH AS BATTALION
IN SOUTHERN SINAI AND SOME OF THESE MAY HAVE BEEN STATIONED
AT EL KUNTILLA.

HART

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1955 OCT 29 AM 7 32

Control: 14906

Rec'd: OCTOBER 28, 1955

3:33 PM

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Control: 14539

NEA

Rec'd: October 28, 1955
6:38 a.m.

Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 423, October 28

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PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR.

L

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SENT DEPARTMENT 423, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA PRIORITY 7,
PARIS 93, LONDON 229, CAIRO 166, AMMAN 57, DAMASCUS 84,
JERUSALEM 49, BEIRUT 119.

USUN

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OLI

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL AND LAWSON.

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

IDF informed USARMA that late last night an Israeli force of
unstated penetrated into Egypt attacking Cuntiles Army Post
(MR/119/935) killing 5 Egyptians taking 23 prisoners. Israeli
casualties were 4 wounded, 2 of them seriously. Israeli forces
withdrew with prisoners.

WHITE

BD

Note: Passed Army, Navy, Air 10/28/55, 5 a.m. SA

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16
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Control: 14608
Rec'd: October 28, 1955
8:35 a.m.NEA
Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 424, October 28, 11 a.m.

G

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PRIORITY

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SENT DEPARTMENT 424; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY GENEVA 9,
PARIS 94, LONDON 139, CAIRO 167, AMMAN 58, DAMASCUS 85,
JERUSALEM 50, BEIRUT 120

L

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USUN

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GENEVA FOR RUSSELL AND LAWSON

UOP

PASS ARMY-NAVY-AIR

ND

OLI

It is clear incident reported EMBTEL 423 is retaliation for
Egyptian attack Israel police control post October 26 which in
turn was interpreted here as retaliation for Israel reprisal
in Syria October 22 (EMBTEL 412).

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

Source close to Cabinet informed me last night one reason
Sharon acquiesced in IDF demands for action in Syria (EMBTEL
403) was Prime Minister knew in his absence Paris and Geneva
Acting Prime Minister Eshkol would have authorized same kind
reprisal but in much larger scale. Magnitude last night's
operation in Egypt lends credence to report.

WHITE

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Action
NEA

Control: 15291
Rec'd: October 29, 1955
7:19 a.m.

Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 429, October 28, 4 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 429 REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 12, PARIS 97, LONDON 132, CAIRO 168, AMMAN 59, DAMASCUS 86, JERUSALEM 51 BEIRUT 121.

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL AND LAWSON

Re EMBTEL 423,

In briefing given this afternoon to Army Attaches, IDF gave following modifications statistics Israel attack Kuntileh Army post.

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

1. "More than 10 Egyptians killed".

2. "More than 23 Egyptian prisoners captured, 7 of whom are wounded".

3. Of 4 Israelis wounded, 2 have since died.

WHITE

BB:LMC/1

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DEC 12 1955

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Action
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Control: 15311

Rec'd: October 29, 1955
7:52 a.m.

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Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 430, October 28, 8 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 430 REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 13, CAIRO 169,
PARIS 98, LONDON 133, JIDDA 7.

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL

PARIS FOR LAWSON

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

DCL

Embassy has been informed by Prime Minister's office that GOI had just learned of notice issued October 10 by Egyptian Government and posted airport Djibouti that any plane flying through central zone above Strait of Tiran would be shot down without warning. MAPAI inner group yesterday considered this problem relative El Al regular weekly flight to South Africa which follows course from Israel above Gulf of Aqaba and Red Sea to Djibouti. Group decided, pending consideration by full Cabinet, to cancel today's flight. In view lack permission Israel commercial plans to overfly any Arab state, El Al to maintain South African service is faced alternative ignoring Egyptian warning or changing to circuitous and uneconomic route via Rome.

Comment: Although GOI has not yet made foregoing public this information when released will further stimulate political debate re Gulf of Aqaba blockade issue.

WHITE

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26

Action
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Control: 14730
Rec'd: October 28, 1955
11:33 a.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 132, October 28, 2 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 132 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 92, LONDON 59,
AMMAN 56, PARIS 58, TEL AVIV 109, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS UNNUMBEREDHommel has reported along following lines to General Burns at
New York regarding situation El Auja (CONTEL 130).

Every effort being made determine who fired first connection
incident October 26. Kibbutz personnel reportedly withdrawn
area near frontier and replaced by police. Regarding Hommel's
appeal to Egyptians withdraw their men from D/Z Egyptian MAC
delegate has replied to effect that he is ready comply when
Israelis completely withdraw their forces from D/Z. Delegate
says incident was "provocative act by Israelis against Egyptian
checkpoint situated in Egyptian territory, resulting in injury
Egyptian soldier and requiring local commander take action
"secure his forces." Communication ends with statement to
effect that "we are still sticking to pledge given by Fawsi
to UNSYG." Evidently reference is to commitment given Burns
to maintain quiet period during his absence from area. UNTSO
has reports that artillery seen outside D/Z on Beersheba Road

Hommel told me today that Israelis have reinforced their
positions in D/Z. Observers have seen personnel apparently in
military uniforms but wearing police hats. Egyptians still
in position in D/Z but situation reportedly quiet this morn-
ing. MAC chairman has reported that Egyptians have not as yet
allowed observers investigate allegations preceding paragraph
or interrogate two Israeli policemen said to be held by them.

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BB:WBB/6

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1955 OCT 30 PM 1 51

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ARMY

AIR

NAVY

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 131, October 28, noon

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 131, REPEATED INFORMATION, PRIORITY AMMAN 55,
PRIORITY CAIRO 91, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 108

UNTSO has just informed me that senior Egyptian MAC delegate
has reported IDF attack on Kuntella some 8 kilometers inside
Egyptian territory and about 55 kilometers northwest of Aqaba.
UNTSO has no details as yet owing absence communications that
area. However, Israeli official sources understood releasing
communique on subject.

SW/5

Control: 14569
Rec'd: October 28, 1955
7:26 a.m.

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NAVY

AIR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 133, October 28, 11 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 133; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY AMMAN 57,
PRIORITY BEIRUT 35, PRIORITY CAIRO 93, PRIORITY DAMASCUS 40,
PRIORITY LONDON 60, PRIORITY PARIS 59, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 110

Acting UNTSO Chief, Colonel Hommel, has this afternoon received letter from Eytan drawing his "urgent attention to continued presence Egyptian troops in Subha area of Nitzana (El Auja) demilitarized zone". Letter states that "within the past three days Egyptians have occupied considerable territory and are now entrenching themselves along a line nearly two kilometers long". Letter stressed "gravity of situation" caused by occupation Israel territory and asks that UNSYG be informed situation D/Z.

Facts available UNTSO and reported UNHQ today are to effect that total Egyptians in Israel territory in D/Z constitute some 12 men who form a part of position which extends some 200 meters across frontier. Balance of position and of its personnel totaling 40 in all remains on Egyptian side of border. UNTSO also reporting that Israelis now have some 150 troops in their three forward positions wearing khaki battle dress and police hats. One Israeli position of 40 men is located on border and extends about 10 meters into Egyptian territory. Israelis fortifying their positions and patrolling actively. Observers have noted some tank activity near Beersheba and on roads to south.

UNTSO considers allegation Eytan's letter grossly exaggerated and designed as propaganda justify further Israeli attack which may well be scheduled for tonight. UNTSO reaches this conclusion especially because attacks on Khan Yunis August 31 and in Syria October 22 were both immediately preceded by receipt similar type communications.

COLE

AB:JJ

Note: Mr. Bergus (NEA) notified 10/28/ 7:25 p.m. JAW

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Control: 15017

Rec'd: October 28 1955
6:38 p.m.

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Department of State

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OSD

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 386, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM

PRIORITY

FOR ACTING SECRETARY FROM LODGE

RE PALESTINE

I IMMEDIATELY RAISED THE QUESTIONS IN YOURTEL 291 WITH HAMMARSKJOLD, TELLING HIM OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER PROVIDING MORE PERSONNEL AND GENERAL ATTITUDE OF HELPFULNESS AND HE THANKED ME VERY MUCH.

LODGE

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Action

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Control: 15127
Rec'd: OCTOBER 28, 1955
9:01 PM

NEA
Info
RMR

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 388, OCTOBER 28, 7 PM

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RE PALESTINE (DEPTEL 278, OCTOBER 22)

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CIA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

MISSION WITHHELD ACTION SUGGESTED REFTEL IN HOPE THAT SITUATION MIGHT CHANGE AND PROVIDE APPROPRIATE OCCASION TO MAKE APPROACH TO EGYPTIAN DELEGATION. HOWEVER RECENT EVENTS MAKE IT SEEM MOST UNLIKELY AN OCCASION WILL ARISE IN NEAR FUTURE. WITH DEPARTMENT'S PERMISSION APPROACH WILL NOT BE MADE.

LODGE

AB

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Control: 14825

Rec'd: October 28, 1955
2:08 p.m.Info
RMR

FROM: USARMA Israel

TO: Secretary of State

IO

NO: MAI 837, October 28, (Army Message)

OLI

SENT DEPARTMENT ARMY FOR G-2,
REPEATED INFORMATION STATE, NAVY, AIR AND USARMAS AMMAN,
BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS

IDF FLO today announced reconstitution of southern command as result recent events. Northern, Central and Southern Commands contiguous with main political division Israel and each also headquarters one army corps. All appointment per R-723-55 suspended and officers revert to original position except Aluf Mishne Meir Amit (repeat Aluf Mishne Meir Amit) who becomes CO Southern Command.

Comment: Establishment Southern Command and restoration in original form two other commands also gives CO a higher degree autonomy, including right to order emergency BOB their commands. Designation each command as army corps tends confirm my contentions set forth in MAI 810. Peacetime rank of CO of commands is Aluf or Aluf Mishne.

2. FLO States no major change since 15 October in Egyptian Army dispositions as follows: One division including two squadrons Churchill tanks in Gaza area; one division El Auja area including armored elements; one division Alexandria-Cairo-Sudan areas. Egyptian Army elements remain dug in in DZ since yesterday.

3. Paragraph 1 less comment is unclassified.

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
Info:

FOR LODGE FROM ACTING SECRETARY

Re: Palestine

Secretary has cabled me inquiring if thought being ~~xx~~ given QUOTE to strongly reinforcing UN border guard under General Burns in view increased likelihood of border incidents. UNQUOTE. While we still thinking of possible ways of strengthening TSO, I suggest you raise matter increasing TSO personnel now with Hammaraskjold and Burns, taking ^{latter's} advantage/~~his~~ presence in New York. Discussions might then ensue with these two plus UK and French delegations/^{on matter} this/~~proposal~~ and problems already confronting TSO, namely best means insuring greater freedom of movement for observers, greater cooperation with TSO particularly from Israel, better administrative support, and more adequate living allowances to permit some of observers to live in Israel. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ US will be consider providing prepared/~~provide~~ more personnel, ~~if required~~.

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Heeshaipd
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11-2-55

Hooves

Acting

HOOVER

CS/M

Drafted by:

10-27-55
Oct. 27, 1955

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

UMP - Mr. Stein

Clearances:

Defense - Col. Abbett (in substance)

NE

PN

S/S

den

IO (in substance)

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11:49 a.m.

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Info
RMR

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 834, October 29, 2 p.m.

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 834, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT TEL AVIV 115,
PRIORITY JERUSALEM 48, PRIORITY USUN 33, NIACT GENEVA 10,
LONDON 151, PARIS 79

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ARMY
NAVY
AIR

Press today front-paged GOE statement re Kuntilla incident, which charged 400 Israeli infantrymen with mortars and automatic weapons had attacked Camel Corps anti-smuggling post (staffed by 30 Sudanese) at 1:45 a.m. October 28 killing 4 and capturing 20. Egyptians claimed 4 Israelis killed in operation which was described as "dastardly" attack by Israeli forces who "feared battle with Egyptian Army units".

GOE official spokesman commented: "Israeli Command is playing with fire in these recurrent attacks on Egypt's borders. They must have lost their minds."

Press also published "confession" allegedly made by two Israelis captured in raid on "police post" in El Auja October 26 in which prisoners allegedly admitted they belonged to regular Israeli Army and had been ordered wear police uniforms while stationed in D/Z. Press further reported Israeli forces had reoccupied positions seized on September 21 from which they had withdrawn at Burns' request and had erected barbed wire defenses.

Comment: Publication of casualty lists in past has indicated possibility reprisal. This connection press has warned "Egyptian commandos still quite prepared give Israel same lesson today as they did yesterday".

HART

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AIR

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 431, OCTOBER 29, 2 PM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 431, PRIORITY PARIS 99, GENEVA 14, REPEATED
INFORMATION LONDON 134, CAIRO 170, BEIRUT 122, DAMASCUS 87,
AMMAN 60.

PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR

PARIS FOR LAWSON

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL

MOBILIZATION PROCESS INITIATED LAST EVENING IS IN ACTIVE
OPERATION THIS MORNING TEL AVIV AREA. AT THIS MOMENT IT
FOLLOWS CLOSELY IN APPEARANCE THE SELECTIVE, PARTIAL CALL-UP
WHICH IDF ADOPTED FOLLOWING KHAN YUNIS INCIDENT AS PRECAUTION
AGAINST POSSIBLE EGYPTIAN MILITARY RESPONSE THAT ACTION.

ALTHOUGH PRESENT MOBILIZATION MAY PROVE TO BE OF SAME LIMITED
CHARACTER, I WOULD NOT DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY SERIES REPRISALS
AND COUNTER REPRISALS PAST FORTNIGHT MAY LEAD WIDER HOSTILITIES.
FIRSTLY, IN LIGHT OF CAIRO'S 799 TO DEPARTMENT IT APPEARS
THAT EGYPTIAN FORCES MAY RESPOND WITH UNCUSTOMARY VIGOR TO
THE KUNTILLA OPERATION WHICH VIRTUALLY WIPE OUT AN EGYPTIAN
MOST APPROXIMATELY COMPANY STRENGTH.

SECONDLY, IT IS KNOWN THAT GOI NOW HAS IN ITS POSSESSION
SHARETT'S REPORT OF HIS PARIS TALKS WHICH MAY BE INTERPRETED
AS A FAILURE TO DEAL ADEQUATELY WITH ISRAEL'S SECURITY
PROBLEM. FINALLY, GOI DECISIONS ARE CURRENTLY BEING MADE,
SHARETT'S ABSENCE, BY A SMALL INNER GROUP, ESHKOL, MYERSON
AND ARRANE, AND TO EXTENT HEALTH PERMITS BY BEN GURION.
THIS GROUP

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Date: 12/9/67

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-2- 431 OCTOBER 29, 2 PM FROM TEL AVIV

THIS GROUP IS MORE RESPONSIVE TO IDF VIEWS AND LESS HESITANT THAN SHARETT TO AUTHORIZE VIGOROUS COUNTERACTION AGAINST ARABS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN ANY FAR-REACHING DECISION PREVENTIVE WAR WOULD BE TAKEN IN SHARETT'S ABSENCE OR BEFORE FORMATION NEW GOVERNMENT. IT DOES MEAN HOWEVER A WEAKENING OF THE FORCES OF RESTRAINT WHICH HAVE TENDED TO LIMIT THE NUMBER AND SCOPE OF ISRAEL MILITARY VENTURES IN SIMILAR SITUATIONS IN THE PAST.

WHITE

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DEC 7 - 1955

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Action
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Control: 15296

Rec'd: October 29, 1955
7:17 a.m.

Info
RMR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 134, October 29, 9 a.m.

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AIR

SENT DEPARTMENT 134 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 94, DAMASCUS 41, PARIS 60, TEL AVIV 111.

Re Tel Aviv's telegram 419 to Department.

Incident near Dan, UNTSO source says Israelis lodged complaint with MAC along lines mentioned but did not (repeat not) ask for investigation nor for emergency meeting. View those circumstances UNTSO does not (repeat not) take matter seriously and no (repeat no) investigation being made. UNTSO assumes Israelis registered complaint merely to increase total.

COLE

TT:GWL/6

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Action

IO

FROM: NEW YORK

Control: 15496

Rec'd: OCTOBER 29, 1955
5:12 PM

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 389, OCTOBER 29, 5 PM

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 389 REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 8

GENEVA FOR SECRETARY DULLES

VERBATIM TEXT

RE PALESTINE



1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER TO BE SENT TODAY BY GENERAL BURNS, TSO CHIEF OF STAFF, TO EGYPTIAN FONMIN FAWZI AND ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE KIDRON, AS DISCUSSED WITH MR. HOOVER, WHICH WILL BE RELEASED PUBLICLY BY SYG AT 6 PM TODAY:

"I HAVE THE HONOR TO DRAW TO YOUR ATTENTION THE VERY SERIOUS SITUATION PREVAILING IN THE EL AUJA DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND VICINITY.

IT APPEARS THAT BOTH PARTIES HAVE RECENTLY BEEN SENDING ADDITIONAL ARMED PERSONNEL INTO THE AREA AND OCCUPYING NEW DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.

THE GRAVE INCIDENT IN WHICH EGYPTIANS ATTACKED AN ISRAELI POLICE POST IN THE DZ, INFLECTING CASUALTIES AND TAKING PRISONERS, WAS FOLLOWED BY A VIOLENT ISRAELI RETALIATION AT KUNTILLA OF MORE SERIOUS EXTENT.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS REPEATEDLY CONDEMNED RETALIATIONS, WHICH CAN ONLY CAUSE THE SITUATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO DETERIORATE.

"IN VIEW

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-2- 389, OCTOBER 29, 5 PM, FROM NEW YORK

"IN VIEW OF MY RESPONSIBILITIES, I FORMALLY REQUEST BOTH PARTIES TO ISSUE ORDERS TO THEIR FORCES IN THE VICINITY OF THE EL AUJA DZ AND AT ALL OTHER POINTS WHERE THEY ARE CLOSE TOGETHER, TO CEASE ALL AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITIES AND RETALIATIONS, AND RESTRICT THEIR OPERATIONS TO DEFENSE, IN KEEPING WITH THE TERMS OF THE GAA.

I CALL TO THE ATTENTION OF BOTH PARTIES THE GRAVE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY THAT WILL BE BORNE BY THE PARTY WHICH TAKES OFFENSIVE ACTION OF ANY KIND WHICH, IN THIS SITUATION, MAY RESULT IN THE GRAVEST CONSEQUENCES.

I AM AUTHORIZED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO STATE THAT HE HAS SEEN THIS LETTER AND THAT THIS DEMARCHE IS MADE ALSO ON HIS BEHALF.

ACCEPT, SIR, ETC"

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF HAMMARSKJOLD'S SUGGESTED TRANSMITTAL NOTE FROM ME TO SECRETARY EXPRESSING HAMMARSKJOLD'S VIEWS:

"THE SYG HAS ASKED ME, ON TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE LETTER TO THE TWO PARTIES, TO INFORM YOU THAT GENERAL BURNS AND HE SHARE THE GRAVEST CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION AND FEAR THE PROSPECT OF PRECIPITATED ISRAELI ACTION ON A LARGE SCALE. IN THIS SITUATION HE FEELS THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FROM THE WESTERN POWERS MAY WISH TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF USING THE PRESENCE OF MR. SHARRETT IN GENEVA FOR DIRECT SUPPORT OF THEIR REQUEST TO THE TWO PARTIES. HE FEELS THAT SUCH FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF YOUR CONCERN MIGHT CONSIDERABLY REDUCE THE RISK OF AN IMMEDIATE FURTHER DETERIORATION. MR. MACMILLAN AND MR. PINAY ARE BEING INFORMED BY THE BRITISH AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS ABOUT SUGGESTION TO YOU."

BARCO

JJ

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6:56 PM

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 390, OCTOBER 29, 6 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 390 REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 9

GENEVA FOR SECRETARY

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AIR

RE PALESTINE

HAMMARSKJOLD ASKED DIXON (UK) AND US TO MEET WITH GENERAL BURNS
(CHIEF OF STAFF, UNTSO) THIS MORNING AT 10 AM TO DISCUSS
DETERIORATING SITUATION IN EL AUJA AREA.

BURNS REVIEWED LATEST REPORTS FROM AREA AND READ US VARIOUS
EXCHANGES BETWEEN COLONEL HOMMEL, ACTING COS OF TSO DURING
BURNS PRESENCE IN NY, AND EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES
IN PALESTINE. FROM SITUATION AS REPORTED, HAMMARSKJOLD AND
BURNS CONCLUDED THAT ISRAELIS MIGHT WELL, IN NEAR FUTURE,
UNDERTAKE LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ACTION TO EXPEL EGYPTIAN
CHECK-POSTS ESTABLISHED ON OLD INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER LINE AND
EXTENDING INTO ISRAELI HALF OF DZ, AND THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO WIDER
CONFLICT.

BURNS STRESSED THAT RECENT ISRAELI STATEMENTS TO HIM CONTAINED
IMPLICIT THREAT TO ATTACK EGYPTIANS TO EXPEL THEM FROM ISRAELI
SIDE OF DL.

DIXON FELT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF BURNS
PRESENCE IN NEW YORK TO MAKE DEMARCHE TO BOTH PARTIES ON
DETERIORATING SITUATION.

IN RESPONSE TO MY REQUEST TO GENERAL BURNS TO GIVE HIS ASSESSMENT
OF GENERAL SITUATION APART FROM EL AUJA PROBLEM, BURNS SAID THAT
ISRAEL'S

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-2- 390, OCTOBER 29, 6 PM, FROM NEW YORK

ISRAEL'S "ACTIVE DEFENSE POLICY SINCE LAST FEBRUARY" AT GAZA SHOWED A GROWING DEGREE OF AGGRESSIVENESS ON THEIR PART WHICH IN TURN PROVOKED OBDURACY IN EGYPTIANS. ISRAELIS THUS WERE LEADING THEMSELVES INTO AN ATTITUDE OF INCREASING SHORT-TEMPEREDNESS, AND HE WAS INCLINED TO FEAR THE WORST. AS FOR EL AUJA SITUATION, BEFORE HE CAME TO NEW YORK, HE FELT COMPLETELY FRUSTRATED BY ATTITUDES OF PARTIES.

I INDICATED THAT ONE POSSIBLE APPROACH TO PRESENT DIFFICULTIES WOULD BE DIRECT STRENGTHENING OF TSO ALONG LINES CONTAINED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE (DEPTEL 291, TEDUL 23). BURNS PROMPTLY REPLIED: "HOW MANY DIVISIONS?" HE WENT ON TO SAY ADDITIONAL MILITARY OBSERVERS WOULD NOT HELP MUCH IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS, INCLUDING WHETHER OR NOT TO UTILIZE SC, WERE DISCUSSED, I.E.:

1. WE COULD REFRAIN FROM TAKING ACTION BEYOND DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES TO TWO SIDES RUGING RESTRAINT.
2. WE COULD UNDERTAKE MAJOR EFFORT BOTH INSIDE UN AND OUTSIDE TO EXTRACT A PEACE SETTLEMENT.
3. WE COULD GO TO THE SC AGAIN ON THE PATTERN OF THE GAZA CASE, HAVING IN MIND A DEFINITE PLAN WHICH WOULD CALL ON THE COS TO ELIMINATE PRESENT DIFFICULTY AT EL AUJA BY MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING DEMARCATION LINE AND REMOVING PRESENT ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN DEMILITARIZED ZONE.

BURNS APPEARED DESIRE SC ACTION WHILE HAMMARSKJOLD FELT SC DEBATE USELESS IN ABSENCE INTENSE DIPLOMATIC PREPARATION FOR MAJOR PEACE EFFORT. BURNS FELT THERE WAS AN IMMEDIATE PROBLEM, TODAY, OF AVOIDING HOSTILITIES AT EL AUJA, WHATEVER WE UNDERTOOK LATER IN SC OR ELSEWHERE. HE BELIEVED HE OR THE SYG SHOULD TODAY ADDRESS A STRONG APPEAL TO BOTH PARTIES.

HAMMARSKJOLD AGREED THAT STRONG DEMARCHES WERE NEEDED WHICH WOULD MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR EITHER PARTY TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE. HE FELT THAT AN ELEMENT OF MORAL PRESSURE SHOULD ALSO BE BROUGHT TO BEAR BY MAKING PUBLIC THE TEXT OF SUCH AN APPEAL.

HE AGREED.

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-3- 390, OCTOBER 29, 6 PM, FROM NEW YORK

HE AGREED WITH MY CAVEAT THAT SUCH A DEMARCHE SHOULD NOT PROVIDE THE VERY EXCUSE TO EITHER OF THE PARTIES, WHICH THEY WERE CAPABLE OF MANEUVERING, TO ALLEGE THAT THE OTHER SIDE HAD TAKEN THE FIRST ACTION, THUS SHEDDING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ATTACK. HE ALSO AGREED WITH MY POINT THAT WHILE WE MIGHT FEEL THAT IT WAS UNDESIRABLE TO OPEN UP A DEBATE IN THE SC AT THIS TIME, WE MIGHT NEVERTHELESS BE FORCED INTO SUCH A SITUATION.

HAMMARSKJOLD PROPOSED, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THAT BURNS, WITHOUT DELAY, ADDRESS LETTERS TO FAWZI (EGYPT) AND KIDRON (ISRAEL) SPEAKING WITH AUTHORITY OF SYG AND MAKING APPEAL IN BROAD TERMS AGAINST ANY PROVOCATIVE ACTION. PRIOR TO TRANSMITTAL THESE LETTERS, WE WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY COMMENT ON TEXT.

DIXON AND I AGREED, SUBJECT TO SEEING TEXT, THAT GENERAL BURNS, IN VIEW OF HIS POSITION, SHOULD TAKE SUCH ACTION. I EMPHASIZED THAT BURNS ACTION SHOULD BE ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF AND SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICLY CONNECTED WITH OUR CONSULTATIONS. DIXON SUPPORTED THIS AND SAID WE SHOULD CONSIDER BURNS ACTION AS AN INTERIM STEP AND THAT WE SHOULD TAKE UP LATER WHAT MORE WAS NEEDED. (DIXON TOLD ME AFTERWARD HE FELT SUCH CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BETWEEN UK, US AND FRENCH AND NOT WITH SYG, WHO COULD BE BROUGHT IN LATER.)

HAMMARSKJOLD ALSO FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR FONMINS IN GENEVA TO STRESS TO SHARETT IMPORTANCE OF ISRAELI'S TAKING NO ACTION WHICH COULD LEAD TO HOSTILITIES. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS A NOTE TO THIS EFFECT TO EACH OF FOUR FONMINS. DIXON, HOWEVER, OBJECTED TO ANY SUGGESTION OF JOINT ACTION WITH SOVIETS AND HAMMARSKJOLD THEREFORE AGREED SEND HIS VIEWS IN THIS CONNECTION ONLY TO SECRETARY DULLES AND LEAVE TO UK AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS INFORMING THEIR FONMINS OF HIS CONCERN. HE WOULD THEREFORE SIMPLY GIVE TO SOVIET DELEGATION TEXT OF BURNS APPEAL TO PARTIES.

TEXT OF BURNS LETTER TO EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS, TOGETHER WITH TEXT OF NOTE HAMMARSKJOLD HAS ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT TO SECRETARY ARE IN IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM..

LODGE HAS BEEN INFORMED OF ABOVE, AND CONCURS IN MY VIEW THAT DEPARTMENT SHOULD CONSIDER DESIRABILITY RAISING PRESENT PALESTINE SITUATION IN SC AND PROPOSING FOLLOWING ACTION:

1. CALLING

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CONFIDENTIAL

-4- 390, OCTOBER 29, 6 PM, FROM NEW YORK

1. CALLING ON PARTIES TO UNDERTAKE DIRECT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH UN RESOLUTIONS AS BASIS.

2. APPOINTING A MEDIATOR FOR ABOVE PURPOSE.

3. IF SUCH PROPOSALS VETOED IN SC SIMILAR ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN GA. SUCH ACTION WOULD, IN OUR OPINION, BE APPROPRIATE FOLLOW-UP TO SECRETARY'S PROPOSALS OF AUGUST 26. MEDIATOR SHOULD PREFERABLY BE US NATIONAL, COMMANDING WORLD-WIDE RESPECT. PLAN OF SETTLEMENT ALONG LINES SECRETARY'S AUGUST 16 PROPOSALS COULD BE DEVELOPED PRIVATELY WHILE DISCUSSION IN UN PROCEEDS, WHICH MEDIATOR COULD SUBSEQUENTLY PUT FORWARD. SUCCESS WOULD, OF COURSE, DEPEND ON FULL US, UK AND FRENCH BACKING OF DETAILED PLAN. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCREASING TENSIONS AND SOVIET INTERVENTION IN MIDDLE EAST, WE FEEL HOLD APPROACH ALONG THESE LINES IS ALMOST ONLY SAFE AVENUE LEFT OPEN..

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JJ

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FROM: NEW YORK

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7:04 PM

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RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 391, OCTOBER 29, 6 PM

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
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FOR SECRETARY HOOVER FROM BARCO

RE PALESTINE



IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING RECEIPT YOUR SUGGESTED ADDITION TO LETTER OF BURNS TO EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES I MADE REPEATED EFFORTS REACH HAMMARSKJOLD, CORDIER AND BURNS, WITHOUT SUCCESS UNTIL 4:15 PM. AT THAT TIME I REACHED CORDIER WHO INFORMED ME THAT LETTER HAD ALREADY BEEN SENT TO PARTIES. I TOLD HIM I HAD UNDERSTOOD CLEARLY THAT OUR COMMENTS WERE EXPECTED, THAT I WAS IN A POSITION TO MAKE COMMENTS WHICH I HAD RECEIVED FROM YOU, AND THAT I STRONGLY PROTESTED ISSUANCE OF LETTER WITHOUT WORD FROM US.

I SUBSEQUENTLY REACHED SYG HAMMARSKJOLD TO MAKE TO HIM SAME PROTEST. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN MISUNDERSTANDING, WHICH HE REGRETTE, BUT THAT LETTER HAD BEEN SENT TO PARTIES BEFORE COPY HAD EVEN BEEN SENT TO US.

I TOLD HAMMARSKJOLD WE HAD ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT I COULD NOT GIVE ON TELEPHONE WHICH MIGHT HAVE HAD BEARING ON TENOR OF LETTER. HE ENDEAVORED HAVE BURNS AND CORDIER SEE ME TO RECEIVE THIS INFORMATION. AS YET HE HAS BEEN UNABLE LOCATE EITHER.

REGRET CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH LETTER ISSUED, BUT CONSIDER OMISSION DEPARTMENT'S SUGGESTED LANGUAGE WILL PROBABLY HAVE NO MATERIAL EFFECT.

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Action

NEA

Control: 15509

Rec'd: October 29, 1955
8:19 p.m.

Info

RMR

FROM: USARMA Israel

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: MAI 840 291433Z (Army Message)

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SENT DEPARTMENT ARMY, DEPARTMENT STATE, NAVY AND AIR; INFORMATION
USARMAS AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, USCINCEUR, USNMR
PARIS, USDOCCOLAND, USDOCOSOUTH.

DEPARTMENT ARMY FOR G-2

1. Reference MAI 839 call-up civilian vehicles all types continues with large number very heavy trucks, civilian heavy transporters and fuel tank trucks. Heavy military traffic in and about Tel Aviv extremely unusual on Sabbath with Army patrol points open and very active. Some reserve units and individuals being mobilized on selective basis with emphasis on transport units. Some combat loaded vehicles noted heading north, as have few Model-4 tanks meeting new French Model-1954 long 75mm guns, on transporters, heavily camouflaged Bulk of transport, both requisitioned civilian and military including busses et cetera, however remains or stand by at motor pools. Comment: My estimate either that heavy precautionary steps being taken looking toward large scale mobilization should such become necessary, or that IDF envisages heavy strike at or by one or more Arab States. Obviously, IDF flatly denies mobilization procedures in effect. However, vehicle call-up on larger scale than during August and early September.

2. Following IDF reports Egypt detachment which dug in in DZ has now been reinforced by two companies which have well field-fortified.*

Two separate attempts night 28-29 by Egyptian troops capture town Nirim near Gaza strip failed. No IDF casualties reported.

As received. Will be serviced upon request.

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 135, October 30, 1 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 135, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY AMMAN 58,
PRIORITY CAIRO 95, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 112, PRIORITY LONDON 61,
PRIORITY PARIS 61, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS UNNUMBERED

Following is situation respecting El Auja D/Z through October 29
according information received currently from UNTSO.

Morning October 29 observers reports stated Egyptians occupy-
ing D/Z in estimated platoon strength, i.e., about 40 men
deployed from MR 987187 to 981180. No apparent increase in
strength. Fortifications primarily two and three man foxholes
reinforced with sand bags. Six armed kibbutzniks in Israeli
position. Israelis placed anti-tank and probably anti-personnel
mines to east Bir Ein MR 993210.

Later report states barbed wire fence being erected around
Israeli position at SQ 09030 and five armed kibbutzniks seen
unloading anti-tank mines. Minefields marked around the
position about 50 meters deep. No change other two Israeli
positions, located at SQ 092039 and SQ 099021. While Israelis
alleged Egyptian positions being extended, observers report
no change. Considerable troop movements noted along Beersheba
El Auja road.

UNTSO press officer reports inquiries received from press
representatives afternoon October 29 indicated clear feeling
anxiety with evidently conviction some form military action
likely near future. Hommel stated Israeli troops are in D/Z
and being reinforced.

Hommel has been ex-correspondence with Eytan and Egyptian
Major Sedky. Fourth appeal to Egyptians to withdraw from
D/E just sent in view lack any reply three earlier appeals.
Eytan has replied to effect that according his information
two additional Egyptian companies entered D/Z in Bir Ein
area and entrenched themselves 1,200 meters inside Israel.

Eytan states

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-2- 135, October 30, 1 p.m., from Jerusalem

Eytan states that in light these developments the "Israel Army authorities" cannot curtail patrol activities within 500 meters of frontier (pursuant to some understanding with Burns on this point) and that same considerations apply with respect "Israel military position". He offers withdraw position on frontier to point 500 meters back if Egyptians do likewise.

Hommel has answered Eytan's communication pointing out that allegation about 2 additional Egyptian companies is not true, since observers have verified no (repeat no) apparent increase made in number Egyptians in D/Z. Hommel also queries Eytan's references to Israeli Army authorities and to "military position" pointing out violation GAA involved. Hommel recalls Burns agreed only to presence limited number police in D/Z and states he continuing efforts obtain removal Egyptians from D/Z.

Israelis allowing observers move freely in area, but Egyptians preventing such movement their side frontier. UNTSO has received Israeli complaint that Egyptian force crossed D/L and attacked post in Nirim area October 28. UNTSO offered investigate, but Israelis did not accept offer.

UNTSO continues regard situation as extremely tense with outbreak fighting likely at any time. One of Eytan's most recent letters concludes with statement that by failing make clear pronouncement charging Egypt with occupation part of D/Z UNTSO is assuming grave responsibility for consequences which might result from "these latest acts of Egyptian aggression".

COLE

BB:LJ/11

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Rec'd: OCTOBER 31, 1955
6:21 PM

IO
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FROM: CAIRO

SS
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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 840, OCTOBER 31, 1 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 840, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 116,
JERUSALEM 49, LONDON 153, PARIS 80.

DEPARTMENT PASS USUN.

OCB
USIA
CIA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

DURING COURSE OF EMBASSY OFFICER'S CALL ON MAJOR SALAMA
(GOHAR'S REPLACEMENT AT PALESTINE AFFAIRS), LATTER COMMENTED
THAT HE DOUBTED EITHER ISRAEL OR EGYPT WOULD BE INCLINED MAKE
FIRST MOVE IMPLEMENT BURNS LETTER OCTOBER 29 CALLING FOR WITH-
DRAWAL FORCES. IF ISRAELIS WITHDREW "TROOPS" (WHICH SALAMA
DEFINED AS INCLUDING "POLICE" BUT PROBABLY NOT KIBBUTZNIKS)
EGYPTIANS WOULD IN TURN WITHDRAW FROM DEFENSIVE POSITIONS
THEY HAD ESTABLISHED ON THREE MAIN ROADS LEADING OUT OF D/Z.

ALTHOUGH SALAMA MENTIONED KJNTILA RAID ONLY IN PASSING,
CONVERSATION WAS NOT PARTICULARLY REASSURING SINCE IN
PAST RELAXED ATTITUDE BY PALESTINE AFFAIRS OFFICIALS HAS
OFTEN BEEN BASED ON KNOWLEDGE OF IMPENDING REPRISALS.
THEREFOR EMBASSY OFFICER POINTEDLY EXPRESSED HOPE THAT
TRANQUILITY WHICH HAD EXISTED ON BORDER FOR LAST 24 HOURS
WOULD CONTINUE SO AS GIVE UN CHANCE ACT REDUCE TENSION, AND
POINTEDLY OBSERVED THAT UNDER EXISTING CONDITION THESE INCIDENTS
CONSTITUTED GREATER THREAT TO SECURITY OF AREA.

BYROADE

AAL

NOTE: PASSED USUN, 10/31/55, 9 PM, CTW.

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16-13

Action
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Control: 15912

Rec'd: OCTOBER 31, 1955
11:50 AM

Info
RMR

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 392, OCTOBER 31, 11 AM

PRIORITY

RE PALESTINE IN SECURITY COUNCIL

IOP

UK DEL REPORTS THAT IT HAS RECEIVED WORD FROM FONOFF INDICATING THAT THEY BELIEVE DESIRABLE COURSE IS TO TAKE ACTION IN SC ON CURRENT SITUATION. THEY BELIEVE WE SHOULD COORDINATE ACTION WITH FRENCH AND WITH GENERAL BURNS AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO THIS END.

REQUEST URGENT INSTRUCTIONS.

AT DEPT DISCRETION PASS GENEVA FOR SECRETARY.

LODGE

REM



JUN 23 1958
E.M.D.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *59* Department of State

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Rec'd: OCTOBER 31, 1955
8:48 PM

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674.84A/10-3155

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 393, OCTOBER 31, 8 PM

PRIORITY

RE PALESTINE IN SC

DURING MEETING WITH DIXON (UK) AND ALPHAND (FRANCE) HELD AT BRITISH REQUEST THIS NOON, IT WAS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO DETERMINE WHAT POSITION OF SECRETARY GENERAL AND GENERAL BURNS WAS ON DESIRABILITY HAVING COUNCIL MEETING IN LIGHT OF PRESENT SITUATION AT EL AUJA. WE ALSO DISCUSSED PROBLEM CREATED BY LIKELY INJECTION INTO ANY SC DEBATE OF SOVIET ARMS DEAL WITH EGYPT.

AT MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH BURNS AND HAMMARSKJOLD PRESENT WE CONSIDERED PRIVATE REPORT IN NATURE OF "PROGRAM OF ACTION" MADE BY GENERAL BURNS TO SECRETARY GENERAL, TEXT OF WHICH CONTAINED IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

PURPOSE OF "PROGRAM OF ACTION" IN SECRETARY GENERAL'S WORDS WAS TO SEEK PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO DEVELOPING SITUATION BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. HAMMARSKJOLD FELT SOLUTION LAY MORE IN DIRECT IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM BY BURNS WITH PARTIES SUPPORTED BY VIGOROUS JOINT DEMARCHES BY UK, FRANCE AND US AMBASSADORS IN TWO CAPITALS. HE FELT IT WAS HOPELESS TO ATTEMPT NEGOTIATE IN SC SINCE PARTIES WOULD ONLY FREEZE POSITIONS IN ANY PUBLIC DEBATE.

SECRETARY GENERAL ALSO FELT SC MEETING NOW UNDESIRABLE BECAUSE, WHILE EGYPT MIGHT AGREE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF BURNS' "PROGRAM OF ACTION" WITHOUT INSISTING THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAW KIBBUTZ FROM DZ, IF MATTER DISCUSSED IN SC THEY WOULD MOST ASSUREDLY POINT OUT PARA-MILITARY CHARACTER OF KIBBUTZ AND DEMAND ITS

WITHDRAWAL.

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-2- 393, OCTOBER 31, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK

WITHDRAWAL.

SINCE ISRAEL WOULD OBVIOUSLY REFUSE TO DO THIS, WHOLE PROGRAM WOULD FALL. HE DID NOT RULE OUT, HOWEVER, POSSIBILITY OF SC ACTION CONFIRMING THIS PROGRAM OF GENERAL BURNS IF IN CIRCUMSTANCES AS THEY DEVELOP THIS SEEMED DESIRABLE OR NECESSARY.

HAMMARSKJOLD REGARDS THIS PROGRAM AS A COORDINATED APPROACH, FOR WHICH AGREEMENT OF THREE GOVERNMENTS NECESSARY AND NO ACTION WILL BE TAKEN ON IT UNTIL COMMENTS AND CONCURRENCE OF THREE GOVERNMENTS AVAILABLE.

HAMMARSKJOLD ENVISAGES THAT THREE POINTS MADE IN BURNS' "PROGRAM OF ACTION" BE PUT FORWARD ESSENTIALLY AS A SIMULTANEOUS AND UNIFIED PROPOSAL WHICH, HOWEVER, COULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN CERTAIN LOGICAL STEPS. HE THEREFORE BELIEVES THAT GENERAL BURNS SHOULD PROCEED FROM POINT THREE, THAT THE OLD INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER BE DEMARCATED. THIS IDEA COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAELIS IF DONE BY UNTSO, ACTING ALONE, PROVIDED THEY SILENTLY ACQUIESCED IN IT AND DID NOT OPENLY PUSH THEIR CLAIMS, WHICH SYG REGARDS AS VERY WEAK, FOR SOVEREIGNTY OVER PRESENT DEMILITARIZED ZONE UP TO OLD INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER.

SECOND LOGICAL STEP OF PROGRAM WOULD BE POINT TWO, I.E., WITHDRAWAL BY EGYPT OF CHECKPOSTS WHICH ARE NOW ON ISRAELI SIDE OF OLD FRONTIER LINE AND IN DZ. FROM HIS TALKS WITH FAWZI (EGYPT) HAMMARSKJOLD BELIEVES EGYPTIANS REALIZE THAT ONCE FRONTIER HAS BEEN MARKED BY UN, POSITION THEIR CHECKPOSTS BEYOND IT WILL BE INTENABLE AND THEY CAN SEE THEIR WAY CLEAR TO WITHDRAWAL.

THEREAFTER POINT ONE OF PROGRAM COULD BE IMPLEMENTED, I.E., WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN EXCESS OF KIBBUTZ INHABITANTS AND CIVILIAN POLICE WHO WERE PRESENT PRIOR TO 26 AUGUST.

GENERAL

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52361

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-3- 393, OCTOBER 31, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK

GENERAL BURNS AT SEVERAL POINTS IN DISCUSSION EMPHASIZED STRONGLY NECESSITY OF COMPLETE AND IMMEDIATE BACKING OF HIS ACTION WITH PARTIES BY TRIPARTITE APPROACHES IN CAPITALS.

IT WAS AGREED THAT THREE DELEGATIONS WOULD TRANSMIT TEXT OF "PROGRAM OF ACTION" TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

I SAID WE SHOULD NOT DECIDE IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST HAVING SC MEETING NOR SHOULD WE PREJUDICE GENERAL BURNS' EFFORTS IN IMPLEMENTING HIS PROGRAM BY PREMATURE MEETING. CONTINUING TO SPEAK PERSONALLY I FELT IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO START WITH GENERAL BURNS IMPLEMENTING HIS PROGRAM. MEANWHILE WE COULD JOINTLY CONSIDER DESIRABILITY OF SC MEETING WITH ATTENDANT PUBLICITY IF THAT APPEARED IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE DESIRABLE. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE AGREED 100 PER CENT WITH THIS APPROACH. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT BURNS WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE ANY ACTION ON HIS PROGRAM UNTIL COMMENTS AND CONCURRENCE OF THREE GOVERNMENTS HAD BEEN RECEIVED.

REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS ON SUGGESTED PLAN OF ACTION.

LODGE

AAL

52362

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NND 897403
Box 2675

(42)

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674 84A/10-3155

Te 1394

Date

31 Oct 55

From

New York

To

Sec State

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Date

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RM/R - file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 31, 1955

SUBJECT: NEAR EAST SITUATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Henry de Torrente, Swiss Minister
NEA - Mr. Allen
NE - Mr. Burdett

COPIES TO: NE(cc), NEA(cc), WE(cc), OLI(2cc), American Embassy BERN(cc).

Mr. Torrente referred to recent discussions in Bern between Ambassador Willis and the Swiss Foreign Office on the Near East and asked Mr. Allen to give him an appreciation of the situation.

Mr. Allen replied that we consider the present situation extremely grave. The current disturbances on the Egyptian-Israel frontier may erupt at any time into a major war. Contrary to the Soviet claims, the Czech-Egyptian arms deal is not a "commercial transaction". Soviet as well as Czech arms are involved and a large number of heavy weapons is being shipped, some of which have already arrived in Egypt. In addition, Soviet bloc technicians are being sent to Egypt to instruct in the use of the new weapons.

NEA:NE:WCBurdett:mh
October 31, 1955

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Memo w/ATTCH
Date 11/1/55
From Russell
To Dulles

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Control: 572
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 1, 1955
7:33 P.M.

NEA
Info
RMR

FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

SS
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NO: 1791, NOVEMBER 1, 8 P.M.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1791, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL. AVIV 52,
PARIS 229.

IOP
OCB
CIA
OSD

EMBASSY TODAY INFORMED FOREIGN OFFICE OF DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS
ON JERUSALEM PROBLEM (DEPTEL 2423) POINTING OUT DEPARTMENT
ANXIOUS ACT PROMPTLY IN VIEW NEED FOR CONTINUING EFFECTIVE
RELATIONS WITH ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DURING PRESENT CRITICAL
PERIOD. FOREIGN OFFICE WILL INSTRUCT BRITISH AMBASSADOR TEL.
AVIV CONCERT WITH AMERICAN, TURKISH, FRENCH AND OTHER
COLLEAGUES IN WORKING OUT DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS ON THE SPOT.
FOREIGN OFFICE STILL HOPES IT WILL BE POSSIBLE HANDLE MATTER
ALONG LINES INDICATED EMBASSY TELEGRAM 1747.

ALDRICH

WM

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Tel 395
Date 11/1/55
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1955 NOV 1 PM 7 55

DC/T

For DC/T only

SENT TO: USUN NEW YORK 301RPTD INFO: Ameconsul GENEVA TOSEC 115

Origin

Info

Re: Palestine in SC

We concur generally in Burns proposed program re El ^{Auja.} ~~Amx~~ We have following specific comments:

1. We assume with regard to Burns' timing of approach to Israel and Egypt he plans to make his proposals known to two governments soon and as nearly at same time as possible. We also assume that three powers would be expected to make their representations in two capitals as soon after his approach as possible.

2. Re necessary legal reservations we believe Burns should point them out to Israelis and if necessary Egyptians at time he makes his proposals. If he does not do so we feel Israelis may interpret his proposals as determining status of Kibbutz. We will make strong point of our legal reservations at time of demarche since we share Burns' view that presence of so-called civilian police in demilitarized zone is violation of Armistice Agreement.

3. We assume General Burns will plan to make report to SC on his negotiations with Israel and Egypt over his proposals and compliance given to them.

Dist.
Desired
(Office
Only)

Drafted by

IO:UNP:JMLadlaw:her 11/1/55

Telegraphic transcription and
classification approved by10 - MR. WILCOX
UNP - Mr. Bond

Clearances:

NE

WDB

52685

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J. ERNEST WHARTON
29TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEE:
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

November 1, 1955

ACTION
is assigned to



SEV

Honorable John Foster Dulles
The Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington 25, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am taking the liberty of enclosing copies of
telegrams received within the past few days, bearing
on the Israel-Egypt situation - the telegrams expressing
the views of many constituents of mine located in the
Poughkeepsie, New York area.

I am sure you will accord these recommendations
your serious consideration and would greatly appreciate
your advices so that I might properly respond to these
inquiries and any others that I might receive.

Sincerely yours,

J. Ernest Wharton
J. Ernest Wharton
U. S. Congressman

Enclosures.

290405

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A/41

N.F. - Bird on 11/9

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VICTORY LETTER	SHIP RADIOGRAM

PLEASE DO NOT FOLD. TYPE OR WRITE MESSAGE PLAINLY WITHIN THE HEAVY LINE BORDER
USE DARK INK OR PENCIL

Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

CHECK	CHARGE TO THE ACCOUNT OF	DATE	TIME FILED
COPY	COPY	COPY	
TO		1955 OCT 30 PM 5 57	
POUGHKEEPSIE NY			
ERNEST WHARTON			
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WASH DC			
<p>OUR ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP WHICH NUMBERS 600 FAMILIES URGES YOU AS OUR ELECTIVE REPRESENTATIVE IN WASHINGTON TO USE THE FULL WEIGHT OF YOUR OFFICE IN PRESSING THE STATE DEPT FOR THE PROCLAMATION OF A UNITED STATES ISRAEL SECURITY PACT. WE NEED NOT TELL YOU OF THE RAPID DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST ONLY BOLD AND COURAGEOUS ACTION BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT CAN STEM THE TIDE OF SOVIET ADVANCE VIA EGYPT. THIS CAN BEST BE DONE THRU AN AMERICAN GUARANTEE OF ISRAELS SECURITY THIS MUST BE DONE NOW.</p> <p>POUGHKEEPSIE ZIONIST COUNCIL JEROME REGUNBERG PRESIDENT</p>			

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CHECK	CHARGE TO THE ACCOUNT OF	DATE	TIME FILED
COPY	COPY	COPY	
TO		1955 OCT 31 PM 6 50	
POUGHKEEPSIE NY			
REPRESENTATIVE ERNEST WHARTON			
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE BLDG WASH DC			
<p>WE RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT YOU URGE EQUAL AID TO ISRAEL AND A MUTUAL SECURITY PACT BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL AS THE ONLY MEANS OF GUARANTEEING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PREVENT A THIRD WORLD WAR.</p> <p>REMEMBER ISRAEL IS OUR ONLY DEMOCRATIC OUTPOST IN THE NEAR EAST.</p>			
POUGHKEEPSIE CHAPTER HADASSAH			
COPY			

DOMESTIC SERVICE	
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CHECK	CHARGE TO THE ACCOUNT OF	DATE	TIME FILED
COPY	COPY		COPY
TO POUGHKEEPSIE, N.Y. CONGRESSMAN WHARTON HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WASH.D.C.		1955 Oct. 31	PM 8 29
I RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT YOU URGE EQUAL AID TO ISRAEL AND A MUTUAL SECURITY PACT BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL AS THE ONLY MEANS OF GUARANTEEING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PREVENTING A THIRD WORLD WAR. REMEMBER ISRAEL IS OUR ONLY DEMOCRATIC OUTPOST IN THE NEAR EAST.			
DR. AND MRS. IRVING OSTROW			
c o p y			

DOMESTIC SERVICE	
Check the class of service desired; otherwise this message will be sent as a full rate telegram	
FULL RATE TELEGRAM	SERIAL
DAY LETTER	NIGHT LETTER

WESTERN UNION

Telefax *Telefax*

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

INTERNATIONAL SERVICE	
Check the class of service desired; otherwise this message will be sent at the full rate	
FULL RATE	LETTER TELEGRAM
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TO		OCT 31 PM 2 42	
POUGHKEEPSIE NY CONGRESSMAN ERNEST WHARTON			
<p>WE RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT YOU URGE EQUAL AID TO ISRAEL AND A MUTUAL SECURITY PACT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL AS THE ONLY MEANS OF GUARANTEERING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AVOIDING A THIRD WORLD WAR.</p> <p>ALBERT L. HECHT PRESIDENT JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER</p>			
COPY			

DOMESTIC SERVICE	
Check the class of service desired; otherwise this message will be sent as a full rate telegram	
FULL RATE TELEGRAM	SERIAL
DAY LETTER	NIGHT LETTER

WESTERN UNION

Telefax *Telefax*

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

INTERNATIONAL SERVICE	
Check the class of service desired; otherwise this message will be sent at the full rate	
FULL RATE	LETTER TELEGRAM
VICTORY LETTER	SHIP RADIOGRAM

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**TYPE OR WRITE MESSAGE PLAINLY WITHIN THE HEAVY LINE BORDER
USE DARK INK OR PENCIL**

Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

CHECK	CHARGE TO THE ACCOUNT OF	DATE	TIME FILED
COPY			
TO		1955 OCT 30 PM 3 00	
POUGHKEEPSIE NY			
REPRESENTATIVE ERNEST WHARTON			
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE WASH DC			
<p>PLEASE DO EVERYTHING IN YOUR POWER TO KEEP THE POWDER KEG FROM EXPLODING. PROTECT THE ONLY MIDDLE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC BASTIAN BY IMMEDIATELY DECLARING TO THE WORLD THAT WE WILL BACK ISRAEL WITH A SECURITY PACN TO PROTECT THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND PROVIDE WHATEVER MILITARY EQUIPMENT THEY NEED.</p>			
MORTON J. DAVIS			
COPY			

DOMESTIC SERVICE	
Check the class of service desired; otherwise this message will be sent as a full rate telegram	
FULL RATE TELEGRAM	SERIAL
DAY LETTER	NIGHT LETTER

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CHECK C O P Y	CHARGE TO THE ACCOUNT OF C O P Y	DATE C O P Y	TIME FILED C O P Y
TO	POUGHKEEPSIE NY	1955 OCT 31 PM 8 46	
CONGRESSMAN ERNEST WHARTON WASH DC THE MENS CLUB OF VASSAR TEMPLE AN ORGANIZATION OF 130 MEN REQUESTS THAT YOU URGE EQUAL AID TO ISRAEL AND A MUTUAL SECURITY PACT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL AS A MEANS OF GUARANTEEING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PREVENTING A THIRD WORLD WAR DR. SEYMOUR LEVIN VICE PRES VASSAR TEMPLE MENS CLUB POUGHKEEPSIE NY C O P Y			

FROM AND TYPE OF DOCUMENT

J. Ernest Wharton, MC

DATE DUE

DATE REC'D

11/2/55

DATE

FILED

NO.

11/1/55

SUBJECT

Telegrams on Israel Egypt situation.

TO:

TO:

TO:

TO:

To Fraser Wilkins

DATE

DATE

DATE

DATE

11/3/55

ANSWERED

NO REPLY NECESSARY

In reply refer to
SEV 674.84A/11-155

November 15 1955

Dear Mr. Wharton:

I refer to your letter of November 1 to Secretary Dulles, acknowledged by telephone on November 8, transmitting copies of telegrams which you have received from your constituents concerning United States policy with regard to the Arab-Israel situation. We appreciate your interest in making the views of your constituents available to us.

Our Government is gravely concerned over recent developments in the Middle East and is continuing to give the most serious attention to this matter. In a major policy statement on August 26, Secretary Dulles proposed, with the authority of the President, a solution which would include a security guarantee sponsored by the United Nations. Subsequently, at his press conference on October 4, Secretary Dulles again indicated his hope that such a solution might be found, and discussed the dangers of an arms race in the area. In a statement on November 9, President Eisenhower indicated that the United States stands firm on the policy as stated by Secretary Dulles and reiterated that, "...given a solution of the other related problems, I would recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors."

In the belief that you may wish to send them to your constituents, I am enclosing ten copies each of the statements of the President and the Secretary.

I believe

The Honorable
J. Ernest Wharton,
House of Representatives.

674.84A/11-155

CS/Y

674.84A/11-155

I believe that your constituents will also be interested in the Department's statement of November 5, ten copies of which are also enclosed, concerning the attitude of this Government toward the hostilities between Israel and Egypt.

Sincerely yours,

Florence Kirlin
Acting Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

- ✓ 1. Press release no. 517, 589, and 638 (10 copies).
- ✓ 2. President's statement, November 9, 1955 (10 copies).

*H O am
H X*

gpm(w) Ric
P:SEV:LECampbell:NRW:dlo/11/14/55 Previous by cleared by: NE, NKA/P
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S/S - CR

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NOV 14 1955 P.M.

NOV 25 1955

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Department of State

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Control: 1240

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 2, 1955
6:06 PM

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State *gal*

NO: 865, NOVEMBER 2, 3 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

Copy No(s) _____

PRIORITY

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Name *C.H.*

Date *11/16/55*

SENT PRIORITY GENEVA 15, REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
PRIORITY 865, BEIRUT 107, DAMASCUS 79, AMMAN 73, BAGHDAD 58,
JIDDA 55, TEL AVIV 118, LONDON 158, PARIS 82, TRIPOLI,
BENGHAZI UNNUMBERED.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION.

GENEVA FOR SECRETARY.

BELIEVE LAST NIGHT'S DISCUSSION NASSER PROFITABLE. MY GENERAL
PURPOSE WAS TO TRY PUT IN BETTER PERSPECTIVE NATURE YOUR
CONCERN RE DEVELOPMENTS IN MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA AND TO
URGE MOST STRONGLY THAT HE ON HIS PART SHOULD SEE ADVANTAGES
OF EARLY MOVE ON SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL.

TOLD HIM I FOUND YOU FULLY FAMILIAR WITH ALL ASPECTS OF
PROBLEM HERE. FRUSTRATIONS HE HAD FELT AT WHAT HE TERMED
LACK OF RESPONSE ON ARMS FROM US HAD BEEN DUE TO INATTENTION
TO HIS PROBLEMS. ON CONTRARY YOU HELD VERY STRONG VIEW BASED
UPON INTENSE STUDY OF AREA OVER LONG PERIOD OF TIME THAT
ONLY SALVATION FOR MIDDLE EAST WAS SETTLEMENT OF ARAB-ISRAELI
PROBLEM ON PEACEFUL BASIS. YOU HAD NOT FELT INJECTION FROM
ANY SOURCE OF ARMS IN QUANTITY COULD FURTHER THAT CAUSE BUT
THAT RESULTING TENSIONS WOULD ONLY MAKE SETTLEMENT MORE
DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. IF THERE HAD BEEN DIFFICULTIES IT
WAS ONLY BECAUSE WE WERE DEDICATED TO A PRINCIPLE WE BELIEVED
RIGHT AND BEST FOR EGYPT AS WELL AS ALL OF US AND NOT BECAUSE
WE WERE INSENSITIVE TO HIS DESIRE FOR GREATER SECURITY WHICH
WE FULLY SHARED.

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I TOLD

~~TOP SECRET~~

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674.84A/11-255

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 865, NOVEMBER 2, 3 PM, FROM CAIRO (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

I TOLD HIM WE HAD NO PUNITIVE FEELINGS TOWARD HIM AND THAT HE MUST UNDERSTAND OUR CONCERN WENT FAR BEYOND ONE SPECIFIC ARMS DEAL. IN FACT WE LESS CONCERNED IMMEDIATE ANGRERS INSIDE EGYPT UNDER HIS MANAGEMENT THAN ELSEWHERE IN AREA WHERE THERE WERE ALREADY WEAK AND LEFTIST-RIDDEN GOVERNMENTS. IN VIEW OF THIS CONCERN, HE MUST NOT FEEL THAT QUESTION OF OUR RELATIONS DEPENDED ENTIRELY UPON ACTS BY US. WE WERE WILLING TO PROCEED IN FULL COOPERATION WITH HIM TO EXTENT ALLOWED BY PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL OPINION AS LONG AS WE CONVINCED HE WOULD COOPERATE WHEREVER POSSIBLE AGAINST SPREAD OF SOVIET INFLUENCE THROUGH MIDDLE EAST. THIS NOT ONLY MEANT INSIDE EGYPT WHERE HE HAD DIRECT CONTROL BUT ALSO IN REFRAINING FROM ACTS THAT WOULD FURTHER AROUSE ANTI-WESTERN FEELING OR BOOST SOVIET INFLUENCE IN WEAKER STATES AROUND HIM. ALSO WE HOPED FOR HIS COOPERATION IN SEEKING WAYS REDUCING GREAT DANGER OF EARLY HOSTILITIES IN AREA. FURTHER WE FIRMLY BELIEVED SETTLEMENT ARAB-ISRAELI CONTROVERSY MORE IMPORTANT TO EGYPT AND AREA AS A WHOLE NOW THAN EVER BEFORE. WITH HIS NEW STRENGTH WE HOPED HE WOULD ADOPT STATESMANLIKE APPROACH AND BE WILLING DISCUSS SUCH A POSSIBILITY WITHOUT DELAY. I SAID IT IMPOSSIBLE TO SEPARATE HIGH DAM, FROM A PURELY PRACTICAL VIEWPOINT FROM STATE OF AFFAIRS THAT WOULD BE EXISTANT HERE OVER NEXT TEN YEARS I.E. WAR OR PEACE QUESTION OF NECESSITY FOR LARGE SCALE MILITARY EXPENDITURES ON PART OF EGYPT ETC.

AS REGARDS TACTICS OF SETTLEMENT TOLD HIM I SPEAKING WITHOUT DIRECTIVE FROM YOU BUT MY OWN FEELING WAS THAT IT WOULD BE TO HIS ADVANTAGE IF WE WORKED TOGETHER HERE RAPIDLY TO SEE IF GENERAL UNDERSTANDING COULD BE REACHED AS TO WHAT MIGHT BE PRACTICAL TERMS OF SETTLEMENT. THIS WOULD ALLOW US TO PROCEED FROM STRENGTH IN TRYING TO CONVINC ISRAELS SHE SHOULD MAKE CONCESSIONS. IF THROUGH THIS APPROACH PROBLEMS COULD BE REDUCED TO ONE OR TWO MAJOR ITEMS (WHICH I THOUGHT POSSIBLE) WE WOULD THEN BE IN A POSITION BEHIND HIM AND COULD PERHAPS THROUGH INTENSIVE EFFORT CAUSE ISRAEL TO BEGIN TO NARROW THE GAP BETWEEN OUR POSITIONS AND HER OWN.

IN THE

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 865, NOVEMBER 2, 3 PM, FROM CAIRO (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

IN THE TWO AND ONE HALF HOUR DISCUSSION FOLLOWING POINTS
OF INTEREST APPEARED:

1. HE WOULD BE WILLING AT ANY TIME, ON HIGHLY SECRET BASIS, DISCUSS WITH ME SPECIFICS OF SETTLEMENT. IF HE AND I COULD HANDLE MAJOR ASPECTS, FAWZI COULD BE BROUGHT IN ON DETIALS.
2. HE AGREES THAT INTERNAL DANGERS OF COMMUNISM ARE INCREASING IN MIDDLE EAST GENERALLY, ALTHOUGH HE NOT QUITE AS CONCERNED AS WE RE SYRIA.
3. HE AGREED TO EXERT MODERATION ON PRESS PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF ITS EFFECT ON NUMBER (2) ABOVE. AS MATTER OF FACT HE HAD ALREADY TAKEN STEPS THIS DIRECTION DURING MY ABSENCE.

BYROADE

AAL

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Control: 1212

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 2, 1955
5:03 P.M.

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 865, NOVEMBER 2, 3 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

PRIORITY SENT GENEVA 15, REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 865,
BEIRUT 107, DAMASCUS 79, AMMAN 73, BAGHDAD 58, JIDDA 55,
TEL AVIV 118, LONDON 158, PARIS 82, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI UNNUMBERED.

(4) INTRA-AREA ARRANGEMENTS WITH SOVIETS HAD NOT PROGRESSED AS FAR AS ASSUMED. EGYPT NOT AS YET A SOURCE OF ARMS TO SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA. SYRIA A VERY POOR COUNTRY AND HAD LITTLE TO OFFER SOVIETS COMMERCIALY. SYRIA WISHED ARMS FROM EGYPT BUT COULD NOT PAY. HE DID NOT SEE THAT EGYPT HAD RESOURCES TO PROVIDE ARMS, FOR WHICH SHE HAD TO PAY, TO SYRIA FREE OF CHARGE. SAUDI ARABIA ALSO IN QUANDARY AND PROBABLY PASSING THROUGH CRISIS STAGE WITH US. HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT ONE FACTOR HERE IS THAT SAUDIES DO NOT LIKE TO SEE MUCH GREATER STRENGTH IN IRAQ. SAUDI MISSION, ACCOMPANIED BY EGYPTIAN, NOW IN WESTERN EUROPE SEEKING ARMS. HE FELT THEY WERE GOING THROUGH SOMEWHAT SAME CYCLE THAT HE HAD DONE, AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN THE HEAVIER TYPES OF EQUIPMENT THEY WISHED. HE, ONLY LAST WEEK, ADVISED THEM THAT IT PROBABLY BETTER IN VIEW OF INTENSER REACTIONS TO EGYPTIAN-CZECH DEAL THAT THEY TRY TO DEAL WITH SOVIET BLOC. HE THEREFORE ADVISED THEY TRY AGAIN IN U.S. HE THOUGHT THAT THEY PROBABLY WOULD NOT OBTAIN SATISFACTION FROM U.S., PARTLY BECAUSE WE WOULD THINK THEIR DEMANDS EXCESSIVE AS REGARDS THEIR CAPABILITIES. HE THEN ENVISAGED THEY WILL TURN BACK TO HIM AND OFFER TO PAY HIM IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOR ARMS. STATED THIS WOULD PUT HIM IN A QUANDARY WHICH HE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO REFUSE. I TOLD HIM GENERAL NATURE OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH SAUDIS THIS SUBJECT.

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Date 11/10/55

SAUDI

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TOP SECRET

- 2 - 865, NOVEMBER 2, 3 P.M. (SECTION 2 OF 2) FROM CAIRO.

SAUDI TROOPS NOT TO BE "STATIONED" ON EGYPTIAN SOIL AS I PREVIOUSLY UNDERSTOOD. SOME WOULD COME FOR JOINT MANEUVERS BUT HE PROPOSED TO LET NO FOREIGN TROOPS, EVEN ARAB, BE STATIONED IN EGYPT IN PEACE TIME.

(5) HE HOPED COMING PERIOD WOULD BE ONE OF LESS TENSION WITH AMERICA. HE WAS NOT GOING TO ASK FOR ARMS; THEREFORE THAT IRRITANT HAD BEEN REMOVED. HE UNDERSTOOD WE WANTED TO STRENGTHEN THE NORTH BUT HOPED PRESSURE WOULD NOT BE APPLIED FOR NEW ADHERENTS AT THIS STAGE. TOLD HIM I THOUGHT THIS OUR POSITION BUT KNEW THAT OTHERS FELT STRONGLY OTHERWISE. I CERTAIN IF GENERAL CONCLUSION WERE EVER REACHED THAT EGYPTIAN COOPERATION IMPOSSIBLE THEN VERY QUICK ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE OBTAIN ADDITIONAL ADHERENTS. THIS HE TOOK IN UNDERSTANDING WAY.

(6) HE AND MINISTER OF FINANCE KAISSUNY WERE ABOUT ONLY ONES HOLDING OUT FOR WORLD BANK IN CONNECTION WITH DAM. HE FELT THIS MOST PRACTICAL WAY OF PROCEEDING BUT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE FEELING HIS OTHER ADVISERS THAT WORLD BANK FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER WOULD ONLY STALL AND DELAY. ONLY ALTERNATIVE HE MENTIONED WAS WESTERN CONSORTIUM.

(7) NOW THAT HUSSEIN HAD ASKED SECRETARY ABOUT WHEAT HE HOPED WE COULD BE HELPFUL. HE SOMEWHAT IRKED AT HUSSEIN AS HE HAD TOLD HUSSEIN NOT TO RAISE SUBJECT WITH YOU. HE CONCERNED REGARDING U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS AND WISHED NOT TO ASK US FOR ANYTHING WE WOULD HAVE TO TURN DOWN BECAUSE OF EFFECT UPON HIS ASSOCIATES.

(8) HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT WE WOULD DO REGARDING ECONOMIC AID IN FUTURE. IF WE COULD ASSIST EGYPT HE HOPED OUR ASSISTANCE COULD BE TURNED WITHOUT DELAY TOWARDS PREPARATIONS FOR HIGH DAM. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT IF EGYPT UNDERTOOK THIS PROJECT SHE COULD NO LONGER AFFORD TO DEVOTE HER RESOURCES TO SOME OF THE OTHER PROGRAMS ON WHICH WE WERE NOW ASSISTING.

IN SUMMARY WOULD SAY I FOUND NASSER MORE CONSCIOUS OF TRUE NATURE OUR CONCERN AND APPARENTLY WILLING TO MAKE MORE OF AN EFFORT IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS. HIS ATTITUDE WITH VISITING CONGRESSMEN YESTERDAY POINTED DECIDELY IN THIS DIRECTION.

52371

BYROADE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TOP SECRET COVER SHEET

1. TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER

1240 RM/R-F-525-1A

4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) (Origin, subject, reference no. or other pertinent data)

674.84a/11-255 Tel#065 from Cairo
Tel. No. 865 fr Cairo dtd 11/2/55
(Sec 1 of 2)

re. Talk with Nasser -Middle East Situation

5. FORWARDED

11/2/55 11/2/55
(Date)

LEO DOLOFF

L. Doloff

(Top Secret Control Officer)

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TELEGRAMS, DESPATCHES, ETC.

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3. DATE AND NAME OF PERSON PREPARING FORM

6. PERSONS TO WHOM ROUTED OR READING DOCUMENT	7. OFFICE SYMBOL	8. SIGNATURES	9. DATE RECEIVED	10. DATE READ	11. DATE RELEASED
Fraser Wilkins	NEA:NE				
		Burdett	11/3	11/3	11/3
		J. G. ...	11/7	11/7	11/7
		CRC	11/7	11/7	11/9
		A. H. Armstrong	11/9		
		Leo Doloff	R-90244-11-9-55		
		Upshad	12/20/56		
Released to HD 2/27/57 #537639		Sam Branner			2/27/57
Helene De Long	HD	Helene De Long	3-1-57		3-1-57
G.M.R. Dougall	HD				11-12-57

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TOP SECRET COVER SHEET

1. TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER

1212

4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) (Origin, subject, reference no. or other pertinent data)

Tel. No. 865 fr Cairo dtd Nov. 2, 1955
(Sec 2 of 2)

2. COPY INFORMATION

ACTION COPY ☒ INFORMATION COPY

TELEGRAMS, DESPATCHES, ETC

COPY NO. 1 OF 4 COPIES received.

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11/3/55
(Date)

LEO DOLOFF

(Top Secret Control Officer)

3. DATE AND NAME OF PERSON PREPARING FORM

6. PERSONS TO WHOM ROUTED OR READING DOCUMENT	7. OFFICE SYMBOL	8. SIGNATURES	9. DATE RECEIVED	10. DATE READ	11. DATE RELEASED
Fraser Wilkins	NEA:NE				
		Burdett	11/3	11/3	11/3
	AF	Stitch	11/7	11/7	11/7
	NE	CRC	11/7	11/7	11/9
		M. Armstrong	11/9		
	RAM/R	- L.D.O.C. -	R-90244		11-9-55A

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FROM
NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

Tel Aviv

Secretary of State

NOV 3 4 40, November 2, 3 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 440 REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 104 GENEVA 18
LONDON 136 AMMAN 62 BEIRUT 124 CAIRO 173 DAMASCUS 89

PASS ARMY NAVY AIR

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL

IDF spokesman announced November 1 that three Arab scouts wear
uniform of Egyptian Fedayeen were killed by Israel forces north of
Mishmar Hanagev.Upon their discovery, an exchange of shots ensued in which all
three men were killed. Allegedly they were armed with Sten guns
and bore Egyptian identity cards indicating they lived in Gaza
Strip. Israel has requested UN observers to receive bodies.In press account of incident, October 30 article in Egyptian AL
GOMHORIYA was cited in which Egypt threatened Israel with Fedayeen
attacks.Comment: Concurrent with evidence of partial mobilization, have
been appearance of numerous police checkpoints on roads throughout
Israel, which request identification from all travelers, including
in some instances personal identification of passengers in auto-
mobiles bearing diplomatic plates. Light planes observed patrolling
coastal areas at night, with infantry patrols along coast during
daylight. November 1 minor riot occurred when Israel police
stopped bus on Tiberias-Nazareth run and made thorough identifi-
cation of all Arab passengers.

LAWSON

GWL/6

DEC 12 1955

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FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 442, NOVEMBER 2, 3 PM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 442 REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 19, CAIRO 174, JERUSALEM 52, LONDON 137, PARIS 105, AMMAN 63, BEIRUT 125, DAMASCUS 90.

PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR.

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL.

EMBASSY CONCURS UNTSO APPRAISAL POTENTIAL SERIOUSNESS NITZANA SITUATION, JERUSALEM 135 TO DEPARTMENT, FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

(1) CONTINUED OCCUPATION ISRAEL TERRITORY BY EGYPTIAN TROOPS CREATES SITUATION WHERE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SERIOUSLY CRITICIZED FOR MILITARY INACTION IN CASE UN UNSUCCESSFUL OBTAINING PROMPT WITHDRAWAL.

(2) MILITARY SITUATION NITZANA AREA SUCH THAT ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY REMOVING EGYPTIAN TROOPS THROUGH A SIMPLE LOCALIZED ACTION. ACCORDING IDF DEPUTY CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, EGYPTIAN UNITS IN D/Z HAVE IMMEDIATELY BEHIND THEM ON EGYPTIAN SOIL A BATTALION LOCATED ON HILL CLOSE PROXIMITY WHICH IN TURN IS REINFORCED BY ENTIRE EGYPTIAN DIVISION WHICH WAS SENT TO EL AUJA AREA AT TIME KHAN YUNIS INCIDENT.

(3) IN EMBASSY'S JUDGMENT RECOGNITION THAT AN OPERATION DESIGNED TO EXPEL A LIMITED NUMBER OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS FROM ISRAEL MIGHT SPREAD TO A DIVISIONAL BATTLE ACCOUNTS, AT LEAST IN PART, FOR THE PARTIAL MOBILIZATION PROCESS INITIATED HERE OCTOBER 28 (EMBT 431) AND WHICH IS CONTINUING AS OF TODAY.

Control: 964

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 2, 1955

10:31 AM

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674.84A/11-255

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● -2- 442, NOVEMBER 2, 3 PM, FROM TEL AVIV.

(4) EVIDENCE THAT FEDA YEEN HAVE RESUMED OPERATIONS IN ISRAEL (EMBTel 440) WILL STRENGTHEN PUBLIC SUPPORT HERE FOR STRONG GOVERNMENT MEASURES DESIGNED TO TAKE INITIATIVE FROM THE EGYPTIANS.

WHILE NEW GOVERNMENT TAKING OFFICE ONLY TODAY, AND WITH SOME OF ITS MEMBERS UNACQUAINTED WITH DETAILS SHARETT'S TALKS PARIS AND GENEVA, IT IS APPARENT THAT NITZANA AND FEDA YEEN SITUATION ARE SO PRESSING THAT FORMULATION BASIC POLICY TOWARDS EGYPT WILL NOT (REPEAT NOT) BE LONG DELAYED.

LAWSON

TT-MEM

NOTE: Relayed OSD, ARMY, NAVY, AIR 3:50 p.m. 11/2/55 CWO-JRL

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DEC 7 - 1955

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Department of State

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Control: 1515
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 3 1955
6:57 A.M.

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 448, NOVEMBER 2, 7 P.M.

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FOR REASONS SET FORTH EMBTEL 442, EMBASSY AGREES WITH HAMMARSKJOLD SUGGESTION TRIPARTITE DEMARCHES SUPPORT BURN'S PROPOSALS EASING TENSIONS DEMILITARIZED ZONE, AS SET FORTH IN TELEGRAM NOVEMBER 1. AGREE ENTIRELY POINTS 1 AND 3 BURN'S PROGRAM BUT BELIEVE HE INTENDED TO INCLUDE IN POINT 2 PROPOSAL WITHDRAWAL EGYPTIAN TROOPS NOW ENTRENCHED ISRAEL SIDE FRONTIER LINE. THIS IS MOST INFLAMMATORY ASPECT OF PROBLEM AT MOMENT. SUGGEST US, UN CHECK THIS POINT WITH BURNS.

LAWSON

LFS-CES

1955 NOV 3 PM 3 21
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Control: 1514
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6:59 AM
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FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 449, NOVEMBER 2, 7 PM

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OSD

SENT DEPARTMENT 449; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 139, PARIS 108

HAVE DISCUSSED CONTENTS DEPTELS 269 AND 299 WITH MY BRITISH COLLEAGUE. WHILE HE PERSONALLY AGREES WITH SUBSTANCE JERUSALEM FORMULA PROPOSED, WE ARE BOTH IN AGREEMENT THAT FROM STAND-POINT NORMAL PROCEDURE AND TACTICS IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO DISCUSS THIS ENTIRE MATTER WITH SHARETT RATHER THAN WITH BEN GURION. UNLESS YOU PERCEIVE OBJECTION, I PLAN TO PROCEED ON THIS BASIS.

LAWSON

LFS-REM

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RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 450, November 2, 7 p.m.

SENT JERUSALEM 53, REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 450,
CAIRO 176, LONDON 140, PARIS 109, GENEVA 21. PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR.

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL

In response to inquiry today by USARMA, IDF Foreign Liaison Office said Egyptians were now occupying five square kilometers Israel territory D/Z and that Egyptian strength therein totaled two companies plus additional supporting machinegun and mortar elements.

In view of fact it is difficult believe Israelis would long permit such a situation, if accurately reported, to continue, believe it would be helpful if you would check foregoing report with UNTSO, obtaining a clear statement of whether UN observers have been in last days close enough to scene to determine accurately Egyptian strength.

IDF has also reported Egyptian vampire jets flying reconnaissance missions over Israel coastal areas. Would appreciate being informed whether GOI has made any complaints UNTSO this matter.

LAWSON

BD

Note: Passed OSD, ARMY, NAVY AND AIR 10 a.m. 11/3/55 GWO/JRL

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DEC 12 1955

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Control: 1505
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 3, 1955
6:50 AM

FROM: JERUSALEM

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 137, NOVEMBER 2, 5 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 137; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 59, CAIRO 96,
TEL AVIV 113

UNTSO REPORTS NO INDICATIONS OF INCREASE IN NUMBER EGYPTIANS
ISRAELI SIDE FRONTIER IN EL AUJA D/Z, WHICH BELIEVED REMAIN
SUBSTANTIALLY AS REPORTED CONTEL 135. BOTH PARTIES ENGAGED IN
CONTINUING WORK IMPROVING THEIR POSITIONS AND SOME MOVEMENT
PERSONNEL IN AREA NOTED. ISRAELIS BELIEVED TO HAVE ABOUT
200 TROOPS IN D/Z. HOWEVER, THESE PERSONS ALTHOUGH CLOTHED
IN ARMY UNIFORMS BUT WEARING POLICEMEN'S CAPS AND INSIGNIA
OF RANK, ARE OSTENSIBLY "POLICE".

UNTSO UNAWARE ANY BASIS FOR STATEMENTS REPORTEDLY APPEARING
IN ISRAELI PRESS TO EFFECT THAT "UNTSO NOW AGREES WITH
ISRAELIS THAT TWO COMPANIES EGYPTIANS ARE ON ISRAELI SIDE
FRONTIER".

COLE

LFS-WM

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1955 NOV 3 PM 9 36

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Action

Control: 1434

Rec'd: November 3, 1955
5:37 a.m.

SCA

FROM: Jerusalem

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 138, November 2, 5 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 138 REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 60, BEIRUT 36, CAIRO 97, ROME 3 TEL AVIV 114.

According UNTSO source UNRWA and UNTSO dependents have been evacuated from Gaza. CONGEN understands that several American missionary families are resident Gaza. In view present situation and fact that Gaza strip apparently not (repeat not) within any Consular district, please advise which Foreign Service post responsible their evacuation if necessary—

COLE

BB:DT

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BUREAU OF SECURITY

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AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS

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Control: 1288
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 2, 1955
8:50 P.M.

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 396, NOVEMBER 2, 7 P.M.

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REFERENCE PALESTINE.

ALPHAND (FRANCE) TELEPHONED TO INFORM US THAT FRENCH FONOFF CONCURRED IN BURNS' PROPOSED PLAN OF ACTION RE EL AUJA. FONOFF DID NOT (REPEAT NOT), HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT THREE GOVERNMENTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE DEMARCHES AT PRESENT TIME WITH ISRAEL AND EGYPT IN SUPPORT OF BURNS' PLAN. THIS WAS BECAUSE WHOLE MIDDLE EASTERN QUESTION BEING CONSIDERED AT GENEVA AND THE OUTCOME OF THESE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE KNOWN BEFORE TAKING SUCH A STEP. AT THAT TIME SOMETHING MORE DECISIVE MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN. ALPHAND SUGGESTED THAT UK, US AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS ARRANGE MEET WITH HAMMARSKJOLD AND BURNS TOMORROW.

DIXON (UK) HAS ALSO RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS PERMITTING HIM GIVE UK SUPPORT TO BURNS' PLAN, INCLUDING UK READINESS MAKE DEMARCHES IN CAPITALS. BOTH UK AND FRENCH AGREE THAT BURNS' LETTER SHOULD BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWALS FROM KIBBUTZ AS BEING WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO PROVISIONS OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

LODGE

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Action
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Control: 1097

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 2, 1955
2:04 PMInfo
RMR

FROM: USARMA ISRAEL

TO: Secretary of State

NO: MAI 849, 021341Z (ARMY MESSAGE)

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NIACT

TO DEPTAR FOR G-2; INFO USARMAS BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO,
DAMASCUS AND AMMAN, STATE, NAVY, AIR, USNMR PARIS, USCINCEUR,
USDOCOLAND AND USDOSOUTH.

NOFORN

HEAVY MIL TRAFFIC CONTINUES ON ROADS WITH LARGE NUMBER ASSORTED
VEHICLES RETURNING EMPTY FROM SOUTH, ALL WITH IMPROVISED
CAMOUFLAGE BY OVERALL APPLICATION MUD. SOME EVIDENCE RELEASE
OF SMALL PORTION REQUISITIONED CIV VEH INCL TRUCKS AND SHERUTIM.
MTR TRK BN OF ONE-ONE HALF TON CIV VEH LOC GAN SCHLOMO (NEAR
REHOVOT). ONE RES CO GUARDING AMMO DUMP NUMBER 504 SOUTH OF
REHOVOT. PERS RECONN OF TSEREFIN (SARAFAND) BASE DISCLOSED HQ
SIGN OF 10 BRIG (HAR-EL). BRIG IN NEW TENT CAMP AND OCCUPYING
OLD BRIT BKS. NEARBY IS GROUP ABOUT SIX NEWLY PAINTED TANKS OF
UNDETERMINED TYPE, AND APPROX 30-40 TANK TRANSPORTERS.

COMMENT: EST THAT PRIMARY MSN OF PARTIAL MOB NOW ACCOMPLISHED:
MOVEMENT COMBAT ELEMENTS AND RES FORCES TO POSITIONS AND ESTAB
LISHMENT FWD SUPPLY DUMPS. VEH STANDBY SUGGESTS PRES UNCERTAINTY
REGARDING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. TANKS AT TSEREFIN POSSIBLY BELONG
TANK SUPT CO 10 BRIG. TRANSPORTERS PROBABLY NOT PART OF BRIG,
BUT BELONG BASE TRANSP UNIT.

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QUERY

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Control: 1096

Rec'd: NOVEMBER

2:04 PM

1955 NOV 2 PM 4 16

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Control

674.84A/11-255

This Document Must Be Returned to

FROM: USARMA ISRAEL

TO: Secretary of State

NO: MAI 850, 021424Z (ARMY MESSAGE)

NIACT

TO DEPTAR FOR G-2; INFO USARMAS BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS, USARMA AMMAN, STATE, AIR, NAVY, USNMR PARIS, USCINCEUR USDOCOLAND AND USDOCOSOUTH.

PART I

FLO IDF REPORTS EGYPT FORCES STRENGTH TWO INFANTRY COMPANYS WITH ADDITIONAL MORTAR AND MG UNITS NOW OCCUPY FIVE SQUARE KILOMETRES ISRAEL TERRITORY IN DZ NITZANA.

COMMENT: THIS A SOURCE POTENTIAL TROUBLE IN VIEW FACT ONE EGYPTIAN BN OCCUPIES RIDGE IN REAR OF ABOVE CO AND REMAINDER DIV TO REAR OF RIDGE.

PART II

FLO REPORTS DAILY INCURSION ALONG SOUTHERN COAST ISRAEL OF VERY LOW FLYING EGYPTIAN JETS ON RECONNAISSANCE OR PHOTO MISSION. SPEED AND INABILITY TO RADAR TRACK MILITATE AGAINST INTERCEPTION.

QUERY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

SECRET

DATE: November 2, 1955

SUBJECT: Mr. Elmore Jackson's Discussions with the Egyptians and the Israelis.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Elmore Jackson, American Friends Service Committee
NEA - George V. Allen
NE - Fraser Wilkins
NE - William C. Burdett
NE - Donald C. Bergus DB

COPIES TO: FILES

Mr. Jackson called today on Mr. Allen after which he came to NE to continue the discussion with Messrs. Wilkins, Burdett and Bergus.

Mr. Jackson reported that since his visit to the Near East this summer he had continued his talks in New York and Washington where he had seen Messrs. Eban and Rafeel from the Israel side and Messrs. Fawzi and Hussein from the Egyptian. Mr. Jackson felt that considerable progress had been made, considering the circumstances. He had sent a letter with Fawzi for Colonel Nasser asking whether the Egyptians felt that the exercise should be continued.

Among the items mentioned by Mr. Jackson were:

1. The Israelis had "given him a bad time" in New York, arguing that Mr. Jackson's efforts this summer had been used as a cover by Nasser for his adventures against Israel in August. They later desisted from this line of argument and stated that Jackson's efforts had prevented an Egyptian reaction to the Israel raid on Khan Yunis on September 1. For this the Israelis were grateful.

2. In the course of the discussions this summer, it had been proposed that each side make some sort of tangible gesture to indicate its willingness to continue the discussions and to consider implementation of other proposals. The Israelis had offered to free twelve Egyptian "political prisoners" they held if the Egyptians would release the six "Zionist spies" in Egyptian prisons for exile to a third, neutral country. The Egyptians had accepted this proposal in principle, but had made reservations about the proper timing. Mr. Jackson was giving consideration to other gestures of this type which the parties might agree to, giving particular thought to a boundary adjustment or a gesture to help the refugees.

3. With regard to the Gulf of Aqaba, the Israelis had suggested to Mr. Jackson that the Friends might wish to form a group of lawyers to study and report on the

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legal rights of the parties. When Mr. Jackson broached this idea to the Egyptians, they were at first inclined to reject it, saying that international law was clearly in their favor. Recently they have been a little more receptive to the proposal. Mr. Jackson doubted if the Friends had the resources to conduct such a study. He was told that the Department, at the working level, was giving thought to suggesting that the matter be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision.

4. Ben Gurion had expressed a willingness to go to Cairo for talks with Nasser. Nasser had rejected the idea but not without considerable thought and gave the impression that he had not closed his mind on the subject.

5. The Israelis were eager to talk with Egyptian representatives and Raphael had said that once talks started, the Egyptians would be surprised by the flexibility and willingness to contribute to a settlement on the part of the Israel representatives. Mr. Allen pointed out the means whereby the U.S. was presently talking to Communist China at Geneva and wondered whether under similar circumstances and on a similar basis, talks between Egyptian and Israel representatives might not be arranged.

MRS. MILTON NEVINS
Honorary President
MRS. WM. S. SILVERMAN
President
MRS. MEYER LEVINSON
1st Vice-President
MRS. JOSEPH KLEIN
2nd Vice-President
MRS. C. DAVID MATT
Recording Secretary

The Sisterhood
OF THE
WEST PHILADELPHIA JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER
63RD AND LUDLOW STREETS
PHILADELPHIA 39, PA.
GRANITE 6-0300

MRS. BERNARD GLICKMAN
Corresponding Secretary
MRS. SIMON FINKELSTEIN
Treasurer
MRS. LEWIS MYERS
Financial Secretary
MRS. SOLOMON GOLDSTEIN
MRS. HARRY FELGOISE
Social Secretaries

R E S O L U T I O N

WHEREAS, Israel is the only Democracy in the Middle East, AND

WHEREAS, the recent increase of tension in that area arising

from the willingness of the Communist bloc to offer arms, and their acceptance by the Arab Countries, has created a situation which has endangered the peace of the world, AND

WHEREAS, it is in the enlightened self interest of the United States that steps be taken at once to secure the borders of Israel upon the basis of the 1949 Armistice Agreement.

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the SISTERHOOD OF THE WEST PHILADELPHIA JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER do hereby call upon the Government of the United States of America to preserve the peace in the Middle East by taking the following steps :

1. Sending no further arms to the Arab Nations.
2. Maintaining the balance of power in the Middle East by granting arms assistance to Israel, to offset Communist arms to the Arab Nations.
3. Enter into a mutual security pact with Israel and any other Nation in the Middle East which desires to maintain peace.

Be it further resolved, that a copy of this Resolution be sent to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and such other public officials as the officers of this SISTERHOOD may consider necessary.

Susan K. Glickman
(Mrs. Bernard Glickman),
Corresponding Secretary

Esther Lee Silverman
(Mrs. William S. Silverman),
President

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THE SISTERHOOD
WEST PHILADELPHIA
JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER
63RD AND LUDLOW STREETS
PHILADELPHIA 39, PA.



*The Secretary of State
Mr. John Foster Dulles
Washington
D. C.*

January 3 1956

Dear Mrs. Silverman:

I have been asked to reply to your recent letter to Secretary Dulles concerning United States policy with regard to the Arab-Israel dispute. The Secretary appreciates your interest in making the views of your organization available to him.

I believe that you and the members of your organization will be interested in the enclosed copy of a statement prepared in the Department concerning our policies in the Near East. Also attached is a copy of the address made by Secretary Dulles on August 26 in which he outlined certain steps which the United States would be prepared to take to contribute toward a solution of the Arab-Israel dispute.

Sincerely yours,

John P. Meagher
Chief
Public Services Division

Enclosures:

1. Statement.
2. Address by Secretary Dulles,
August 26, 1955.

16
Mrs. William S. Silverman, President,
The Sisterhood of the West Philadelphia Jewish
Community Center,
Sixty-third and Ludlow Streets,
Philadelphia 39, Pennsylvania.

W
P:SEV:ICAMPBELL:mr

12/29/55

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JAN 3 1956 P.M.

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AIR

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 869, NOVEMBER 3, 5 P.M.

FACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 869, REPEATED INFORMATION ROME 19, JERUSALEM 51.

REFERENCE: JERUSALEMS 138 TO DEPARTMENT REPEATED CAIRO 97
ROME 3.

IN ABSENCE INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRARY CAIRO ASSUMES IT IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR AMERICANS IN GAZA. OUR CAPABILITIES LIMITED
BUT HAVE TAKEN STEPS AT LEAST TO INFORM AMERICANS THEY MIGHT
BE WELL ADVISED TO LEAVE GAZA UNTIL SITUATION CLARIFIES.

BYROADE

WEB

Note: Mr. Bergus (NE) notified 11/3/55 5:25 p.m. EH

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 870, NOVEMBER 3, 10 PM

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 870, NIACT GENEVA 17, NIACT USUN 34, REPEATED
INFORMATION NIACT TEL AVIV 119, NIACT JERUSALEM 52, NIACT
LONDON 160, PRIORITY MOSCOW 11, PRIORITY PARIS 84, PRIORITY
AMMAN 74, PRIORITY BAGHDAD 59, PRIORITY BEIRUT 109, PRIORITY
DAMASCUS 80, PRIORITY JIDDA 56.

DEPARTMENT PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR

GENEVA PASS SECRETARY.

JOINT STATE-ARMY MESSAGE.

GOE SPOKESMAN THIS AFTERNOON STATED SUCCESSFUL EGYPTIAN
COUNTERATTACK 3 NOVEMBER WHICH STARTED AT 1000 AND COMPLETED
1500 RECAPTURING SEBHA POSITIONS LOST PREVIOUS NIGHT TO ISRAEL
ACTION DESCRIBED AS THREE-WAY ATTACK INVOLVING INFANTRY,
TANKS AND AIR. TWO HUNDRED ISRAELIS REPORTED KILLED AND TOTAL
70 EGYPTIANS NOW MISSING IN TWO DAYS ACTION. ALL PLANES
RETURNED SAFELY TO BASES.

MAJOR SALAMA, ACTING CHIEF PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS, QUERIED AS TO
FURTHER DETAILS STATED:

1. EGYPTIANS ESTIMATED 3000 ISRAELIS IN EL QUJA AREA AND THEREFORE
EGYPTIAN COUNTER ATTACKING FORCE MUST HAVE BEEN IN SUFFICIENT
STRENGTH TO EFFECTIVELY HANDLE.

2. EGYPTIAN AIR PARTICIPATED ONLY IN RECONNAISSANCE ROLE.
NO AIR ACTION TOOK PLACE.

3. ISRAELIS

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-2- 870, NOVEMBER 3, 10 PM, FROM CAIRO

3. ISRAELIS SINCE YESTERDAY HAVE CONFINED UN OBSERVERS IN EL AUJATO QUARTERS AND HAVE LEFT UNANSWERED UN PROTESTS BY MAJOR GIACOMOGGI IN GMCA.

4. SPECIFICALLY DENIED ANY FIGHTING ELSEWHERE BUT AVOIDED COMMENT ABOUT POSSIBLE COMMANDO OPERATIONS.

BYROADE

JK

NOTE: MR. BURDETT (NEA) NOTIFIED 11/3/55, 9:20 PM, EH
PASSED ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR, 11 PM, (CTW)

NOV 8 1955

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Action
NEA

Control: 1421

Rec'd: November 3, 1955
5:07 a.m.

Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 451, November 3, 8 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 451 REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 172 AMMAN
65, JERUSALEM 54, BEIRUT 128, DAMASCUS 92, PARIS 119, LONDON 141,
PRIORITY GENEVA 22.

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PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE

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USIA
CIA

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL

48
NOT CORRECTED ATTACHED
IDF-FLO advised USARMA that "late last night" IDF drove Egyptian forces in strength one battalion from demilitarized zone. Egyptian losses were 50 killed and 40 prisoners, latter including two officers. Israel casualties 4 dead and 19 wounded. IDF forces allegedly did not strike beyond D/Z boundary, FLO claims all Israel troops have returned to their base. Further details will be forwarded when available. All signs Tel Aviv point toward acceleration mobilization.

LAWSON

BB:GWL/5

Note: Relayed OSD Army Navy and Air 1 p.m., 11/3/55 CWO, JRL

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11/4/55 4:30 a.m.
CORRECTED COPY

Control:1421

Rec'd: November 3, 1955
5:07 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 451, November 3, 8 a.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 451, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 177, AMMA
65, JERUSALEM 54, BEIRUT 128, DAMASCUS 92, PARIS 119, LONDON 141,
PRIORITY GENEVA 22.

PASS, ARMY NAVY, AIR FORCE

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL

IDF-FLO advised USARMA that "late last night" IDF drove Egyptian
forces in strength one battalion from demilitarized zone. Eyp-
tian losses were 50 killed and 40 prisoners, latter including two
officers. Israel casualties 4 dead and 19 wounded. IDF forces
allegedly did not strike beyond D/Z boundary, FLO claims all
Israel troops have returned to their base. Further details will be
furnished when available. All signs Tel Aviv point toward
acceleration mobilization.

LAWSON

EOC:ECM

Note: Relayed OSD Army Navy and Air 1 p.m., 11/3/55 CWO, JRL

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by RM/R

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NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Control: 1625

Rec'd: November 9:26 a.m.

1955 NOV 3 AM 11 43

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RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 453, November 3

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SENT DEPARTMENT 453; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 178, AMMAN 66, JERUSALEM 9, BEIRUT 128, DAMASCUS 93, PARIS 111, LONDON 142, PRIORITY GENEVA 23

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GENEVA FOR RUSSELL

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PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE

In commenting on IDF operation Nitzana Foreign Ministry spokesman made following release (translated from Hebrew):

QUOTE

The IDF operation was aimed at removing the Egyptian forces from Israel area. The Egyptian Army entered Israel on October 26. The following day Egyptian units crossed the border again, began to occupy Israel territory. Later these units were reinforced and spread over a large area. A line of Egyptian posts was set up by Egyptians. They continued to dig in.

Israel drew attention of UN to these facts. She was told that UNTSO had approached Egypt at least 4 times calling upon her to retreat from Israel. Egypt refused. It was also reported to Israel that General Burns made same appeal to Egypt and he was told by Egyptian representatives in New York, Egypt would not retreat.

Last Friday Foreign Ministry spokesman announced Israel only wants Egypt to clear out of Israel territory. Egypt disregarded this announcement. Egypt continued to keep her forces in Israel and reinforced them in area occupied by her. There is no room in Israel for Egyptian soldiers. Their place is in Egypt and it is up to them to go back there. If they do not go voluntarily it will be necessary to return them there.

Presenting his new government yesterday morning Ben Gurion said

"We never

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-2- 453, November 3, from Tel Aviv

"We never have nor ever shall premeditate war against anyone".
This is our policy, but if Israel territory is invaded,
invaders will be rebuffed.

END QUOTE

LAWSON

LFS/6

Note: Relayed OSD, Army, Navy, Air force, 11/3/55, 10:30 a.m.
CWO/JRL

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DEC 7 - 1955

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Control: 1656

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 3, 1955
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FROM: TEL AVIV

SS
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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 455, NOVEMBER 3, 4 P.M.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 455 REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT GENEVA 24.

PASS ARMY, NAVY AND AIR.

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CIA

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL

ALTHOUGH EMBTEL 451 REPORTING NITZANA ACTION LAST NIGHT APPEARS TO HAVE CROSSED DEPTTEL 310, I PLAN TO SEE SHARETT TONIGHT AND, IN VIEW OF FACT THAT SITUATION WITH EGYPT VERY TENSE AND ADDITIONAL MILITARY CLASHES QUITE POSSIBLE, SHALL TAKE PRECAUTION OF REMINDING HIM OF SECRETARY'S ADMONITION. EMBASSY ESTIMATES SITUATION IS:

(1) IT HAS BEEN APPARENT SINCE OCTOBER 29 (EMBTLS 431, 432,

442, 448 AND 450) THAT UNLESS EGYPTIANS WITHDREW TROOPS FROM ISRAEL SIDE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY IDF TROOPS WOULD FORCIBLY REMOVE THEM.

(2) IN EMBASSY'S JUDGMENT SHORT DELAY IN DOING SO WAS TRACEABLE LARGELY TO IDF PRECAUTIONARY MOVE TO CALL UP AND POSITION ADDITIONAL MILITARY STRENGTH TO MEET AND DEAL WITH ANY EGYPTIAN COUNTERACTION.

(3) AS OF THIS MORNING PARTIAL MOBILIZATION PROCESS IS CONTINUING. IT APPEARS LIKELY IF NASSER SENDS HIS TROOPS ACROSS BORDER ISRAELIS ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN ACTION LARGE ENOUGH TO WIPE OUT EGYPTIAN FORCES IN SINAI. IF, ON OTHER HAND, NASSER DECIDES TO RETALIATE FOR NITZANA AND KUNTILLA BY EXTENSIVE

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-2- 455, NOVEMBER 3, 4 P.M. FROM TEL AVIV

USE FEDA YEEN WITHIN ISRAEL, PUBLIC AND MAAG REACTION HERE
IN CASE CIVILIAN MURDERS MIGHT BE STRONG ENOUGH TO LEAD GOI
AUTHORIZE IDF ENGAGE SIMILAR LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS.

(4) GOI SO SENSITIVE TO POSSIBILITY PREVENTIVE WAR LABEL
(EMBEDS 309) AND BEING CALLED AGGRESSOR THAT IT WOULD BE
RELUCTANT TO SEND ITS FORCES SOUTHERN AREA INTO EGYPTIAN TERRITORY
WITHOUT INITIAL EGYPTIAN PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY.

(5) UNDERLYING EGYPTIAN-ISRAEL SITUATION IS DETERIORATING TO
POINT WHERE ADMONITIONS AND CONDEMNATIONS MAY PROVE INEFFECTUAL
AND STRONGER MEASURES REQUIRED BY TRIPARTITE POWERS RE BOTH
PARTIES IF GENERAL CONFLICT TO BE AVOIDED.

LAWSON

TT

NOTE: PASSED OSD, ARMY, NAVY AND AIR 11/3/55, NOON CWO/JRL.

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DEC 7 - 1955

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13 *Info* Department of State

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19-13

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NAVY

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 459, November 3, 9 p.m.

Control: 2212

Rec'd: November 4, 1955
5:39 a.m.This Document Must Be Returned to
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674.34A/11-355

SENT DEPARTMENT 459, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 179, AMMAN 67,
JERUSALEM 56, BEIRUT 130, DAMASCUS 94, PARIS 113, LONDON 144,
GENEVA 25

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL

EMBTel 451.

In first official press release from Army spokesman on Nitznan
action, announcement as well as subsequent Foreign Minister
fchl* made no (repeat no) mention of D/Z. Army referred twice
to Nitzana area in Israel and Foreign Minister spokesman announ-
ment made 6 references to "Israel territory".

At least one newspaper MAARIV (Independent) in writing its
account of actions speculated these 2 announcements by inference
meant henceforth GOI would not (repeat not) consider this area,
setforth in jgaa* as "demilitarized", as such but in future
would consider it as sovereign portion of Israel's territory.

LAWSON

LJ/12

* As received. Will be serviced upon request.

1955 NOV 4 PM 12 23

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Control: 1519

Rec'd: November 3, 1955
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674.84A/11Info
RMR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 139, November 3, 12 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 139, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY AMMAN 61,
PRIORITY BEIRUT 37, PRIORITY CAIRO 97, PRIORITY DAMASCUS 42,
PRIORITY LONDON 62, PRIORITY PARIS 62, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 115.

UNTSO has given following information regarding Israeli attack
El Auja area last night. At midnight observers in D/Z were
ordered to get indoors and remain there. UNTSO believes they are
still "confined to quarters". However, observers were able to see
(apparently through windows) following Israeli materiel leaving
area after attack: 53 trucks, 39 Command cars, 14 jeeps plus
artillery and 120 M.M. mortars. They also saw captured Egyptian
materiel being moved away by Israelis which reported as follows:
3 trucks, 6 Command cars, 3 Bren gun carriers, 11 "power wagons", one
40 M.M. Bofors gun, 157 M.M. anti-tank guns. UNTSO radio trans-
mitter Beersheba can not be heard account jamming its wave length.
No interference UNTSO radio El Auja.

Regarding Egyptian platoon previously reported across frontier
Egyptian officer has explained to observer reason for location
there was solely tactical. He added that without holding par-
ticular location involved position of remainder company to which
platoon belonged would not be tenable. While naive, explanation
apparently given quite seriously.

COLE

BB:REM/1

Note: Relayed OSD, Army, Navy & Air 9:45 am 11-3-55 CWO-JRL

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1955 NOV 3 AM 10 18

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Control: 1734

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 3, 1955
1:10 P.M.

1955 NOV 3 PM 3 45

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This Document Must Be Returned to

674.84A/11-355

FROM: JERUSALEM

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 141, NOVEMBER 3, 6 P.M.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 141; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY AMMAN 63,
PRIORITY BEIRUT 38, PRIORITY CAIRO 100, PRIORITY DAMASCUS 43,
PRIORITY LONDON 63, PRIORITY PARIS 63, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 117

DISCUSSED EL AUJA SITUATION WITH COLONEL HOMMEL UNTSO CHIEF
TODAY. HIS REMARKS PLUS SITUATION AS KNOWN TO UNTSO 1600
HOURS LOCAL TIME TODAY SUMMARIZED HERewith.

AS FROM 1000 HOURS TODAY ISRAELIS AGAIN ALLOWING OBSERVERS
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, EXCEPT THAT THEY MAY NOT GO SOUTH AND
WEST OF VILLAGE OF EL AUJA (NITZANA). EGYPTIANS NOT ALLOWING
OBSERVERS MOVE FREELY IN THEIR AREA. ISRAELIS FIRING ARTILLERY
INTO AREA FROM WHICH THEY DROVE EGYPTIANS LAST NIGHT, EVIDENTLY
WITH VIEW TO INTERDICTING IT TO LATTER, WHO ARE RETURNING THE
FIRE. HOMMEL APPEALING BOTH PARTIES FOR "CEASE-FIRE." EGYPTIANS
HAVE APPARENTLY NOT LODGED COMPLAINT WITH MAC. GENERAL BURNS
SCHEDULED ARRIVE JERUSALEM MORNING NOVEMBER 6.

ON BASIS ISRAELI TRANSPORT SEEN BY OBSERVERS HOMMEL ESTIMATED
THAT PERHAPS SOME 750 ISRAELI TROOPS PARTICIPATED IN ATTACK.
HOMMEL SAID GOHAR GAVE GENERAL BURNS SAME EXPLANATION FOR
PRESENCE EGYPTIAN PLATOON WITHIN ISRAEL TERRITORY AS THAT
SET FORTH FINAL PARAGRAPH CONTEL 139. HE IS UNABLE FOLLOW
GOHAR'S REASONING THIS POINT SINCE APPARENTLY LOGICAL SOLUTION
TACTICAL PROBLEM WOULD HAVE BEEN TO MOVE COMPANY BACK SOMEWHAT
TO BETTER POSITION AVAILABLE NEARBY.

Note: Relayed OSD, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, USUN, 3:45 p.m. CWO-J.R.L. 11/3/55
LFS-CES

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24-26
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IO

FROM: NEW YORK

Control: 1914

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 3, 1955
5:43 PM

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 397. NOVEMBER 3, 5 PM

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RE PALESTINE - MYTELS 393, 394 AND 395.

HAMMARSKJOLD CALLED MEETING OF US, UK AND FRENCH THIS MORNING ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN PALESTINE SITUATION. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT IT WAS REGRETTABLE THAT BURNS AND HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO PURSUE THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTION IN EL AUJA BEFORE LAST NIGHT'S ATTACK, BUT THAT HE FELT NOW THAT YESTERDAY'S EVENTS MADE IT EVEN MORE DESIRABLE TO PROCEED. HE HOPED THEREFORE THAT HE COULD GO AHEAD WITH HIS LETTER TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT BUT, AT SAME TIME, HE COULD NOT ACT AS THOUGH NOTHING HAD HAPPENED LAST NIGHT. HE WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED WITH ISRAEL'S "GRAVE INTERFERENCE" LAST NIGHT WITH UN OBSERVERS, AND CIRCULATED A DRAFT OF A NEW LETTER WHICH HE PROPOSED SENDING IMMEDIATELY TO ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE. HE ALSO BELIEVED THAT WITH APPROPRIATE AMENDMENTS TO BRING IT UP TO DATE, BURNS' PROGRAM OF ACTION RE EL AUJA SHOULD BE SENT BY HIM FORTHWITH TO THE PARTIES.

COMMENTING ON HAMMARSKJOLD'S PROPOSALS, DIXON (UK) SAID HE WAS NOT SURE IT WAS NOW DESIRABLE TO CARRY THROUGH WITH ORIGINAL LETTER TO PARTIES RELATING TO EL AUJA SITUATION. THAT LETTER HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO STOP WHAT HAD IN FACT HAPPENED YESTERDAY, AND HE FELT IT WAS RATHER UNREAL NOW TO SEND THE LETTER IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE FELT THAT WE COULD NOT OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT ISRAEL HAD TAKEN THE SITUATION INTO THEIR OWN HANDS AND BELIEVED THAT SOME CONDEMNATION SHOULD BE PASSED UPON THEM.

CROSTHWAITE ADDED THAT REMOVAL OF THE EGYPTIAN CHECK-POSTS WHICH BURNS HAD INTENDED PROPOSING HAD NOW BEEN ACCOMPLISHED

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-2-397, NOVEMBER 3, 5 PM PRIORITY FROM NEW YORK

BY FORCE AND HE, TOO, THOUGHT THE BURNS PROPOSALS WERE NOW OBSOLETE. DIXON CONCLUDED THAT SC WOULD HAVE TO ACT IN SITUATION, PARTICULARLY SINCE ISRAELI ACTION WAS NOT STRICTLY A RETALIATION AND HENCE ALL THE MORE REPREHENSIBLE.

HAMMARSKJOLD REPLIED TO DIXON THAT HE REMAINED VERY DOUBTFUL AS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF SC ACTION BUT HE FELT STRONGLY THAT A PROTEST FROM THE UN TO THE ISRAELIS WAS A "MUST" FOR TODAY. HE CONTINUED TO FEEL ALSO THAT THE ONLY PRACTICAL COURSE OF ACTION LAY IN BURNS' THREE POINTS AS CONTAINED IN HIS PROPOSED LETTER.

AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION, BRITISH AND FRENCH AGREED THAT HAMMARSKJOLD SHOULD ADDRESS A LETTER OF PROTEST TO ISRAEL ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT THE BURNS PROPOSALS, WITH APPROPRIATE AMENDMENTS, SHOULD ALSO BE FORWARDED TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT. THEY AGREED, LIKEWISE, WITH HAMMARSKJOLD'S PROPOSAL TO ISSUE A PRESS RELEASE REFERRING TO HIS ACTIONS.

ALPHAND (FRANCE) SAID THAT FRENCH FONOFF DID NOT FEEL THAT THREE POWERS SHOULD MAKE DEMARCHES TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT IN SUPPORT OF BURNS' PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH EL AUJA SITUATION, IN VIEW OF FACT THREE FONMINS WOULD BE CONSIDERING WHOLE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION. HE DID NOT OBJECT TO HAMMARSKJOLD SENDING THE PROPOSALS TO THE PARTIES, HOWEVER, NOR DID HE OBJECT TO HAVING IT KNOWN THREE POWERS HAD CONCURRED IN DESIRABILITY THESE PROPOSALS "PRIOR" TO LAST NIGHT'S ATTACK. DIXON AGREED THAT IF PROPOSALS WERE SENT FORWARD, THREE GOVERNMENTS' DEMARCHES WOULD BE DEFERRED FOR TIME BEING, PENDING DECISION AS TO ANY ADDITIONAL ACTION THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN.

I SAID I WOULD HAVE TO SUBMIT TO DEPARTMENT THE FINAL TEXTS OF HAMMARSKJOLD'S LETTER TO ISRAEL AND HIS LETTER TO BOTH PARTIES CONTAINING THE BURNS PROPOSALS. HAMMARSKJOLD ARGUED THAT HIS FINAL TEXTS WOULD BE LITTLE DIFFERENT IN SUBSTANCE FROM WHAT WE NOW HAD BEFORE US, BUT DID FINALLY AGREE TO HOLD UP ISSUANCE OF TEXTS UNTIL AFTER WE HAD BEEN ABLE SEE FINAL VERSION AND RECEIVE AND COMMUNICATE WASHINGTON'S COMMENTS.

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-3-397, NOVEMBER 3, 5 PM PRIORITY FROM NEW YORK

FINAL VERSIONS AS NOW RECEIVED FROM HAMMARSKJOLD HAVE BEEN
TELEPHONED DEPARTMENT AND ARE CONTAINED IN NEXT FOLLOWING
TELEGRAM.

LODGE

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674.84A/11-355

Tel 398

Date

11/3/55

From

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To

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Action
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Control: 1565
Rec'd: November 3, 1955
7:04 a.m.

Info
RMR

FROM: USARMA Israel

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: MAI 851,030621Z (Army Message)

NIACT

NOFORN

QUERY TO DEPTAR FOR G-2 INFO USARMAS BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, AMMAN AND DAMASCUS, STATE, NAVY, AIR, USNMR, PARIS, USCINCEUR, USDOCOLAND AND USDOCOSOUTH.

FLO advises late last night Israeli forces drove Egyptian forces amounting 1 battalion from Israeli territory in DZ. Casualties: Egypt, 50 killed and 40 prisoners including two officers; Israel, 4 dead and 19 wounded. Israel troops did not go beyond DZ and returned to base after operation. Comment: All indications this morning point to massive mob.

LMS:BD

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Bergus (NE) 9:40 a.m. 2/3/CWO-JRL.

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Action

NEA

FROM: USARMA ISRAEL

Control: 1679

Rec'd: November
10:55 a.m.

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: MAI 854, 031003Z (Army Message)

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Reference MAI 851.

Reconnaissance and reports indicate heavy movements civilian and military vehicles including heavy and lighter trucks, tankers, busses loaded with military personnel, tank transporters and prime movers during night two-three November. All motor parks empty at 0800 hours local time, but rapidly filling with newly-requisitioned vehicles. Physical count of 300 Sherutim, 50 busses, and large number civilian trucks at Ramatgan Park newly arrived; newly-mobilized civilian heavy truck battalion 50 Sherutim newly arrived Herzlia-Petuach temporary truck park. Gan Schlomo park now emptying, and military 1-1½ ton truck battalion located south Rehovot departed, but empty park now heavily camouflaged. Evidence further intent accumulate vehicles for possible use suggests mobilization reaching massive stage. I estimated 1 division (3 brigades, 1 of which is armored) now vicinity Syrian border, 3 divisions (9 brigades) 1 of which armored infantry division in southern Negev, 1 division (3 brigades 2 of which armored) in control reserve. Signed Query

LMS:DT

Note: Mr. Bergus' office (NE) notified. 2:35 p.m. 11/3/55. MG

1955 NOV 3 PM 3 20

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OLI

FROM: USARMA Israel

TO: Secretary of State

NO: MAI 855, 031131Z (Army message)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPTAR FOR G-2; INFORMATION USARMAS BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS AND AMMAN, STATE, NAVY, AIR, UNSMR PARIS, USCINCEUR, USDOCOLAND AND USDOCOSOUTH

FLO IDF adds to information MAI 851 as follows:

Egyptian forces ousted from Nitzana DZ formed part of regular infantry BI partly on Israel territory and partly on Egyptian territory. Force organized in plat position entrenched with barbed wire. Force supported by battery heavy mortars, troop 6-PDR arty, 20 mm guns and weapons carriers.

QUERY

BB:LMC/11

Control: 1711

Rec'd: November 3, 1955
11:46 a.m.

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Date 11/3/55
From State
To Geneva

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Date

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**OUTGOING
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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

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1955 NOV 3 AM 12 22

DC/T

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SENT TO: Amembassy TEL AVIV 310 NIACT
Repeated info: Amconsul GENEVA TOSEC 135 NIACT

Origin

Info:

We have been informed by SYG UN that considerable Israeli forces are building up outside El Auja zone. Info comes from General Burns' deputy. Please see Israeli authorities immediately and remind them of Secretary's admonition to Sharrett against resort to military action.

Hoover
HOOVER
(Acting)

Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)



674.84A/11-355

CS/M 674.84A/11-355

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Drafted by: NEA: GVAllen
DCT: FEDuvall:tem

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

George V. Allen

Circumstances:

52686

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TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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1955 NOV 5 PM 3 51

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SENT TO: AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

PRIORITY 917
PRIORITY 321

674.84a 11-355

(Code Room please repeat USUN's 398, November 3, to indicated posts)

*Development in
Palestine situation*

*Hoover - (ear)
Acting HOOVER*

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Origin

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(Office
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DC/R

Anal

Re: Palestine

Rev

Cat

Drafted by

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by

Clearances

IO: UNP: JML: JMW: jml 11/5/55

IO: Mr. Phillips

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Control: 2436

Rec'd: November 4, 1955
11:47 a.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 464, November 4, 2 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 464, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY GENEVA 26,
LONDON 145, PARIS 115, AMMAN 67, BEIRUT 131, PRIORITY CAIRO 180
DAMASCUS 95, JERUSALEM 57

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL

I arranged to see Foreign Minister in Jerusalem last night following a social function. I delivered message (DEPTEL 310) regarding Secretary's admonition to Sharett with regard to military action and stressed danger of such action developing into an area-wide conflagration.

Sharett then replied along following lines: When Secretary Dulles spoke to him on this matter, Secretary stressed possibility of border incidents developing into an uncontrolled situation. Sharett recalled he had said to Secretary that if Egypt continued provocative acts on borders then Israel must do something about it. He said when he spoke to Secretary he had not (repeat not) known that Egyptians at that time had penetrated into sovereign Israeli territory. When he heard of this incident which involved the digging in of sizeable number of Egyptian troops on Israeli soil, he was surprised that IDF had not (repeat not) thrown them out. On his return to Israel he said he inquired as to why such action had not (repeat not) been taken and IDF replied was waiting for "diplomatic processes to operate". However United Nations had insisted Egyptians withdraw, without results. UN had made this request not (repeat not) once but four times. Therefore Israel had to act. Had she not (repeat not) acted as she did this penetrative spirit on part of Arabs would have spread quickly and Syria might well have started similar policy and Egypt might have made invasions at other points along border. He underscored point that Israel had not reacted at once but had given diplomatic processes time to operate.

Sharett then commented that he could not (repeat not) understand

Nasser's

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-2- 464, November 4, 2 p.m., from Tel Aviv

Nasser's logic in encouraging such actions at this time. "Apparently he does not (repeat not) want war, yet he insists on creating tension whole time" he said. In reply to my statement there might be some possibility that Nasser did not (repeat not) order Egyptian troops to move into Israeli territory but that action was taken on authority assumed by local commander, Sharett was not (repeat not) convinced this was case. If it were, however, why had Nasser not (repeat not) announced it and withdrawn troops. Israel had taken exactly that line when one of its patrols made an unauthorized crossing into Gaza month or two ago (EMBTel 224).

Comment: Although there may be something in Sharett's statement re IDF awaiting diplomatic processes, this reticence does not (repeat not) appear to have extended beyond October 28, when Foreign Minister sent "for the record" letter to UNTSO, with partial mobilization beginning same evening. Neither does it explain Kuntilla operation (EMBTel 423) of October 27 which was reportedly reprisal for attack on Israel police post previous day (EMBTel 412).

LAWSON

RSP:LJ/12

Note: Relayed OSD and USUN 4 p.m., 11/4/CWO JRL.

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DEC 7 - 1965

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Action

Control: 3208

Rec'd: November 5, 1955
9:49 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 465, November 4, 5 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 465, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 182, AMMAN 69, JERUSALEM 58, BEIRUT 132, DAMASCUS 96, PARIS 116, LONDON 146, GENEVA 27.

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL

IDF Foreign Liaison Office informed USARMA morning November 4: Night passed with relative quiet. One incident. Egyptian patrol of 15 soldiers attacked observation post at Nir-Yizhaq (near Kah Yunis) at 0100 this morning. Egyptians driven away with rifle fire. No casualties. Minor parts of equipments were found.

LAWSON

JK

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Control: 3117
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10:44 AM1955 NOV 7 AM 7 41
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NEA FROM: TEL AVIV
Info
RMR TO: Secretary of State
NO: 470, NOVEMBER 4, 9 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 470, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 29, LONDON 148, PARIS 118, AMMAN 71, BEIRUT 134, CAIRO 184, DAMASCUS 98, JERUSALEM 59.

PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR

GENEVA FOR RUSSELL

IDF FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICER CHARACTERIZED CAIRO RADIO'S REPORT OF EGYPTIAN COUNTERATTACK YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AS COMPLETELY IMAGINARY. HE SAID THAT BY 4:30 A.M. NOVEMBER 3 IDF ACTION, WHICH HAD BEEN AIMED AT ELIMINATING EGYPTIAN TROOPS ENTRENCHED ISRAEL SIDE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY, HAD BEEN COMPLETED. THIS ACTION TO BE EFFECTIVE HAD ALSO REQUIRED REDUCTION EGYPTIAN SUPPORTING TROOPS ON SABHA HILL WHICH EXERCISE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED. SINCE 4:30 A.M. NOVEMBER 3 NOT (REPEAT NOT) A SINGLE SHOT HAS BEEN FIRED FROM EITHER SIDE OF LINE. BY 7:30 A.M. ALL ISRAEL FORCES HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM OTHER SIDE OF BORDER AND ISRAELIS ARE NOW ENTRENCHED IN STRENGTH WITH REINFORCEMENTS ON ISRAEL SIDE OF BOUNDARY. A FEW HOURS AFTER ISRAEL EVACUATION TO OWN TERRITORY EGYPTIANS REOCCUPIED SABHA. ISRAEL CASUALTIES ARE AS REPORTED EMBTEL 451 EXCEPT WITH DEATH AND WOUNDED COUNT IS NOW 5 DEAD AND 18 WOUNDED (CAIRO 870 TO DEPARTMENT).

IDF OFFICER CHARACTERIZED EGYPTIAN ALLEGATION COUNTERATTACK AND VICTORY AS HOPEFUL DEVELOPMENT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PEACE BECAUSE NASSER MIGHT REGARD PRESENTATION HYPOTHETICAL VICTORY TO HIS PUBLIC AS SUBSTITUTE FOR ACTUAL RETALIATION. IDF HOWEVER WOULD WELCOME MATTER AS OPPORTUNITY TO "CLOBBER" EGYPTIAN ARMY. SOURCE SAID IDF DID ANTICIPATE FEDAYEEN REPRISALS AND ADDED WHILE ISRAEL HAD MADE EXTRAORDINARY PREPARATIONS FOR THESE THEY CONSTITUTE TYPE OF OPERATION MOST DIFFICULT TO COMBAT.

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-2- 470, NOVEMBER 5, 9 PM, FROM TEL AVIV

THE CONFIRMED TO USARMA THAT IDF MOBILIZATION EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORT WAS MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE HERE THAN CALLUPS OF PERSONNEL AND ADDED THAT THIS WAS PRECAUTIONARY MOVE WHICH WOULD ENABLE IDF TO MOVE RAPIDLY IF SITUATION DEMANDED.

COMMENT: SITUATION AT MOMENT APPEARS TO BE THAT BOTH PARTIES ARE IN VIOLATION ARMISTICE: ISRAELIS BY HAVING TROOPS IN D/Z AND EGYPTIANS BY HAVING TROOPS IN AREA PROHIBITED BY ARTICLE VIII PARAGRAPH 3 OF AGREEMENT.

LAWSON

GEM-JK

NOTE: PASSED OSD, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, USUN, 11/5/55, 3 PM, CWO-JRL

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FROM: JERUSALEM

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 142, NOVEMBER 4, NOON
PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 142 REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY AMMAN 64,
PRIORITY BAGHDAD 6, PRIORITY BEIRUT 39, PRIORITY CAIRO 101,
PRIORITY DAMASCUS 44, PRIORITY GENEVA UNNUMBERED, PRIORITY
JIDDA 2, PRIORITY LONDON 64, PRIORITY MOSCOW UNNUMBERED,
PRIORITY PARIS 64, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 118.

REFERENCE CAIRO'S TEL 870 TO DEPARTMENT UNTSO REPORTS ALL QUIET
EGYPT-ISRAEL FRONT SINCE AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 3. ONLY ACTIVITY
FOLLOWING ISRAELI NIGHT ATTACK WAS ARTILLERY FIRE (CONTEL
141) WHICH TERMINATED DURING AFTERNOON. GOC STATEMENTS
CHARACTERIZED AS "PURE ROMANCE."

CCLE

WDR-MEM

NOTE: RELAYED OSD, ARMY, NAVY, AIR AND USCN 9:30 AM 11/4 CW

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Control: 3029

Rec'd: NOVEMBER
7:51 A.M.

FROM: JERUSALEM

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 144, NOVEMBER 4, 6 P.M.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 144, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 120 REPEATED INFORMATION
PRIORITY AMMAN 65, PRIORITY CAIRO 102, PRIORITY GENEVA
UNNUMBERED, PRIORITY LONDON 65, PRIORITY PARIS 65.

DISCUSSED TEL AVIV'S TELEGRAM 53 WITH HOMMEL NOVEMBER 4.
HE SAID PRIOR ISRAELI ATTACK NIGHT NOVEMBER 2 EGYPTIANS HAD TWO
COMPANIES IMMEDIATE VICINITY FRONTIER. SOME ACROSS FRONTIER
AS REPORTED CONTELS 135 AND 137 ACCORDING OBSERVERS BEST ESTIMATE
HOWEVER, IN ABSENCE SURVEY AND CLOSE STUDY IMPOSSIBLE FOR
OBSERVERS KNOW PRECISELY WHICH TROOPS ACTUALLY OVER LINE AND
WHICH JUST BEYOND. OBSERVER WAS POSTED BETWEEN ISRAELI AND
EGYPTIAN POSITIONS, PROBABLY FEW HUNDRED YARDS FROM LATTER AND
NEARER EGYPTIANS THAN ANY ISRAELI PERSONNEL. EGYPTIANS WERE
CONTINUALLY IMPROVING ENTRENCHMENT THEIR POSITIONS INCLUDING
PART ACROSS FRONTIER. MOREOVER THEY PATROLLED FROM SUCH POSITIONS,
THUS INCREASING SOMEWHAT EXTENT THEIR PRESENCE D/Z. HOMMEL
NOT (REPEAT NOT) AWARE ANY COMPLAINT ABOUT OVER FLIGHT BUT WILL
ADVISE SOON AS POSSIBLE.

ISRAELIS ALLOWING OBSERVERS MOVE IN D/Z EXCEPT IN VICINITY AREAS
OCCUPIED BY THEIR FORCES. UNTSO RECEIVED REPORT AT 1400
HOURS NOVEMBER 4 THAT ISRAELIS FIRED WARNING BURST FROM MACHINE-
GUN IN DIRECTION OBSERVER WHO APPROACHING ONE OF THEIR UNITS.

HOMMEL ASKED BOTH PARTIES FOR "CEASE-FIRE" AS OF 2200 LOCAL TIME
NOVEMBER 3. ISRAELIS ACCEPTED PROVIDED EGYPTIANS REFRAINED
FROM SHOOTING OR CROSSING FRONTIER. EGYPT ACCEPTED PROVIDED
D/Z IS IN FACT TREATED IN ACCORDANCE GAA. HOMMEL CONSIDERING
INFORMING PARTIES HE CONSIDERS CEASE-FIRE IN EFFECT.
HEADED THAT UNSYG IS ADDRESSING LETTER TO PARTIES ON SAME

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-2- 144, NOVEMBER 4, 6 P.M., FROM JERUSALEM

SUBJECT BUT CALLING SPECIFICALLY FOR LIMITATION PERSONNEL IN D/Z TO THOSE BELONGING KIBBUTZ PLUS THIRTY POLICE.

IN ABSENCE ANY APPARENT REASON EGYPTIAN INSISTENCE IN MAINTAINING TROOPS ON ISRAELI SIDE FRONTIER HOMMEL ASSUMES THIS CONNECTED IN SOME WAY WITH CONTINUED PRESENCE ISRAELI POLICE OR SOLDIERS IN D/Z.

COLE

WDR

NOTE: Relayed OSD. ARMY, NAVY, AIR, USUN 11:30 a.m. 11/5/55 CWO-JRL

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5
Action
IO

Control: 2881
Rec'd: November 4, 1955
11:35 p.m.

FROM: New York

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 400, November 4, 8 p.m.

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Re Palestine,

Ordonneau (France) telephoned this afternoon to inform us that French Foreign Office had now decided, contrary to its views yesterday, that 3 governments should make demarches in Tel Aviv and Cairo in support of Burns' program re El Auja. After check with Department we informed Ordonneau, Crosthwaite (UK) and Cordier (Secretariat) that Department would instruct our Ambassadors Tel Aviv and Cairo to concert with UK and French Ambassadors for such demarches. Cordier said SYG would be highly pleased and Crosthwaite agreed inform Foreign Office immediately.

LODGE

EOC:MEB/5



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FROM: USARMA Israel

TO: Secretary of State

NO: MAI 857, 041444Z (Army Message)

NOFORN

SENT NIACT DEPTAR FOR G-2 INFO CINCNELM, COMSIXTHFLT, USCINCEUR,
CONCUSAFE USARMAS BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, AMMAN RE-
PEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT STATE.

(Situation Report)

Egyptian patrol 15 soldiers attacked OP at (08860770) 0100 hours
Driven off with rifle fire. Otherwise FLO declares no (repeat no)
shots fired anywhere since cessation action DZ 0430 hours, 3 No-
vember.

B. FLO states no change disposition Egyptian forces, other than
changes Egyptian armor in position in line.

C. Senior FLO stated confidentially that mobilization of Israeli
equipment, transportation and materiel on relatively massive scale
as precaution if large scale mobilization personnel should be
necessary, but mobilization of personnel more limited and sufficient
to take care immediate requirements. Period of watchful waiting.
Israelis ready and able to defeat Egyptian forces if attacked.

D. None.

E. None.

F. Israeli high. On basis confidential reports action in DZ Egypt
poor.

G. Aircraft dispersed and camouflaged, some camouflage painted at
main fighter-bomber base Hatzor. Airdrome heavily protected by
Bofors 40 mm. 4 October from point one-half mile distant AIRA
counted 3 Hurricanes, 8 Meteors, 30 Mosquitoes on ground. Moderate
activity in traffic pattern. IAF staff officers cancel social
engagements and visits bases not permitted. Believe activity
normal precautionary. This item in this and subsequent reports
will be provided by AIRA except as otherwise stated.

H. None. Signed Query.

PT:REM/11

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Control: 3135
Rec'd: November 1955
11:41 a.m.

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Control: 3224
Rec'd: November 5, 1955
7:31 p.m.

SCA

FROM: Cairo

Info

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 882, November 5, 3 p.m.

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SENT TEL AVIV 121, REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 882. (SCA)

Re Department telegram 314.

CIA

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

On November 4th UNRWA representative Gaza indicates total 9 Americans residing Gaza. Eight with Southern Baptist Hospital. Dr. James Young, wife and four minor children and Misses Annie Dwyer and Caroline Cate, nurses. Mr. Cecil Barr CARE representative. Barr now in Cairo will return Gaza shortly. On November 3 UNRWA Cairo requested UNRWA Gaza by telephone to suggest Americans depart Gaza. Code message by telephone was to "take a shopping trip". This code message is the usual code for evacuation of UNRWA dependents. It is not known whether any of the eight Americans have departed Gaza or that they considered request as originating Embassy Cairo.

BYROADE

AB:SBH/6

file
up 11-7-55
BUREAU OF SECURITY
NOV 7 1955
AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON
NOV-7 1955
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Control: 3072
Rec'd: November 5, 1955
9:22 a.m.

Info
RMR

FROM: Damascus

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 451, November 5, Noon

SENT DEPARTMENT 451; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 107, CAIRO 156,
JERUSALEM 38, TEL AVIV 102

Tel Aviv's 337 to Department

UNITSO source November 4 said he has reliable information
indicating: (1) Fedayin raids into Israel being directed
from Syria; (2) Headquarters for this activity is Egyptian
Embassy, Damascus; (3) operations under control Egyptian
Military Attache Hamman; and (4) Fedayin personnel largely
Palestinians trained in Egypt.

Comment: No confirmation this report from any other local
source.

MOOSE

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Control: 3315
Rec'd: November 6, 1955
7:09 a.m.

FROM: USARMA Israel

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: MAI 858, 051302Z November (Army Message)

SENT NIACT DEPTAR FOR G-2 INFO CINCNELM COMSIXTHFLT USCINCEUR,
USARMAS AMMAN BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS, CINCUSAFE AND CO
FS 8604; STATE DEPARTMENT

NOFORN

Reference: DA 991493

This Joint ARMA AIRA Situation Report.

C: No change anticipated, although retaliatory action
initiated by Egyptian-Arab states possible. Israeli
intelligence anticipates resumption Elhddayean terrorist
activities in near future. Fedayeen

E: IDF has released 85 percent busses, 50 percent Sherutim
recently mobilized. No evidence release personnel or other
types vehicles. Signed Query.

TT/1

Note: Mr. Wilkins (NE) notified 9 a.m., 11/6/CWO-JRL

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1955 NOV 5 AM 9 55

Control: 2926

Rec'd:

November 5, 1955

2:26 a.m.

FROM: USARMA Egypt

TO: Secretary of State

NO: USARMA 1427, 050117Z (Army Message)

SENT NIACT DEPTAR FOR G-2 INFORMATION ARMAS TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, AMMAN; CINCNELM, COMSIXTHFLT CINCENR, CINCUSAFE DEPTAR G-2 NOW REPEATS INFORMATION DEPARTMENT STATE.

THIS IS JOINT MESSAGE.

Reference: DA 991493

A. According to press Egyptians recaptured Shebha by 1500 November 3 using tanks, artillery and aircraft. Supposedly opposed by 3,000 Israelis. Last 24 hours reported quiet. GOE flew newsmen to scene this A.M.

B. According to British ARMA bulk of armor still remains at Shallufa but that all three squadrons 50th Cavalry Regiment (armored cars) now in East Sinai. Exact locations unknown.

C. Another limited objectivity by Israeli appears likely.

D. In last two days engagement Egypt claims two hundred Israelis killed and total seventy Egyptians killed or missing.

G. Operational flying continues vicinity Cairo no other information.

H. In contrast to Tel Aviv and Damascus reports no unusual military preparations or activities noted in Cairo area nor signs of mobilization.

Reference I.A. victory claimed by Egyptians cannot be confirmed but appears to ring false. Doubt accuracy press releases.

CES/1

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

PRIORITY 918
PRIORITY 322

Origin

Info

RPTD INFO: USUN, NEW YORK 313
AMCONSULATE JERUSALEM 57

Re Palestine

You are requested to concert with your British and French colleagues promptly on joint demarche to Foreign Office Supporting General Burns' proposals transmitted to Cairo as Deptel 917 and Tel Aviv as DEPTTEL 321. You are to impress upon Foreign Office seriousness with which we view recent developments and importance we attach to prompt and complete cooperation with General Burns in carrying out his proposals. DEPT this morning called in Israeli and Egyptian Ambassadors to convey similar views. Text of press release on these calls to follow as USIA telegram.

Repeating
USUN's 398

674.842/11-355

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Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by

IO: Mr. Phillips

Clearances:

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SENT TO: THE WHITE HOUSE
DENVER, COLORADO PRIORITY

Origin

Info:

TODEN 15

FOR GOVERNOR ADAMS FROM ACTING SECRETARY HOOVER

~~believe~~ ~~not~~

Department of State ~~feels~~ answer to Congressman Powell should ~~be made~~

~~It~~ be signed by the President. Suggest reply along following lines from
someone in Denver: *some one in Denver.*

QTE Dear Mr. Powell: I have your letter addressed to The President ~~and Mrs. John F. Kennedy~~

~~your message~~ in which you suggest that you might be able to ameliorate the present crisis between Egypt and Israel. It is thoughtful of you to offer your services at this time.

QTE General Burns, who is the United Nations Truce Supervisor, has recently returned to the Near East, ~~and General Burns~~ with the authority of the Security Council, has made proposals to both Israel and Egypt for the purpose of easing the situation along their common border. As you know, we support fully the efforts of the United Nations in this situation.

QTE In view of these developments I believe you will agree that the matter would be complicated if you were to proceed to that area. Naturally I appreciate your offer to assist and thank you for it.

QTE Sincerely UNQTE

ACTING

Drafted by:

NE:Wilkins

P:McIlvaine:Hoover:cph

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. McCalliffe

Clearances:

11/5/55

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

11/7/55

G - Mr. Murphy

Copies are being sent to:

NEA - Mr. Allen

P - Mr. McIlvaine

Robert G. Barnes

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2/15/57
(Date)

Harold L. Slean
(Top Secret Control Officer)

3. DATE AND NAME OF PERSON PREPARING FORM

2/14/57 E. A. Murto

6. PERSONS TO WHOM ROUTED OR READING DOCUMENT	7. OFFICE SYMBOL	8. SIGNATURES	9. DATE RECEIVED	10. DATE READ	11. DATE RELEASED
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Grace Horn	DC/T	<i>G. Horn</i>	2/15/57	<i>no green</i>	4-5-57
James P. Burke	RM/R				

NEA- Allen

~~P- McQuarrie~~

~~G- Murphy~~

~~Mr. Harlan~~ *for*

Project *Dr. J. R. Powell*
to Rep. Powell

A - 3

2, 4, 5, 6 *extraneous*

2/1/57

C. P. Wall

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NEAControl: 3347
Rec'd: November 6, 1955
1:12 p.m.Info
RMR

FROM: USARMA TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: MAI 859, November 061305Z (Army Message)

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FROM USARMA TEL AVIV SIGNED QUERY AND PETERSON.

NOFORN.

ACTION G-2 DEPTAR, INFO CINCNELM, COMSIXTHFLT, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, CO FS 8604, USARMAS BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, AMMAN.

DEPTAR G-2 NOW REPEATS FOR INFO TO STATE DEPT.

Reference DA 991493.

THIS JOINT ARMA AIRA SITREP.

A: FGN Liaison Office, IDF reports following incidents:

On 5 November an IDF patrol of four jeeps fired on with SMG from Egypt PG near Ein Hashlosa (Gaza strip). Fire returned-no Israel casualties. At 052230 infiltrators damaged two houses at Sde Chemed 1448/1742 but no casualties. Tracks led across Jordan border. FLO believes not Fedayeen, but villagers Qalquilyn. No change other paragraphs.

SW

NEA

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11/6/CWO-JRL

1955 NOV 7 AM 7 47

12/9/55

Name

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File Designation 674.84A/11-655
Te/1430
Date 11/6/55
From ARMA Egypt
To SecState

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☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

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Authority


1/3/89
Date

6

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 14, 1955

Respectfully referred to the officials
of the Department of State.



SHERMAN ADAMS

The Assistant to the President

FW 674.848/11-655

ES DIV. 62

11-17

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2241 ... boll ...
San Antonio, Texas
November 6, 1955

~~ALA~~

SEV

THE WHITE HOUSE

Nov 10 11 22 AM '55

RECEIVED

Mr. Sherman Adams
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Adams:

The purpose of this letter is to express my concern about the present foreign policy of the United States toward the Israeli-Egyptian conflict. I feel that our statement to the effect that we would guarantee the present border tended to create additional tension.

During 1952-3, I served as a consultant to the Turkish Ministry of Education under the Fulbright program. I spent some time during that year in visiting the other countries of the Middle East. Through contacts made at that time and since, I have come to the conclusion much injustice has been done to those people and nations surrounding the new state of Israel. Our action in recognizing Israel was much too hasty and certainly disregarded the rights of those innocent people who were driven from their homes and into the refugee camps. Our present administration could do great good if it would press for a re-study of that whole situation in the United Nations. It isn't a matter of politics, it is a matter of doing the right thing. The Jewish minority in the United States must not be permitted to influence our policy to the extent which they have.

May I take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the fine work you are doing. As a liberal Republican I had a very small part in helping to elect Mr. Eisenhower in Texas and I am proud to have been a part of that effort.

Your consideration of the above matter will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

Lester Beals
Lester Beals

291805

374.34A/11-355

CS/K

674.34A/11-655

1955 NOV 22 AM

In reply refer to
SEV 674.84A/11-655

January 24 1956

Dear Mr. Beals:

The White House has asked us to reply to your letter of November 6 to Mr. Adams concerning United States policy with regard to the Arab-Israeli situation. Your interest in making your views available to the Government is appreciated.

I believe that you and the members of your organization will be interested in the enclosed copy of a statement prepared in the Department concerning our policies in the Near East. Also attached is a copy of the address made by Secretary Dulles on August 26 in which he outlined certain steps which the United States would be prepared to take to contribute toward a solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Sincerely yours,

John P. Meagher
Chief
Public Services Division

Enclosures:

1. Statement.
2. Address by Secretary Dulles,
August 26, 1955.

Mr. Lester Beals,
2241 West Woodlawn,
San Antonio, Texas.

674.84A-11-655
S/S-CR
JAN 24 1956 P.M.

RECORDED P:SEV:LMCampbell:dlo

1/21/56

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Department of State

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6 PM 11/11/55
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15-14

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Rec'd: NOVEMBER 8, 1955
7:11 AM

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FROM: TEL AVIV

Info

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 478, NOVEMBER 7, 2 PM

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
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SENT DEPARTMENT 478, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 187, JERUSALEM
UNNUMBERED, USUN 16.

AFTER CONSULTATION MY FRENCH AND BRITISH COLLEAGUES DEMARCHE IN
SUPPORT BURNS' PROPOSALS WAS MADE TO DIRECTOR GENERAL FOREIGN
MINISTRY THIS MORNING AS PER INSTRUCTIONS DEPTTEL 322. FRENCH
AND BRITISH ARE MAKING SIMILAR APPROACH TODAY. EYTAN REPLIED
THAT IF GOI HAD COMMENTS THIS MATTER THEY WOULD BE CONVEYED TO ME
TOMORROW.

LAWSON

MEM:REM



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JUN 23 1958

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674.34A/11-755Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS
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SP

NO: 479, November 7, 2 p.m.

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PSENT DEPARTMENT 479, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 149, PARIS 119
AMMAN 73, BEIRUT 36, CAIRO 188, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED, BAGHDAD 188UOP
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PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR.

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Developments this weekend indicate situation quieter. Firstly partial mobilization ceased on Friday some older reservists have returned home, buses and taxis have been released to civilian economy and Army personnel were granted weekend leave. Additional Cairo reports of phantom counterattack victory over Israel plus Syrian report fictitious action resulting capture 57 Israelis lend credence to IDF thesis (EMBTEL 470) Nasser may be substituting hypothetical for actual retaliation. While Israel continues to maintain strengthened military position both in south and along Syrian border, it is apparent that GOI considers possibility large scale Arab military reaction more remote possibility than was case few days ago. Principal concern at moment appears to be Nasser may send homicide squads into Israel. While there have been some indications Fedayeen activity, these appear for moment to have been limited to intelligence and sabotage operations.

LAWSON

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1955 NOV 8 PM 12 21

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Control: 3619
Rec'd: November 7, 1955
9:17 a.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 146, November 7, 2 p.m.

SENT CAIRO 103, REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 146, TEL AVIV 122

General Burns would be obliged if following message from him could be passed to Kirkwood, Canadian Ambassador:

"Re my visit to see Mr. Pearson. Expected arrive Cairo airport 1550 local time 10 November and leave morning 12.

"Informed through Kidd that hotel reservations made. Would appreciate if appointments could be made for me to see UK and US Ambassadors during my visit and afterwards Dr. Fawzi to follow up our conversations in New York."

COLE

MEM/13

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1955 NOV 7 PM 1 20

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File Designation 674.84A/11-755
Desp 89 w/ATTCH
Date 11/7/55
From Jerusalem
To State

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1/3/89
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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PRIORITY

(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

674.84A/11-755
XR
774.56 JB

FROM AMEMBASSY, MADRID

411

DESP. NO.

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

November 7, 1955

DATE

REF

JC-4 S/P-1 USUN-1

27 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.	IN F O	OTHER
	REC'D			
	NEA-4 11-9	R/M/A-2 E/A-5 P-1 OLI-6 MC-2 CIA-7 USIA-10		

SUBJECT:

Soviets Seen by Madrid Paper as
Taking Initiative in Near East

Commenting on the attack launched by Israeli troops on November 3 against Egyptian forces in the vicinity of EL AUJA, the Madrid daily ABC says that it would be interesting to know the intentions and objectives of the Israelis. "It is understandable," the paper says, "that the attack took place at almost the exact time when the new head of Government and Defense Minister of Israel, David BEN GURION, proposed to meet with Abdel NASSER and, if necessary, with the other leaders of the Arab countries, in order to reach an understanding. It is not strange that they assert in Cairo that the proposal 'was a trick to divert attention from the military operation'. What are the Israelis seeking? Simply to show that they do not fear their enemies, in spite of the arms which the latter have received from the Soviet bloc? Or are they really carrying out the preventive war advocated by the ultra-Nationalists? Who is interested in maintaining the dangerous state of tension in the Near East? Do the Tel-Aviv leaders wish to force the Western powers to send them urgently at least defensive weapons, so that the military balance of power may be restored?"

According to ABC, the U.S. Department of State is seriously concerned, although it does not believe that the operations will lead to a full-scale war. It is uncertain as to whether it should push the idea of conversations between Israel and Egypt, or seek to bring the United Nations' peace-making machinery into play.

Thus, concluded the paper, the Soviet bloc has once again succeeded in taking the initiative and in weakening the position of the Western powers. Egypt is receiving arms, planes and submarines and training in their use, as well as the visit of an East German economic mission. Israel is getting Russian crude oil and other combustibles, in exchange for citrus fruit and bananas. More importantly, it is letting itself be persuaded that

TJDuffield/olk

REPORTER

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1955 NOV 14

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674.34A/11-755

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Page 2 of
Desp. No. 411
From Madrid

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

Page of
Encl. No.
Desp. No.
From

it would find a reorientation of policy in the direction of the Kremlin, rather than that of the White House, to be profitable.

For the Ambassador:


Richard A. Johnson,
Counselor of Embassy.

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Department of State

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Control: 4823

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 9, 1955
3:57 A.M.

NEA

FROM: TEL AVIV

Info

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 485, NOVEMBER 8, 5 P.M.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 485 REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 150, PARIS 121, AMMAN 74, BEIRUT 139, DAMASCUS 99, CAIRO 190, JERUSALEM 61.

PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR

IDF/FLO INFORMS US ARMA THAT AT 12:45 PM TODAY ISRAELI PATROLL OF 12 MEN IN TWO COMMAND CATS AND ONE JEEP MET EGYPTIAN INFANTRY PLATOON 10 MILES NORTHWEST OF EILAT AT HILL 833 (MR 138-0895) EGYPTIANS OPENED FIRE AND ISRAELIS REPLIED. FIRE CONTINUED ONE HOUR WHERE UPON ISRAELI PATROL WITHDREW.

UNATTRIBUTED PRESS REPORTS STATED THAT MONDAY TWO EGYPTIAN VAMPIRE JETS VIOLATED ISRAEL AIR SPACE OVER EILAT TOWNSHIP.

LAWSON

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AIR

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1955 NOV 9 PM 2 19

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Control: 4215
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 8, 1955
7:22 A.M.

NEA

FROM: JERUSALEM

Info

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 149, NOVEMBER 8, 9:00 A.M.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 149, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 105, LONDON
66, PARIS 66, TEL AVIV 125, AMMAN UNNUMBERED

SAW GENERAL BURNS TODAY. HE PROCEEDING CAIRO NOVEMBER 10
DISCUSS UNSYG LETTER TO GOE REGARDING AMELIORATION BORDER
SITUATION, ESPECIALLY COMPLIANCE ARTICLE 8, PARAGRAPH 3,
GAA, ESTABLISHING ZONE FROM WHICH EGYPTIAN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS
TO BE EXCLUDED. BURNS SAID HE ALSO INTENDS DISCUSS QUESTION
FREEDOM MOVEMENT DENIED BY EGYPTIANS TO OBSERVERS IN FORE-
GOING ZONE, AS WELL AS PROPOSALS SC RESOLUTIONS SEPTEMBER
8 CONCERNING 500 METER BUFFER AREA ALONG D/L GAZZA STRIP
AND BARRIER. ON LATTER POINT BURNS SAID HE WISHED ESPECIALLY
DETERMINE WHERE EGYPTIANS WOULD BE WILLING ERECT FENCES.
HE COULD THEN RECOMMEND TO ISRAELIS THAT THEY CONSTRUCT
SIMILAR FENCE TO COVER REMAINDER D/L. HE WOULD IN ADDITION
TAKE UP WITH ISRAELIS ONCE MORE MATTER OF 500 METER WIDE
BUFFER AREA TO WHICH THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY RAISED OBJECTIONS.
BURNS SAID HE MAY ASK UN PROVIDE A FEW ADDITIONAL OBSERVERS,
ALTHOUGH THEIR USEFULNESS POSSIBLY DOUBTFUL IN FACE VARIOUS
RESTRICTIONS WHICH PARTIES HAVE IMPOSED ON MOVEMENTS.

COLE

HEK:WDR

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Control:
Rec'd:

4398

November 8, 1955
11:16 a.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 151, November 8, 3 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 151; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 106, LONDON 67,
PARIS 67, TEL AVIV 126, AMMAN UNNUMBERED

Colonel Hommel gave me following account of conversation he had
with Tekoah during meeting at latter's request November 4.

Tekoah said he was acting on instructions from his superiors.
He asked that SS Acting Chief UNTSO Hommel make verbal agreement
with him to effect that activities observers in El Auja
demilitarized zone should be confined to movements specifically
authorized by IDF. Tekoah argued that UNTSO had no need for
detailed knowledge Israeli activities in zone. Since entry into
zone of military forces is per se a violation of the GAA informa-
tion on that point should suffice for UNTSO. However, Tekoah
indicated willingness to go further by agreeing on his part that
Israelis would themselves supply any information specifically
requested by UNTSO. He pointed out that proposed arrangement
as he outlined it appeared reasonable, especially in view circum-
stance that Egyptians did not allow observers freedom of movement
in zone defined by Article 8 paragraph 3 GAA, but obliged them
remain on main road.

Hommel replied to effect that any such agreement as Tekoah
proposed was quite outside scope UNTSO terms of reference and
that he thought it would be logical to endeavor get Egyptians
ease restrictions on observers, rather than increase restriction
imposed by Israelis.

Hommel said Tekoah evidently reflecting IDF pressures on Foreign
Ministry to head observers away. One IDF objection voiced by
Tekoah was that observers radio reports to UNTSO sometime had
effect of disclosing positions military units. Hommel replied
that observers would hereafter send radio reports in code only,
except that UNTSO would have to receive rights transmission
such reports in clear language if violation of GAA being reported.

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Please repeat Deptel 171, GENEVA TOSEC, NOV. 5 to above post.)

*hostilities
Egypt + Israel*

Hoover

(R.P.) HOOVER

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Drafted by:

NEA/P:TRFrve:ld

11/8/55

Telegraphic transmission and
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NEA/P - *R. Prohm*
Rupert Prohm

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NOV 8 1955 P.M.*

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SENT TO: Amconsul, GENEVA NIACT

TEDELL 71

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For Secretary from Hoover

I will discuss problem posed by Dulte 55 in Denver tomorrow and would appreciate your cabling me at Denver any comments regarding our draft statement by President which is quoted below. We understand Sharett scheduled arrive in US Thursday morning November 10 and believe statement would be most effective if issued as soon as possible.

"All Americans have been following with deep concern the latest developments in the Near East. The recent outbreak of hostilities has led to a sharp increase in tensions. These events inevitably retard our search for world peace. Insecurity in one region is bound to affect the world as a whole.

"While we continue willing to consider requests for arms needed for legitimate self-defense, we do not intend to contribute to an arms competition in the Near East because we do not think this would be profitable to any participant in such a race.

"I stated last year that our goal in the Near East as elsewhere is a just peace. Nothing has taken place since which invalidates

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NEA:NE:WCBurdett:apg 11/8/55

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Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved

Herbert Hoover, Jr.

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invalidates our basic policies, policies based on friendship for all of the peoples of the area.

"We believe that true security must be based upon a just and reasonable settlement. The Secretary of State outlined on August 26 the contribution which this country was prepared to make towards such a solution. On that occasion I authorized Mr. Dulles to state that, given a solution of the other related problems, I would recommend that the U. S. join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

"Recent developments make it all the more imperative that a settlement be found. The U. S. will continue to play its full part and will support firmly the UN which has already contributed so markedly to the maintenance of tranquility in the area. I hope that other nations of the world will cooperate in this endeavor, thereby contributing significantly to world peace."

HOOVER
(J. M. H.)

52691

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Classification

ACTION

assigned to

STN

November 8, 1955

United States Senate

Letters from Rabbi Herschel Levine, President
Willimantic Zionist District, 866 Main Street,
Willimantic, Conn., and Mrs. Jack Purcirs,
American Affairs Chairman, Litchfield County
Chapter of Hadassah, Torrington, Connecticut

Re: situation between Israel and Egypt
Respectfully referred to
Honorable John Foster Dulles
The Secretary
Department of State

with thanks for such favorable consideration as
the communication herewith submitted warrants,
and for a report thereon, in duplicate to
accompany return of inclosure.

By direction of

W. A. Purtell
William A. Purtell, U. S. S.

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674.84A/11-855

FEB 2 1956

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PUBLIC SERVICES DIV.
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NOV 9 PM 4 35

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 23 1955

In reply refer to
SEV 674.84A/11-855

Dear Senator Purtell:

I refer to your communication of November 8 enclosing letters from Rabbi Herschel Levine, President of the Willimantic Zionist District of the Zionist Organization of America, and Mrs. Jack Pincus, American Affairs Chairman of the Litchfield County Chapter of Hadassah, Torrington, Connecticut, concerning United States policy with regard to the Arab Israel situation.

Our Government is gravely concerned over recent developments in the Middle East and is continuing to give the most serious attention to this matter. In a major policy statement on August 26, Secretary Dulles proposed, with the authority of the President, a solution which would include a security guarantee sponsored by the United Nations. Subsequently, at his press conference on October 4, Secretary Dulles again indicated ~~his~~ hope that such a solution might be found, and discussed the dangers of an arms race in the area. In a statement on November 9, President Eisenhower indicated that the United States stands firm on the policy as stated by Secretary Dulles and reiterated that, "...given a solution of the other related problems, I would recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors."

There are enclosed copies of the statements of the President and the Secretary. I believe that your

constituents

65
The Honorable
William A. Purtell,
United States Senate.

674.84A/11-855

CS/S

674.84A/11-855

constituents will also be interested in the enclosed statement of November 5 concerning the attitude of this Government toward the hostilities between Israel and Egypt.

Sincerely yours,

Florence Kirlin
Acting Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

- ✓ 1. Press releases nos. 517, 589, and 638, (2 copies of each).
- ✓ 2. Statement by the President, November 9, 1955 (2 copies).
- ✓ 3. From Rabbi Levine and Mrs. Pinous (returned).

gpm
(u) *Mac (hlo.)*
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11-17-55

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NOV 21 1955 P.M.

NOV 20 1955

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FROM: CAIRO

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 906, NOVEMBER 9, NOON

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SENT DEPARTMENT 906; REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 1821
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CIA
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AS INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED DEPTTEL 918 ARRIVED JUST AS I
DEPARTING FOR LONG-SCHEDULED VISIT WITH HIGH EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS
AND MEMBERS OF PRESS TO EARIS PROJECT NEAR ALEXANDRIA,
APPOINTMENT WITH FAWZI NOT POSSIBLE UNTIL LAST EVENING.

FOLLOWING MY PRESENTATION IN SUPPORT SYG AND GEN BURNS' NEW
EFFORTS DECREASE TENSIONS OF HIGHLY DANGEROUS SITUATION,
FAWZI REPLIED ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: HE HAD HAD LONG, AND HE
THOUGHT, SATISFACTORY TALKS WITH BOTH SYG AND BURNS IN
NEW YORK AND FELT THERE HAD BEEN UNDERSTANDING AND MEETING
OF MINDS OF AT LEAST FACTS BEHIND MANY POINTS AT ISSUE.
AS REGARDS DZ, HE FELT FACT THAT ISRAEL WAS IN OCCUPATION
OF DZ THROUGH MEANS OF HER KIBBUTZ AND DISGUISED POLICE
WAS RECOGNIZED. EGYPT HAD LONG PROTESTED THIS SITUATION,
AS IT GAVE ISRAEL NOT ONLY MILITARY ADVANTAGE BUT POLITICAL
AS WELL. EGYPT WAS NOT UNAWARE OF GRADUAL TAKEOVER OF DZ'S
IN NORTH AND DID NOT WISH THIS TO HAPPEN AT EL AUJA. EGYPT,
ON HER PART, MIGHT BE ASSESSED GUILTY OF SHORTCOMINGS AS
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AROUND TWO THEIR OUTPOSTS PROBABLY
EXTENDED SOME 10 OR 15 METERS ACROSS DEMARCATION LINE.
(GEN. HAKIM AMER EXPLAINED THIS SITUATION TO ME MANY WEEKS
AGO. HE STATED THAT TO MOVE BACK THIS SHORT DISTANCE WOULD
PUT THEIR POSTS ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE HILL, THUS MAKING
IT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO GO BACK TO THE NEXT RIDGE CONSIDERABLE
DISTANCE AWAY. THIS WOULD NOT LEAVE THEM WITH ADEQUATE
OBSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF COMMUNICATIONS CENTER FROM
WHICH STRATEGIC POINT OF VIEW THEY BELIEVED IMPORTANT.)

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-2- 906, NOVEMBER 9, NOON, FROM CAIRO

FAWZI SAID THEREFORE EGYPT'S POSITION SIMPLE. THEY FELT BOTH SIDES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM DEMILITARIZED AREA ALL MILITARY OR PARA-MILITARY FORCES. IF THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE THEN HE SUPPOSED ONLY COURSE LEFT WAS THAT BOTH STAY INSIDE AS THEY NOW ARE. AS REGARDS DEMARCATION HE HAD EXPLAINED IN NEW YORK EGYPT HAD NO OBJECTION TO DEMARCATION BY UN. EGYPT WOULD NOT EVEN CARE TO BE PRESENT. HOWEVER, THIS MEANT DEMARCATION AROUND ENTIRE ZONE AND NOT JUST ALONG THE OLD INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER. ISRAEL HAD BEGUN TO REFER TO THE ZONE AS ISRAELI TERRITORY AND THE DEMARCATION OF THE WESTERN BOUNDARY ONLY WOULD TEND TO CONFIRM IT.

TURNING TO GAZA, FAWZI SAID HE HAD VOLUNTEERED IN NEW YORK TO TRY TO OBTAIN EGYPT'S ACQUIESCENCE TO A CONTINUOUS BARBEDWIRE OBSTACLE 500 METERS INSIDE ISRAELI TERRITORY IF THE UN AND ISRAEL WISH TO GO AHEAD WITH SUCH A PROJECT. THIS WOULD BE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT BE "REQUIRED" TO DO THE SAME ON HER SIDE OF THE LINE AND THAT EGYPT'S ACQUIESCENCE, IF ISRAEL WISHED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE PROJECT, NOT BE MENTIONED IN ANY DOCUMENT. THIS OF COURSE WOULD BE COUPLED WITH EGYPT'S ORIGINAL IDEA OF WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS A SPECIFIED DISTANCE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE LINE. HE AT FIRST ASKED THAT I NOT REPORT THAT HE HAD OBTAINED NASSER'S APPROVAL THIS PROPOSAL, BUT LATER SAID IT WOULD BE ALRIGHT PROVIDED WE DID NOT PASS INFORMATION TO BURNS. HE HAD PROMISED ANSWER TO BURNS AND WISHED OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE IT TO HIM DIRECT WHEN HE VISITS HERE WITHIN NEXT COUPLE DAYS.

COMMENT: THERE ARE OF COURSE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH ISRAEL IN EGYPTIAN POSITION, BUT AM INCLINED TO THINK WE GAIN NOTHING BY ATTEMPTING SHOVE ASIDE QUESTION OF WHAT IS LEGALLY AND MORALLY JUST IN SMALL ITEMS SUCH AS THESE IN FAVOR OF TRYING TO FIND SOME HALF-WAY POSITION BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS. NO ONE CAN ARGUE EFFECTIVELY AGAINST FAWZI'S CASE AS REGARDS THE KIBBUTZ AND DISGUIZED POLICE, EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL PROBABLY WOULD NOT EVEN CONSIDER THEIR WITHDRAWAL. NEITHER, HOWEVER IN MY OPINION WILL EGYPT NOW ACQUIESCE IN ANY SOLUTION WHICH LEAVES ISRAELI MILITARY PERSONNEL THERE, AS REGARDLESS OF LEGAL RESERVATIONS, ISRAELI PRESENCE IN DZ WOULD HAVE EFFECT SIDE-TRACKED AND PERPETUATED. FAWZI'S POSITION ABOUT DEMARCATION OF WHOLE ZONE IS LIKEWISE UNASSAILABLE EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL WILL MOST PROBABLY STRONGLY OBJECT IN VIEW OF PRECEDENT IT WOULD SET FOR DZ'S OF NORTH WHICH THROUGH

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-3- 906, NOVEMBER 9, NOON, FROM CAIRO

YEARS SHE HAS PRACTICALLY TAKEN OVER.

AS TO FAWZI'S PROPOSAL RE BARBED WIRE, AM INCLINED FEEL THIS REPRESENTS LITTLE ADVANCE BUT PLAN TALK TO BURNS WHILE HE IN CAIRO ABOUT THIS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF PROBLEM. WE HAVE HAD SOME HOPE HERE THAT EGYPT MIGHT GO AHEAD WITH FENCES AT WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE TRAVELLED CROSS ROUTE AREAS AND THAT THIS MIGHT END UP TO BE 30-40 PERCENT OF TOTAL LINE.

ISRAEL MIGHT THEN CONSTRUCT MAJORITY OF REMAINING FENCE AND BOTH SIDES ACQUIESCE IN UN CONNECTING UP VARIOUS SEGMENTS. FROM PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW WE OFTEN THINK IDEA OF FENCE OR EVEN FENCE ITSELF IF CONSTRUCTED, MAY BE UNNECESSARY POINT OF FRICTION RATHER THAN OPPOSITE.

BYROADE

WDR

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NAVY

AIR

FROM: JERUSALEM

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 152, NOVEMBER 9, 11 A.M.

Control: 4887

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 9, 1955
6:08 A.M.SENT TEL AVIV 127; REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 152,
CAIRO 107

WITH FURTHER REFERENCE URTEL 53 UNTSO RECEIVED COMPLAINT
THAT ON NOVEMBER 1 EGYPTIAN AIRCRAFT PROCEEDING UP GAZA
STRIP FAILED MAKE LEFT TURN PROMPTLY, THUS VIOLATING ISRAELI
AIR SPACE. UNTSO STATES MACS RECEIVE NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS
ABOUT SUCH MATTERS FROM ALL PARTIES BUT VERIFICATION USUALLY
NOT POSSIBLE.

HOMMEL HAS NOW INFORMED ME THAT OBSERVER POST MENTIONED FIRST
PARAGRAPH CONTEL 120 WAS ABOUT 500 YARDS FROM EGYPTIAN
POSITION.

COLE

LFS

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Control: 5138
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 9, 1955
1:19 P.M.

FROM: AMMAN

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 226, NOVEMBER 9, 5 P. M.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 226, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 74,
DAMASCUS 57, JERUSALEM 8, TELAVIV 36, BEIRUT, LONDON
UNNUMBERED.

PASS ARMY

GENERAL GLUBB INFORMED ME EGYPTIANS TAKING PALESTINE REFUGEES
FROM JORDAN FOR MILITARY TRAINING IN GAZA AND RETURN FOR
SABOTAGE ALONG JORDAN-ISRAEL BORDER. SEE TEL AVIV'S 337
TO DEPARTMENT. THE ARAB LEGION CONTINUES ITS AMAZINGLY
EFFECTIVE EFFORTS TO PREVENT ANY INFILTRATION BUT FRANKLY
REALIZES THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF COMPLETE CONTROL, ESPECIALLY
OF CIVILIAN-TYPE SABOTEURS DIRECTED FROM ABROAD. DEPARTMENT
MAY WISH CONSIDER POSSIBILITY PERMITTING EMBASSY TEL AVIV
DISCREETLY INFORM ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OF CONTINUING, SINCERE
LEGION EFFORTS.

SO-CALLED RETALIATION BY ISRAELIS CAN ONLY BE TO GENERAL
DETRIMENT AND WE CAN EXPECT DETERIORATION OF BORDER SITUATION
IN JORDAN IF ISRAEL ADOPTS MEASURES THREATENED IN JERUSALEM
TO DEPARTMENT EITHER BECAUSE THEY (1) ARE SUCKED IN BY
THESE EGYPTIAN TACTICS OR (2) THEY WISH TO BE PROVOCATIVE.

FROM WHAT WE KNOW OF SITUATION HERE WE ARE PREPARED TO BELIEVE
INFORMATION CONTAINED IN DAMASCUS 451 TO DEPARMTNET.

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DEC 15 1955

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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04726

1955 NOV 10 PM 6 06

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SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL 75

674.84A/11-1055

Origin
SEV
Info:

Senator Prescott Bush requests following message be forwarded you.

QUOTE The explosive elements of the present conflict between Egypt and Israel are apparent. The arming of Egypt by Czechoslovakia, a satellite of Soviet Russia, endangers the only democratic state in the Middle East and creates a situation imperiling the whole free world. Modern and heavy communist arms, such as jet planes and submarines, are inevitably followed by communist technicians and soldiers who will form the nucleus of a red fifth column in this vital area. The United Nations must continue and intensify efforts to avert new bloodshed, mediate the differences and restore stability to the troubled area. All of the free world hopes for, prays for, and awaits a peaceful solution of this situation. We have the responsibility of making every effort to secure it. The United States must speak out, officially and publicly, for an effective security pact in the Middle East and make it crystal clear that we will not tolerate an imbalance of arms which can only encourage aggression. As a proven friend

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(Offices
Only)

Drafted by: *LMC*
P:SEV:LMC:Campbell: *LMC*; dlo 11/9

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: *Don F.* SEWJ. M. Flanagan *LMC*

Clearances: S/S NEA P P H S/S
RP BW Clm

S/S-CH *LR*

NOV 10 1955 P.M.

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SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TEDUL

Origin

Info:

- 2 -

of Israel at her birth and in her troubled young years as a new member of the family of nations, we have an obligation to make certain that her borders remain inviolate and secure. ~~ENDQUOTE~~

Department's reply refers Senator to your August 26 address, October 4 press conference, Department's November 5 statement, President's November 9 statement.

HOOVER

Hoover
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(gmh)
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SENT TO: AmEmbassy AMMAN 212
RPTD INFO: AmEmbassy Cairo 954
AmEmbassy DAMASCUS 335
AmEmbassy TEL AVIV 337
AmConsul JERUSALEM 60
AmEmbassy BEIRUT (POUGH)
AmEmbassy LONDON "

We appreciate information communicated by Glubb and hope he will continue supply it. We note in this connection that if USG becomes regular means of transmission to Israelis we may become undesirably involved. Accordingly suggest that for this latter purpose it would be preferable if Glubb also conveyed information to Gen Burns and MAC.

ACTING

(P.W.)

HOOVER

DC/R

Anal 13

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Drafted by: NEA:NE:FWilkins:bm
11/10/55 NAB

Telegraphic transmission and
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NEA - Fraser Wilkins

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Action

NEA

Control:

6627

Rec'd:

November 12, 1955

5:03 a.m.

Info

RMR

FROM: USARMA Israel

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: MA 870, 111331Z November (Army Message)

NIACT

ACTION G-2, CINCNELM, CINCUSAFE AND USCINCEUR INFORMATION COM
17 AF, SECOND AIR DIVISION, COMSIXTHFLT, USARMA AMMAN, CNO
WASHINGTON, COFSUSAF WASHINGTON, USARMAS BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO
AND DAMASCUS, CO FS 8604 DU

DEPARTMENT ARMY G-2 REPEATS ACTION STATE DEPARTMENT

JOINT SITUATION REPORT NO. 8

NOFORN

(C): Large number Sabbath leaves granted indicates no major
activity next several days.

(E): Qualified observers states very large dumps POL, mostly
in "Jebricans", ammunition all types, other supplies exists
many locations Negev area, despite substantial demobilization.
One such dump of very large size exists vicinity Beerli 103093.
Such dumps indicate ability IDF resume initiative moments
notice.

Signed Query and Peterson.

RJB/2

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1955 NOV 12 AM 7 11

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FROM: ARMA Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: CITE 1438, 111850Z November (Army Message)

NIACT

SENT G-2 CINCNELM CINCUSAFE CINCCEUR REPEATED INFORMATION ARMAS
TEL AVIV DAMASCUS BEIRUT BAGHDAD COMSIXTHFLT AMMAN, CO
SEVENTEENTH AF RABAT, CMDR SECOND AIR DIV DHAHRAN; DEPARTMENT
ARMY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION STATE DEPARTMENT.

Joint situation report. No.8

C. No change expected E military rallyards dark and empty last
night small afternoon movement odds and ends suggests completion
unit outloading possibly field artillery regiment.

ASHMAN

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NEA 11/18/55

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1955 NOV 12 AM 7 16

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05339

1955 NOV 11 PM 7 47

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SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TEDI 80

FOR SECRETARY

Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett has requested meeting with me November 16. I will have to answer his request November 12 and will appreciate your advice whether you prefer I receive him or wish this deferred for your return. If you wish me to receive him, in order minimize possibility of public confusion or misunderstanding re US position Israeli-Egyptian difficulty, I plan read to Sharett statement which I will inform him will be given to press following our meeting. I will telegraph draft statement for any comments or suggestions which you may wish make.

Hoover
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my

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Drafted by:

NEA:WRountree:11/11/55

G:RMurphy:akh 11/11/55

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Acting Secretary

Clearances:

52692

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(10)
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Tel 340
Date 11/11/55
From State
To Tel Aviv

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Control: 6667
Rec'd: November 12, 1955
7:24 a.m.

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Info
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FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 929, November 12, Noon

SENT PRIORITY GENEVA 22, REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 929.

FOR RUSSELL

IOP
CIA

Reference: Geneva telegram sent Cairo 17 repeated Department
SECTO 738.

DCL

In absence specific information re Saroit's capabilities
my only thought on proposed meeting is that Nasser appears
to have fairly clear understanding our position at present
time and that Secretary may therefore not (repeat not) consider
it necessary entail risk, always present when dealing with
someone new, that by misunderstanding or poor reporting
situation might become confused. My present thought is that
Russell might see Saroit leaving in abeyance meeting with
Secretary until and if there appears be specific purpose.

BYROADE

TT:MEM/13

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1955 NOV 13

AM 5 48

Control: 6771

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 12, 1955

1:19 P. M.

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 934, NOVEMBER 12, 3 P.M.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 934 REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA PRIORITY 24.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

HAVE NO BASIS FROM HERE TO FORM JUDGMENT PROBABILITY ISRAELIS MAY ACT IN ACCORDANCE DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 964. WHILE MAKING THIS RESERVATION CLEAR, TOLD SECRETARY IN PARIS IT MY GENERAL FEELING CHANCES SUCH ISRAELI ACTION PROBABLY ABOUT 50 PERCENT. ALSO STATED I FELT TIME ESTIMATE OF SOME PERSONS THIS STAGE MIGHT BE REACHED IN 4 TO 6 MONTHS EXCESSIVE, AND THAT IF IT CAME PROBABLY FIRST 2 MONTHS MORE LIKELY.

WE HAVE SOME DOUBTS THAT NASSER WOULD TOPPLE NOW WITHOUT REALLY DECISIVE DESTRUCTION HIS FORCES. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EASY DURING PERIOD WHEN HE WAS HESITATING ABOUT ACCEPTING SOVIET ARMS.

IT IS PERHAPS WORTH REPEATING THAT IF ISRAEL TAKES SUCH ACTION WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE WIDELY INTERPRETED IN MIDDLE EAST AS OUR RESPONSE TO SOVIET ARMS DEAL AND THAT ISRAELI ACTION EITHER SUGGESTED OR CONDONED BY UNITED STATES. IN SUCH EVENT UNITED STATES POSITION IN MIDDLE EAST WOULD BE VIRTUALLY UNTENABLE. WHILE USE OF FORCE DREADFUL TO CONTEMPLATE, BELIEVE IN END WE IN ALL IMPLICATIONS CLEAR, AMERICAN PUBLIC WOULD CRITICIZE US FOR NOT DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE INCLUDING USE THIS ULTIMATE STEP. TROUBLE IS ISRAELIS WOULD PROBABLY FEEL THAT THEY COULD FINISH JOB BEFORE WE COULD MOVE.

IF THIS THE CASE, AND INTELLIGENCE SOURCES CONSIDERED GOOD ENOUGH, SUGGEST WE MIGHT CONSIDER SUPPLEMENTING WARNING REFERENCE USE OF FORCE BY INDICATION WE WOULD CLOSE AMERICA AS ANY SOURCE

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-2- 934, NOVEMBER 12, 3 P.M. FROM CAIRO

OF SUPPLY TO ISRAEL, INCLUDING TRANSFER OF CAPITAL. THIS WOULD NOT BE DONE DURING JUST FEW DAYS OF OPERATIONS BUT EXTENDED TO POINT OF LASTING DETRIMENT (THIS OF COURSE WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN). ANOTHER THOUGHT IS THAT WE MIGHT SAY AS FAR AS WE CONCERNED SHE WOULD LOSE HER RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS EQUAL IN PEACE SETTLEMENT. WE WOULD WORK ONE OUT WITH ARABS AND USE ALL RESOURCES OUR DISPOSAL FORCE HER TO ACCEPT IT.

BYROADE

DDC-TT

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52398

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TOP SECRET COVER SHEET

1. TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER

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RM/R-F-526-1A

4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) (Origin, subject, reference no. or other pertinent data)

Tel. 934 fr Cairo dtd. Nov. 12.
674.84a/11-1255 Tel#934 from Cairo
re. Egypt-Israel Situation

2. COPY INFORMATION

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TELEGRAMS, DESPATCHES, ETC.

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3. DATE AND NAME OF PERSON PREPARING FORM

Same.

5. FORWARDED 11/13/55
Nov. 13, 1955
(Date)
LEO DOLOFF L. Doloff
(Top Secret Control Officer)

6. PERSONS TO WHOM ROUTED OR READING DOCUMENT	7. OFFICE SYMBOL	8. SIGNATURES	9. DATE RECEIVED	10. DATE READ	11. DATE RELEASED
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Control: 6893

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 13, 1955

7:23 A.M.

Info
RMR

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 496, NOVEMBER 12, 4 P.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 496, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 30, CAIRO 193.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE REPORT DEPTEL 340 APPEARS TO BE DELAYED ACQUISITION INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY EMBASSY.

FOREIGN MINISTER SHARETT ON OCTOBER 13, EMBTEL 359, STATED THAT NASSER MUST BE DESTROYED. DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL THAT BEGINNING LAST SPRING WHEN EGYPTIAN FORCES APPEARED TO BE EMULATING ISRAELI ACTIVIST PRACTICES, DEBATE WITHIN ISRAEL CABINET ENSUED WHETHER NASSER SURVIVAL ADVANTAGEOUS OR OTHERWISE. HOLDERS FORMER VIEWPOINT HAVE CONSISTENTLY LOST GROUND AND LAST VESTIGE SUPPORT FOR NASSER DISAPPEARED WITH HIS ADOPTION VIGOROUS FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY WITHIN ISRAEL LAST WEEK AUGUST AND THROUGH OTHER ARAB STATES IN SEPTEMBER.

IDF MILITARY DOCTRINE EGYPTIAN PRESENCE SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM GAZA-DZ AREA AND SINAI DESERT ESTABLISHED AS BUFFER BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES AS MEANS INCREASE ISRAEL SECURITY IS WELL KNOWN HERE. WHILE THIS THESIS HAS BEEN SUBJECT BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND PUBLIC DEBATE, THERE IS NO (REPEAT NO) EVIDENCE THAT IT HAS YET BEEN ADOPTED AS GOVERNMENTAL POLICY.

ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN HOPING INTERNAL FORCES IN EGYPT, POSSIBLY AIDED AND ABETTED BY US WOULD BRING ABOUT NASSER'S DOWNFALL PARTICULARLY IF NASSER WAS TO RECEIVE SET BACKS AS RESULT OF LOCALIZED MILITARY ACTIVITIES ALONG BORDER. THIS HAS NOT (REPEAT NOT) COME ABOUT AND ISRAELIS ARE BIT NON-PLUSED BY FAILURE OF USG TO ADOPT MORE VIGOROUS POLICY TOWARDS EGYPT SINCE CONCLUSION LATTER'S SOVIET ARMS DEAL.

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NOV 14 1955
7 27 AM

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-2- 496, NOVEMBER 12, 4 P.M. FROM TEL AVIV.

TWO SOURCES OF EVIDENCE WHICH POINT TO GOI RELUCTANCE INAUGURATE PREVENTIVE ACTION ARE: (1) REPORTED CABINET DECISION LARGE-SCALE MILITARY PROCUREMENT WHICH APPEARS TO MANY HERE AS ALTERNATIVE TO PREVENTIVE WAR IF IT CAN BE EXECUTED AND (2) FAILURE ISRAEL ARMY TO UTILIZE LARGE-SCALE FORCE AVAILABLE TO IT IN SOUTH TO ENGAGE EGYPTIAN DIVISIONS IN SINAI AT TIME OF RECENT NITZANA ACTION WHEN ISRAEL HAD GOOD PRETEXT FOR DOING SO; I.E., PRESENCE EGYPTIAN FORCES ON ISRAEL SOIL.

ALTHOUGH ABSENCE AFFIRMATIVE DECISION BY ISRAEL CABINET APPEARS TO STAND BETWEEN IDF AND LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ACTION IN SINAI, GOI RELUCTANCE TO ADOPT SUCH MEASURE MAY BE OVERCOME BY ONE OR COMBINATION OF DEVELOPMENTS. FIRSTLY, ADOPTION BY EGYPT OF NEW AGGRESSIVE MEASURES SUCH AS LARGE-SCALE FEDA YEEN ACTIVITIES WITHIN ISRAEL. SECONDLY, FAILURE OF ISRAEL TO OBTAIN FROM WESTERN POWERS ASSURANCES OF ARMS SUPPLY WHICH WILL PREVENT SHIFT BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER TO EGYPT. THIRDLY, WESTERN POWERS SUPPORT OF PROGRAM FOR TERRITORIAL EMASCUALTION OF ISRAEL OF SUCH DIMENSIONS AS TO FORESHADOW ISRAEL'S EVENTUAL OBLITERATION.

ISRAEL WOULD ADOPT POLICY OF PREVENTIVE WAR WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE AND ONLY IF THERE APPEARS TO BE NO (REPEAT NO) CLEAR ALTERNATIVE. IN EVENT SUCH ACTION IS DETERMINED EMBASSY REPEATS ITS BELIEF THAT IT WILL FOLLOW AN INCIDENT FOR WHICH EGYPTIANS APPEAR PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE.

LAWSON

TT

52400

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TOP SECRET COVER SHEET

1. TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER

6893

RM/R-F-527-1A

4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) (Origin, subject, reference no. or other pertinent data)

Tel. 496 fr. Tel Aviv dtd. Nov. 12, 1955.
674.84a/11-1255 Tel #496 from Tel Aviv
re. Egypt-Israel Situation

2. COPY INFORMATION

ACTION COPY ☒ ☒ INFORMATION COPY ☐

TELEGRAMS, DESPATCHES, ETC. ☐

COPY NO. 1 OF 4 COPIES read.

5. FORWARDED 11/14/55 L. Doloff
Nov. 14, 1955 LEO DOLOFF
(Date) (Top Secret Control Officer)

3. DATE AND NAME OF PERSON PREPARING FORM

6. PERSONS TO WHOM ROUTED OR READING DOCUMENT	7. OFFICE SYMBOL	8. SIGNATURES	9. DATE RECEIVED	10. DATE READ	11. DATE RELEASED
Fraser Wilkins	NE				
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CR Cheney	NE	CR Cheney	11/18		11/18
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Helene De Long	HD	Helene De Long	3-1-57		3-1-57
G.M.R. Dougall	HD				11-12-57

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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
Control: 6892

Rec'd: - NOVEMBER 13, 1955

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 497, NOVEMBER 12, 4 PM



SENT DEPARTMENT 497, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 191, JERUSALEM 62, USUN 17.

EYTAN DIRECTOR GENERAL FOREIGN MINISTRY YESTERDAY MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO EMBASSY COUNSELOR RE EMBASSY'S DEMARCHE AS PER DEPTTEL 322:

1. IN CONVERSATION NOVEMBER 9 EYTAN TOLD GENERAL BURNS THAT IN VIEW OF FACT THAT GOI ON FOUR DIFFERENT OCCASIONS HAD GIVEN AGREEMENT TO BURNS' D/Z PROPOSALS ONLY TO HAVE EGYPTIANS FAIL TO AGREE IT WAS NOW UP TO EGYPT TO GIVE ITS REACTION FIRST. IF EGYPTIANS AGREED BURNS COULD BE ASSURED OF ISRAEL'S COOPERATION.

2. EYTAN THOUGHT THAT IF THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCES OF VIEW TALKS COULD BE HELD BETWEEN TWO PARTIES UNDER BURNS' CHAIRMANSHIP. THIS MIGHT BE PRODUCTIVE IF NASSER COULD FIND BETTER REPRESENTATIVE THAN GOHAR. AFTER ALL, THE KILOMETRE 95 TALKS HAD SUCCEEDED IN MAINTAINING TRANQUILLITY ON GAZA STRIP FOR SOMETIME.

COMMENT: GOI ENTHUSIASM FOR RESUMPTION TALKS MAY EVAPORATE WHEN THEY LEARN (CAIRO'S 906 TO DEPARTMENT) THAT EGYPTIANS PROPOSING DEMARCATION ENTIRE D/Z AND GAZA BARRIER TO BE 500 METERS INSIDE ISRAEL TERRITORY.

LAWSON

TT:MEM

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Control: 6781

Rec'd: November 12, 1955
12:39 p.m.

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FROM: USARMA Israel

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: CITE MAI 871, 121301Z (ARMY MESSAGE)

NIACT

FOR DEPTAR G-2 INFORMATION CINCNELM CINCUSAFE CINCCEUR COMAFONE
COM SECOND AIR DIV, COFS USAF AND CNO, COMSIXTHFLT USDOCOSOUTH
NAPLES USDOCOSOUTHEAST IZMAR CO FS 8604 DU ASMARA AND USARMAS
AMMAN BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO SYRIA PA. SIGNED QUERY AND PETERSON.
DEPTAR REPEATS FOR INFORMATION TO STATE DEPT

NOFORN

JOINT SITUATION REPORT No. 9

C: Large number armored infantry personnel from Negev on Sabbath
leaves indicate no Israel large scale military action in view
for several days. Other paragraphs negative.

BB:DT

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Date 12/9/55

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Control: 6829

Rec'd: November 12, 1955
10:20 p.m.

FROM: ARMA Egypt

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1442 121305Z November (Army Message).

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT ARMY G-2 CINCNELM CINCUSAFE CINCEUR, REPEATED
INFORMATION ARMAS TEL AVIV DAMASCUS BEIRUT BAGHDAD COMSIXTHFLT
CO 17 AF RABAT, CMDR SECOND AIR DIVISION DHAHRAN, DOCOSOUTH,
DOCOLANDSOUTHEAST, ARMA AMMAN AND DEPARTMENT, SIGNED ASHMAN.

JOINT SITUATION REPORT NUMBER 9 C.

No change expected.

RSP/12

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Control: 6942
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 13, 1955
8:01 PM

NEA
Info
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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 938, NOVEMBER 13, 4 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 938 REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 174, GENEVA 25
PARIS 92 BEIRUT 116 JIDDA 65 DAMASCUS 83 AMMAN 78 BAGHDAD 3
TEL AVIV 124 JERUSALEM 54

SAW BURNS BRIEFLY LAST EVENING AFTER HIS DISCUSSIONS HERE
COMPLETED. BELIEVE HE WAS DISAPPOINTED OVER EGYPTIAN STAND
ON SOME OF MINOR ISSUES (DEMARCATON OF ENTIRE BORDER OF DZ,
QUESTION OF FENCES, ETC) BUT IMPRESSED BY AND SYMPATHETIC
WITH GENERAL EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE. MOST OF HIS DISCUSSION APPARENT
CENTERED UPON BROADER ISSUES THAN THE SPECIFIC ITEMS IN LETTER
OF SYG.

NASSER, HAKIM AMER AND FAWZI, ALL TOOK LINE THAT THERE SHOULD
BE A MORE FUNDAMENTAL SEPARATION OF FORCES THAN MERELY BORDER
MARKINGS AND THAT ENTIRE AREA SHOULD RETURN TO STRICT OBSERVANCE
OF GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THEY STATED THAT ISRAELI
FORCES WERE STATIONED THROUGHOUT THE "WESTERN FRONT" OF NEGEV
(WITH STOCKPILING FAIRLY LARGE QUANTITIES) IN VIOLATION OF
GAA, ARTICLE ROMAN KKV* PARAGRAPH 4. BURNS FELT THAT BOTH
NASSER AND HAKIM AMER APPARENTLY MADE FAIRLY CONVINCING CASE
THAT THEY DID NOT (RPT NOT) FEEL THEY COULD WITH THIS
SITUATION SAFELY WITHDRAW THEIR OWN FORCES FROM THE DEFENSIVE
AREA WEST OF EL AUJA AS DEFINED IN ARTICLE ROMAN IIIV* PARAGRAPH
3 OF GAA. IN OTHER WORDS BURNS CONSIDERS EGYPT IS ASKING
FOR A STRICT RETURN TO THE SITUATION PRESCRIBED BY GAA WITH
POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF BEING WILLING TO IGNORE ESTABLISHMENT
KIBBUTZ IN DZ PROVIDED POLICE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH
BE BONA FIDE AND NOT (RPT NOT) EXCESSIVE.

JJ

* AS RECEIVED, WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST

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25
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Control: 6929
Rec'd: November 13, 1955
3:46 p.m.

NEA
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FROM: USARMA Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1443, 131345Z November (Army Message).

PRIORITY

SENT USARMA AMMAN AND ALL JOINT SITUATION REPORT ADDRESSEES,
REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, SIGNED ASHMAN.

JOINT SITUATION REPORT NUMBER 10 C.

USIA

No change expected.

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Action
NEAControl: 7768
Rec'd: November 15, 1955
7:38 a.m.Info
RMR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 156, November 14, 5 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 156 REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY AMMAN 72,
PRIORITY CAIRO 109, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 130, BAGHDAD 8, BEIRUT 42,
DAMASCUS 48, JIDDA 3, LONDON 68, PARIS 69.UOP
OLI

General Burns has given me description his meeting GOE officials
gist of which contained Cairo's telegram 938 to Department.
However, as Burns had opportunity go more into detail today
summary is set forth below.

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Nasser said that basically Egyptians want peace, but that Israel
attack on Gaza February 28 and subsequently aggressions re-
present Israel effort to pressure Egypt into peace negotiations
on Israel's own terms.

Nasser told Burns that Egyptian forces have orders not (repeat
not) to fire at individuals, and I gathered, to exercise reasonable
restraint about shooting along border. Nasser also said that
subsequent fighting El Auja area November 2 he "suppressed" desire
Egyptian military for retaliation. Nasser evidently implied that
military authorities had wished send more "suicide squads" into
Israel, but that he did not (repeat not) allow this. Burns en-
deavored impress upon Nasser that violence of emotional reaction
Israel public to "suicide squads" almost certainly would lead
further acts of retaliation whenever such squads sent into Israel.

With regard El Auja DZ Nasser said Egyptians want to have all bound-
aries DZ surveyed and marked, not (repeat not) just old inter-
national frontier. Burns considered such step as pointless, and
presumably mere stalling tactic. With respect police in DZ Nasser
not (repeat not) satisfied with their presence there since in his
opinion they constitute military force. He is willing acquiesce
in existence Kibbutz in DZ for time being, however, if this question
will be raised in SC in due course. He evidently did not (repeat
not) desire make an issue of the police at this time, so long as

their number

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-2- 156, November 14, 5 p.m. from Jerusalem,

their number reduced to 30.

Burns pointed out that if Egypt expected obtain reduction forces in DZ as mentioned above, then Israel would doubtless insist on withdrawal of Egyptian forces pursuant Article 8 paragraph 3 GAA. Nasser replied by referring Article 7 GAA as reported Cairo's telegram 938.

With regard SC resolution September 8, Fawsi told Burns Egyptians would "close their eyes" if Israelis wished build fence 500 meters from border their side, but owing attitude Arab States GOE could not (repeat not) collaborate in building it nor agree to mention of matter in any document.

Burns said that nothing of especial significance developed from his interview with Ben Gurion November 9. Latter voiced same opinions on situation as have appeared in the press. Burns remarked that evidently Ben Gurion is expressing willingness "live up to his own interpretation of the armistice." Burns seeing Eytan today primarily in endeavor make some progress toward settling El Auja questions.

In Burns' view there is reasonable chance for improvement in situation if things can be kept quiet for a time. He expects to proceed Amman November 15 see Glubb (DEPTEL 60 to Amman).

COLE

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DEC 7 1955

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AIR

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 504, NOVEMBER 14, 7 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 504, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 76, CAIRO 198

OVER WEEKEND IDF-FLO ANNOUNCED FOLLOWING INCIDENTS:

1. NOVEMBER 10 DURING EARLY EVENING AUTOMATIC FIRE DIRECTED AT BORDER POLICE PATROL AT KHIRBET AD DAIR. NO CASUALTIES.

2. EVENING 12-13 NOVEMBER HOUSE BLOWN UP AT ROSH HAIN. NO CASUALTIES.

3. NOVEMBER 11 SHOTS FIRED AT HERD OF CATTLE NEAR EIN HASHLOSHA.

4. NOVEMBER 14 SHOTS FIRED AT BORDER POLICE PATROL VICINITY NAHAL OZ.

COMMENT: NUMEROUS ROAD BLOCKS OBSERVED BY EMBASSY DURING WEEKEND, ALLEGEDLY SEARCHING FOR FEDAYEEN.

LAWSON

LR

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1955 NOV 15 AM 11 34

Control: 7784
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 15, 7:55 AM

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1 WEST 37TH STREET  JUST OFF FIFTH AVE.

NEW YORK 18, N. Y.

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November 14, 1955

Hon. John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

No doubt you receive more advice than is useful on the Israeli-Egyptian difficulty. May I nevertheless take the liberty of calling your attention to my over-all statement of policy, prepared for you a year and a half ago, at your request. I enclose a copy.

Provided the objectives stated in this proposal are acceptable, the American answer on the Near East is contained in the first few paragraphs. Either a war between Israel and Egypt and such other Near Eastern nations as might be involved would be a threat to the security of the United States and/or nations to whom we are committed, or it would not. If it would not threaten our or their security, we should remain neutral, although always offering our good offices.

If it would threaten our or their security, we should demand submission by both sides of all issues to arbitration, notifying both sides that whichever refused arbitration would, in case of war, find itself at war with the other nation and the United States as well. Such war would be fought to the quickest possible victory by all forces of the United States, and inasmuch as we have no ulterior motives or desires anywhere in the world, we would be willing to submit the peace settlement after victory to arbitration, provided no other great powers intervene.

Still slowly recovering from coronary attacks of more than a year ago, I want to pay tribute to your tremendous energy on behalf of your countrymen, and to the fact that you have done as well as you have in situations, and with policies, both of which I found discouraging.

Very sincerely yours,


Alfred Kohlberg

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7/8/54

In a Republic, all policy must be a function of the public consent. We, the undersigned, therefore submit to our fellow-citizens.

A PROGRAM TO GOVERN OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS.

The independent sovereignty of the United States must forever remain the ultimate objective of American foreign policy. This objective can best be attained in a peaceful community of free and sovereign nations, guided in their relationship by minimum standards of law and equity. To this end, it is the hope of Americans that governments be constituted to derive their lawful powers from the consent of the governed, and that peoples everywhere enjoy the dignity and freedom which is their grant from the Almighty.

As such a world develops, should breaches of such minimum standards threaten its security, the United States would dedicate its leadership and its power to enforcing just settlements alone or in co-operation with like-minded nations temporarily willing to act under its leadership. Under other circumstances the U.S. would maintain neutrality.

The greatest present obstacle to the attainments of the above stated objectives is the existence of the Communist Dictatorship, and its world agencies. Our aim must be to eliminate this menace, if possible without war.

Specifically, we propose that the Government of the United States:

1. Mobilize the strongest possible deterrents to war--military, psychological, political and economic.
2. Return to those traditional American policies which sustained us in the past, especially:
 - (a) The policies recommended by Pres. George Washington in his Farewell Address.
 - (b) The Monroe Doctrine.
 - (c) The Open Door Policy as defined in the 9 Power Treaty of 1922.
3. Exterminate the Communist conspiracy in the United States.
4. Withdraw recognition from the Soviet Union and its satellites.
5. Employ all measures to sap the economic strength of the Communist world.
6. Scrupulously observe present military alliances (where such alliances are in truth honored by our contracting allies), and form new alliances only for the period of the emergency.
7. Extend military and economic aid only to cooperating allies.
8. Wage unremitting psychological warfare against Communist regimes, including aid to effective anti-Communist exile, underground, and resistance groups.
9. Return to Open Diplomacy, except where military security imposes secrecy.
10. Press for the expulsion of Communist member-states from the U.N.

Reform the U.N. by removing all semblance of a permanent military alliance and separate it from its specialized agencies. Amend our Constitution to provide that neither the U.N. Charter, nor treaties, nor covenants, shall supersede it.

11. Base American Foreign Policy solidly on Moral Law, Patriotism, Enlightened Nationalism and Christian Principles.

copy for Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy

SEV file
G.R.M.
12/19/55

Noted
by

December 5, 1955

Hon. John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Thank you for sending me five of your speeches, plus one by Under-Secretary Hoover and two by Under-Secretary Murphy, as a means of settling my argument with our Washington newspaper friend as to whether this nation has a foreign policy or not.

From each speech I have excerpted words which, in my opinion, make policy pronouncements. As your speech of September 22, 1955 before the U.N. Assembly contained no policy statement not included in the others, I have omitted it in the interest of brevity. The excerpts from the other 7 speeches are attached hereto.

Having done this I then took the Foreign Policy Statement signed by 70 Americans and advertised in the N.Y. TIMES, Washington POST and other papers. From that advertisement I cut the extraneous quotations, leaving only the Policy Statement. On a separate sheet I have placed your comparable statements (or Messrs. Hoover or Murphy's) under the same paragraph numberings.

In 1945 Gen. George C. Marshall told Congress that the U.S. was so powerful that, alone, we could assure our security in the world. In 1955 his successor, Adm. Radford has declared that, alone, America faces destruction.

Congratulations on your press statement of Nov. 29th inviting the Democrats to debate foreign policy. It is my hope that the two enclosed statements (yours and the one I signed) may develop uninhibited but constructive criticism of policies, rather than of individuals, administrations or parties.

With kindest regards.

Very sincerely yours,

AK:eb

cc: Each person named

To press for release Dec. 12th.

Alfred Kohlberg

EXCERPTS FROM SPEECHES

SECRETARY JOHN FOSTER DULLES:

Address before National Four H Club Congress, Chicago, November 29, 1954

"...the goal of our foreign policy...is to enable you and me and our children to enjoy in peace the blessings of liberty....International Communism threatens both peace and liberty."

"Our nation will react....to the outrages against our citizens....our first duty is to exhaust peaceful means.... rather than resorting to war action such as a naval and air blockade of Red China....We hope....that they (the Communists) will renounce the effort to rule the world by....force, intimidation and fraud."

"...we must remain vigilant....to meet both the military risk and the subversive risk and we do have such policies."

"...the greatest contribution we can make to peace is to be ready to fight....military preparations....will deter war."

"...friendly relations with many other countries....the common defense includes many areas outside the U.S.In some cases the local forces....are larger than local governments can support. If so we help out."

"Western Europe....requires special protection. It gets it by NATO."

"...it is our policy to support vigorously the U.N."

"The Latin American countries are vulnerable to Communist subversion....This Caracas Declaration greatly protects this hemisphere against Communist subversion."

"...At the Manila Conference....both Western and Asian participants joined in a Pacific Charter...."

"...the U.S....has the most capital available to help develop other countries. We must find a way to put it to work....President Eisenhower's plan for putting atomic energy....at the peaceful service of all mankind."

"Liberation normally comes from within....Developments clearly portend the change at some time...."

"...conferences with the Soviet Government....to find out whether the Soviet Union will sign the Austrian Treaty....talk seriously about uniting Germany....limitation of armaments...."

"...the U.S. is the world's greatest power not only materially but spiritually."

"The Peace We Seek" - before Y.W.C.A. January 11, 1955, New York, N. Y.

"Peace....implies inner tranquility....To the orthodox Communists....peace....means a state of enforced conformity...."

"If that system....can be made worldwide, then, they argue, there will be an end to war."

"...between Great Britain and Egypt....there is peace in the true sense....between Italy and Yugoslavia....a true peace has been achieved."

"...the peoples of Europe....federal union....we can have good hope....will be consummated....peace in the lofty sense of that word is in fact within man's reach."

"In this country there is a vast urge for peace. We ended the fighting in Korea....to develop collective securityenlightened economic policies....extend good offices to promote acts of peace elsewhere."

"This struggle for peace cannot be won by pacificism or neutralism or by weakness....Aggression is deterred only by an evident will and capacity to fight for rights more precious than is a debasing peace."

"...to deter war and save peace we may have to be ready to fight, if need be, and to have the resources and the allies to assure that an aggressor would surely be defeated."

Department of State Pub. 5874 - April 11, 1955. "Principles in Foreign Policy." Address to All-Jesuit Alumni Dinner, Washington, D.C.

"National action should always reflect principles....More than immediate political expediency."

"...if peace is the absolute goal, then surrender becomes inevitable....face the great dilemma of when and whether to use force to resist aggression...."

"...any problem in any part of the world ramifies into almost every part of the world."

"...a nation situated as is ours needs to follow a consistent and predictable course....Our policies must.... be dependably embraced by our own people, and....reflect a decent respect for the opinions of mankind....only principles which conform to Moral law meet that specification."

Council on Foreign Relations, N.Y. - August 26, 1955

"The Middle East" "...problem of the Suez Base has been successfully resolved." "...tragic plight of the 900,000 refugees....pall of fear that hangs over Arab and Israel people alike....lack of fixed permanent boundaries."

"I speak in this matter with the authority of President Eisenhower."

1. "U.S. would participate in loan to Israel to pay Arab refugees; also aid in water and other projects for resettlement."
2. "...U.S. join in formal treaty....to....thwart any effort....to alter by force the boundaries...."
3. "...should be prior agreement upon what the borders are....U.S. would be willing to help in the search for a solution...."
4. "...the status of Jerusalem. The U.S. would give its support to a U.N. review of this problem."

EXCERPTS FROM SPEECHES

UNDER SECRETARY HERBERT HOOVER, JR.

Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, Cal. - May 23, 1955 - "Some Aspects of our Far East Policy"

"In last few months....creation of the Western European Union....entry ofGermany into NATO....Soviet's sudden offer of an Austrian state treaty....may really mark turning of the tide of history."

"It took 7 years to bring Western European Union....10 years....for Austrian independence."

"The Chou En-lai proposal"

"....we would like to hope....the Chinese Communists....will permit a lessening of tensions....we shall not.... depart from the path of fidelity and honor toward our ally, the Republic of China....(we) welcome the possibility of peaceful settlements. If....the Chinese Communists have adopted a change in tactics, it will be added vindication of our foreign policy."

"In the Far East as in Europe....free countries have become increasingly conscious of outright Communist aggression as well as....undercover subversion....Some have tried to find security in....neutrality....We do not question their right....But we feel their position is a mistaken one...."

"A second group....do not wish to become involved in aggressive military action. Their central objective is their own defense."

"Formosa" "....Formosa is vital to the defense of the whole Pacific area....we limited our agreement to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores....They were put in the possession of the Republic of China in accordance with a solemn agreement entered into during World War II....we are not legally committed....to Quemoy and Matsu....the U.S. has proposed that there should be a ceasefire in the area....We want peace in the Pacific....the face we turn toward the Pacific is as important as the face we turn toward the Atlantic."

"Japan" "The U.S. is making every effort to help Japan increase her trade with other parts of the world."

"Vietnam" "....we have been and are continuing to support the government of Prime Minister Diem."

"Burma" "....to advance the cause of peace with justice and freedom....principles of the U.N. Charter, our respect for treaty obligations and international law....fundamental human rights and dignity of the individual" are our common principles. "....Burma's approach to the external Communist menace in Asia is different from our own...." "....insistent Asian demands for economic improvement should....be carried out primarily by the efforts of the people themselves."

"Conclusion" We shall not succeed "if we attempt to combat Communism by appeasement....we should not engage in aggression....we must proceed from a position of firmness and strength, with a full appreciation of the realities as they exist in the world today."

UNDER SECRETARY ROBERT MURPHY

before Foreign Policy Association, Pittsburgh, Pa., May 5, 1955 - "Our Policies in Asia"

"....what President Eisenhower has called for, the courage to be patient. We can be slow to anger, as Secretary Dulles has recommended."

"....our policy....is designed to protect and promote the security and welfare of the American people....by assisting friendly nations there to build up their strength."

"....early in our history....By the Monroe Doctrine we announced that we would not tolerate further European colonization or permit the extension of despotic political systems any place in the Western Hemisphere....at the time we were about 50 years short of being able to back it up."

"....We threw in our lot against the carving up of China....Filipinos....their independence....refused to countenance....Japan's imperial rule over China....made liberation of Korea World War II objective....By 1945....Asian Nations....looked to us for leadership....The encouragement of nationalist aspirations....has been our consistent policy in Asia....The Manila Pact and Pacific Charter....binds eight nations....against direct aggression and indirect subversion...."

"We have ourselves reached military aid agreements with Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq and....Iran. There exists the Balkan Alliance...."

"We are for freedom, the dignity of the individual, and better standards of living everywhere."

"....cornerstones of our Asian policy: encouragement of legitimate national aspirations, collective security against aggression and subversion, economic and military assistance to the free nations with which we are allied....to promote our own national security and the best interests of our people....part of the good alliances....is the ability to disagree within the framework of mutual trust and mutual need."

before International College of Surgeons, Philadelphia, Pa., September 14, 1955

"....our foreign policy....objective is....the welfare and security of the American people."

"Obviously human freedoms should be restored in the vast areas where they are now denied....vigilance in....subversive activities....of international communism."

"The keystone of our foreign policy is collective security....through the U.N., NATO, the Rio Pact, the Andus Treaty, the Manila Pact and many bilateral arrangements...."

"....the fundamental principles of our policy should be firm and predictable....Our collective security undertakings....are working partnerships."

"....we do not believe that relaxation of tension....permit(s) of the scrapping of programs for....self defense, nor....to tolerate covert aggression by International Communism nor....the injustices of the status quo."

"China" "Our policy against recognition of (Chinese People's Republic) continues....we also oppose (its) seating in the U.N...."

"Middle East" "We have interests in many areas of the world where the U.S.S.R. is of secondary concern. One such area is the Middle East....the Administration would recommend American assistance to enable Israel to pay compensation which is due to the Arab refugees and in development programs....join in formal treaty engagements to prevent....any effort by either side to alter the boundaries....The Northern tier for defense of the Middle East....and....the Balkan Pact...."

"Ambassador Lodge presented....President Eisenhower's Geneva proposal for aerial inspection....for the Soviet Union and U.S. to exchange a complete blueprint of military establishments...."

A. IN A REPUBLIC, ALL POLICY MUST BE A FUNCTION OF PUBLIC CONSENT. WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, THEREFORE SUBMIT TO OUR FELLOW-CITIZENS

A PROGRAM TO GOVERN OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS

B. The independent sovereignty of the United States must forever remain the ultimate objective of American foreign policy. This objective can best be attained in a peaceful community of free and sovereign nations, guided in their relationship by minimum standards of law and equity. To this end, it is the hope of Americans that governments be constituted to derive their lawful powers from the consent of the governed, and that peoples everywhere enjoy the dignity and free-

dom which is their grant from the Almighty.

C. As such a world develops, should breaches of such minimum standards threaten its security, the United States would dedicate its leadership and its power to enforcing just settlements alone or in cooperation with like-minded nations temporarily willing to act under its leadership. Under other circumstances the U. S. would maintain neutrality.

D. The greatest present obstacle to the attainment

of the above stated objectives is the existence of the Communist Dictatorship, and its world agencies. Our aim must be to neutralize, isolate, reduce and eventually eliminate Communist Power. This policy of firmness does not mean we favor preventive war. Nevertheless, our enemies should be set on notice that—however grim the prospect—we will not shrink from war if the Kremlin forces us to choose between conflict and surrender to Communist slavery.

Specifically, we propose that the Government of the United States:

1. Mobilize the strongest possible deterrents to war—military, psychological, political and economic.
2. Return to those traditional American policies which sustained us in the past, especially:
 - a. The policies recommended by President George Washington in his Farewell Address.
 - b. The Monroe Doctrine.
 - c. The Open Door Policy as defined in the Nine Power Treaty of 1922.
3. Exterminate the Communist conspiracy in the United States.
4. Withdraw recognition from the Soviet Union and its satellites.
5. Employ all measures to sap the economic strength of the Communist World.
6. Scrupulously observe present military alliances (where such alliances are in truth honored by our contracting allies), and form new alliances only for the period of the emergency.
7. Extend military and economic aid only to cooperating allies.
8. Wage unremitting psychological warfare against Communist regimes, including aid to effective anti-Communist exile, underground, and resistance groups, based on the principles of the Golden Rule.
9. Return to Open Diplomacy, except where military security imposes secrecy.
10. Oppose all activities which tend towards a world state, super-government, or the transfer of decisions for American security and welfare to foreign powers and/or foreign nationals. To this end, press for the expulsion of Communist member-states from the U. N. Reform the U. N. by removing all semblance of a permanent military alliance and separate it from its specialized agencies. Amend our Constitution to provide that neither the U. N. Charter, nor treaties, nor covenants, shall supersede it.
11. Base American Foreign Policy solidly on Moral Law, Patriotism, Enlightened Nationalism and the Teachings of Christ.

Col. Ulius Louis Amos, Gibson Island, Md.
Miss Robley Besterville, San Diego, Cal.
Congressman Alvin M. Bentley, Michigan
E. Manchester Boddy, Penna Valley, Cal.
Lt. General Lewis H. Brown, Winter Park, Fla.
Basil Brewer, New Bedford, Mass.
Ray Brock, New York, N. Y.
James Burnham, Kent, Conn.
Major General Claire L. Chennault, Taipei, Taiwan
Dr. Kenneth Colegrove, Buena Vista, Ill.
Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Sonoma, Cal.
Ambassador James H. D. Crowell, Washington, D. C.
Thomas J. Cuite, Washington, D. C.
Hon. Charles Edison, West Orange, N. J.
Brig. General Bonner Fellen, Washington, D. C.
Rev. James W. Fifield, Jr., Los Angeles, Cal.
Devlin A. Garrity, New York, N. Y.
James H. Gipson, Caldwell, Idaho
Congressman Ralph W. Griffin, New York
J. Evans Haley, Canyon, Texas
Admiral Thor. C. Hart, Sharon, Conn.
Major General Frank H. Lowe, Harrison, Mo.
Mr. Ward Bond, Beverly Hills, Calif.

Dr. William Lee Hart, San Antonio, Tex.
Conrad H. Hilson, Beverly Hills, Cal.
Gordon Hunter, Hartford, Conn.
Congressman Donald E. Jackson, California
Rear Admiral I. C. Johnson, Laguna Beach, Cal.
Richard Lloyd Jones, Tulsa, Okla.
H. V. Kibben, New York, N. Y.
Frank Kilduff, Milwaukee, Wis.
Alfred Kolberg, New York, N. Y.
Ambassador Arthur H. Lee, Washington, D. C.
Governor J. Nathan Lee, Utah
William Leach, Manchester, N. H.
H. B. Leavelle, Lansing, Mich.
Eugene Lyons, New York, N. Y.
Clarence Manning, South Bend, Ind.
Adolphine Martin, Beverly Hills, Cal.
Archibald McIndoe, New York, N. Y.
Col. Lucius B. Meade, Washington, D. C.
V. O. O'Connor, Carlsbad, N. Mex.
Wm. F. Pace, Chicago, Ill.
Paul A. Robinson, Birmingham, Ala.
Mr. John Dee Francis, Baltimore, Md.
Mr. Harold S. Park, Milwaukee, Wis.
General John E. Ridge, (Ret.), Fayetteville, N. C.

Commodore Frederick G. Reinicke, New York, N. Y.
Dr. E. Merrill Root, Richmond, Ind.
George S. Schuyler, New York, N. Y.
Congressman Timothy P. Sheridan, Illinois
Igor I. Silversky, Bridgeport, Conn.
William Philip Simms, Washington, D. C.
Congressman Lawrence H. Smith, Wisconsin
Congressman Wirt Smith, Kansas
Hear-John-W. Snyder, St. Louis, Mo.
Admiral William H. Standley, Coronado, Cal.
Judge Haden Melville Seely, Jr., Danville, Ill.
Dr. J. W. Sencer, Tulsa, Okla.
Lt. General George E. Stratemyer, Winter Park, Fla.
Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart, Washington, D. C.
Miss Freda Utley, Washington, D. C.
Col. William E. Warner, Columbus, Ohio
Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, New York, N. Y.
Robert H. W. Welch, Jr., Cambridge, Mass.
Brig. General W. H. Wilbur, Highland Park, Ill.
Major General Charles A. Willoughby, New York, N. Y.
Admiral H. E. Yarnell, Newport, R. I.
Dr. Roscoe Pound, Boston, Mass.
Mr. Robert B. Vogeler, New York, N. Y.

POLICY STATEMENTS FROM STATE DEPARTMENT SPEECHES

(Sec. Dulles, Nov. 29, 1954, Jan. 11, April 11 and August 26, 1955; Under Sec. Hoover, May 23 1955; Under Sec. Murphy, May 5 and Sept. 14, 1955. Paragraphs lettered and numbered for comparison with Policy Statement of Committee of Endorsers.)

A. "....a nation situated as is ours needs to follow a consistent and predictable course....Our policies must.... be dependably embraced by our own people, and....reflect a decent respect for the opinions of mankind...."

B. "....our foreign policy....objective isthe welfare and security of the American people....to enable you and me and our children to enjoy in peace the blessings of liberty....to advance the cause of peace with justice and freedom....we are for freedom, the dignity of the individual, and better standards of living everywhere.... This struggle for peace cannot be won by pacifism or neutralism or by weakness....The U.S. is the world's greatest power not only materially but spiritually....The encouragement of nationalist aspirations....has been our consistent policy in Asia....the peoples of Europe....federal union....we can have good hope....will be consummated....peace in the lofty sense of that word is in fact within man's reach....extend good offices to promote acts of peace elsewhere."

C. "The keystone of our foreign policy is collective security....through the U.N., NATO, the Rio Pact, the Anzus Treaty, the Manila Pact and many bilateral arrangements....any problem in any part of the world ramifies into almost every part of the world....friendly relations with many other countries....the common defense includes many areas outside the U.S....collective security against aggression and subversion....We have interests in many areas of the world where the U.S.S.R. is of secondary concern. One such area is the Middle East.... the Administration would recommend American assistance to enable Israel to pay compensation which is due to the Arab refugees and in development programs....join in formal treaty engagements to prevent....any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries....The Northern tier for defense of the Middle East....and....the Balkan Pact...."

D. "International Communism threatens both peace and liberty....To the orthodox Communists....peace.... means a state of enforced conformity....if peace is the absolute goal, then surrender becomes inevitable....face the great dilemma of when and whether to use force to resist aggression....the greatest contribution we can make to peace is to be ready to fight....military preparations....will deter war....Aggression is deterred only by an evident will and capacity to fight for rights more precious than is a debasing peace....to deter war and save peace we may have to be ready to fight, if need be, and to have the resources and the allies to assure that an aggressor would surely be defeated."

1. "....We must remain vigilant....to meet both the military risk and the subversive risk and we do have such policies....we do not believe that relaxation of tension....permit(s) of the scrapping of programs for self defense, nor....to tolerate covert aggression by International Communism nor....the injustices of the status quo.what President Eisenhower has called for, the courage to be patient. We can be slow to anger....our policy... is designed to protect and promote the security and welfare of the American people....by assisting friendly nations to build up their strength."

2. -----

a. -----

b. "....early in our history....by the Monroe Doctrine we announced that we would not tolerate further European colonization or permit the extension of despotic political systems any place in the Western Hemisphere....The Latin American countries are vulnerable to Communist subversion....This Caracas Declaration greatly protects this hemisphere against Communist subversion."

c. "we shall not....depart from the path of fidelity and honor toward our ally, the Republic of China.... Our nation will react....to the outrages against our citizens....our first duty is to exhaust peaceful means....rather than resorting to war action such as a naval and air blockade of Red China....We hopethat they (the Communists) will renounce the effort to rule the world by....force, intimidation and fraud....We threw in our lot against the carving up of China....Filipinos....their independence....refused to countenance....Japan's imperial rule over China....made liberation of Korea World War II objective."

3. -----

4. "Our policy against recognition of (Chinese People's Republic) continues....We also oppose (its) seating in the U.N....(we) welcome the possibility of peaceful settlements. If....the Chinese Communists have adopted a change in tactics, it will be added vindication of our foreign policy....Ambassador Lodge presented....President Eisenhower's Geneva proposal for aerial inspection....for the Soviet Union and U.S. to exchange a complete blueprint of military establishments....conferences with the Soviet Government....to find out whether the Soviet Union will sign the Austrian Treaty....talk seriously about uniting Germany....limitation of armaments...."

5. -----

6. "Western Europe....requires special protection. It gets it by NATO....to develop collective security...."

7. "....the U.S....has the most capital available to help develop other countries. We must find a way to put it to work....President Eisenhower's plan for putting atomic energy....at the peaceful service of all mankind.... enlightened economic policies....economic and military assistance to the free nations with which we are alliedIn some cases the local forces....are larger than local governments can support. If so we help out....insistent Asian demands for economic improvement should....be carried out primarily by the efforts of the people themselves....At the Manila Conference....both Western and Asian participants joined in a Pacific Charter.... The U.S. is making every effort to help Japan increase her trade with other parts of the world."

8. We shall not succeed "if we attempt to combat Communism by appeasement....we should not engage in aggression....we must proceed from a position of firmness and strength, with a full appreciation of the realities as they exist in the world today....Obviously human freedoms should be restored in the vast areas where they are now denied....vigilance in....subversive activities....of international communism....Liberation normally comes from within....Developments clearly portend the change at some time....Formosa is vital to the defense of the whole Pacific area....the U.S. has proposed that there should be a ceasefire in the area....We want peace in the Pacific....the face we turn toward the Pacific is as important as the face we turn toward the Atlantic.... The Manila Pact and Pacific Charter....binds eight nations....against direct aggression and indirect subversionwe have been and are continuing to support the government of Prime Minister Diem."

9. "part of the good alliances....is the ability to disagree within the framework of mutual trust and mutual need....Thus we agree to disagree but work together in the U.N. and Colombo plan."

10. "....it is our policy to support vigorously the U.N."

11. "National action should always reflect principles....More than immediate political expediency....only principles which conform to Moral law meet that specification....principles of the U.N.Charter, our respect for treaty obligations and international law....fundamental human rights and dignity of the individual are our common principles."

17

Rayn.

674.84a 11-1555

In reply refer to
SEV 674.84A.11-1555

March 20 1956

Dear Mr. Corbett:

I trust you will excuse the inadvertently long delay in acknowledging the receipt of your letter of November 15 regarding your community's interest in the Arab-Israel dispute. We appreciate very much your interest in informing us of the discussion of this matter in your community and in making your views available to the Department.

Perhaps you would be interested in the enclosed material concerning United States policy with regard to the Arab-Israel dispute.

Sincerely yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:

John P. Meagher
Chief
Public Services Division

✓
Enclosures:

Selected material.

cc/R
Anal <u>2</u>
Rev _____
Cat _____

The Reverend
Gordon L. Corbett,
The Presbyterian Church,
Glens Falls, New York.

P:SEV:LMCampbell:DKP:pb

3/6/56

✓ S/S-CR
MAR 19 1956 P.M.

674.84A.11-1555

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File Designation 674.84A/1-1555
LTR W/ATTCH
Date 11/15/55
From Hancock
To Merchant

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11

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 000
Rec'd: November 17, 1955
7:17 a.m.FROM: Jerusalem
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 11 November 1955, 4 p.m.SENT DEPARTMENT 158, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 73, CAIRO 123,
LONDON 12, PARIS 70, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, BAGHDAD
UNRECEIVED.

Re Jerusalem's 156.

Have discussed Burns' visit Cairo with Graham Lucas, American
political adviser to UNTSO, who accompanied Burns at meeting
with Fawzi and Amer November 12. His comments substantially
as follows:

1. Lucas gained impression that Egyptians will not (repeat not)
press for the removal of the Kibbutz from El Auja D/Z, since
this matter would be connected in SC with the blockade of
Gulf of Aqaba. GOE is not (repeat not) keen on having latter
capitalized near future.

2. Egyptians will not (repeat not) insist their point that all
boundaries of D/Z should be marked. While Lucas not (repeat not)
aware their precise motives, he assumes Egyptians trying cast
doubt Israeli claims "sovereignty" over D/Z.

3. GOE more seriously concerned existence in D/Z of Israeli
"police". They realize "police" are in fact members GOI
Armed Forces. General Burns now has doubts about wisdom
his acquiescence in Israelis stationing police there.

4. Presence Egyptian troops in zone opposite El Auja D/Z
(Article 8 GAA paragraph 3) is related to presence Israeli
troops in area west of line through Beersheba within Israel
contrary to Article 7 GAA. General Amer said that Egypt
will not (repeat not) evacuate the "non-defensive position"
facing El Auja D/Z unless Israelis remove all other than
defensive forces from the "western front" under Israeli
control, as provided by GAA. Amer expressed opinion that
unless Israel meets Egyptian requirements (i.e. compliance
Article 7, plus return to situation existing before entry
Israeli Armed Forces and police El Auja D/Z) any arrangement
such as

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-2- 158, November 16, 4 p.m., from Jerusalem

such as UNSC proposal for withdrawal armed forces zones established by Article 8 would be inequitable and in Israel's favor. In any event, GOE Forces being given strict orders against opening fire at individuals, or unless under immediate danger attack.

5. General Amer stressed he primarily interested in question Egyptian security. Consequently, he said, he must look to defense of area west of international frontier, unless Israelis willing withdraw troops as indicated above.

6. Lucas added that Amer did most of the talking. Fawsi had little to say with respect foregoing. However, Fawsi expressed strong dislike tripartite declaration and efforts influence developments between Egypt and Israel. Fawsi expressed himself as strongly opposed to establishment of anything resembling "spheres of influence" in area. He argued that the three powers should not (repeat not) meddle in Egyptian affairs any more than Egypt should, for instance, "tell Britain how to run Kenya."

Lucas also told me that GOE has at last allowed UNTSO set up radio station Cairo plus liaison officer there. Latter would presumably have job of dealing with Gohar. Burns hopeful that someone else could then take Gohar's place in any future talks which may possibly be held Gaza under his auspices concerning outstanding issues.

COLE

SW:MEM/12

DEC 7 1955

DEC 1 1955

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Handwritten:
No reply necessary
file - NE - Burns
11/18/55
שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון
RM/R

November 16, 1955

Dear George,

On returning to my office I have studied the proposals which the United Nations authorities have made for the Nitzana (El Auja) zone.

It appears that the proposal for marking a line refers, in the minds of the Secretary General and General Burns, to the demarcation line, which is also the international frontier and the western limit of the demilitarized zone.

It is to this United Nations proposal that I have stated my Government's generally favorable attitude. I understand that General Burns sees good reason for marking this line and no other. I am now informed by cable that the General, during his visit to Cairo, rejected the Egyptian suggestion for changing his original proposal.

After our talk on Saturday, November 5, I informed my Government that the United States strongly supported the precise proposal which the U.N. Secretary General had made in his letter.

Yours very sincerely,

The Honorable
George V. Allen
Assistant Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 10030
Rec'd: November 18,
11:21 a.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 159, November 17, 4 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 159, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 74, CAIRO 111,
LONDON 70, PARIS 71; BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED.

Re CONTELS 156 and 158.

Hommel has given me following details current UNTSO matters.

(1) Burns saw Eytan November 14 and gave him gist Egyptian position. Eytan said GOI would consider matter, but nothing conclusive developed at meeting. Ben Gurion reportedly has commented on subject by asking "will they stop sending saboteurs!"

(2) Observers still restricted by each party, since Israelis permit them move only along roads in El Auja D/Z. If they use El Auja-Ismaglia road, however, they must take liaison officer with them. Egyptians restricting observers to El Auja-Rafa road and have pigeon-holed requests for permission go elsewhere. Burns did not go into question freedom of movement for observers while at Cairo since UNSYG making approach Egyptians this subject. UNTSO is requesting assignment five additional observers of whom one American, one Canadian, one French. Nationality of others not specified in request.

(3) Israel armed forces El Auja D/Z have not been reduced in strength. UNTSO believes their number consists approximately 400 troops well dug in. Troops have been removed from area between D/Z and Beersheba. UNTSO estimates at least one brigade withdrawn and few, if any, remaining there.

(4) At meeting Burns and Glubb November 15 latter reportedly expressed view that incidents such as mentioned CONTELS 148 and 155 were instigated by Egyptians. Since Nasser evidently sincere in assurances he gave Burns after both Kuntilla and El Sabha incidents that there would be no retaliation, Burns of opinion that Nasser not fully informed of activities of the Feda Yeen. He surmises they may be directed by lower level of military or possibly by Mufti.

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-2- 159, November 17, 4 p.m., from Jerusalem.

According information given Burns at meeting with Glubb Egyptians are believed training Palestinians in Syria or Gaza Strip in sabotage activities. Trainees later return, using West Jordan as base for incursions.

COLE

BB:BD

DEC 7 1955

52406

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMCONGENERAL, JERUSALEM
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

95
DESP. NO.

November 17, 1955
DATE

REF :

BEIRUT-1 CAIRO-1 DAMASCUS-1

15 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION NEA-4	DEPT. IN RMR-2 011-6 IO-4 USOA-1 P-1 U/O P-1
	REC'D 12/1	OTHER CIA-7 USIA-4 OCB-2 OSD-4 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3

SUBJECT: Activities of the MACs during the Period October 1-28, 1955

There are enclosed copies of the four weekly reports addressed by the UNTSO Chief of Staff to Mr. Andrew CORDIER, Executive Assistant to the UN Secretary General, on the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions during the period October 1-28. Hereafter it is the intention of the Consulate General to forward subsequent similar reports to the Department as soon as they are obtained.

William E. Cole
William E. Cole
American Consul General

4 Enclosures
1-4. Copy of Four Weekly Reports
of UNTSO, Jerusalem

cc: Amman, Tel Aviv

Dept: Please pouch Beirut, Cairo, Damascus

1955 DEC 2 AM 11 00
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DEC 13 1955

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HEADQUARTERS
TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

Jerusalem, 12 October 1955

MAIL DESPATCH NO. 41

To : Mr. Andrew W. Cordier
Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General

From : Major-General E.L.M. Burns
Chief of Staff, UNTSO

Subject: Weekly Summary of Activities of the MACs

1. The following is a summary of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions for the period 1 to 7 October 1955.

EGYPT - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

2. The evacuation of the Demilitarized Zone of El Auja by the military forces of the two Parties took place on 2 October. However, the situation remained tense. The Egyptian Delegation will not allow United Nations Military Observers to inspect their positions situated inside Egypt along the International Frontier facing the D/Z unless the Israeli police are withdrawn from the D/Z.

3. One serious incident was reported by the Israel Delegation alleging that on 4 October Israeli labourers were attacked near Gilat settlement by infiltrators coming from Egyptian-controlled territory. One Israeli was killed, and two were wounded.

4. During the period under review, the Egyptian Delegation submitted ten complaints: 2 alleging overflight of the D/Z by Israeli aircraft; 2 alleging movement of Israeli trucks carrying soldiers and equipment inside the D/Z; 2 alleging the presence of Israeli military positions in the D/Z; 1 alleging patrolling of the D/Z by an Israeli force; 3 alleging Israel forces occupy and maintain positions within the D/Z facing the Egyptian checkposts.

The Israel Delegation submitted five complaints: 1 alleging the firing at and shelling of an Israel patrol in the D/Z by an Egyptian positions stationed within the D/Z; 3 alleging firing at Israeli aircraft from Egyptian military positions within the D/Z; 1 alleging the attack of Israeli citizens well inside Israel territory by an armed group emanating from Egyptian-controlled territory (see paragraph 3 above).

Outstanding complaints: Egypt - 129; Israel - 236; Total: 365

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HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

5. Quiet prevailed along the Jordan-Israel Demarcation Line. At an informal meeting held between the senior members of the MAC on 3 October, a proposal was drafted stating that all outstanding complaints would be considered as having been settled, and giving Jordan the right to bring before the MAC any complaints they have regarding the alleged expulsions of Israelis into Jordan. The proposal is to be brought to the attention of the authorities of each Party, and adoption of the proposal is to be made in a formal MAC meeting. If approved, this would result in the settling of over 2,000 complaints; (see M.D. No. 39, paragraph 8).

6. The question of the removal of the markers in the KH. EL BURJ - Kilo 69 area was again brought to the attention of the Israel Delegate. No definite answer was given (see M.D. No. 30, para. 5).

7. The Jordan Delegation lodged 13 complaints: 1 alleging crossing of the D/L by military units; 5 alleging firing across the Line; 6 alleging overflights and 1 alleging grass fire. There were no casualties.

The Israel Delegation lodged 4 complaints: 2 alleging crossing of the D/L by unarmed civilians and 2 alleging stone throwing. There were no casualties.

Outstanding complaints: Israel-1,190; Jordan-1,177; Total: 2,367

ISRAEL - LEBANESE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

8. Although a few minor incidents took place, the situation remained quiet and there were no incidents that might influence the situation. The Lebanese Delegation submitted 5 complaints: 1 alleging exchange of fire between Lebanese gendarmerie and armed gang at MR 1775-2796; 1 alleging the blowing up of a house by mines at Bent Jbeil; 1 alleging the explosion of a mine near a house at Teir Harfa; 1 alleging shots of automatic weapons fired at cattle at Boustan Yarin and 1 alleging shots of automatic weapons fired at cattle at Boustan Yarin and 1 alleging exchange of fire between patrol of Lebanese gendarmerie and armed men near Marwahine.

ISRAEL - SYRIAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

9. The period under review has been quiet. The Syrian Delegation submitted four complaints: three alleging overflights and one alleging firing by Israelis across the D/L at the inhabitants of Kafar Hareb.

Outstanding complaints: Syria-484; Israel-359; Total: 843

10. Work at the Jordan River Diversion Project remains halted in the Demilitarized Zone.

E.L.M. Burns
Major-General
Chief of Staff

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Headquarters
TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

Jerusalem, 20 October 1955

MAIL DESPATCH No. 42

To : Mr. Andrew W. Cordier
Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General

From : Major-General E.L.M. Burns
Chief of Staff, UNTSO

Subject: Weekly Summary of Activities of the MACs

1. The following is a summary of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions for the period 8 to 14 October 1955.

EGYPT-ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

2. Although both parties lodged few complaints during the period under review, the situation in the Demilitarized Zone remained very tense. The Israeli authorities object:

(a) to the existence, along the International Frontier, of four Egyptian checkposts the complement of which is alleged to be in excess of the normal;

(b) to the postponement of the survey of the International Frontier by UN observers.

3. The Egyptian authorities claim that the Israeli troops did not completely evacuate the D/Z (referring to the Israeli police stationed in this area since 2 October 1955), and that consequently, they will not allow any survey or inspection of their checkposts unless the D/Z is completely "clear of Israeli troops."

4. Thus both parties are stiffening their attitude. The Israelis apparently intend to pursue the survey of the D/Z by themselves; an incident is consequently to be feared if the Israeli survey team approaches the Egyptian checkposts.

5. On 13 October, a UN Observer witnessed at Kilo 95 the transfer to the Israeli authorities of the body of an Israeli who died while a prisoner in Egypt. A post mortem by an Israeli doctor showed that the death was due to natural causes and that the body showed no traces of ill-treatment.

6. The Egyptian Delegation submitted one complaint alleging that a minefield laid by the Israeli military authorities during their occupation of the El Auja D/Z had not been removed.

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The Israel Delegation submitted two complaints: one alleging that Egyptian troops had deployed one reinforced platoon at four different locations and that these four positions were backed up in depth by other Egyptian forces.

Outstanding complaints: Egypt - 130; Israel - 238; Total: 368

HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

7. During the week under review, the situation remained unchanged. At the 242nd MAC meeting it was agreed that all outstanding complaints were to be considered settled, and a new series was started. It was agreed that the new series of complaints would be referred to the Sub-Committee without delay for prompt settlement. Initial complaints received involving the alleged abduction of a herd of goats and the alleged firing by the shepherd were investigated and settled to the agreement of both parties.

8. The Israel Delegate advised the MAC that work in removing the markers in the Kh. el Burj - Kilo 69 area would commence on 17 October and that the physical work of removing the markers would commence on 24 October 1955 (see M.D. No. 41, para. 6).

9. The Israel Delegation submitted 4 complaints: 2 alleging crossing of the D/L by armed civilians; 1 alleging crossing of the D/L by unarmed civilians and 1 alleging firing across the D/L. There were no casualties.

The Jordan Delegation lodged 12 complaints: 2 alleging crossing of the D/L by military units; 1 alleging firing across the line; 7 alleging overflights; 2 alleging stone throwing and one alleging abduction. There were no casualties.

Outstanding complaints as of 12 October 1955:
Israel - 1,192; Jordan - 1,186; Total: 2,378

Outstanding complaints as of 14 October 1955:
Israel - 1; Jordan - 2; Total: 3

ISRAEL - LEBANESE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

10. The situation remained quiet and there were no incidents that might influence the situation. The Israel Delegation submitted a complaint about a shot allegedly fired from Lebanese territory. The Lebanese Delegation submitted one complaint alleging an overflight.

ISRAEL - SYRIAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

11. The period under review has been relatively quiet. On 10 October, the inhabitants of Tawafiq in the Southern D/Z prevented two Observers on a routine patrol from entering the village, threatening to shoot next time they approach

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the village. No reason or explanation was given for this attitude. Chairman has written letter of protest to Senior Syrian Delegate requesting him to instruct the villagers of Tawafiq not to interfere with the freedom of movement of the observers on duty in the D/Z.

12. The Syrian Delegation submitted six complaints: 2 alleging Israeli penetration in the Southern D/Z; one alleging that an Israeli boat fired across the D/L from Lake Tiberias; three alleging overflights. Israel did not submit any complaint.

Outstanding complaints: Syria-490; Israel-359; Total: 849

13. Work at the Jordan River Diversion Project remains halted in the Demilitarized Zone.

14. On 14 October, word was received that the Israelis had constructed a temporary dam across the River at MR 090718. Senior Israeli Delegate later stated that this dam was erected to raise the water level in the Huleh marshes to put out a peat-bog fire. He said that it would take five days to raise the water to the required level.

E.L.M. Burns
Major-General
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS
TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

Jerusalem, 27 October 1955

MAIL DESPATCH NO. 43

To : Mr. Andrew W. Cordier
Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General

From : Colonel R.E. Hommel
Acting Chief of Staff, UNTSO

Subject: Weekly Summary of Activities of the MACs

1. The following is a summary of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions for the period 15 to 21 October 1955.

EGYPT-ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

2. During the period under review, the situation remained tense in the Demilitarized Zone of El Auja. Neither party altered their attitude as explained in M.D. No. 42.

3. A serious incident happened on 16 October when a UN investigation team, composed of a UN Observer and a Radio Officer, both driving white jeeps, were fired at by automatic-weapon and rifle fire in full daylight by an Egyptian checkpoint situated at MR 0966-0216. (See UNTSO 421). The observer's jeep was hit by 10 bullets, the radio-jeep by 2 bullets. When the fire began, the UN cars were in the D/Z 70 meters from the international frontier, investigating an Egyptian complaint. The observer reported seeing no Israelis. However, the Egyptian officer in command of the Egyptian checkpoint, obviously trying to find an excuse, maintained during the investigation of this incident that an Israeli car was with the two UNTSO vehicles. The Senior Egyptian Delegate even stated by letter that the Egyptian checkpoint had fired at the Israeli car. It is the first time that a delegation to the MAC openly and in writing denied a statement made by a UN observer.

4. The Egyptian Delegation submitted five complaints: 2 alleging overflight of Egyptian-controlled territory by Israel aircraft; 1 alleging crossing of the I/F by Israelis; 1 alleging movement of Israeli forces in the D/Z and one alleging that armed Israeli soldiers in a lorry approached the I/F although warned off by an Egyptian checkpoint; an exchange of fire ensued.

The Israel Delegation submitted six complaints: 1 alleging interference by an Egyptian position with a survey team operating in the D/Z; 1 alleging crossing of the D/L by Egyptians; 1 alleging firing by Egyptians at an Israeli tractor

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driver in Israel and 3 alleging overflight of the D/Z or of Israeli territory by Egyptian aircraft.

Outstanding complaints: Egypt - 135; Israel - 244; Total: 379

HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

5. The period under review has shown some activity in the Zeita and Tulkarm areas. The situation was discussed with both parties who appear to be anxious to keep the area quiet.

6. Israel has commenced to remove the markers in the Kh. el Burj-Kilo 69 area which were placed in error during the survey of the D/L by Israel. (See M.D. No. 42. para. 8).

7. The Jordan Delegation lodged 21 complaints: 4 alleging firing across the line; 11 alleging overflights; 2 alleging expulsions and 4 alleging stone throwing. One Jordanian was killed and two were wounded.

The Israel Delegation lodged 7 complaints: 1 alleging crossing of the D/L by armed civilians; 3 alleging crossing of the D/L by unarmed civilians; 2 alleging firing across the D/L and 1 alleging stone throwing. One Israeli was wounded.

Outstanding complaints: Israel - 6; Jordan - 12; Total: 18

ISRAEL - LEBANESE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

8. The situation remains quiet. The Lebanese Delegation informed the MAC that on 21 October four Israeli jet propelled planes overflew Lebanese territory in the vicinity of Naqoura.

ISRAEL - SYRIAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

9. The period of relative calm which has existed for the last 8 to 9 months in ISMAC has been shattered by a rash of shooting incidents all along the D/L and in the D/Z. This outbreak began on 15 October and lasted until 19 October inclusive. During those five days there were eleven shooting incidents.

10. During the period under review three Syrian subjects were wounded, two seriously and one with only minor wounds. One Israeli was wounded slightly and one is alleged to have been wounded and kidnapped by the Syrians.

11. During the incidents of 15 October a series of exchange of fire took place between the settlement of Hagovrim and the dam site at Khoury Farm which resulted in the wounding of 2 Syrians. The shooting can probably be attributed to the work done by the Israelis on the dam at the mouth of the Jordan which possibly

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irritated and worried the Syrian troops (see L.D. No. 42, para. 14). In addition, the farmers of Nagovrim, whilst investigating the reasons for the shortage of water caused by the construction of the temporary dam, may have aided to the tension in the area and the arrival of the Israeli police did not contribute to peacefulness.

12. The alleged wounding and kidnapping of an Israeli hunter (Israeli soldier on leave from the Negev according to witnesses) in the Gonen area is alleged to have taken place at 0630Z on 18 October. It is worth noting that the Chairman was only informed and asked for an investigation some 29 hours later. During the investigation, trackers without dogs were used but, as many people had been over the area looking for the missing man, the tracks were not conclusive. Blood stains, however, were seen and followed to about 100 metres from the border. The Syrian authorities denied knowing anything of the incident. It is significant that the Israel Delegation did not ask for an emergency meeting.

13. On 21 October, the Israelis removed part of the dam at the mouth of the Jordan near Khoury Farm at LR 092-718 which had been constructed temporarily to raise the water of Lake Houle in order to flood the peat bogs NW of Houle in which underground fires had been burning for several days. The dam was not completely removed, but a ten foot gap was made in it to allow sufficient water to flow to supply the farms S. of Houle. The intention is apparently to maintain the level of Lake Houle at a certain level for a while yet to soak the peat bogs thoroughly before the remainder of the dam is brought back to its original height all the way across the river.

14. The Israel Delegation submitted 18 complaints: 4 alleging overflights, 12 alleging shooting across the D/L; 1 alleging shooting and attempt of abduction of a settler and one alleging shooting and kidnapping of an Israeli hunter.

The Syrian Delegation submitted 11 complaints: 5 alleging overflights, 5 alleging shooting across the D/L and one alleging illegal work in the D/Z.

Outstanding complaints: Syria-501; Israel-377; Total: 878

15. Work at the Jordan River Diversion Project remains halted in the D/Z but is continuing inside Israeli territory at a slightly increased tempo. Some 200 workers are now working at the site as opposed to 60 odd in the previous months. A new piece of equipment is now in use to lay the concrete bed of the canal. The machine is of a type similar to those used in road construction in the USA and in Canada and called automatic concrete layers. The equipment moves on rails over the area on which the concrete is to be laid and mixes and lays the concrete in one operation. About 25 blocks of cement have been poured into the canal, and the same amount of concrete blocks is ready to be poured. Besides, Israeli workers are widening the road next to the canal.

R.E.Hommel
Colonel, USMC
Acting Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS
TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

Jerusalem, 2 November 1955

MAIL DESPATCH NO. 44

To : Mr. Andrew W. Cordier
Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General

From : Colonel R.E. Hommel
Acting Chief of Staff, UNTSO

Subject : Weekly Summary of Activities of the MACs

1. The following is a summary of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions for the period 22 to 28 October 1955.

EGYPT - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

2. The tension increased again the the (sic) El Auja Demilitarized Zone during the period under review. The Israel Delegate alleged that on 26 October Egyptian troops penetrated inside the D/Z and attacked an Israeli police checkpoint at Bir Ein, MR 983 195, six hundred meters from the international frontier. As a result of this attack, four policemen were wounded, one of whom subsequently died, two were captured and are still detained by the Egyptian authorities. The Egyptian Delegation gave quite a different version of the incident and alleged that Israeli forces attacked an Egyptian checkpoint with automatic, small-arms and mortar fire. One Egyptian soldier was wounded.

3. The Egyptian Delegate alleged that during the night of 27 to 28 October an Israeli force, estimated at one battalion, attacked the village of El Kuntilla, MR 1190 9340. As a result of this attack, 20 Egyptian soldiers were captured, four Egyptian soldiers were killed. It should be noted that the number of killed and captured soldiers was said to be approximate due to the lack of communications between El Kuntilla and the Egyptian headquarters after the attack. It is believed that the number of killed is more than 10 and the number of prisoners about 30.

4. The Egyptian Delegation submitted 13 complaints: 1 alleging crossing of the international frontier by Israeli soldiers; 1 alleging firing across the D/L into Egyptian-controlled territory; 4 alleging the presence of Israeli positions in the D/Z, one of which partially in Egyptian territory; 1 alleging attack of an Egyptian checkpoint by an Israeli force; 3 alleging overflight of the D/Z and of Egyptian territory; 1 alleging movement of Israeli forces in the D/Z; 1 alleging firing in the D/Z by Israeli forces using the white UN flag as protection; 1 alleging the occupation of the D/Z by Israeli forces.

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The Israel Delegation submitted five complaints: 2 alleging the attack of an Israeli checkpoint by Egyptian forces; 1 alleging the presence of an Egyptian position in the D/Z; 1 alleging crossing of the D/L by Arab shepherds; 1 alleging firing at an Israeli command car by an Egyptian military position (this complaint was later withdrawn).

Outstanding complaints: Egypt-148; Israel-248; Total: 396

HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

5. During the period under review the situation remained quiet. There were, however, 8 complaints from Jordan alleging overflights, showing an increase in this type of violation probably for air reconnaissance during the period of tension between Egypt and Israel and Syria and Israel. It has been discussed repeatedly in the sub-committee and the Israel Delegate has been requested to have his authorities take measures to prevent the recurrence of overflights. Following a meeting of the Area Commanders, stone throwing in the Jerusalem area has lessened.

6. The Jordan Delegation submitted 10 complaints: 1 alleging crossing of the D/L by armed civilians; 8 alleging overflights and 1 alleging expulsion. There were no casualties.

The Israel Delegation submitted 4 complaints: 1 alleging crossing of the D/L and 2 alleging stone throwing. There were no casualties.

Outstanding complaints: Jordan-9; Israel-2; Total: 11

13 Jordan complaints were settled in the sub-committee.

8 Israel complaints were settled in the sub-committee.

ISRAEL - JAPANESE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

7. The situation remains quiet. No complaints were submitted.

ISRAEL - SYRIAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

8. On the night of 22 October a very serious Israeli attack took place in Syrian territory and has since been fully admitted by the Israeli authorities, radio and press. The attack has been reconstructed as follows: at approximately 18.40Z on 22 October, a Syrian army truck proceeding in the direction of Bouteiha Farm was ambushed at approximately MR 108 677 by a military or para-military group of approximately 20 to 30 men equipped with small arms, grenades and demolition equipment. The sole passenger, a Syrian officer, was taken prisoner but the driver managed to escape and gave the alarm to the Syrian commander at Customs House, who immediately despatched a patrol of one officer and approximately 10 men along the same road. Meanwhile, the attackers blew up the ambushed vehicle and set

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fire to it.

When the mounted Syrian patrol arrived on the scene of the ambush, the officer deployed about half dozen of his men and proceeded with the rest some 400 m. further south where his truck was fired at and went out of control and off the road. The officer was killed and a yet unspecified number of Syrian soldiers were killed, wounded and taken prisoner. The truck was then blown up by the attackers.

Meanwhile, a Syrian army truck carrying a Sergeant and driver moving north on the same road was ambushed at LR 101 644. The Syrian Sergeant and the Syrian driver were apparently taken prisoners and the truck was blown up and burned.

At about 20.10Z, the Syrian commander of a nearby post, noticing the burning truck, sent a foot patrol of one sergeant and 3 men. They approached the truck and seeing nobody around started to extinguish the fire. Some 15 minutes later, they heard somebody shout: "Who goes there" in Arabic, and as soon as the Syrians identified themselves, fire was opened on them. The Sergeant got away but the other Syrian soldiers either were wounded or captured.

Total Syrian casualties: 1 officer and 2 soldiers killed; 6 soldiers wounded; 1 officer, 1 sergeant and 3 soldiers captured. No indications of Israeli casualties, if any.

Some traces of blood were seen along the tracks leading out of the area but they were probably from the Syrian prisoners. Some of the equipment and ammunition on the scene of the incident had Israeli markings. Tracks were followed by UN Observers assisted by Syrian trackers and dogs and led right to the Jordan River at LR 087 667. Witnesses stated that each Israeli group consisted of about 30 to 40 men. There was probably also a supporting group.

9. Following this incident, and probably as a result of it, a series of shooting incidents took place all along the D/L, resulting in the death of a woman and the killing of several animals in Syrian territory on 25 October, and the wounding of a Syrian man in the Banias area of 27 October.

10. The investigation of the alleged kidnapping of an Israeli hunter at Gonen on 18 October has been reopened on 25 October, and a search was carried out in the Gonen marshes in Israeli territory but did not produce any result. Witnesses from the Gonen settlement were also questioned again to obtain further information on the man and on the alleged incident. On 23 October during the investigation of the incident referred to in para. 8 above, the Chairman spoke to the Senior Syrian Delegate and the Syrian Frontier Commander concerning the alleged kidnapping. The Frontier Commander stated that he had carried out his own investigation among his troops and among the civilian population of the neighbouring areas. He added that as a result of this investigation he was convinced that no incident took place on the morning of 18 October in the Gonen area and that the missing hunter was not in Syria.

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11. A check was made of the water situation at Khoury Farm and Bouteiha farm, following the breaching of the dam at Khoury Farm by the Israelis (see M.D. 43, para. 13). It appears that the breach made in the dam is not wide enough to allow sufficient water to flow to irrigate those two farms adequately. A request has been submitted to the Israelis to increase the flow of water.

12. During the period under review, the Syrian Delegation submitted 12 complaints: 1 alleging Israeli aggression in Syrian territory by military or paramilitary force, 1 alleging penetration into the D/Z and firing across the D/L into Syrian territory, 1 alleging firing by Israelis across the D/L, 1 alleging penetration into the Central D/Z and 8 alleging overflights.

The Israel Delegation submitted 7 complaints: 4 alleging firing across the D/L and 3 alleging penetration into the D/Z and firing at Israeli settlers.

13. Work at the Jordan River Diversion project remains halted in the Demilitarized Zone.

R.E. Hommel
Colonel, USMC
Acting Chief of Staff

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action
NEA

Control: 10512
Rec'd: November 19, 1955
6:14 a.m.

Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 522, November 18, 4 p.m.

SENT CAIRO 204, REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 522

Would appreciate it if you would repeat here your comment to
Department re subject matter Department's 964 to Cairo and
Tel Aviv's 496 to Department (193 to Cairo).

LAWSON

SW:LJ/6

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4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) (Origin, subject, reference no. or other pertinent data)

Tel. 522 fr. Tel Aviv. dtd. Nov. 18, 1955.
674.84a/11-1855 Tel#522 from Tel Aviv
re. Egypt-Israel Situation

2. COPY INFORMATION

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TELEGRAMS, DESPATCHES, ETC.

COPY NO. 1 OF 4 COPIES recd.

3. DATE AND NAME OF PERSON PREPARING FORM

5. FORWARDED 11/20/55
11/20/55
(Date)

L. Doloff
LEO DOLOFF
(Top Secret Control Officer)

6. PERSONS TO WHOM ROUTED OR READING DOCUMENT	7. OFFICE SYMBOL	8. SIGNATURES	9. DATE RECEIVED	10. DATE READ	11. DATE RELEASED
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	NE	Bergus			
Bergus	NE	Bergus	11/21	11/21	11/21
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1955 NOV 18 PM 7:49

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For your background information there follows pertinent portion of Memo of Conversation between Secretary and Macmillan, November 9 at Geneva, concerning Eden speech.

QUOTE. Mr. Macmillan said that Prime Minister Eden is making a speech tonight in which he will refer to the Secretary's August 26 speech and renew Britain's appeal for a settlement and its offer of a formal guarantee in the context of a settlement. It will say that the Arabs take their stand on the 1947 Resolutions and the Israelis take theirs on the armistice agreement and the present situation. Eden will ask whether these positions are so wide apart that no negotiation is possible and will say that if the people of the area want peace there must be some form of compromise. The Secretary commented first that Mr. Eden might want to say something about the offer of economic aid; and secondly, that the Arabs do not want the 1947 Resolutions boundaries so much as they wish to base their negotiations upon them. The '47 Resolutions give the Negev to Israel. What Nasser suggests therefore is that Israel be given some of the Galilee which the '47 Resolutions would have denied to Israel, and that Israel give the Negev to Egypt. UNQUOTE.

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CS/M

774.84A/11-1855

Drafted by:

EUR:BNA:TGB/cher/js
11/18/55

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Thomas Beale

Clearances:

Cat

NE - Burges

EUR

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

1- ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR CONGRESSIONAL

November 28, 1955

1955 NOV 29 PM 2 18
S - Mr. Macomber

This letter looks a bit too abrupt. Do you agree?

No, on balance

think it is

RB
R. G. B.

OK However I think
Thurston Morton should
probably sign it. He will
be back on Wednesday
AM.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

S/S - RO Mr. Link

As suggested by Mr.

Meenaker, will you send

this to H for Norton

to sign on his return.

RS.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

Mr. Baines

Out of the Sec's
office Mon night.

W. H. S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

November 21, 1955

NEA - Mr. Root

For preparation of a brief reply for signature by the Secretary. The draft reply should be received in S/S prior to the close of business, Wednesday, November 23.

RK

R. Kirk

S/S-RO

Attachment:

Tel to Sec from Emanuel Celler (MC) protests Eden Plan for Israel-Egypt Settlement, 11/18. (6473)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

S/S - RO

This letter - which
is on the abrupt side -
should be cleared with

H.

PLB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

November 29, 1955

H - Mrs. Miller

Mr. Macomber has requested that on his return Mr. Morton sign the attached letter to Congressman Celler.

RK

R. Kirk
S/S-RO

Attachment:

Tele. from Cong. Celler,
11/18 w/ltr. to Cong. Celler,
(6559)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

November 25, 1955

✓
H - Mrs. Miller:

For Mr. Morton's concurrence
prior to submission to the
Secretary.

H-ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR CONGRESSIONAL
RELATIONS

NOV 23 AM 11 30

DSC
J. S. Cottman
S/S Duty Officer

*Reply anyone
NE - Bureau
11/22/55
and*

SS/RO

*Redrafted
H: Settlement
11/30/55*

*For preparation of brief
reply for Secy's signature*

*6472
6559*

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WU024 GOVT PD BU WASHINGTON DC NOV 13 416PME

JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE

DEPT OF STATE

DISPATCHES FROM LONDON AND RELIABLE WASHINGTON SOURCES
INDICATE THAT IN YOUR RADIO ADDRESS TO THE NATION TONIGHT
YOU WILL SUPPORT PRIME MINISTER EDENS PLAN FOR AN ISRAEL-
EGYPT SETTLEMENT. WE ALL WANT PEACE, AND THAT MUST BE DONE
WHICH WILL MOST EFFECTIVELY AND SURELY INSURE PEACE IN THAT
AREA. THE EDEN PLAN OFFERS NO SUCH ASSURANCE AND FURTHER
HEIGHTENS THE TENSION IN THAT AREA. IT CAN ONLY
SERVE AS AN ENDORSEMENT OF EGYPTS INTRANSIGENCE AND FURTHER
ENCOURAGE HER TO SEEK MORE AND MORE CONCESSIONS
IN HER FAVOR, SUPPORTED THUS BY THE WESTERN
POWERS. WE CANNOT SO READILY FORGET
EGYPTS AGREEMENT TO TAKE COMMUNIST ARMS. IT
IS HOPED THAT THESE REPORTS ARE WRONG AND THAT THE
UNITED STATES WILL NOT COMMIT HERSELF TO A POLICY WHICH
SPELLS OUT APPEASEMENT

CONGRESSMAN EMANUEL CELLER 446P.

M

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2/2 NO follow-up action required. This

Life Insurance No. 6559

Roger Kirk

December 1 1955

Dear Mr. Celler:

Your telegram of November 18, 1955, to Secretary Dulles has been received. The Secretary's report to the American people on November 18 did not touch on the Middle East situation. Our policy toward the Middle East was restated by the President on November 9, and I am enclosing a copy of his statement.

Sincerely yours,

Thornton B. Horton
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure;

Statement by the President,
November 9, 1955.

The Honorable
Samuel Celler,
House of Representatives.

NEA:NE:DBurgess:lm 11/22/55
H:CH:craft 11/30/55

S/S-CR
DEC 1 1955 P.M.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

November 23, 1955

TO : S - The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : NEA - George V. Allen *GVA*
SUBJECT: Telegram from Congressman Emanuel Celler.

Discussion

Congressman Emanuel Celler telegraphed you (Tab B) on the eve of your address of November 18, 1955 expressing apprehension that you would endorse Sir Anthony Eden's proposals for an Arab-Israel settlement.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached brief acknowledgment of Mr. Celler's telegram (Tab A).

Attachments

- Tab A - Draft reply to Mr. Celler.
- Tab B - Telegram from Mr. Celler,
November 18, 1955.

NEA:NE:DCBergus:bm

N. - 21

6559
647.3

Dear Mr. Celler:

I have your telegram of November 18, 1955. My report to the American people on November 18 did not touch on the Middle East situation. Our policy toward the Middle East was restated by the President on November 9 and I am enclosing a copy of his statement.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

Enclosure:

Statement by the President,
November 9, 1955.

The Honorable
Emanuel Celler,
House of Representatives.

NEA:NE:DCBergus:lm
11/22/55

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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1

Action

Control: 10661

NEA

Rec'd: November 19, 1955
1:21 p.m.

Info

FROM: Cairo

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 992, November 19, 4 p.m.

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SENT TEL AVIV 136, REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 992

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Deeply regret discover our 934 not repeated Tel Aviv and
am repeating in next following message for your information.
Can assure you this administrative oversight as had been
wondering all week how unhappy you would be with its contents.

BYROADE

LMS:LJ/6

674.84A/11-1955

52408

Copy No. (a) 5

Noted in RM/R

Name CH

Date 12/19/55

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1955 NOV 20 6 06

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1. TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER

RM/R-F-529-1A
10661

4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) (Origin, subject, reference no. or other pertinent data)

Tel. No. 992 fr. Cairo dtd. Nov. 19, 1955.
674.84a/11-1955 Tel#992 from Cairo
re. Repeat of Cairo's Tel#934 to Tel Aviv

5. FORWARDED 11/20/55 LEO DOLOFF L. Doloff
11/20/55 (Date) (Top Secret Control Officer)

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TELEGRAMS, DESPATCHES, ETC.

COPY NO. 1 OF 4 COPIES recd.

3. DATE AND NAME OF PERSON PREPARING FORM

6. PERSONS TO WHOM ROUTED OR READING DOCUMENT	7. OFFICE SYMBOL	8. SIGNATURES	9. DATE RECEIVED	10. DATE READ	11. DATE RELEASED
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Department of State

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Rec'd:10683
November 19, 1955
2:13 p.m.RM/R
Central
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674.34A/11-1955
This Document Must Be Returned to

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 526, November 19, 4 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 526, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 80, CATRO 206.

PASS ARMY NAVY AIR

IDF Foreign Liaison Office has informed Embassy of following incidents:

(1) On November 17 Israel patrol intercepted 3 Fedayeen on main road proximity Brur-Chail near Beersheba. In gun fight 2 Fedayeen killed and third wounded and captured. Documents found included espionage reports with vehicle sightings. Wounded man allegedly admitted group sent by Egyptian intelligence.

(2) On November 18 2 Kibbutzniks from Kibbutz Lahav "voluntarily" crossed with tractor and jeep 20 yards into Jordan. Arab Legion fire wounded 1 and pinned both down. Other Kibbutzniks came to assistance, laid down fire for 3 hour permitting 2 to escape. Wounded man died immediately after rescue.

WHITE

AB:JK

Note: Passed Army, Navy, Air; 11/19/55, 3:50 p.m., -RW

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Department of State

18

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Action

Control: 11681
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 10:03 AM

NEA

FROM: TEL AVIV

Info

WNR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 530, NOVEMBER 21, 4 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 530, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 82, CAIRO 809.

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IDF-FLO INFORMED EMBASSY OF FOLLOWING INCIDENTS OVER WEEKEND:

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1. NOVEMBER 18 - AUTOMATIC FIRE FROM DUREIJAT (MR 209-627) DIRECTED AT AUTOMOBILE FROM NEARBY ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. NO CASUALTIES.

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2. NOVEMBER 18 - AUTOMATIC FIRE FOR TWENTY MINUTES WAS DIRECTED ON DAN SETTLEMENT (MR 211-294). NO CASUALTIES.

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3. NOVEMBER 19 - MACHINE GUN FIRE DIRECTED AT ISRAEL OUTPOST FROM EGYPTIAN POST VICINITY OF WUHEIDI (MR 098-009). NO CASUALTIES.

4. NOVEMBER 19 - AUTOMATIC AND MORTAR FIRE AT NUSEIRAT. (MR 094-009) NO CASUALTIES.

5. NOVEMBER 19 - WAGON BEARING TWO SETTLERS AMBUSHED NEAR ZINOCH. (MR 150-127). ONE SETTLER KILLED.

6. NOVEMBER 21 - TWO CIVILIAN CARS AMBUSHED AT WADIARA ON MAIN HIGHWAY FROM MEGIDDO TO AFULA. DRIVER WOUNDED. CAR STRUCK SIX TIMES FROM FOUR ENTRENCHED POSITIONS ALONG ROAD.

7. NOVEMBER 21 - KIBBUTZ ABUKA. (MR 200-209) AT THREE PREDAWN EXPLOSIONS BLEW UP CARPENTER SHOP AND KIBBUTZ WATER PUMP.

COMMENT: LARGE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS MAJORITY OF JORDANIAN ORIGIN INCREASES POSSIBILITY OF IDF RETALIATORY RAID. ISRAEL PRESS CLAIM THESE INCIDENTS INDICATE COORDINATION BETWEEN ARAB STATES UNDER EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP FOR CONDUCT OF GUERRILLA WARFARE TACTICS.

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Action

Control: 11:34

Rec'd: November 22, 1955

11:08 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 532, November 21, 5 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 532, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 83, CAIRO 210, LONDON 164, PARIS 131.

In view increasing incidence of marauder activities (EMBTLS 504 526, 530) took opportunity today with Tekoah in charge armistice affairs Foreign Ministry to recall to him Jordanian Government statement re desire for quiet border and its concern Fedayeen activities may result in Israel reprisal against Jordan. Tekoah replied they had learned from other sources (General Burns and British Ambassador) Jordanian Government attributed these activities to Egyptian military attache in Amman. Nevertheless GOI felt Jordan Government would have to share responsibility with Egypt and expressed doubt that it had taken strict measures in sense that Lebanese Government had in September after discovery that Fedayeen activities directed by Egypt being based in its territory.

Comment: Latest outbreak of incidents in terms of frequency penetration into Israel territory and civilian casualties reflects pattern which, if maintained, will provide stimulus for Israel reprisal. General Burns told me Saturday he is of same opinion and plans to send chairman Israel-Egypt MAC to Cairo to remind Nasser his statement to Burns that he had suppressed plans resumption Fedayeen activities. Emissary will tell Nasser that through oversight or lack of coordination at local level policy does not appear to have reached Egyptian military attache Amman.

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28

Action

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Control: 11077

Rec'd: November 21, 1955
11:30 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Jerusalem

Info

RM/R

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 163, November 21, 7 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 163, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 77, CAIRO 112,
DAMASCUS 49, TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED.

With reference reports in Israeli Press that GOI preparing reply UN proposals respecting El Auja area, General Burns told me at social gathering November 17 that for the moment he had no (repeat no) special information additional to that already reported except that he had recently seen Eytan again. Letter indicated Israeli especially concerned over subject of suicide or sabotage squad activities, which they continue believe inspired by Egyptians. Eytan had said that while GOI willing otherwise keep border quiet, they would not tolerate such activities. He expressed doubt whether reliance could be placed on assurances from Nasser.

Burns added that Glubb was seriously concerned about possible involvement Egyptians in directing sabotage operations from Jordan, regarding which Glubb had some fairly concrete evidence which he did not feel free to disclose.

Burns considered that trend respecting any possible incidents next few days might serve to clarify whether Nasser has in fact succeeded in suppressing above activities. If no further incidents that type occur he thought borders might remain reasonably quiet for a time.

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From GEREN
To _____

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1955 NOV 24 AM 10 19

Control: 12616

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 23, 1955

8:01 PM

4
Action
NEA

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 535, NOVEMBER 22

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SENT DEPARTMENT 535, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 85, BAGHDAD 23, BEIRUT 150, CAIRO 212, DAMASCUS 104.

GOI LAST NIGHT ISSUED FOUR STATEMENTS WHICH DOMINATED ALL FRONT PAGES TODAY DEALING WITH EGYPTIAN-ISRAEL RELATIONS AND LAYING PRINCIPLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SABOTEUR ACTIVITIES WITHIN ISRAEL EGYPT.

1. IT ISSUED RECAPITULATION 21 MAJOR INCIDENTS "ALONG LEBANESE AND JORDANIAN BORDERS" BETWEEN SEPT SIX AND NOV TWENTY "EXECUTION OF WHICH HAS BEEN PLANNED AND ORGANIZED BY EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES".

2. IT REPORTED TWO INCIDENTS OF SUNDAY NIGHT NOV TWENTY IN WHICH FIRE WAS OPENED ON TRUCKS ON WADI ARA HIGHWAY, WOUNDING A DRIVER; AND WELL HOUSE WAS DYNAMITED AT AVUKA IN BETH SHEAN VALLEY. IT ATTRIBUTED BOTH TO EGYPTIAN INSTIGATION.

3. IT CONFIRMED IN WRITING ITS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO GENERAL BURNS PROPOSALS RE NITZANA AS FOLLOWS:

"FOLLOWING FRIDAYS MEETING BETWEEN GENERAL BURNS AND MR EYAN IN COURSE OF WHICH HAMMERSKJOELD PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT OF NITZANA (EL AUJA) PROBLEM WERE DISCUSSED, FOMIN HAS TODAY CONFIRMED IN WRITING TO UN CHIEF OF STAFF ISRAEL AGREES IN PRINCIPLE TO THESE PROPOSALS. IN VIEW OF ISRAEL AUTHORITIES, EGYPTS REACTION TO THESE PROPOSALS AMOUNTS TO THEIR REJECTION."

4. GOI FORMALLY INDICTED EGYPT IN FOLLOWING COMMUNIQUE: "EGYPT, WHO PROCLAIMS HERSELF TO BE IN STATE OF WAR WITH ISRAEL, IGNORING HER INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKINGS AND NUMEROUS RESOLUTIONS OF SC, IS NOW PURSUING POLICY OF OPEN HOSTILITY IN NUMBER OF DIFFERENT WAYS:

(1) SHE IS NOT

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-2- 535, NOVEMBER 22, FROM TEL AVIV

(1) SHE IS NOT HONORING CEASE FIRE TO WHICH SHE RECENTLY AGREED. SHOOTING AND OTHER ATTACKS BY HER TROOPS ON BORDER AGAINST ISRAEL FORCES CONTINUE UNABATED.

(2) SHE HAS OPENED CAMPAIGN OF AGGRESSION AGAINST ISRAEL BY ORGANIZING RAIDS INTO ISRAEL - RECENTLY IN PARTICULAR FROM TERRITORY OF NEIGHBORING ARAB COUNTRIES.

(3) THESE ACTS WHICH ARE PERPETRATED ON BORDERS OF ISRAEL AND IN ISRAEL ITSELF GO HAND IN HAND WITH REJECTION BY EGYPT OF HAMMERSKJOELD - BURNS PROPOSALS FOR SETTLING NITZANA PROBLEM. AS AGAINST THIS

(1) ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES HAVE REFRAINED FROM ANSWERING EGYPTIAN FIRE FROM ACROSS LINE.

(2) ISRAEL DOES NOT DISPATCH SABOTAGE GANGS AND MARAUDERS INTO EGYPTIAN-CONTROLLED TERRITORY.

(3) ISRAEL HAS ACCEPTED UN PROPOSALS REGARDING NITZANA IN PRINCIPLE AS BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT."

PRESS RELEASE WHICH RECOUNTED WADI ARA AND BETH SHEAN INCIDENTS SAID JORDAN GOVT COULD NOT SHIRK ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE OCCURRENCES ALONG JORDANIAN BORDER BUT ADDED THAT "RECENT CHAIN OF KILLINGS, SHOOTINGS, AND EXPLOSIONS IS NOW IN FACT BEING ORGANIZED BY EGYPT. RELEASE FOLLOWS IN FULL: "TWO ATTACKS THAT OCCURRED LAST NIGHT, WHEN FIRE WAS OPENED ON PASSING TRUCKS ON WADI ARA HIGHWAY, WOUNDING ONE OF DRIVERS, AND WELL HOUSE WAS DYNAMITED AT AVUKA IN BETH SHEAN (BEISAN) VALLEY, BEAR SIGNS OF BEING PART OF ORGANIZED GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN DIRECTED AGAINST ISRAEL - FOMIN SPOKESMAN SAID IN JERUSALEM TODAY.

"SINCE FIVE NOVEMBER, WHEN A HOUSE WAS BLOWN UP AT SICH HEMED, OVER HEADS OF ITS INHABITANTS SIMILAR ATTACKS HAVE RECURRED WITH OMNIOUS FREQUENCY. REGULARITY. THOUGH THESE ACTS OF VIOLENCE HAVE BEEN OCCURRING ALONG JORDANIAN BORDER AND GOVT OF JORDAN CAN NOT SHIRK ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE HAPPENINGS. IT HAS BEEN

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-3- 535, NOVEMBER 22 FROM TEL AVIV

IT HAS BEEN NOTED THAT ALL THESE ATTACKS CLOSELY RESEMBLE HOSTILE ACTS PREVIOUSLY CARRIED OUT BY EGYPTIAN FEDAYEEN ALONG GAZA STRIP.

"ISRAEL IS IN POSSESSION OF EVIDENCE THAT RECENT CHAIN OF KILLINGS, SHOOTINGS AND EXPLOSIONS IS IN FACT BEING ORGANIZED BY EGYPT WHOSE MILITARY AUTHORITIES TRAIN GUERRILLA FIGHTERS WHO INFEST BORDER REGION ALONG ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE WITH JORDAN AND SUPPLY THEM WITH ARMS AND MONEY.

"THE INVESTIGATION OF LAST NIGHT'S TWO INCIDENTS HAS SO FAR REVEALED FOLLOWING FACTS:

AT THE SPOT WHERE TRUCK DRIVER WAS WOUNDED YESTERDAY EVENING ON WADI ARA HIGHWAY FOUR POSITIONS WERE DISCOVERED ON HILLSIDE FLANKING ROAD FROM WHICH AUTOMATIC FIRE HAD BEEN DIRECTED ON PASSING TRAFFIC. NEAR PLACE OF ATTACK SPLINTERS OF HAND GRENADES WERE FOUND. TRACKERS FOLLOWED FOOTPRINTS TO JORDANIAN BORDER WHERE ARAB LEGION OFFICERS TOOK OVER. INVESTIGATORS AT AVUKA, NEAR BETH SHEAN (BEISAN) ESTABLISHED THAT AT APPROXIMATELY 0520 AM TODAY VILLAGE WORKSHOP WAS BLOWN UP. AT 0635 AM PUMPING STATION WAS DYNAMITED. AT SAME TIME ATTACKERS CUT TELEPHONE LINE TO AVUKA AT TWO POINTS. AGAIN TRACKS LEAD TOWARD BORDER."

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NAVY

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 538, November 22, 7 p.m.

Control: 12244

Rec'd: November 23, 1955
8:06 a.m.This Document Must Be Returned to
RM/R 674.34A/11-2255
Central
filesSENT DEPARTMENT 538 REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 86, CAIRO 213,
LONDON 165, PARIS 132.

Foreign Minister announcements. (EMBTel 535) so closely resemble previous justifications a priori for Khan Yunis and Nitzana actions as to create presumption that GOI is establishing rationale for future retaliation against continuation recent Fedayeen activities. Foreign Ministry official has informed Embassy that statements should be interpreted as warning to Egypt that unless marauder activities cease, Israel would find it necessary to take necessary action.

It appears probable that GOI has accepted information transmitted to it by General Burns and through diplomatic channels re Jordanian good intentions and has decided to place full responsibility on Egypt for incidents irrespective of country in which operations commence. This constitutes new departure from Israel practice of conducting reprisals in close proximity to locus of provocation.

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23
Action
NEAControl: 11792
Rec'd: November 22, 1955
1:23 P.M.

FROM: Jerusalem

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 165, November 22, noon.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 165, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 79, CAIRO 161
DAMASCUS 50, TEL AVIV 133.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Supplementing CONTEL 163 Burns informed me today that "highest Jordan military authorities" told him they have evidence Egyptian involvement in Fedayeen activities (CONTEL 164 and previous). He understood Egyptian Military Attache Amman believed directing Jordan-based Fedayeen operations in Israel. Authorities rather at a loss to know how to deal with situation since Jordan did not (repeat not) wish oppose Egypt nor presumably be placed in position of interfering with "patriotic" effort Palestinians against Israel. Since Burns given foregoing information in confidence he asked that it be closely held.

Burns said Attache recently returned from visit Cairo. While Burns hoped Attache might have received instructions discontinue above operations, incidents of past few days may well indicate contrary.

Prominence given by JERUSALEM POST November 22 to statement Foreign Ministry spokesman regarding Egyptian "Campaign of aggression by organizing raids into Israel --- in particular recently from the territory of neighboring Arab countries" may foreshadow new Israeli retaliation, either against Egypt or possibly Jordan.

Burns has sent chairman EIMAG to Cairo endeavor impress upon other potential danger situations and need terminate Fedayeen activities.

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25
Action
NEAControl: 12377
Rec'd: November 23, 1955
11:13 a.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 166, November 22, 4 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 166, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 80, CAIRO 115,
LONDON 71, PARIS 72, TEL AVIV 134, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
JIDDA UNNUMBERED

Burns told me today he has received letter from Eytan containing (buried among text of argument about Egyptian "rejection" of UNSYG proposals for El Auja D/Z) sentence to effect that Israel "agrees in principle" those proposals. Burns now (repeat now) corresponding with Israelis endeavor clarify extent they prepared implement them in practice. He has pointed out that Egyptian's statement their position (CONTEL 156) does not (repeat not) constitute rejection UNSYG proposals despite allegation of Israel press and radio.

In discussion of matter November 18 Israelis told Burns they had no (repeat no) forces on "western front" in excess those permitted Article 7, paragraph 4 GAA. Burns doubts accuracy that statement, but in view restrictions movements observers he has been unable verify. Burns indicated that Israeli's displayed no (repeat no) discernible enthusiasm for UN call for removal troops, together with excess police, from D/Z. While some troops believed withdrawn account inclement weather, Burns thought Israelis more interested in maintaining armed forces there than in negotiating about their withdrawal. However, if Israeli position these matters clarified near future he hopes return Cairo for further discussions possibly next week.

Burns said he had not (repeat not) broached with Israelis suggestion of Egyptians that former build fence along Gaza strip border within their own territory. He thought mention this matter would not (repeat not) be helpful.

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AIR POUCH

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy, Tel Aviv

350
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

November 22, 1955
DATE

REF :

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	NEA-4	IN Rm R-2, OLI-6, EUR-5, ID-4, P-1, P-1
	12/1	CIA-7, USIA-10, ARMY-4, NAVY-3, AIR-3

SUBJECT: Israel Press Comment Favoring Preventive War

There is forwarded herewith under enclosure a collection of recent press comments in Israel, most of which either demand outright preventive war or analyze the current Egyptian/Israeli problem in such terms that preventive war is the only course of action that seems plausible. The significance of the articles is two-fold. In the first place they have begun to appear in traditionally moderate newspapers (none enclosed are from "Herut") such as Haaretz and those of the General Zionist, Progressives and Agudist movements. Secondly their appearance has become more frequent during the past 2-3 weeks.

The articles from Lamerchav (Achdut Avoda) are of interest in that they reveal a progression of sentiment, from David Eshkol's article of October 21, which rejects preventive war, into the belligerent tone of the "Buffer Zone" editorial of November 15. The latter is transmitted in its entirety, since it is a pure and simple exposition of IDF strategical thinking, which favors ejection of the Egyptians from the Gaza strip and from part of or all of the Sinai peninsula. In connection with this, it should be kept in mind that Achdut Avoda has a heavy IDF membership, second only to that of Mapai. The reference in the editorial to the Western Powers standing "in Israel's way when her army was finishing the job" is to Achdut Avoda's General Igal Alon, who was at an approximate mid-point between Khan Yunis and Suez when his army was called back. (This is Achdut Avoda's most attractive legend, which has a partial kernel of truth, and is additionally embellished by making Sharett responsible for the call-back; needless to say the present Gaza trouble enhances the political value of the fable.) Eshkol's article of October 21 reiterates a point made in the October 17-18 Knesset foreign policy debate by an Achdut Avoda MK, denouncing preventive war (really in response to Herut's challenge) and causing a good deal of speculation at the time as to whether the party was reversing its "activist" line because of the Soviet origin of the arms to Egypt. Eshkol's position was untypical, however, as revealed in

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the November 15 editorial and Israel Galili's statements that the IDF is not "duty-bound" always to return from a Khan Yunis raid.

The really new factor is the increasing incidence of such articles in Haboker (General Zionists), Haaretz (Independent, but owned and directed by Gershon Schoken, a Progressive MK who is definitely a moderate on the subject of "activism"), and Zmanim, (Progressives). These are usually in the form of "think pieces", not of editorials.


The real breakthrough in the General Zionist camp occurred with the article of Peretz Bernstein, "The Switch", which although ambiguous in choice of words is generally accepted in Israel as endorsing preventive war. The explicit adoption of this course is urged by Dr. von Weisel, a prominent Herut leader who left Herut in early 1955 to join the General Zionists, who has written a series of pieces for Haboker advocating war soon and the country's immediate conversion into a full war economy with extensive civilian defense precautions ("airraid shelters near the bus depot et cetera").

Even more surprising, however, than the change of General Zionist attitude has been the recent change in Progressive party expositions of the subject, especially as reflected in the editorial of October 20 which claims that the majority of the population has become "activist".

The tough tone of the Agudist editorial from Hamodia is less unusual than with the General Zionists and the Progressives. Of the two religious parties, the Agudists have always been more "activist" than the Mizrahi.


So far the most outstanding exceptions to this trend have been papers of Mapai, Mapam and the Mizrahi. If the appearance of the articles is symptomatic, then it is fortunate that these three coalition parties have not yet joined in the recent fad. It is difficult to assess how accurately these disturbing articles reflect party decisions or basic attitudes of the leadership, and it appears that the device of presenting them as compositions of individual writers is in fact designed to release the parties of the onus of responsibility at this stage.

FOR THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AD INTERIM:


William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosures: 

✓ Collection of press
comments, as stated.


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GENERAL ZIONIST (Haboker newspaper)

Peretz Bernstein - October 28

"THE SWITCH"

"Myself, and I believe, a decisive majority of the nation have opposed premeditated war for conquest of areas and places on which Jewish history has left its imprint... We opposed premeditated war for the purpose of enforcing peace... We opposed... war regardless of the question of what were the chances of achieving the desired aims by means of war...

"As compared to the situation which had existed since the setting up of the State... a revolutionary change has now taken place."

Ben Avraham - November 14

"The Gaza strip held by the Egyptians is the symbol and the source of provocation of Israel.

"It is a convenient place from which to send saboteurs at night; it is easy to use it as a Fedayeen base and, from time to time, it is possible to trouble the peace of the border settlements.

"The Gaza strip in the hands of Israel would mean a lessening of the danger of war with Egypt, if not the end of it altogether. An Egyptian penetration into Israel, and a possibility of total war would become a complicated and difficult task even if undertaken by a superior army. It would be almost impossible for the Egyptian Army, at least in the near future."

Dr. Von Weisel - November 10

"This must be Israel's line of policy:

- a) She must deal Egypt an immediate blow, before winter is here.
- b) She must capture not only the Gaza strip, but the whole Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal, including Port Said and Port Tewfiq.

c) Israel

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- c) Israel should let the British Government know that she will not remove her forces from there except if given international guarantees that both the Sinai Peninsula and the whole of the Suez Canal, including Port Said and Suez, would be included in an area which is separate and completely neutral, in which a foreign army, preferably British, would separate Israel from Egypt.

"There is reason to hope that the Western Governments will accept these conditions in order to prevent the progress of Israel's armies onto the Western bank of the Suez Canal and onto Cairo and Alexandria. They will pay the price which Israel is demanding in exchange for the evacuation of the Peninsula by Israel."

Dr. Von Weisel - November 8

PREPARE FOR WAR, JUST THE SAME

"Our first demand is that this Government declare to the people that it must prepare for a war with Egypt which will indubitably take place, even if the chances are that it will not break out within the next twelve months..."

"Our second demand is that the Government appoint, forthwith, a specially chosen person for a new task - to be Minister in a new office called, 'Bureau for War Economy', and which will deal with all activities now under the purview of the development, public works, transport, trade and commerce, and agricultural departments. This office will be authorized to organize our manpower in such a way, that during the next two years, all men and women in the state will be active only in enterprises which facilitate the defense of the State."

PROGRESSIVES (Zmanim newspaper)

Editorial - October 20

"For many years there were two schools of thought in this country in matters of policy and security. One was 'activist' and the other 'non-activist'. For a long time the 'activist' school of thought was in the minority; but after the establishment of the State, many of the differences between the two were obliterated to a certain extent.

"As a result of the recent chain of events, however, one could

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could note a sort of 'activist' renaissance, even in the staunchest of the 'non-activist' movement, and public opinion, also, has gone through a similar metamorphosis. So far, however, there are no obvious signs that this change has also taken a hold of the leadership of this country; but there is no doubt whatever that the pressure of events and public opinion will force the new Government to consider such means and possibilities as the larger part of the population regards as the only solution to the present situation.

Y. Artzi - October 28

"Sharett's appearance in Paris indicates that the Israel Prime Minister has decided this time to abandon diplomatic niceties. He called a spade a spade; and when the declaration that 'a preventive war in the Middle East is possible' comes from a careful, conservative and thoughtful man like Sharett, it indicates the extreme gravity of the present phase of Israel-Arab relations.

"Mr. Sharett's announcement in Paris suddenly gives an official stamp to a solution which thus far had only been mentioned in the State's most extreme circles - Preventive War.

"There is no longer any need to prove that all political possibilities for solving the problem of Israel-Arab relations have been exhausted. Israel has tried everything, but without success. The Arabs' hate of Israel has by no means abated over the years but has, on the contrary, grown.

"There were times when Israel could hope for pressure from the West to be brought to bear on the Arabs' policy in favor of Israel, and not only has this hope been proven futile, but the East too has thrown in its weight against Israel by supplying arms to the Arabs.

"Should Israel sit back with her arms akimbo and wait till the Arabs choose an auspicious moment in which to attack her? Are there any chances still of preventing a preventive war?"

ACHDUT AVODA (Lamerchav newspaper)

David Eshkol - October 21

THE REINCARNATION OF "PREVENTIVE WAR"

"There

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"There is no need for proofs and explanations to show that the large majority of the Israel population do not see in a 'preventive war' any kind of solution to Israel-Arab relations. Despite the marked difference of opinion in the public which covers a multicolored variety of parties from Communists to General Zionists, it appears that it is unanimous in its negation of preventive war.

November 6.

(In an editorial not advocating war, but posing several questions, after pointing out that Jordan and Lebanon would not join Egypt in fighting Israel.)

"Iraq will undoubtedly encounter opposition to transferring a considerable portion of her armies across the Syrian desert. In view of the struggle for power and influence between Iraq and Egypt, would not Iraq also rejoice at the dimming of Egypt's glory?

"The Western powers will no doubt welcome the clipping of Nasser's wings. This would be important for Britain's Suez and Cyprus interests; and in view of her competition with Egypt regarding the Sudan. And the U.S. will certainly not forgive Nasser the headache he has caused her by the arms deal with Czechoslovakia."

Israel Galili - November 4.

"We must point out that for the State of Israel to instigate a war would be foolhardy at best; but when Israel sends its army to Khan Unis, it is not always its duty to return from there. When we declare that we will not start a war, this does not mean that we have to permit Nasser to choose for himself, and at his convenience, the time and place of attack on Israel. I am convinced that all the forces in the Government have a negative attitude to a preventive war, but I must warn against the comparison being drawn between the security of this country and that of other countries, because no such comparison exists."

AGUDISTS (Hamodia newspaper)

Al Roy - November 18.

"ISRAEL'S SECURITY PLIGHT"

"It

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"It is now perfectly clear that a war between Israel and Egypt in the near future is unavoidable. The question now is whether Egypt will open it when she has finished organizing her forces with the newly-acquired arms, or whether Israel will forestall the danger by launching a preventive war. What is perfectly clear, however, is that in view of the recent developments, it is vain to hope that the Israel-Egyptian dispute will be solved in a peaceful way.

"The Czech-Egyptian deal is the main cause of the recent development and it is practically certain that had it not been for that, Israel would not have found herself today on the verge of war. Even without the Czech arms, Egypt so far has been superior to Israel in the matter of equipment, but the Israel Army could have defeated the Egyptians if we take into consideration that from an organizational point of view as well as the individual fighting capacity, the Israel Army is far superior to the Egyptian one.

"It is no secret that the Israel Army is the strongest one in the Middle East, but its strength is not estimated on the basis of the amount of arms and equipment in its possession, but from the point of view of the human fighting material in it.

"It has now been disclosed that the arms deal is not limited to Egypt; USSR apparently, has decided to flood the entire Middle East with arms and to catch all the Arab countries into her net. The first to bite the bait was Egypt, and now Syria is following suit.

"The assumption that the threat of danger is not so near since it will take Egypt quite a while to be able to put it into use, is a highly erroneous one. It is a simple matter to learn to use new arms, and it will take at the most half a year to do so. Similarly, it is a mistake to make any distinction between arms for the purposes of defense and arms for purposes of attack, because they are both exactly one and the same thing, and either is capable of being the deciding factor in the battlefield.

"Recent collisions between the Israel and Egyptian armies have proved beyond a shadow of doubt superiority of the former to the latter, owing to its superiority of human material and the strength of its morale and good intellect. But these are facts which must not be relied upon, since Nasser will not wage a war now when he knows he will be defeated, but is biding his time till he is good and ready for it.

"The security plight of Israel becomes more and more acute, the longer the war is being postponed and the stronger the

Egyptian

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Egyptian Army gets. Then the question will be a very grave one, and Israel will be able to conquer only in as much as she will be able to prevent a test of strength by arms.

"It is hard for the writer to foretell what Israel intends to do in order to forestall the danger, even though it looks as though a preventive war is unavoidable. But be the decision of the government as it may, it is clear that both military and civilian alertness must be maintained.

"It is necessary for the public to change its present way of life which is totally incompatible with a state of emergency. It must discipline itself to live on a very austere modest and economic standard and contribute thereby to the full defeat of the enemy.

INDEPENDENT (Haaretz and Yedioth Aharonot newspapers)

Arie Ziv - Haaretz - November 9

"WHAT IS PREVENTIVE WAR"

"The writer of these lines has for seven years belonged to that minority which has been convinced that a second war with the Arab neighbors is unescapable, because the first war was not completed and left Israel in an intolerable situation from the viewpoint of her borders.

"The occupation of the Gaza strip will constitute a great setback to any regular military attack. As for the 250,000 hostile inhabitants, they would be the only part of the state in which a large Arab population would be completely cut off from any outside hostile contact."

Yedioth Aharonot - November 15

"From a military point of view, there is no justification for a postponement of a preventive war... Tomorrow the enemy will have the advantage over Israel."

ACHDUT AVODA (Lamerchav newspaper)

Editorial - November 15

"BUFFER ZONE"

"It is a well known fact that there is no Egyptian territory in Israel and never has been. The Egyptian forces are stationed in Gaza as invaders. The strip is a Palestinian territory into

which

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which the Egyptians penetrated to fight Israel. They remained there by the grace of the Western powers, who intervened through the U.N. and stood in Israel's way when her army was finishing its job of chasing out the unwelcome invaders.

"The presence of the Egyptians in the Gaza strip is the source of all evil and of all trouble on the borders. It is a base from which to attack Israel and invade her. But the big powers and the U.N. have never proposed the removal of the Egyptian invaders from the strip, which is not their territory. Instead, plans are being made that Israel give up territory to Egypt in the Negev which comprises a third of the state of Israel.

"The proposal for a buffer zone only implies the removal of Israel's forces from an area which only a fortnight ago was a fighting base for Egypt. This was allegedly done in the name of the armistice agreement. But had the Egyptians honored this agreement the U.N.'s intervention would have been unnecessary.

"But the Egyptians turned the Nitsana area into an area similar in nature to the Gaza strip, a source of constant provocation. Now the proposed buffer zone has arisen again to facilitate Egypt's deployment of her forces along the Israel borders.

"If a buffer zone is a true necessity, then such a one exists already and it is ages old and has not been put there by the U.N. It is none other than the Sinai desert. If the Egyptians stood behind that buffer they would have no contact with the Israel army.

"Israel cannot and need not provide Egypt's forces with fighting bases aimed against herself. The Egyptians will not be allowed to return to the occupied zone from which they have been removed. No armistice agreement can claim that the aggressor be given back what he has lost in battle."

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AIR POUCH

PRIORITY

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(Security Classification)

NOV 30 1955

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : American Embassy, Tel Aviv

355
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

November 22, 1955

DATE

REF :

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
67	NEA-4	RMR-2, OLI-6, P-1, EUR-5, ID-4, AIR-3
	12/5	CIA-7, USA-10, Army-4, Navy-3

SUBJECT: Recent Achdut Avoda Press Opinion on Deteriorating Egypt/Israel Relations and Soviet Responsibility.

The Embassy forwards herewith two articles from Pamerchav (Achdut Avoda) of November 18, which did not appear in the Mission's Hebrew Daily Press Review, and which furnish interesting pointers on possible changes in fundamental attitudes of the traditionally Soviet-oriented party.

In the first article, "Short Range and Long Range Campaign", written by Tadmor, the author does not shirk placing responsibility on the Soviet Bloc, although he minimizes the effect by assigning as the historical cause for this the necessity of responding to the Western challenge in the area. For a leftist his surmise that, "(Russian politicians),,, may have even relied on the Arab hostility towards Israel in order to strengthen relations with the Arab world", is a strong statement. The second article, by Eshed, is even more critical in tone, since it imputes to the Soviets the questionable leftist definition of Egypt as "progressive".

The hints or recommendations of the two writers on "activism" are of interest. Tadmor admits that a local "decisive military blow" would have no effect on the East/West struggle in the area, and he suggests Israel may wish to initiate a policy of subversion of government in the surrounding Arab countries. Most intriguing along this line is his analysis that a "few counter-blows of the NAHALIN type will undermine Britain's position in Jordan". In the second article Eshed's allusion that Israel is "liable to expand its borders "in case a war is forced upon it" is of note.

COMMENT: Achdut Avoda has not abandoned "activism", and the recommendation that Israel stimulate subversive activities among its neighbors is a tempting design for "activism" which could conceivably damage the Arab states and allow Israel to escape the blame of starting a "preventive war".

The enclosed articles are also indicative that the party is

abandoning

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Desp. No. 355
From Tel Aviv

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From _____

abandoning its unreasoning pro-Soviet attitudes in favor of a neutralist position, which in view of its leftist background will probably be accompanied by expressions of hurt resentment at the Soviet "error" in ignoring Israel.

FOR THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES a.i.

William Hamilton

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

✓ Articles, from Lamerchav,
as stated.

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1. SHORT RANGE AND LONG RANGE CAMPAIGN

Mr. Tadmor, Lamerchay political correspondent writes of the immediate - military - and more remote - political threats facing Israel.

While Israel is still overwhelmed at the supplies of Czech arms to Egypt, reports have been received on the resumption of supplies of British and French arms to Egypt. This is but a further proof of the murderous cynicism of Western politicians who argue against the violation of the regional balance of power. Most outstanding is the British Government which has again proved its hostility towards Israel. It is typical that following a rejection of Israel's demand for arms and even the suspension of a certain quantity of arms previously ordered, the British Government has found it fit to resume the supplies to Egypt. On the other hand, Israel's arms campaign in Washington promises to take the form of lengthy negotiations whose results are doubtful.

Israel's short range policy should examine by order of priority all the factors threatening this country and the means of meeting them.

In addition to the short-range military threat, there exists no less dangerous long-range political menaces. The Soviets continue to declare that they do not aim at harming Israel. It is to be assumed that Russia was prompted to conclude the arms transaction by the chain of Western bases south of the oil wells. Russia's support of any neutral tendency in Asia and Europe as part of the anti-colonial campaign should also be noted.

Israel's security does not serve as a checking factor in the considerations of Russian politicians. They may have even relied on the Arab hostility towards Israel in order to strengthen relations with the Arab world. Israel's politicians have unfortunately assisted this tendency by their declarations to the effect that "Israel was part of the free World etc."

During last year two alliances, both hostile to Israel, were set up: the Baghdad Pact and the "neutral" treaty between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The race has now started in respect of those Middle Eastern states which have not yet determined their stand.

There is ground to fear that a joint agreement between East and West would be found through the miraculous formula of "a settlement" in the Middle East under the U.N. resolutions. The Bandung resolutions and Eden's statement are but first indications of this tendency.

The long-range threats facing Israel cannot be cancelled through

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through a decisive military blow. The political menace lies in the Western policy to remove Soviet influence from this region, an influence which according to the British and American Foreign Ministries was made possible through the exploitation of the Israel-Arab conflict. Israel's existence or annihilation cannot check either blocs in the competition over the Middle East.

Israel should examine the factors likely to help her in the struggle for her existence. She should exert efforts to mobilize world Jewry and the liberal world opinion.

She should not spare any efforts to restore her ability for political maneuvering. Every idea or initiative should be carefully examined-whether originating from Washington, London, Moscow or New Delhi.

The main arena for action should, however, be the Middle East. Israel should examine the possibility of undermining the rule of Arab leaders. Maybe this aim can easily be achieved if this country finds ways of joining hands with elements hostile to Nasser in Cairo, to the British rule in Amman or the shaky regime in Damascus.

These activities are likely to "shock" the hypocritical officials at the British Foreign Office, but they are also likely to deter them from their hostile intentions towards Israel.

Anybody familiar with what goes on in Amman and the factors prompting Glubb Pasha to check infiltration, is well aware of that fact that a few counter-blows of the Nahalin type will undermine Britain's position in Jordan. Without her influence in Jordan, Britain will be less dangerous to Israel.

Israel should also aim her propaganda at the Arab refugees and prompt them to direct their wrath at the factors really responsible for their plight. This country has not yet been active in the psychological warfare field and now is the time to launch activities in this direction.

2. SOCIALIST BLOC REMAINS SILENT- Lamerchav

Mr. Eshed in Lamerchav regrets that during the meetings commemorating the October Revolution Day, representatives of the Soviet Embassy did not voice their reaction to the alarm prevailing among Israel public in view of the arming of the Arab countries by both East and West.

The Soviet press ignores Israel's claims although it refrains from sharply denouncing this country. The writer goes on to analyze

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From _____

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Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 355
From Tel Aviv

analyze Russia's point of view and her desire to increase the scope of influence and wonders whether that country is indifferent to the existence of Israel. "Russia's silence is strange; it brings no consolations; it is depressing and frightening". The State of Israel is able to defend itself and in case of a war forced upon it is liable to expand its borders. What will, in this case, be Russia's stand? True, that country had welcomed the War of Independence, but then it was an "anti-imperialistic" war whereas a defensive war now against Egypt would be directed against a "neutral" country with a "progressive regime".

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CHARLES E. BENNETT
MEMBER
2d DISTRICT, FLORIDA

J. W. NORMAN
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

November 22, 1955

Honorable John Foster Dulles
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

COMMITTEE:
ARMED SERVICES

SECRETARIES:
AUDREY W. STRINGFELLOW
CAROLE WEATHERLY
JEANNETTE CHESBROUGH SOWERS

419 Federal Building
Jacksonville, Florida

ACTION
is assigned to

NEA

*Reper drafted
NE - Bureau
11/27/55
AM*

Dear Mr. Dulles:

I recently was talking with Reverend Frank Dunn, pastor of the First Christian Church here and he told me on his recent trip to Europe he was impressed by the fact that it would be a very great error on the part of the U. S. if we unnecessarily allow ourselves to become embroiled in a war as a result of the friction between Israel and Egypt. He expressed the opinion that there was not enough ideological importance, much less material, or other importance to the conflict, to allow ourselves to become in a world war as a result of this friction. I do not know any of this information of my own knowledge, but I am inclined to agree with this information on the basis of my conversation with Reverend Dunn; at least I am inclined to that belief in view of our previous actions in Korea because it seems to me that in Korea we had an excellent opportunity to stand firm for taking for the Korean Republic, at least all of the land south of the 38th Parallel and probably all the land through the narrow neck of Korea and in view of our stopping short of these objectives in Korea it would seem to me that it is very dubious that we should take a firmer stand where less ideological importance is involved. I will appreciate any comments which you might be able to make about the efforts of the U. S. to bring about peace and to end war in the Near East.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely,

Charles E. Bennett

Charles E. Bennett, M. C.

CEB:jcs

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DEC 27 1955

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Short Note*

FROM AND TYPE OF DOCUMENT

DATE DUE

Charles E. Bennet

DATE REC'D

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11/25/55

11/22/55

Israel Egypt affair

TO:

TO:

TO:

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11/25/55

NO REPLY NECESSARY

November 30 1955

Dear Mr. Bennett:

I have been asked to reply to your letter of November 22, 1955, addressed to the Secretary of State, relating a conversation you held with the Reverend Frank Dunn. Your letter has been reviewed by officers concerned with the Arab-Israel problem.

On November 9, 1955 the President issued a statement at Denver which said in part, "I stated last year that our goal in the Near East as elsewhere is a just peace. Nothing has taken place since which invalidates our fundamental policies, policies based on friendship for all of the peoples of the area." A copy of the President's statement is enclosed.

In a speech given on August 26, 1955 the Secretary of State dealt with the specific problems of a settlement and suggested possible ways in which the United States would be willing to aid in reaching such a settlement. With regard to the fear that exists on both sides in the conflict, he announced that he had been authorized to say that the President would recommend, given solutions to related problems, that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart alteration by force of the frontiers between Israel and her neighbors.

As the President said in a message on this problem which was made public on November 15: "The need for a peaceful settlement becomes daily more imperative. The United States will play its full part in working toward such a settlement and will support firmly the United Nations in its efforts to prevent violence in the area. By firm friendship toward Israel and all other nations in the Near East we shall continue to contribute to the peace of the world."

65
The Honorable
Charles E. Bennett,
419 Federal Building,
Jacksonville,
Florida.

December 1 1955

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I am also enclosing, for your possible future reference, a copy of the Secretary's speech of August 26, 1955, together with copies of statements he has made to the press in recent weeks on the question of Soviet arms sales in the Middle East.

Sincerely yours,

Florence Kirlin
Acting Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Statement by the President,
November 9, 1955.
2. Statement by the Secretary,
August 26, 1955.
3. Press Release No. 588,
October 4, 1955.
4. Press Release No. 606,
October 18, 1955.

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NOV 30 1955 P.M.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

November 23, 1955

NEA - Mr. Gordon

For your information.

RK

R. Kirk

Attachment:
Ltr to Pres. from
Hla Aung of the Asian
Socialist Conf. on the
Israel and Egypt situation,
dtd. 11 Nov. 1955 encl.
press release issued 9 Nov.

~~REF 6~~

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~~REF 6~~

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

ROUTE SLIP

(To Remain With Correspondence)

ACTION

is assigned to

~~NEA~~

TO _____

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OFFICE OF THE STAFF SECRETARY.

Date _____

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

ACTION:

Comment _____

Draft reply _____

For direct reply _____

For your information _____

For necessary action _____

For appropriate handling _____

See below _____

Remarks: _____

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DEC 22 1955

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By direction of the President:

A. J. Goodpaster
A. J. GOODPASTER
Staff Secretary

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Cables: "SOCIALST"

Phone: North 240.

ASIAN SOCIALIST CONFERENCE

Chairman: U BA SWE.
Secretary: WIYANA.
Jt. Secretaries: MADHAV GOKHALE.
HLA AUNG.
CHISATO TATEBAYASHI.
Treasurer: U KYAW NYEIN.

SECRETARIAT

4, Wingaba Road;

Rangoon.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Nov 22 9 00 AM '55

11th November 1955

RECEIVED

No. 393 ASC(B)/55.

Dear Sir,

I am directed to forward to your good office
a copy of the Press Statement issued by the Asian
Socialist Conference on 10th November on the situation
in the Middle-East.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
A.S.C. SECRETARIAT

HLA AUNG
JT. SECRETARY

The President,
United States of America,
WASHINGTON D.C.

U.S.A.

ASIAN SOCIALIST CONFERENCE

SECRETARIAT

4, Wingaba Road,

9th November 1955. ^{Bangkok.}

PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE ASIAN SOCIALIST CONFERENCE ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE-EAST

In the past few weeks news of mounting tension have been coming in to us from the Middle East, and we of the Asian Socialist Conference feel that the moment is ripe for calm thoughts and sober counsel. The bloody clashes between Israel and Egypt, we consider, form a serious menace to peace in the area, and the desperate armament race and the urgent military pacts load the unhappy situation with danger for world peace as well.

While this anxious situation prevails in the Middle East, and tempers of the Israelis and the Egyptians alike run high, and angry slogans and cries for war tear the air in that troubled area, we of the Asian Socialist Conference consider it our sacred duty to raise our voice for calm and peace. War in the area, should it break out, will not be contained, but will spread over the world, scattering destruction and misery along all; war at this critical juncture will forever extinguish the hopes of a socialist society which must draw nourishment from durable peace.

We therefore consider that the following conditions for restoration of peace in the Middle East should be established with the sincere co-operation of the parties themselves and all nations which hold peace precious:

1. The Arab states and Israel, all members of the U.N.O., should refrain from the use of force and explore all available methods for the peaceful settlement of their outstanding disputes, as indeed they have pledged to renounce force when they subscribed to the United Nations Charter;
2. That the Arab states, accepting the reality of Israel's existence, should give her due recognition and work together in harmony for the peace and prosperity of the region;
3. That Israel should immediately set herself to solve the problem of Arab refugees, and the Socialist forces in Israel should throw their weight behind development programmes which will absorb the unhappy victims of war and return back to them their human dignity and happy and fruitful life;
4. That the Big Powers, the U.S.A, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and France, should rather use their good offices to restore peace in the region than increase the tensions by abetting the arms race in any direct or indirect way;
5. That the Colombo Powers -- India, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon and Pakistan -- should use their friendship with the Asian-African nations and lend their good offices in restoring peace in the region;
6. The United Nations Organisation should use its machinery and influence in removing the tensions in the Middle East, and help to build an era of peace and productivity in the region.

---oOo---

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

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Control: 12612
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 23, 1955
4:37 PM

Info
RMR

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 540, NOVEMBER 23, 1 PM

SENT CAIRO 214, REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 540.

ALTHOUGH YOUR TELEGRAMS 136 AND 137, SENT DEPARTMENT 934 AND 992, REACHED HERE AFTER AMBASSADOR'S DEPARTURE ON LEAVE, I ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR VARIOUS PROPOSALS TO SOLVE ISRAEL PROBLEM CREATE AMONG US HERE NEITHER HAPPINESS NOR UNHAPPINESS--ONLY DOUBTS AS TO THEIR PRACTICABILITY.

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Date 12/20/55

1955 NOV 24 AM 6 00

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1955 NOV 24 AM 10 20

Control: 12639

Rec'd: November 23, 1955
5:28 P.M.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 542, November 23.

SENT DEPARTMENT 542, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 87, BAGHDAD 24,
BEIRUT 151, CAIRO 216, DAMASCUS 105.

Reference EMBTEL 535.

GOI late Tuesday charged "Egyptian army is apparently under orders to harass and provoke Israel forces and Israel citizens continuously. It is daily becoming more and more evident Egypt is bent on aggression."

Foreign Ministry spokesman declared there was no other "explanation for rash of attacks that has broken out lately. In less than three weeks Egyptian military positions attacked Israel positions and patrols with automatic and artillery fire on 21 occasions."

"In most of these unprovoked attacks, Israel forces did not even return fire. During the same period, there were 12 incursions by Egyptian military planes over Israel territory.

"At same time, Egyptian army representatives in other Arab States, particularly Jordan, have been organizing and conducting military raids against Israel from territories of these countries.

"In past 36 hours alone, Egyptian army forces launched four attacks against Israel troops and civilians: '1. Egyptian soldiers, penetrated into Israel in Nitzana demilitarized zone and attacked Israel patrol.

'2. Unarmed Israel fishing boat in open seas was savagely shelled by Egyptian shore batteries from Gaza strip.

'3. Israel outpost near Kissufim was attacked from across border by machine gun fire without itself returning fire.

'4. Tuesday morning two Egyptian positions again opened fire on Israel post in the Kissufim area."

Incidents referred to in immediately preceding paragraph described by IDF as follows:

"Group of

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- 2 - 542, November 23, from Tel Aviv.

"Group of four Egyptian soldiers who crossed into Israel territory Monday morning fired at Israel police patrol traveling within Israel territory south of Beerotayim in Nitzan demilitarized zone. Police returned fire and group fled. Patrol suffered no casualties. Toward midnight Monday, group of armed infiltrators fired at Israel patrol traveling along Israel-Jordan armistice line in vicinity of Yardenah, north of Beisan. Patrol returned fire and continued on its way without loss."

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NAVY

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 544, NOVEMBER 23, 9:00 P.M.

Control:

Rec'd:

12853

NOVEMBER 24, 1955

9:55 A.M.

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674.84A/11-2355
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MESSAGE CENTER
NEA
1055 10/25 AM 7:50

SENT DEPARTMENT 544; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 88, CAIRO 21.

ISRAEL EDITORIAL OPINION HAS REACTED VIOLENTLY TO CONTINUATION
SABOTAGE RAIDS. MAJOR EGYPTIAN RESPONSIBILITY EXPRESSED
IN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENTS OF NOVEMBER 21 AND 22 NOT
(REPEAT NOT) REECHOED IN PRESS, WHICH NOW INCREASINGLY
INCLINED PUT EQUAL OR SUBSTANTIAL SECONDARY BLAME ON JORDAN.
OPINION ROUNDUP BY SUBJECT MATTER FOLLOWS:

1. JORDANIAN COMPLICITY IN RAIDS: LAMERCHAV (ACHDUT AVODA)
PROGRESSED IN TWO DAYS FROM BELIEF JORDAN AUTHORITIES EXERTING
EFFORT TO KEEP BORDER QUIET (NOVEMBER 21) TO VIEW "COOPERATION"
WITH EGYPT EXISTED, AND EVEN IF NOT (REPEAT NOT), JORDAN WOULD
HAVE TO LEARN IT CANNOT (REPEAT NOT) BE "WASHED CLEAN OF GUILT."
(NOVEMBER 22) AL HAMISHMAR (MAPAM) CLAIMED "ARAB LEGION OFFICERS
PASSIVE ALTHOUGH IN KNOW." HAARETZ (INDEPENDENT) CALLS IT
"CHAIN SABOTAGE ACTIVITY INITIATED AND ORGANIZED BY EGYPT
INSIDE JORDAN TERRITORY, WHILE JORDAN OFFICIALLY IGNORES IT".

2. BRITISH INVOLVEMENT: LAMERCHAV THINK PIEVE (NOT REPEAT NOT)
RELATED CURRENT ATTACKS) NOVEMBER 18 SUGGESTED "NEW COUNTER
BLOWS NAHALIN TYPE "WOULD UNDERMINE BRITAIN'S POSITION IN
JORDAN. WITHOUT INFLUENCE IN JORDAN BRITAIN WOULD BE LESS
DANGEROUS TO ISRAEL." HAARETZ (INDEPENDENT) AND HABOKER
(GENERAL ZIONIST) NOVEMBER 22 SPECULATED BRITISH MOTIVES
ADVISING OF EGYPTIAN RESPONSIBILITY "PREVENT ISRAELI RETALIATION
IN JORDAN, EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL KNOWS JORDAN DOES NOT (REPEAT NOT)
WANT INCIDENTS."

3. EGYPTIAN MOTIVES: LAMERCHAV NOVEMBER 21 AND AL HAMISHMAR
NOVEMBER 22

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11-2355
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-2- 544, NOVEMBER 23, 9:00 P.M. FROM TEL AVIV

NOVEMBER 22 SAW DESIRE TO OPEN SECOND FRONT AND TAKE HEAT OFF GAZA STRIP, WITH AL HAMISHMAR CLAIMING TIMING IS DESIGNED PROVOKE ISRAEL TO AGGRESSION AT TIME OF BAGHDAD CONFERENCE, AS DESIRE TO SOLIDIFY ANTI-ISRAEL SENTIMENT. AL HAMISHMAR ALSO THOUGHT ATTACKS INSPIRED BY EDEN PROPOSALS AND NOTED SIMILAR EGYPTIAN AGGRESSION END AUGUST FOLLOWING SECRETARY DULLES SPEECH.

4. LOCUS AND METHOD OF TRAINING. EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR AND MILITARY ATTACHE AMMAN RESPONSIBLE, WITH RECRUITING DONE IN JORDAN. (HAARETZ AND LAMERCHAV NOVEMBER 22) CENTERS FOR TRAINING ARE HEBRON AND IRBID (HAARETZ) AND/OR HEBRON, JENIN, TULKARM, NABLUS AND AMMAN (LAMERCHAV).

5. CONSEQUENCES: HABOKER NOVEMBER 23 ACTIVELY WRITING BEN AVRAHAM CENSURED OFFICIAL FOREIGN MINISTER NON-INCLUSION OF JORDAN AS EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE, AND LAMERCHAV NOVEMBER 22 WROTE JORDAN WILL HAVE TO LEARN "NO LOCALE IS SANCTUARY AGAINST IDF FOR MURDERERS OF ISRAELIS." USUALLY MODERATE HAARETZ NOVEMBER 23 EDITORIALIZED "IF JORDANIANS REMAINED INEFFECTIVE CUSTODY BAND, EGYPTIAN GUERRILLAS GUILT TERRITORY THEY MUST NOT (REPEAT NOT) BE SURPRISED IF OTHER FORCES TAKE MATTERS INTO OWN HANDS AND DO WHATEVER NECESSARY ENSURE SAFETY ISRAEL SETTLEMENTS." STRONGEST REACTION IN NOVEMBER 23 HERE AND NOW, MAPAI WEEKLY, WHICH OUTLINED SERIES UNFAVORABLE FACTORS (JORDAN CONDONING INFILTRATION BY MURDERERS, ISRAEL LOSS CONFIDENCE COLONEL BREWSTER OF MAC, UNLIKELIHOOD GREAT POWERS INTERVENTION TO STOP ARAB AGGRESSION) AND CONCLUDED "IT SEEMED ISRAEL WOULD SOON HAVE TO DEAL WITH SITUATION DIRECTLY."

COMMENT: ALTHOUGH STILL DISAGREEING REGARDING DEGREE HASHEMITE GUILT, PRESS NOW PREOCCUPIED WITH THESIS EGYPT CAPABLE USING JORDAN AS BASE EVEN IF WITHOUT IT'S VOLITION BUT NOT (REPEAT NOT) WITHOUT IT'S KNOWLEDGE. PRESS REACTION LAST 48 HOURS TOUGHEST IN OPPOSITION (S) HABOKER, HERUT AND IN LAMERCHAV, HAARETZ, AL HAMISHMAR AND HERE AND NOW, LATTER FOUR WITH ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT DECISIONS.

WEB

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REC-105
1956-1-17

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

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Classification

09980

1955 NOV 23 PM 5 21

DC/T

For DC/T only

SENT TO: AmConsul JERUSALEM PRIORITY 65

RPTD TO: AmEmbassy CAIRO 1064
AmEmbassy TEL AVIV 376
AmEmbassy AMMAN 236

Origin

Info:

Israel Embassy representative called Dept Nov. 23 at his request and very pointedly referred to "twenty-one armed incursions into Israel from Egyptian territory" in last three weeks as well as fact Egyptian sponsored marauders now entering Israel from Jordan. Dept asked whether cases had been brought to attention of MACs and whether Israel had reached decision re Burns' proposals, making general observation that handling in this way plus free movement of UN observers would be best way of preventing further incidents.

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674.84A/11-2355

6034-674/11-2355

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Drafted by: NEA:NE:DCBergus:bm
11/23/55

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NE - Fraser Wilkins

Clearances:

52696

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Classification

NOV 23 1955 P.M.

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31/53 Department of State

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10328

1955 NOV 23

6
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DC/1

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SENT TO: Amembassy CAIRO 1072
LONDON 2928
TEL AVIV 377

Origin

Info

~~SECRET~~
Secretary

Secretary took advantage of visit by Sharett to Washington November 21 to speak to him in strongest terms re importance of calm along armistice lines. He said it was imperative that Israel do its utmost to preserve such calm and avoid aggressive or "retaliatory" measures. He also stressed importance of cooperating with Burns. Sharett declared that Israel would act only to defend its territory and had no thought of "preventive war".

Secretary has Please let Nasser know that ~~Sharett~~ spoken to Sharett in these terms he is and that ~~Sharett~~ disturbed by reports of Fedayeen activity from Jordan. Egypt for its part must take all possible steps including discontinuance of guerilla activities to avoid incidents along frontiers with Israel if calm is to be preserved.

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(Offices
Only)

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674.84A/11-2355

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674.84A/11-2355

Drafted by:

NEA:GVAllen:hh

NEA:NE:FWilkins:cro

11/23/55

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

George V. Allen

Clearances:

As directed in substance by the Secretary

52695

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10593

1955 NOV 24 PM 12 09

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11/25
11/25

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SENT TO: **USUN** (Priority) **366**

Origin
Info
Dist. Desired (Offices Only)

USDEL requested to bring to attention Secretary General substance TEL AVIV's
535 and 542, JERUSALEM's 166 and DEPTTEL 65 to JERUSALEM which being rptd
New York.

Re Israel 674 84A
Egypt the part

Women 11-203
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ADMT 59
REV

674.84A/11-2355

674.84A/OSN-2355

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Drafted by: **NEA: NE: WCBurdett: mh** 11/24/55
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: **NE - Fraser Wilkins**

Clearances: **UMP - Mr. Stein (in substance)** *FW*

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File Designation 674,84A/11-2455
Tel 422
Date 11/24/55
From New York
To Sec State

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

State
Authority

1/3/89
Date

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14

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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23
Action

Control: 12887
Rec'd: November 24, 1955
2:21 p.m.

NEA
Info
RMR

FROM: USARMA Israel

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: MAI 891, November 24 (Army Message)

SENT DEPTAR FOR G-2, REPEATED INFORMATION USNMR PARIS, USCINCEUR
USDOCOSOUTH, USDOCOLAND, USARMAS AMMAN BAGHDAD BEIRUT CAIRO AND
DAMASCUS, DEPARTMENT STATE.

1: Partial small selective call-up personnel and vehicles
underway Tel Aviv. May be for unit maneuver but initial stages
similar those of last large call-up due requisitioning some
very heavy trucks, civilian type tank transports, Sherutim,
very few busses this stage. Approximately one battalion artil-
lery or armored force drivers noted assembly point Rahatgan
motor park (black berets).

2: 232315 and 232400 hours local time automatic fire opened on
Watchman Neduot Beitar M/R 160125. No casualty. Signed Query.

JK

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FEB 7 1956

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Department of State

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AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 545, November 25, 1 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 545; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 89, CAIRO 218.

Five incidents announced by IDF spokesman since Embassy telegram 542 include:

1. Egyptians opened automatic and 81 mm mortar fire at Israel observation point at Noo Sirat November 23. No casualties.
2. Egyptian positions fired on Israel plane over Beerl November 23. Plane not hit.
3. Automatic fire opened by Egyptians on November 24 near Beerl. No casualties.
4. Egyptians opened automatic fire on November 24 at Israel patrol north of Kissufim. No casualties.
5. Jordanian infiltrators opened fire on November 23 at watchman of Meeobetar. Watchman returned fire. No casualties.

Comment: Foregoing are not incidents of sufficient severity to provoke local opinion or increase possibility of retaliatory action.

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125 NOV 26 AM 11 54

DEC 12 1955

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Action
NEA

Control: 13233
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 25, 1955
11:32 A.M.

Info
RMR

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

SS
G

NO: 425, NOVEMBER 25, 11 A.M.

RE PALESTINE (DEPTTEL 366, NOVEMBER 24)

INFORMATION CONTAINED IN TELEGRAMS REFERRED TO IN REFERENCE TELEGRAM IS SUBSTANTIALLY SAME AS THAT RECEIVED BY SECRETARY GENERAL THROUGH UN CHANNELS. SINCE ACTION SUGGESTED IN REFERENCE TELEGRAM WOULD BE DUPLICATION, PROPOSE THAT WE NOT TAKE UP THIS QUESTION WITH SECRETARY GENERAL AT THIS TIME.

LODGE

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
United States Senate

November 25, 1955

Respectfully referred to
Hon. Thruston B. Morton
Assistant Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

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HONORARY
BRANCH
with thanks for such favorable consideration as
the communication herewith submitted warrants,
and for a report thereon, in duplicate to
accompany return of inclosure.

By direction of



CHARLES E. POTTER,

U. S. S.

292907

ACTION
is assigned to

FILES DIV.

SEV

10-10-87

674.84A/11-2555

674.84A/11-2555

In reply refer to
SEV 674.84A/11-2555

December 7 1955

Dear Senator Potter:

I refer to your communication of November 25 transmitting a letter from the President and other officials of the Jewish Community Council of Metropolitan Detroit, Michigan, concerning United States policy with regard to the Arab-Israel situation. Your interest in making your constituents' views available to the Department is appreciated.

Our Government is gravely concerned over recent developments in the Middle East and is continuing to give the most serious attention to this matter. In a major policy statement on August 26, Secretary Dulles, with the authority of the President, proposed a solution which would include a security guarantee sponsored by the United Nations. Subsequently, at his press conference on October 4, Secretary Dulles again indicated his hope that such a solution might be found, and discussed the dangers of an arms race in the area. In a statement on November 9, President Eisenhower indicated that the United States stands firm on the policy as stated by Secretary Dulles and reiterated that, "...given a solution of the other related problems, I would recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors."

I am enclosing for your constituents' reference copies of the statements of the President and the Secretary and a copy of the Department's statement of

November 5

The Honorable
Charles E. Potter,
United States Senate.

This Document Must Be Returned to
FM/R 374.84A/11-2555

CS/M

11/11/55

November 5 concerning the attitude of this Government toward the hostilities between Israel and Egypt.

The statement of the Jewish Community Council is returned, as you requested.

Sincerely yours,

Thruston B. Norton
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Press releases nos. 517, 589, and 638. (5 copies)
2. Statement by the President, November 9, 1955. (5 copies)
3. From the Jewish Community Council of Metropolitan Detroit (returned).

JPM
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DEC 6 1955

7-17 1955

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Department of State

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Action

Control: 13699

Rec'd: November 26, 1955

NEA

FROM: Jerusalem

7:58 a.m.

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 168, November 26

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SENT DEPARTMENT 168, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 81,
CAIRO 116, TEL AVIV 135, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS UNNUMBERED

Following is substance UNTSO press communique November 24
UN proposals El Auja D/Z.

Various rumours and statements have appeared in the press
concerning reactions of the GOE and GOI to certain proposals
regarding situation in demilitarized area of El Auja and
vicinity made on 3 November by UNSYG and UNTSO. View
conflicting nature these reports, a public clarification
of present position appears necessary.

GOE, while not rejecting proposals, have suggested certain
additional points for consideration in connection demilitarized
area.

GOI, while stating they accepted proposals in principle, have
also indicated there are points in regard to their implementation
on which they intend clarify their position.

View initial attitudes taken by the two governments, further
negotiations by the chief of staff concerning above proposals
are required with both parties.

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1955 NOV 26

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Action
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Control: 13983

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 27, 1955
4:34 PMInfo
RMR

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1028, NOVEMBER 27, 1 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1028, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 92, BAGHDAD 76
BEIRUT 133, DAMASCUS 97, JIDDA 78, TEL AVIV 139, LONDON 191,
PARIS 102.

HAD LONG TALK WITH NASSER YESTERDAY ON SUBJECT FEDAYEEN
(REPEAT FKTDAYEEN) OPERATIONS INSIDE ISRAEL, STRESSING CONCERN
OF SECRETARY ALONG LINES DEPTTEL 1072. FOUND HIM COMPLETELY
INFORMED OF ISRAELI CHARGES AND FACT THAT GLUBB AND EVEN
SOME JORDANIANS BELIEVED EGYPT RESPONSIBLE. STATED HE HAD
RECENTLY DISCUSSED THIS "BELIEF" WITH JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER.

NASSER STATED EMPHATICALLY THAT EGYPT WAS NOT DIRECTING
OPERATIONS OF A GUERRILLA NATURE INTO ISRAEL. HE EXPRESSED
AT SOME LENGTH AND IN PERFECTLY LOGICAL MANNER HIS VIEWS
AS TO WHY THIS WOULD BE AGAINST EGYPT'S OWN INTEREST AT
PRESENT TIME. STATED HE FELT GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLE WAS
SPONTANEOUS AND NOT DIRECTED BY ANYONE. AUGUST GUERRILLA
OPERATIONS INSIDE ISRAEL HAD CAUGHT THE IMAGINATION OF
REFUGEES AND OTHER EMBITTERED PERSONS. THESE RAIDS HAD
LIFTED THEIR SPIRITS AND REDUCED THEIR FEAR OF ISRAEL. HE
HIMSELF HAD RECEIVED HUNDREDS OF LETTERS FROM ARAB ENTHUSIAS
OFFERING TO VOLUNTEER THEIR SERVICES AFTER THE AUGUST RAIDS.
SOME OF THE LETTERS WERE FROM GROUPS WHICH STATED THAT IF
THEIR SERVICE WAS NOT NEEDED OR ACCEPTED BY EGYPT THEY WOULD
OPERATE ON THEIR OWN AS OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED THEMSELVES.
HE COULD ONLY SURMISE THAT SOME OF THESE INDIVIDUALS AND
GROUPS WERE IN FACT OCCASIONALLY OPERATING ON THEIR OWN.
HE KNEW ABOUT THE CHARGES AGAINST HIS MILITARY ATTACHE IN
JORDAN WHICH HE DENIED. HE ADMITTED FRANKLY HOWEVER THAT
THERE WAS AN ORGANIZATION FOR SUCH OPERATIONS AND HE SUPPOSED
KNOWLEDGE OF THIS MIGHT BE BEING USED AS EVIDENCE OF EGYPT'S
COMPLICITY IN PRESENT OPERATIONS. HE FELT SUCH AN ORGANIZA-
TION WAS IN ARAB INTERESTS AS NO ONE KNEW WHAT ISRAEL WOULD

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-2- 1028, NOVEMBER 27, 1 PM FROM CAIRO

DO AND THE ARABS SHOULD HAVE IN READINESS EVERY POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION OPEN TO THEM.

WHEN QUESTIONED AS TO WHO ELSE MIGHT BE DIRECTING OPERATIONS, HE STATED HE DID NOT KNOW. HE VOLUNTEERED GRANT MUFTI MIGHT BE OPERATING ON A SMALL SCALE BUT IF SO IT WAS WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OR APPROVAL. HE STATED HE DID NOT TRUST GRANT MUFTI AND GAVE SOME PLAUSIBLE REASONS FOR HIS ATTITUDE.

WHILE MANY CAN FIND REASON PERHAPS DISTRUST NASSER ON THIS ISSUE, FOR MY PART I BELIEVE HE WAS TELLING THE TRUTH. HE SEEMS FULLY AWARE OF DANGER OF ISRAELI REACTION YET APPEARED WITHOUT HOPE THAT ISRAELIS COULD BE CONVINCED HE NOT DIRECTING PRESENT OPERATIONS. HE FEELS MOREOVER EVEN IF THEY WERE SO CONVINCED THEY WOULD STILL BELIEVE IT TO BE IN THEIR INTEREST TO ACCUSE EGYPT AT PRESENT STAGE.

BYROADE

MDM

52416

DEC 7 1955

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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27
Action

Control: 14201
Rec'd: November 28, 1955
7:57 a.m.

NEA
Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 549, November 27, 4 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 549, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 90, CAIRO 219

IDF foreign liaison reported following incidents over weekend:
November 25 Egyptians fired on Baikatabuarif. No damage.

November 25 Israel aircraft over Israel territory fired at from
three Egyptian positions near Nahaloz. No hits.

November 25 Egyptian machine gun detachment three men crossed
into Israel territory and fired on outpost. Fire returned and
group retreated across border. Incident repeated fifteen minutes
later. No casualties. Coordinates MR 09060800.

November 26 Egyptians fired on local outpost near Kissufim. No
casualties.

November 26 shots fired at Israel command car at 14201100 vicinity
Beit Govrin. One wounded. Tracks led over Jordan border.

November 26 Israel Command car ran over two land mines on road
near Gaza at 0900760. One wounded. Car damaged.

November 26 Jew named Jacov Cohen shot and killed in Jerusalem City
DM Zone. No other details.

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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 169, November 28, 10 a.m.

Control: 14286

Rec'd: November 28, 1955
10:43 a.m.SENT DEPARTMENT 169 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 117, AMMAN
TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED.

Re DEPTTEL 65.

According UNTSO Israelis filed list with EIMAC on November 22 of complaints alleged incidents said to have occurred between November 13 and 19 inclusive. These comprised 8 cases firing across border by Egyptians and 1 case "anti-aircraft fire at Israeli aircraft flying over Israel." Similarly about November 10 Israelis filed with EIMAC list 16 complaints covering period October 31 to November 8 and alleging 4 cases firing across border, 6 cases Egyptian soldiers crossing border, 3 cases firing at Israeli planes and 3 overflights by Egyptian planes.

Israelis did not ask for investigation any cases first list. They asked for investigation only 1 case second list, which said to involve actual capture Egyptian soldier within Israeli. Israelis well aware procedure to effect MAC investigates only on request of one of parties. In absence investigation complaint, when reached, is treated as mere unsupported allegation and dropped without discussion. UNTSO view is therefore that Israelis merely piling up "complaints" for their own political purposes rather than attempting utilize MAC machinery alleviate border situation.

With respect complaints about firing at aircraft, Lucas, American political adviser to Chief of Staff, had stated that Israeli aircraft have recently made habit following UNRWA plane to vicinity Gaza when latter landing there. This practice may cast some doubt on validity this category of "complaint."

UNTSO has no record of "twenty-one armed incursions into Israeli" mentioned referenced telegram.

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1955 NOV 29 AM 7:29

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Action

Control: 14287
Rec'd: November 28, 1955
10:43 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Jerusalem

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 170, November 28, 11 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 170 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 118; AMMAN, BEIRUT DAMASCUS TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED.

Lucas, American political advisor to UNTSO, told me November 26 that at meeting Burns-Eytan November 24 latter stated Israelis would outline their position respecting UN proposals of November for El Auja D/Z in communication which would be sent UNTSO next few days. Following release UNTSO press communique (CONTEL 168) November 24, however, Tekoah told Burns that communique had caused Israelis reconsider and that statement their position might be "delayed for sometime".

Impression UNTSO officials is that neither party displaying any discernible willingness accept UN proposals respecting border, but that each hoping make other appear responsible their rejection.

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FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 429, November 28, 11 a.m.

RE DEPTTEL 349, November 18.

Information contained reference telegram transmitted to Kidron (Israel) as instructed on November 24.

IMS:MAA/2

Control: 14335

Rec'd: November 28, 1955
11:49 a.m.

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Control: 15186

Rec'd: November 29
5:16 p.m.

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1047, November 29

SENT DEPARTMENT 1047; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 96, BAGHDAD 178,
BEIRUT 135, DAMASCUS 99, JIDDA 81, LONDON 194, TEL AVIV 141,
TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, PARIS UNNUMBERED

JOINT EMBASSY-USIA

At press conference yesterday Nasser "clarified Egypt's position
on Palestine in light of Eden's recognition UN resolutions this
issue."

Nasser pointed out that Eden had made no settlement proposals
as such. He had however, acknowledged existence of 1947 resolu-
tions which the United Nations and the big powers had neglected,
in spite Arab efforts and Bandung conference support and rights
of people of Palestine. Britain as mandatory power had abandoned
Palestine and its people to armed Zionist gangs; however, Eden's
reference to these neglected resolutions indicates rights of
Arabs of Palestine have not been completely abandoned as some
big powers thought, but time had come for their revival.

Nasser saw no need to convene Arab League political committee
as "OME" had proposed to study Eden "proposals" since no "pro-
posals" had actually been made.

Asked to comment on Hamed Kheirat Said's statement to UN Corre-
spondents Association in New York that Egypt was prepared to
accept third party mediation in Palestine settlement, Nasser
replied GOE had not received official text but "Egypt's policy
is absolutely clear - Palestine problem concerns all Arab states
and no one Arab is entitled alone to deal with it. Egypt insists
on rights Palestinian Arab people and maintains matter does not
require negotiation" view UN resolutions 1947 and 1949 which
should be carried out. Arab states have tried at UN to have
these resolutions implemented but UN has ignored its resolutions
and Arab rights "in belief that by doing so it can avoid problems"

"It is now high time for UN and big powers which dominate it to
realize their attitude of pretending forget or neglect these
resolutions and thereby abandoning rights of Palestinian Arabs
will never

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-2- 1047, November 29, from Cairo

will never be conducive peace".

Editorial comment:

AL AHRAM: UN has too long neglected its own resolutions and Palestinian peoples rights. If UN stands by its resolutions matter will be solved therefore mediation is unnecessary. Palestine is cause of all Arabs who unanimously agree on what should be done and to refuse mediation.

AL GUMHOURIYA: Arabs should beware of imperialists disguising themselves as Arabs who feign enthusiasm for Arab causes and sow seeds of dissension to provide gap for admission imperialism. They took news agency report and tried provoke disputes among Arabs trying demolish united Arab front.

Egypt could not agree negotiate by herself on Palestine. Palestine question is for all Arabs not for any separate Arab state to consider.

BYROADE

JJ

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FROM: USARMA Israel

TO: Secretary of State

NO: MAI 898, 291103Z (Army Message)

TO DEPTAR FOR G-2 AND STATE DEPARTMENT, INFO USARMAS BAGHDAD, BEIRUT AND AMMAN, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS.

At 281500 hours local Egypt outpost fired few shots toward Israeli position at (09820948), no casualties, no fire returned, according Israel defense force FLO this morning.

Comment: Since Israel making desperate attempt gain favorable US opinion for arms procurement retaliatory strike very unlikely

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SW:DT

Control: 15712

Rec'd: November 30, 1955
9:48 a.m.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TEL AVIV

360

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

November 29, 1955

REF :

67 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	12/5	12/5

SUBJECT: Achdut Avoda Newspaper Sees January 1956 as Decisive Month in Middle East

There is enclosed an article from Lamerchav, Achdut Avoda, for November 28, 1955, in which the paper speculates that January, 1956, will be a crisis month in the Middle East. Of the three reasons given, the latter two are of interest, in that they state that the deadline of January, 1956, will be one of Israel's choosing, since the "grace Sharett afforded the United States for a re-examination of its Middle Eastern policy" will have expired, and the IDF by then will be ready for any action it may be asked to carry out.

The paper's emphasis of the theme, now repeated in speeches and editorial comments of all shades of opinion, that after January (or a short time later) deferral of the decisive blow against Egypt will work to Israel's disadvantage, is of particular interest in its timing.

The article appeared on the same day as the A.P. interview of Chief of Staff General Moshe Dayan, which he opened by saying, "Israel's chances to win a war against the Arab States, or only against Egypt, are diminishing from month to month in the proportion as Egypt receives arms and trains its army to use them." Against the background of heavy Achdut Avoda membership in the IDF, it should be recalled that Lamerchav often expresses IDF thinking, and the simultaneous expression by Lamerchav and the IDF Chief of Staff that Israel's chances are diminishing monthly, or almost monthly, is of significance. In this connection, the Department is advised that General Dayan's speech and conclusions were given "top billing" on all November 28 Hebrew broadcasts of Kol Israel, the national radio, and in the News columns of all the leading newspapers of November 29.

Enclosure: 1

Article from Lamerchav, as stated.

For the Chargé d'Affaires A.I.

William F. Hamilton, Jr.
William F. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

DEC 13 1955

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ME FATE TO BE DECIDED IN JANUARY 1956

Lamerchav (November 28):

According to a reliable Western source who has access to the most authoritative information sources, January 1956 will decide the future of the ME, and whether there will be an Israel-Arab war or not. Until then, a temporary lull in the border tension is to be expected, while Israel and Arab political activity in the world capitals would be stepped up. Early in 1956 both sides would have to review the results of their diplomatic efforts and come to clear-cut decisions on their relations with both the Western and Eastern blocs.

Three vitally important events are to take place in January next which will shape the future of this region:

(1) In the first week of January the International Bank will have to give Nasser a definite reply as to whether it will finance the Asswan dam. If the reply is in the negative, Nasser will turn to the USSR for funds.

(2) In the same month, the grace Sharett afforded the U.S. in her reappraisal of her ME policy, will lapse, according to reliable U.S. quarters.

(3) In January 1956, according to the same source, the Israel Army will be prepared for any action it may be required to carry out, whether on the Egyptian front, or any other border. And if until then a balance of power is not guaranteed, any deferring of the decisive blow to be dealt the Egyptian Army will be very much to Israel's disadvantage.

According to Western diplomats, the Asswan is of far greater importance than the Czech arms deal. As one of them put it, the fate of the dam will shape the destiny of generations to come, while the arms have a short-term significance only.

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674.84a/11-2955

FROM : Amembassy, Tel Aviv

361

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

November 29, 1955

DATE

REF :

67 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	12/5	NEA-4, RMR-2, EUR-5, OLI-6, P-1, IO-2, CIA-7, USIA-10, ARMY-4, NAVY-3, AIR-3

SUBJECT: Israel Comment on Past and Present Significance of the Tripartite Declaration.

There are enclosed two summaries of press thinking on the Tripartite Declaration, one by Mr. Poless in Haaretz (Independent) and one by Dr. Horowitz in Haboker, General Zionist.

Both authors conclude that the Declaration has been invalidated by the recent recommendations or comments of Sir Anthony Eden to the effect that the Declaration did not concern itself with maintaining an Israel/Arab balance of power in the area, and (magnified according to Israel interpretation) his November 9 suggestion that Israel surrender land as the price of a peace settlement. The articles recall to mind Prime Minister David Ben Gurion's remarks to a reporter for the London Times of August 26, 1955, in which he characterized the 1950 Tripartite Guarantee as being made without Israel's or the Arabs' participation, a "one-sided declaration" which did not confer any rights on the signatories. He added that by providing arms to the Arabs, two of the signatories had shifted the balance of power in the area and therefore acted contrary to the terms and purpose of the declaration.

The same specific tie-in as in the two above cited press articles of cession of territory being inconsistent with the 1950 Declaration was also contained in an editorial of Haaretz of November 18. In this editorial, entitled "Whither the United States in the Area?", the following comment is offered apropos President Eisenhower's message to Rabbi Silver:

"Israel greatly values the display of friendship so strongly emphasized by the President's message to Silver; but she must point to the glaring contradictions between adherence to the Tripartite Declaration and the insistence on negotiations on those very same borders which the Declaration meant to stabilize."

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Page 2 of
Desp. No. 361
From Tel Aviv

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Page _____ of
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

The three press examples cited above also typify the conversational comments on the 1950 Declaration of many Israelis to the drafting officer recently. Moreover, the final conclusion that Eden's proposals really mean his abandonment of the Tripartite Declaration was implicit in the spate of "No Munich for Israel" editorial reactions of two weeks ago, which came from papers of Mapai, Achdut Avoda, Herut, General Zionists, Mizrahi and Agudists.

FOR THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.:

William L. Hamilton

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure: *[Signature]*
✓ As stated.

cc to Amcon Haifa, Jerusalem.

[Signature]
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PAST AND PRESENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRIPARTITE
DECLARATION

Article by Mr. Poless - Haaretz

For the last five and a half years every responsible Western politician has been praising the 1950 Declaration as being the pillar for stability in the Middle East. Wherever Israel raised contentions as to the intentions of the Arab states, the West asked her to rely on the Declaration. A few days ago, Sir Anthony asserted that the declaration did not speak of the maintenance of balance of power. This view is most surprising in the light of its clear contents.

The declaration saw the light in May 1950 and aimed at consolidating an Anglo-American Stand on the Middle East in view of former British supplies of arms to the Arabs and U.S. arms consignments to Israel.

The writer goes on to analyze at length the various points in the declaration and states that although the term "balance of power" is not expressly mentioned, the entire purpose of the declaration is to preserve the balance of power and safeguard border stability. Israel has never ignored the importance of the Declaration, but raised objections as to means of its implementation. True, an alliance with America is preferable, but as things are now, the declaration is the only existing political instrument likely to safeguard the borders.

By claiming that the declaration did not provide for the safeguard of borders, Sir Anthony undertakes a most serious violation of this document. The balance of power was upset through the supply of Czech arms to Egypt and the West is now seeking means of restoring the balance. They have reacted by consolidating the Northern tier. The writer asserts that this is not sufficient since the chances that Egypt would declare war on Iraq are slight while the menace directed against Israel is very tangible. If the Western Powers wish to maintain the validity of the Declaration, they should act in its spirit while adjusting their policy to the situation created. The Declaration speaks of a prevention of an armament race initiated by the U.S., Britain and France, but if Russia launches such a race what could the West achieve by its reiterated assurances on intentions to prevent

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this race?

Declarations of this type are at present devoid of political value. One of the aims of the Declaration - safeguard of border status quo - was seriously violated through the arms transactions and the West can now remedy the harm done by sending arms to Israel. Although this can be termed as an armament race, it is not the type of race which the West undertook to stop. A Western decision to arm Israel would also implement the Declaration in accordance with changed circumstances. Sir Anthony's reference to the effect that a balance of power was not referred in the declaration makes the latter devoid of any contents. As such, it can no longer appease any of the parties concerned.

Article by Dr. Horowitz - Haboker

In his review of world Affairs, Dr. Horowitz writes in Haboker that nothing is left of the Tripartite Declaration, since it contains no provision for the maintenance of the regional balance of power and does not even constitute a guarantee for the existing borders.

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AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 561, November 30, 4 p.m.

Control: 65

Rec'd: December 1, 1955
3:42 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 561, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 92, CAIRO 221.

Re Amman's 249 and 250 to Department.

Subject only to caveat that Israelis do surprising things,
I would say that prospects Israel retaliation against
Jordan are remote.

Firstly, recent wave of incidents has receded, with only
current difficulty along Gaza strip. Secondly, IDF
intelligence corroborates Glubb Pasha's information that
Egyptians responsible organization and direction incursions
from Jordan, (in spite of Nasser's protestations to con-
trary).

Finally, GOI so preoccupied with shifting balance of military
power to Egypt that it would hesitate to "rock boat" at time
when it regards Washington-Paris approval arms requests as
vital to its interests.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM

AmEmbassy, Paris

1041

COPY NO. 1 SERIES A

TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

DESP. NO.

November 30, 1955

ACTION	NEA	DEPT.	RM/R ENR OLI S/S HC S/P IO R MCP
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Un. Only	12-8	INFO	

SUBJECT: Israeli Counselor of Embassy's Views on Present Situation in Near East

The Counselor of the Israeli Embassy, Mr. BENDOR, called at the Embassy on November 29 for a general review of the current situation in the Near East. The purpose of Mr. Bendor's visit appeared to be a clarification of the United States Government position on Prime Minister EDEN's statement and to urge the United States to conclude some kind of temporary security guarantee for the present Israeli frontiers. Mr. Bendor further suggested that the United States Government might work toward removing Colonel Nasser from power since it was obvious to him that it was only a question of time before Egypt, under Colonel Nasser's guidance, would declare war on Israel.

Mr. Bendor violently attacked the Eden Mansion House speech and asked why Israel should be made to forfeit territory which she had gained through so much sacrifice. Although the territories which Israel was expected to cede to Egypt had not been spelled out, Mr. Bendor said the intent of Mr. Eden's statement was to have Israel withdraw from the port of Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba and to return the Negeo to Egypt. For Israel to accept Eden's proposal, Israel would not only surrender the valuable port but, much worse, would submit to the Egyptian bargaining position which that country had achieved through dealing with Russia.

Mr. Bendor asked exactly what the United States Government position was with regard to the Eden project. He was informed that Secretary DULLES approved the Eden statement insofar as it supported the Secretary's statement of August 26. Mr. Bendor objected that the Eden plan went much further. Although Israel would certainly agree to frontier rectification, it would never accede to territorial cessions. He explained that frontier rectification would mean a redrawing of the frontiers to give Jordan or Egypt complete control of fields which were owned by villages located on Arab territory and vice-versa. Israel would claim a compensating amount of territory at other points along the frontier. However, Israel would never cede an inch of territory without some compensation. When asked if Mr. Eden's proposal would have had greater success if taken up through secret diplomatic channels, Mr. Bendor replied that no such project would be acceptable to the Israelis under any terms, particularly with Great Britain acting as the third party.

Regarding the Czechoslovak delivery of arms to Egypt, Mr. Bendor said his reports confirmed the arrival in Egypt of from 100-200 MIG's, several of which had already been assembled, along with 32 Czech pilots. He further believed that

POL: J. Dorman :mm

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six submarines and some Lenin tanks were to be included in the delivery. The six submarines, Mr. Bendor continued, provided a great potential danger to the West, since the submarines would have to be manned by Russian personnel.

The Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations, Mr. Bendor said, had become a strong force to be reckoned with. He pointed, as an example, to the Algerian question on which the Arab-Asiatic bloc was committed to vote for inscription without regard for the merits of the case. Last year's Bandung Conference, Mr. Bendor said, had crystalized the position of the Arab-Asiatic bloc. Israel had wished to attend and only by the veto of one of the inviting powers, Pakistan, was it decided that Israel not be invited. Had Israel attended, it could have had considerable influence in presenting the position of the West and would have compensated, to an important degree, for the presence of such Eastern powers as Communist China. Mr. Bendor had received reports that the second Afro-Asian Conference would take place in April 1956 in Cairo. The selection of Cairo as the location for the second conference precluded Israel's being represented since the Israeli delegation would never be permitted to enter the country. Mr. Bendor said that it had been decided that the conference should take place in an African country and the decision had been narrowed down between Egypt and Ethiopia. Since Colonel Nasser had personally headed the Egyptian Delegation to Bandung, and since the Ethiopian Delegation had been led by a comparatively unimportant political figure (Ethiopian Ambassador Deressa to Washington), Egypt had been selected. Mr. Bendor said the original five inviting countries would again send out invitations for the second Afro-Asian Conference.

Mr. Bendor had recently read with some interest Colonel Nasser's change of heart on the Eden Plan. This was evidence, Mr. Bendor said, of Nasser's weak position. Having supported the plan, the pressure of the other Arab countries and extremist elements in Egypt on Nasser had forced him to reverse his position and to attack Eden's statement.


Mr. Bendor felt that France had taken a weak position in Middle Eastern affairs by resuming its shipment of arms to Egypt in return for Nasser's word that broadcasts from Cairo, hostile to the French position in North Africa, would cease.

When asked what position Mr. Bendor felt the United States could take under the present circumstances, Mr. Bendor admitted that any recommendations he made would be biased. However, he felt that the United States should come out openly in support of guaranteeing the present frontiers on a temporary basis only, until final settlement of the boundaries had been reached between Israel and Egypt. This would be consistent, he thought, with the United States previous position of strict impartiality. Mr. Bendor also felt that the United States Government might work toward Nasser's removal from power. He again reiterated his belief that Nasser

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Page 3
Despatch 1041
from Paris

was fundamentally weak and had little support either inside Egypt or in the rest of the Arab world. The build-up of Egyptian arms under Nasser's leadership could only lead to war. Should Nasser be removed from power, Mr. Bendor continued, Egypt would be faced with several years of non-leadership, in which the political parties would gradually re-form and gain power. In the meantime, the immediate threat of war with Israel would be removed and a permanent settlement could be sought in a peaceful atmosphere.


Robert P. Joyce
Counselor of Embassy

cc: Cairo
Tel Aviv
London

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Rec'd: December 1, 1955

10:43 a.m.

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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 174, December 1, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 174, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 85, CAIRO 119,
 LONDON 72, PARIS 73, BEIRUT DAMASCUS TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED

Following summarizes current status outstanding UNTSO matters
 as outlined by Lucas of UNTSO in conversation December 1.

(1) Israelis have not yet sent UNTSO communication setting
 forth their position respecting UN proposals for El Auja D/Z,
 but Burns now expects receive this in very near future. He
 intends thereafter to proceed Cairo continue conversations there

(2) On basis discussions already held with Israelis they may be
 expected reject Egyptian idea of marking all boundaries D/Z, as
 well as any suggestion that they return to status quo existing
 up to September 21. On contrary they would insist on maintaining
 situation as it existed on October 3. Latter includes stationing
 of police in D/Z. Israelis may be expected to keep their troops
 in D/Z so long as Egyptians have forces in zone established by
 Article 8 paragraph 3 GAA. Israelis have stated that they have no
 troops (other than defensive forces authorized by Article 7 GAA)
 west of line running through Faluja and Beersheba.

(3) Egyptian troops have frequently directed small-arms fire
 across DL. Burns has told Egyptian delegate through chairman
 Eimac that such firing is contrary assurances given him in Cairo
 by Nasser and Amer (CONTELS 156 and 158). Burns also intends call
 attention Israelis to their unsubstantiated accusations in press
 regarding numerous incidents allegedly perpetrated by Egyptians,
 Jordanians, etc, pointing out lack of evidence and failure utilize
 MAC machinery to establish facts such cases (CONTEL 169).

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1955 DEC 2 AM 7 27

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Control:
Rec'd:

1086
DECEMBER 2, 1955
9:17 AM

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FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 572, DECEMBER 2, 3 PM

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bm
CENT DEPARTMENT 572; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 225.

PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE

IDF-FLO GAVE EMBASSY FOLLOWING VERSION INCIDENTS DECEMBER 1.

(1). EGYPTIAN OUTPOST DIRECTED AUTOMATIC FIRE AT NUSEIRAT
(MR 935-928). FIRE NOT RETURNED;

(2). MACHINE GUN FIRE DIRECTED FROM EGYPTIAN POST AT
(MR 891-875). IDF RETURNED FIRE AND EXCHANGE CONTINUED APPROXI-
MATELY 30 MINUTES. IDF SUFFERED TWO SLIGHTLY WOUNDED;

(3). MORTAR SHELLS DIRECTED (MR-972-869). FIRING STOPPED
WHEN UN OBSERVERS ARRIVED;

(4). MORTAR SHELLS EXPLODED ON KHIRBET YEHUDI. FIRE WAS
DIRECTED FROM EGYPTIAN POST AT (MR 972-964).

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1955 DEC 3 AM 5 **FILED**

DEC 12 1955

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Control: 1624
Rec'd: December 3, 1955
8:40 a.m.

NEA
Info

FROM: Jerusalem

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 175, December 2, 5 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 175; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 86; CAIRO 120, LONDON 73, PARIS 74, TEL AVIV 136.

Burns told me today he has appointment with Ben Gurion for December 5, when latter is to apprise him of GOI position respecting UN proposals for El Auja D/Z. (CONTEL 174). Referring delay this matter Burns said he has been waiting all week for Ben Gurion to recover from his attack of influenza.

Burns added that Israelis recently assured him IDF complying with Article 7 GAA, whereupon he again raised question of restrictions on freedom movement observers.

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Action1955 DEC 4 AM 6 52 Control: 1728
Rec'd: December 3, 1955
1:54 p.m.NEA
Info

FROM: Jerusalem

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 186, December 3, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 186, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 121,
PRIORITY LONDON 74, PRIORITY PARIS 75, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 137,
AMMAN 86, BEIRUT 44, DAMASCUS 51.

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Re CONTEL 175.

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Burns has informed me of role currently being played by
Colonel Cyril Banks, British member of Parliament, in con-
nection Israel-Egypt situation. Banks understood have con-
fidential relation Nasser as economic adviser to GOE.

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After recent interview Nasser Banks came Jerusalem where
he informed GOI officials that he had emphasized to Nasser
need more peaceful relations with Israel as prerequisite
economic aid from western powers. Acting Foreign Minister
Meyerson and Eytan expressed doubt Nasser's intentions lack-
ing assurance that he would be firm orders stop firing and
raiding across D/L. Banks undertook endeavor obtain such
assurance. He requested UNTSO facilitate his travel Cairo
and return Jerusalem, since he had to return London by
December 5 participate Commons debate Mid-East affairs that
date. Banks proceeded Cairo in UN airplane where he saw
Nasser, returning Jerusalem December 1.

According Banks, Nasser promised issue firm orders to troops
against acts mentioned providing Israelis do likewise. These
orders to take effect from time statement on subject made in
Parliament, London. Nasser apparently sure his orders will
be obeyed. Discussing El Auja, Nasser said position there
somewhat different from Gaza area. He could not guarantee
situation there to same extent unless Kibbutz should be
removed and provisions GAA respected in entirety.

Banks gave above information to Eytan in Burns' presence
night December 1. After discussion subject Ben-Gurion has
sent reply to Banks in care Israeli Embassy Paris along fol-
lowing lines:

Egyptians

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 186, December 3, 1 p.m., from Jerusalem.

Egyptians and GOI accepted Burns' request of last August 30 for cease-fire, but former continued firing, attacks, mining and sabotage. Israelis have been disappointed on various occasions following Egyptian agreements to cease-fire arrangements. Their acts of violence continue. However, Israelis willing to try once more. Ben Gurion therefore assured Banks that if Nasser gives orders, and they are carried out, IDF will refrain from all firing. Ben-Gurion's message adds "instructions to that effect are already in force in the whole of our army, and will continue to be scrupulously observed." He asked Banks add that order from Nasser against shooting, etc., would amount to only partial compliance by GOE with armistice terms.

Present arrangement regarding above exchange assurances is that Banks will inform member British Government, who will make statement in House Monday afternoon. Cease-fire orders will then presumably go into effect. Burns has communicated to Nasser substance Ben-Gurion message.

Since message does not cover question El Auja, Burns has informed parties that he considers UN proposals of November 3 as still before them. As previously reported, he hopes receive statement Israeli's position on matter December 5, after which he will proceed Cairo with view ascertain firm position GOE.

Burns unaware extent to which Banks actions sanctioned by British Government. Burns only authorized his use airplane "after checking his status" and since Banks request immediate interview Nasser (transmitted through UNTSO channel) was promptly granted.

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SW:BD

DEC 7 1955

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5

CORRECTION

12/6/55 11 p.m.

Action

Control: 1728

NEA

Rec'd: December 3, 1955
1:54 p.m.

Info

FROM: Jerusalem

JMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: - 176, December 3, 1 p.m.

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The serial number of this CONFIDENTIAL message received as
175 should be corrected to read 176.

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1955 DEC 7 AM 7 52

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Correction made
by RM/R

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Control: 1622
Rec'd: December 3, 1955
8:13 a.m.

Info

FROM: Damascus

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 545, December 3, 11 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 545; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 134, BAGHDAD 157, BEIRUT 183, CAIRO 185, JIDDA 98, TEL AVIV 116, LONDON 144, PARIS 104.

Cairo EMBTEL 1028 to Department.

C/S Shuqayr [has informed ARMATT that he] was recently "approached" re organizing Fedayeen operations from Syria. After consulting Lebanese CINC Shehab, Shuqayr said he told Egyptian Military Attache Hammad that neither Syria nor Lebanon considered it in their interest to permit Fedayeen operations since inevitable result would be retaliatory attacks on unarmed Lebanese villages or commencement of hostilities on Syrian border which both wished avoid. In case of full hostilities, however, neither country would oppose use of Fedayeen.

Comment: If original report re a Fedayeen operations in Syria with headquarters at Egyptian Embassy Damascus (EMBTEL 451) is correct, organization may exist without concurrence Shuqayr.

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23
Action
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Control: 2781

Rec'd: December 6, 1955
9:28 a.m.This Document Must Be Returned to
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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 577, December 5, 4 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 577 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 227, LONDON 173,
PARIS 16, AMMAN 95, BEIRUT 159, DAMASCUS 109, JERUSALEM 64.

Foreign Ministry today gave Embassy its account Colonel Banks activities reported Jerusalem 186 to Department. GOI version similar to that reported General Burns except its account Banks quotation of Nasser was that latter said he would instruct his troops EL Auja area not to fire but could not guarantee they would follow his instructions because of this "neurosis" about Ziot Kibbutz. Nasser was quoted as adding he could only be certain behavior his troops if members of Kibbutz were removed from D/Z.

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Foreign Ministry did not attach much importance to Banks activities (A) because of disappointment with previous messages from Nasser and (B) because GOI was convinced that Nasser was insincere and merely "playing for time".

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1955 DEC 7 AM 7 52

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10:21 a.m.

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674.34A/12-555

16
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Info
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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 177, December 5, Noon

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SENT DEPARTMENT 177, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 88, CAIRO 122, LONDON 75, PARIS 76, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, ANKARA, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS UNNUMBERED

In contrast Turkish President Bayars' visit to Jerusalem last month (re MYTEL 145, November 7, 1955), visit of Egyptian Defense Minister Abul-Hakim Amer December 1 met with warm welcome in press and private conversation Jerusalemites though without noticeable public demonstration. Security measures less extreme than for Bayar but still conspicuous, reportedly directed against possible action of local Moslem Brotherhood. City's activity normal during visit. King Hussein did not accompany Amer in Jerusalem but joined him later at Arab Legion camp. Pursuant purpose of visit as described by Egyptian Ambassador (according Jordan press December 1) as "study of military situation," Amer shown Israel-held Jerusalem and "Jerusalem corridor" to Tel Aviv from vantage points in Jordan territory.

Comment: Articulate opinion on west bank appears strongly in favor Egyptian-Syrian military alliance, Egyptian leadership Arab world.

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Control: 2730

Rec'd: DECEMBER 6, 1955

8:27 A.M.

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FROM: JERUSALEM

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 178, DECEMBER 5, 5 P.M.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 178, CAIRO 124, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV
UNNUMBERED

BREWSTER WAS RECENTLY INFORMED BY MAJOR FRIEND, BRITISH OFFICER WITH ARAB LEGION INTELLIGENCE, THAT WHILE EGYPTIANS SUSPECTED OF IMPLICATION IN RECENT DEMOLITION INCIDENTS IN ISRAEL LEGION HAS NO POSITIVE EVIDENCE WHICH COULD ESTABLISH EGYPTIAN COMPLICITY. ACCORDING TO FRIEND JORDAN AUTHORITIES HAVE NO DEFINITE IDEA WHO IS RESPONSIBLE. HE POINTED OUT IMPOSSIBILITY OF STOPPING ALL INCURSIONS INTO ISRAEL IN VIEW LENGTH FRONTIER AND DIFFICULTY OF APPREHENDING GUILTY PARTIES.

I AM UNABLE EXPLAIN DISCREPANCY BETWEEN FOREGOING AND INFORMATION CONTEL 165. HOWEVER, FRIENDS STATEMENT OBVIOUSLY ACCORDS WITH ARAB LEGION PRESS RELEASE ENCLOSED AMMANS DESPATCH 183.

HAVE DISCUSSED ABOVE WITH OBUROS WHO HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO ADD THIS SUBJECT.

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NOTE: IN LAST PARAGRAPH OBUROS AS RECEIVED

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NAV

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 180, December 6, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 180, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 126,
PRIORITY LONDON 76, PRIORITY PARIS 77, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED

General Burns saw Ben-Gurion December 5. He is going Cairo
December 7.

According Burns Ben-Gurion stressed point that prerequisite
any agreements about El Auja area or elsewhere must be ces-
sation by Egypt of shooting and raiding across border. If
that condition met Ben-Gurion would agree to UNTSO marking
old international frontier El Auja D/Z, but not (repeat not)
all D/Z boundaries as Nasser has proposed. He also expressed
willingness remove troops from D/Z provided Egyptians move
their position from zone opposite (Article 8, paragraph 3 GAA).

Burns raised question of Kibbutz in D/Z, pointing out mili-
tary characteristics this settlement. Ben-Gurion countered
by arguing that all settlers near borders had to be organized
for self-defense, et cetera. Burns observed that situation
D/Z not (repeat not) exactly comparable that elsewhere. How-
ever, Ben-Gurion gave no (repeat no) indication that Israelis
might be prepared under any circumstances consider removal
Kibbutz or police force.

Burns said he is preparing report of above interview for
UNSYG. He offered send me copy. Will telegraph summary when
available. In discussing above with me Burns commented that
matter of Kibbutz in D/Z is "a farce", since it is clearly a
military-type establishment. He said Ben-Gurion does not
(repeat not) appear to be in good health and expressed doubt
that latter would remain in office long under difficult cir-
cumstances. Burns is not (repeat not) optimistic regarding
outcome his current efforts improve matters.

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SW:LJ/5

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FOR BYROADE FROM SECRETARY

Origin

Info:

In long talk with Sharett today, I probed deeply into question of possible settlement along lines of my talks with Fawzi in San Francisco and Washington. While discussion was inconclusive and Sharett took ~~rather~~ stubborn attitude on territorial matters, I did not get impression he closed doors ~~irrevocably~~. His repeated emphasis was against QTE territorial ~~cessions~~ UNQTE but was willing to talk about QTE mutual adjustments UNQTE and did not repeat not insist that Israeli losses had to be matched acre for acre by gains.

I think it would be useful for you to let Nasser or Fawzi know that my talk was in consequence of our discussions with them and that I am doing everything possible to achieve early progress.

FYI I have in mind that press may give impression, perhaps through information by Israeli Embassy, that I have been discussing settlement with Sharett behind Egypt's back. Summary of discussion will follow in subsequent telegram.

Dist. Desired
(Offices Only)

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674.84A/12-655

Dulle
= DULLES

Drafted by:

NEA:GVallen:hh

12/6/55

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

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Control: 4590

Rec'd: December 9, 1955
6:41 a.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

1955 DEC 9 PM 2 32

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 182, December 8, 5, p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 182, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 90, CAIRO 127,
TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED.

SUPPLEMENTING CONTEL 169.

Since November 22 Israelis have lodged complaints with EIMAC as follows: November 29, 7 complaints; December 1, 5 complaints; December 3, 7 complaints; December 5, 1 (verbal) complaint; December 6, 2 (verbal) complaints. With exceptions prompt verbal complaints, each batch covered incidents occurring within preceding 2 or 3 days.

Israelis requested investigation in only 2 of above instances. One case involved mining of Command car, the other alleged shelling of Kissufim and Ein Hashlosa with 120 MM mortar fire. In first of these, observer found two craters, fragments of car and of what appeared to be mine container. No tracks were discovered and the vehicle itself had been moved to Beersheba by time of investigation.

Israelis and Egyptians have engaged in series complaints and counter-complaints. Recent history this matter may be summarized as follows: Israelis alleged Egyptian post fired on Israeli outpost at 1030 hours 28 November and that Egyptian platoon attacked at 1200 wounded 2. No investigation requested. Egyptians alleged that Israel position fired at Egyptian soldiers working in their positions. Investigation Egyptian side D/L disclosed 32 craters from 120 mm mortar plus 6 tails mortar shells. According Israeli allegation on afternoon November 28 Egyptian position shelled Kissufim and Ein Hashlosa. Observer found one tail of 120 MM mortar, but no other crater.

According Israeli allegation Egyptian position opened machine gun and mortar fire at Israeli outposts December 1 wounding 2. Observer who saw part of exchange fire believes Israelis fired first, but could not verify since some positions beyond his vision. On basis similar complaint and counter-complaint same date observer found ten mortar impacts at site of Egyptian position. Israelis did not request investigation.

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-2- 182, December 8, 5, p.m. from Jerusalem.

On December 6 both parties complained that the other opened fire at 0930. MAC chairman arranged cease-fire for 1130 and 1300 hours but these were disregarded. Observer reported that after second attempt at cease-fire Israelis were continuing harassing fire. Cease-fire successful about 1600 after UNTSO appealed to Israeli Foreign Ministry.

Chairman EIMAC has indicated to UNTSO that most major firing incidents have in his opinion been commenced by Egyptians. One cause this situation is resumption Israeli motor patrols along D/L since about November 1. UNTSO reports Gaza strip now manned mostly by Palestinians. Evidently Egyptians have "written off strip" from military viewpoint and would not make serious effort hold it in event outbreak hostilities. El Auja area has remained quiet. Number Israeli troops in D/Z believed reduced to roughly one company. UNTSO cannot express opinion about number Egyptian troops in zone established Article 8 paragraph 3 GAA owing restrictions movement observers.

COLE

DT:HRW/5

52421

DEC 13 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

December 22 1955

In reply refer to
SEV 674.84A/12-855

Dear Senator Scott:

I refer to your letter of December 8 to Secretary Dulles enclosing a letter from Mr. J. L. Pressman of Charlotte, North Carolina, concerning United States policy with regard to the Arab-Israel dispute. We appreciate your interest in making the views of your constituent available.

I believe that your constituent will be interested in the enclosed copy of a statement recently prepared in the Department concerning our policies in the Near East. Also attached is a copy of the address made by Secretary Dulles on August 26 in which he outlined certain steps which the United States would be prepared take to contribute toward a solution of the Arab-Israel dispute.

Mr. Pressman's letter is returned, as you requested.

Sincerely yours,

Thruston B. Morton
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Statement.
2. Address by Secretary Dulles, August 26, 1955.
3. From Mr. Pressman (returned).

The Honorable
W. Kerr Scott,
United States Senate.

P. SEV: L. Campbell: MTW: pp

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DEC 21 1955 P.M.

674.34A/12-855

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674.84A/12-855

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Control: 4989

Rec'd: December 6:17 p.m.

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1107, December 9, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1107; REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 147, JERUSALEM 61, LONDON 204, USUN 38

General Burns met Foreign Minister Fawzi 7 December and sought Egyptian approval SYG proposals re El Auja D/Z. Fawzi who not particularly forthcoming indicated GOE might be willing drop proposal demarcate entire D/Z and work out formula withdrawal few meters checkpoint now encroaching on D/Z if Major General Amer was satisfied maintenance of 30 police in D/Z on conditions approved by Burns did not present threat security Egyptian forces Burns saw Amer December 8 Amer stated GOE could not accept maintenance of police in D/Z for reasons of security and because acceptance would be unfavorably received by Egyptian army as representing "concession." Amer called police "screen" preventing Egyptians obtain intelligence information re Israeli forces in Western front area and indicated such intelligence necessary view Israeli unwillingness permit movement observers when Israeli had operation in mind.

(Burns explained to us that police in his view counter-balance personnel of GOE checkpoints on Western side D/Z. He noted that special committee had not yet decided their status but he felt that principle of police in D/Z depended essentially on status Kibbutz which SC has never decided. He speculated SC might eventually have to decide status police but he had observed no enthusiasm for SC consideration problem at present time.)

Burns saw Fawzi again later same day. View Amer's position Fawzi withdrew suggestions previously made re demarcation and checkpoint Burns clearly disappointed Egyptian position. He points out that by sticking to technicalities GOE in effect leaving Israelis in military occupation D/Z. Burns hopes situation will remain "fluid" and mentioned Amer had assured him Egyptian troops in region D/Z had strict orders hold fire unless attacked. However Burns fears Israelis may take advantage GOE "rejection" SYG proposals to try mark unilaterally Western side D/Z. Burns said he would forbid such action but is not hopeful Israelis will desist. In that event further clashes likely.

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Comment:

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-2- 1107, December 9, 5 p.m., from Cairo

Comment: Problem is that each side fears attack by other but neither for political reasons seems prepared grant free movement UN observers in disturbed area. (Burns admitted Israelis still restricting movements of observers in Western front area to main roads, although they are permitted move freely in D/Z. In return GOE prohibits movement observers in area west of D/Z.)

This would appear best means solve problem which is essentially fear of both sides of concealed military build-up. Hope to see Nasser within next few days and will endeavor persuade him re-examine GOE position. In meantime, hope Israelis can be persuaded not to go ahead with marking and to make some progress on observer movement in Western front area.

BYROADE

AB:JJ

DEC 15 1955

52423

CONFIDENTIAL

AIR POUCH

CONFIDENTIAL

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PRIORITY

(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMEMBASSY LONDON

1338

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

December 9, 1955

REF : Embassy's Tel. 2311, Dec. 6: Jerusalem Tel. 186, Tel Aviv's
Tel. 577 and Cairo's Tel. 1077.

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION REC'D 12-12-	DEPT IN F O OTHER	RMK-2 CIV-6 EVR-5 IO-4 P-1-5-2 CIA-7 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3 USIA-4 OCA
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SUBJECT: Activities of Col. Banks, Member of British Parliament in connection with Israeli-Egyptian Border Situation.

The recent activities of Col. Cyril Banks, a Conservative member of the British House of Commons, in seeking to bring about an improvement in the situation along the Israeli-Egyptian border were brought to the Department's attention in tel. no. 186 of Dec. 3 from the Consulate General at Jerusalem and were also mentioned in tel. no. 577 of Dec. 5 from Tel Aviv and tel. no. 1077 of Dec. 6 from Cairo. Col. Banks' activities had also been mentioned by the British Foreign Office to this Embassy prior to the receipt of Jerusalem's telegram in question and the Foreign Office had stressed that Col. Banks was not acting in behalf of Her Majesty's Government. On Dec. 6 the Embassy discussed the matter with the Foreign Office and as reported in the Embassy's tel. no. 2311 of that date, the Foreign Office confirmed that Col. Banks had not been acting in behalf of the British Government nor had the Foreign Office even been aware of his intention to act as an intermediary between Egypt and Israel on this question. The Embassy's telegram also pointed out that although General Burns, the Chief of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, had apparently obtained the impression from Col. Banks that a statement was going to be made on the subject in the House of Commons on Dec. 5, no such statement was in fact made either by a Government spokesman or by Col. Banks himself on that date. The Embassy also learned that Col. Banks, who had meanwhile returned to London, had an appointment at the Foreign Office that same day (with Mr. Harold Turton, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State).

On Dec. 3 an Embassy officer discussed the matter with Mr. Turton, who said that he was well acquainted with Col. Banks. He stated that Col. Banks has paid a number of visits to the Middle East and knows Col. Nasser, the Egyptian Prime Minister quite well (although as indicated in Cairo's tel. no. 1077 there appears reason to believe that Col. Banks has any special relationship with Col. Nasser or with the Egyptian Government). Mr. Turton did not indicate the reason for Col. Bank's latest trip except to refer to the latter's business interests (he is a director of several companies). On his arriving in Cairo, Col. Banks called both on the British Ambassador, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, and on Col. Nasser. A number of subjects were discussed at his meeting with Nasser, including Israeli-Arab relations.

Evan M. Wilson:ls

REPORTER

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674.34A/12-955

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but at that time there was no question of Col. Banks' acting in any mediatory capacity. He subsequently went to Israel where he had a conversation with the Acting Foreign Minister, Mrs. Golda Myerson. The subject of the disturbed conditions along the frontier with Egypt came up and Mrs. Myerson asked Col. Banks whether, in view of his acquaintance with Col. Nasser, he would be willing to go back to Cairo and speak to Nasser about the matter.

In discussing the foregoing with the Embassy's representative, Mr. Turton emphasized it was at the request of the Acting Israeli Foreign Minister that Col. Banks had undertaken his mission to Cairo. As indicated in Jerusalem's telegram no. 186, Col. Banks was provided with a plane for the journey by General Burns. He flew to Cairo and saw Col. Nasser, who indicated that the Egyptians would be prepared to issue firm orders to stop firing and raiding across the demarcation line, provided the Israelis would do the same and providing the Israeli kibbutz were removed from the Auja demilitarized zone. Col. Banks had to return to Jerusalem immediately and therefore did not have an opportunity to inform the British Embassy in Cairo of his talk with Nasser. When he arrived in Jerusalem, he communicated Nasser's views to General Burns and to Mrs. Myerson, who undertook to inform Mr. Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister, and to send word on to Col. Banks, who had to return to London, as to Mr. Ben Gurion's reaction. Mr. Ben Gurion, however, refused to agree to the removal of the Israeli kibbutz from the demilitarized zone.* Col. Banks was so informed by the Israeli Government following his return to London and there the matter rests. The Foreign Office, while not having sponsored or even having been informed regarding Col. Banks' attempt to improve the border situation, is disappointed at the failure of his efforts as it would, of course, welcome any amelioration. It is expected that during the course of the Middle East debate in the House of Commons on December 12 Col. Banks will undoubtedly have something to say about his efforts.

According to information available to the Embassy, Col. Cyril Banks was born in 1901 and has been Conservative member for Pudsey since 1950. During the war he served with the Ministry of Food and with the War Office and was engaged on the supply side of COSSAC in 1943 and SHAEF in 1944. From 1952 to 1953 he held minor

*see Jerusalem's tel. no. 180 of Dec. 6 for a confirmation of this attitude of Ben Gurion's.

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Page 3 of
Desp. No. 1338
From Amembassy London


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Page _____ of
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

ministerial rank as Joint Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation but holds no ministerial position at the present time.

For the Ambassador:



Evan M. Wilson
First Secretary of Embassy

cc: Jerusalem
Damascus
Tel Aviv
Amman
Cairo
Beirut
Paris



CONFIDENTIAL



~~ACFG~~

~~NEA - GVA~~

~~WMP~~ ✓

~~NE - DCB~~

In my opinion we have here another
example of the policy of "divide and conquer".

NE - FW

12/23/55

NE - Mr. Wilkins

~~DCB~~ WEB DCB

Who are the "people in the Department" Eban and Sharett keep talking about -- you and me? Maybe they're starting a back-door campaign against Francis.

VA

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

December 9, 1955.

Mr. Allen
Mr. Russell

WMA
file
D.C.B.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I had breakfast this morning with Ambassador Eban and Minister Shiloah. As you know, Foreign Minister Sharett is here. They reviewed with me their recent conversations with you and conversations which friends of theirs had had with Senator George which had been relayed to them, expressing generally the opinion that the United States should guarantee the respective boundaries of Israel and Egypt, and your general view that nothing could be done about the security pact until the Congress had reconvened. They also reviewed for me the general discussions that they had had with you, Mr. Russell and others in the State Department.

They expressed great concern as to whether Israel was not in effect being punished for its attitude of cooperation with the free nations of the western world, whereas Egypt, which was in effect thumbing its nose at the western world by buying arms from Czechoslovakia and in general cooperating with the Russians and with Nehru on a program of neutralism, was in effect being rewarded for its bad conduct. They were concerned with what they regarded as the general feeling in the Department that Israel, with its exceedingly small territory must give way in order to satisfy Egypt. They told me that they had submitted an exceedingly modest arms proposal which included airplanes which would help them with their defense but which could not be used for offensive bombing and that in general they had submitted a very affirmative program for discussion. This program included:

(1) The agreement by the United States to give Israel defensive arms but not necessarily to put it on a par with Egypt.

(2) Straightening out any irregularities in the boundaries insofar as they were really irritating provided it did not mean any substantial sacrifice of territory on their part, including especially the Negev and provided it did not mean their giving up their sea coast, which was their lifeline. This program they said might even envisage Egypt's getting more in acreage than Israel got.

(3) Satisfactory international commission under U.N. or other auspices to govern the use of the holy places in Jerusalem and other holy places.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

(4) With financial aid from the United States, the working out of an appropriate program to take care of the Arab refugees; although they thought this would have to be done by resettlement rather than by absorption in the Jewish community. They also thought there should be certain offsetting credits for their refugees and the moneys they had already spent on this problem.

(5) Since traffic generally is moved from the south to the north, they would be willing to grant rights of way for the re-activation of the Cairo Beirut railway.

(6) If it is essential that there be a connecting link between Egypt and Trans Jordan, they would be willing to have an international highway across Israeli territory for this purpose. They do not want it set up as an international enclave and they do not wish to grant deeded rights or concessioned rights to Egypt or Jordan, as they believe they would ultimately want to guard it and station troops and indulge in the doctrine of "hot" pursuit on the crimes committed on the concession itself. They feel that their territory is already so small that they must be exceptionally careful about granting further inroads and especially about the granting of concessions that would be productive of riots and hard feelings.

(7) They said it was essential that they should continue to have access to the Red Sea and that it would be utterly impossible to grant a triangular piece of land adjacent to Egypt and a triangular piece of land adjacent to Trans Jordan which would meet at Israeli territory at a point, through which point the Israelis would be permitted to pass south to the Red Sea and into present Israel territory immediately north of the Red Sea. They said they had difficulty enough persuading people to settle in that area without subjecting them to further hazards of raids from Moslem territory. They felt that the authors of this plan had merely done it on paper and were not at all cognizant of its ethnological, sociological and economic consequences.

(8) They would be glad to grant a free port of entry to Trans Jordan at Haifa, which would have a profound favorable effect upon the economic climate of Trans Jordan.

(9) They would be willing to carry out all aspects of the Johnston plan, which would give Trans Jordan favorable water resources.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

(10) They would hope that the United States and Great Britain would guarantee the boundaries of both Israel, Egypt and the other adjacent Arab states and would make it clear that they would punish violations.

(11) They pointed out that purely from a military standpoint alone we should be careful about urging a program which will connect Egypt with Trans Jordan physically and which would give the Communists great maneuverability and would give them a military highway that they do not now possess.

Despite this very affirmative, constructive program, they feel that persons in the Department working on this matter feel that it is not enough and that you must give Egypt more in order to settle. They feel that Nasser is being coached by Molotov and that Krishna Menon is lending encouragement to the Arab states in the United Nations and that at the present time, with Nehru's approval, Krishna Menon is doing his level best to promote the idea that Moscow has peaceful intentions and that each Arab nation should be permitted to work out its own destiny. They feel that Krishna Menon is very evasive when they talk to him, and is not trustworthy.

They deplore Eden's speech at the Guild Hall and deplore the present British approach, which they feel is geared to persuading the United States to adopt the Bagdad pact, which would be inimical to Israel's interests.

They said there was calm in Israel today because there was great confidence that you would work the situation out. They hoped that there was a real desire on the part of the administration to work out the mutual security pact and that it would be put up to the Senate with the approbation of the Eisenhower administration and not merely put up. They were very appreciative of the very constructive manner in which you had discussed the problem with their Foreign Minister, Mr. Sharett, and the fact that you had referred to the consequences of negotiations envisaged by Sharett as a "chamber of horrors" and expressed great confidence in you, but wondered if you were not being too much influenced by people in the Department who still were preaching that Israel must make greater sacrifices to Egypt.

I commented that you were not the kind of a person who talked one way to one side and the other way to the other side and that when you publicly expressed your beliefs in moral law, you believed in carrying out that moral law in your negotiations and that you were not one to deceive people by the profession of sentiments which you knew you could not carry out.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

They expressed a great fear that the British would now sell us a "bill of goods" and that India would somehow come in as a neutral negotiator when they really felt their interests were the other way. I said I had discussed this matter briefly with Judge Proskauer the night before, who told me he was breakfasting with Foreign Minister Sharett; that Judge Proskauer had mentioned some of the points outlined above and that someone in Washington who claimed it came from the "horse's mouth" had telephoned his partner George Shapiro, who used to be legal counsel for Governor Dewey, that Proskauer should set up a formula for settlement which would be acceptable to American Jewry. I commented that if they announced any public formula, the Arabs would immediately start whittling away at it and that if one started to discuss these settlements in public one got public opinion frozen in such a manner that it was very difficult to arrive at a settlement; and I thought their Foreign Minister would be well advised, apart from negotiations with you, not to state with others, no matter how prominent in American Jewry, that any particular formula was acceptable to Israel; because if you were going to approach the negotiations in good faith there were bound to have to be compromises on both sides. They agreed with this and said they thought Judge Proskauer was getting rather old and that occasionally he sometimes forgot that matters were told to him in extreme confidence. I expressed great admiration for Judge Proskauer and said he was one of my oldest and closest friends and that I knew that he and many other prominent Jews wished to intervene in this matter but I thought the problems were so difficult that they would be well advised to keep their negotiations with you on a fairly confidential level. With this they agreed.

I also said that I was skeptical of any plank that they might wrest from either political party as their real problem as a nation was to solve their problems with the Arabs and not merely to keep American Jewry aflame. With this they also agreed. They said there were certain people in the Department who had wanted them to "sell" certain formulae for settlement to American Jewry in order that the pressure for settlement here would make the problem of the Israeli government easier. I commented that despite the warm sympathy here for the problems of Israel, they still were ambassadors of a foreign country and that I thought they had better do their best to work out their problems with the State Department on the confidential level and to leave the propaganda problems here to the leaders in American Zionry.

They said they did not think that our government realized the terrific propaganda value in the Middle East

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

of the statements presently being made by Nasser and of the apparently exceptionally conciliatory policy of the United States. I commented that the United States had no desire to see Africa aflame and that if we could give something to Nasser, who is discontented with his present status (because he has no oil), although Egypt was the foundation of the present civilization, and that some of the peoples or tribes of the countries in which oil had been found could be likened to "backwoods hill-billies". I said I thought the Asswan dam would cost nearer \$900,000,000 than \$600,000,000 and would take twelve to fifteen years to build it; it would flood two thirds of the Sudan; it would require the building of expensive transmission lines and at present there were no factories capable of using its output; and even if the loan were made to it by the United States Government or the International Bank or others, Egypt would have a tough time getting enough out of her current economy to pay the interest and instalments on the loan; and that I thought the Russians were proposing something they knew they would never be called upon to carry out, in order to get great credit; and that perhaps we could work out something not quite as spectacular but which would nevertheless help Nasser climb down from his post of having dealt with the Soviets without losing too much face and which would give him something about which he could be proud in relation not only to his own people but to the Arab states. They thought that this was a sound approach provided the quid pro quo to Nasser did not come out of Israel.

They said the sentiment in the Department was that this matter might be straightened out in the next two or three weeks and that they thought that was like the "spirit of Geneva" and that if you proceeded on that basis you would be doomed to disappointment.

I told them you always quoted to me the story of Lot and the Lord and the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah in 18th and 19th Genesis that they must not harden their hearts to compromise. They are apparently very scary that you and the British are going to work out something which will leave them outside in the cold.

Arthur H. Dean

Dec. 10, 1955.

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Control: 5741

Rec'd: December 12, 1955
10:13 a.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

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RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 184, December 12, 3 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 184 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 128, LONDON 78,
PARIS 79, AMMAN, TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED.

Burns gave me today account his visit Cairo which reported
Cairo's telegram 1107 to Department. He said he is now
"playing for time" in effort keep parties engaged in consider-
ing proposals before them rather than in resuming hostile
actions.

Burns saw Ben-Gurion December 11 to inform latter regarding
visit, and stressed GOE still considering proposals El Auja
area. Burns pointed out that Egyptians regarded patrolling
along Gaza DL as provocative and cause firing across line.
Ben-Gurion inquired rather pointedly as to how long he would
have to wait for Egyptians to stop firing incidents and take
steps accepting UN El Auja proposals. Burns gained impression
Ben-Gurion implied that Israelis would not (repeat not) wait
indefinitely with respect foregoing but might on contrary
engage some new act of retaliation before very long.

There was some discussion on subject sabotage acts within
Israel evidently work of persons crossing from Jordan.
Burns pointed out that these have recently stopped and expressed
doubt Egyptian complicity. Ben-Gurion insisted Egyptians
responsible but gave no (repeat no) details in support of
that viewpoint.

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1955 DEC 12 PM 4 33

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Control: 7040

Rec'd: DECEMBER 14, 1955
12:04 P.M.

FROM: JERUSALEM

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 188, DECEMBER 14, 12 NOON

SENT DEPARTMENT 188, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 131, DAMASCUS 54, LONDON 82, PARIS 73, TEL AVIV 141, AMMAN UNNUMBERED.

DURING CONVERSATION AT SOCIAL GATHERING YESTERDAY GENERAL BURNS EXPRESSED HIMSELF AS SOMEWHAT WORRIED OVER POSSIBILITY RENEWED ISRAELI ATTACKS, PRESUMABLY AGAINST EGYPTIAN FORCES.

REFERRING HIS INTERVIEW WITH BEN GURION SUNDAY AFTERNOON (CONTEL 184) BURNS SAID BEN GURION OF COURSE WELL AWARE THEN OF IMPENDING ATTACK ON SYRIAN POSITIONS SAME NIGHT. HE ADDED THAT BEN GURION INSISTED ON SEEING HIM SUNDAY ON SHORT NOTICE TO DISCUSS HIS VISIT CAIRO, WHICH BURNS HAD EXPECTED TAKE UP WITH EYTAN FOLLOWING DAY. WHILE BURNS THEN SOMEWHAT PUZZLED AT URGENCY BEN GURION'S WISH SEE HIM, HE NOW ASSUMES LATTER WANTED INFORMATION ABOUT EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE PRIOR COMMENCEMENT OPERATION AGAINST SYRIANS. BURNS SPECULATED THAT BEN GURION PROBABLY HAD SOME IDEA IN MIND OF CALLING OFF THE ATTACK IF HE COULD HAVE REPORTED EGYPTIAN ACCEPTANCE UNITED NATIONS PROPOSALS OR INDICATION THEY LIKELY ACCEPT NEAR FUTURE. AS MENTIONED REFERENCED TELEGRAM BURNS CONSIDERED BEN GURION'S ATTITUDE, ESPECIALLY INQUIRY ABOUT EGYPTIAN INTENTIONS RESPECTING UNITED NATIONS PROPOSALS, AS HAVING SOMEWHAT SINISTER OVERTONES.

OTHER FACTORS ADDING BURNS CONCERN FUTURE PROSPCTS ARE SERIES ISRAELI CHARGES ABOUT "WAVE EGYPTIAN AGGRESSIONS" AND ARTICLE DECEMBER 13 JERUSALEM POST BY "DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT" WHICH REFERS SUNDAY NIGHT'S ATTACK AND STATES INTER ALIA EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN DEFENSE PACT MAY NOW APPEAR "TO SOME SYRIANS AS AN ADDED DANGER RATHER THAN A PROTECTIVE DEVICE".

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AIR

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1152, December 16, 10 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1152; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 102, BAGHDAD 89
BEIRUT 148, DAMASCUS 111, JIDDA 86, TEL AVIV 156, LONDON 210,
PARIS 115, USUN NEW YORK 42.

Nasser's letter to Hammerskjold front-paged all papers. Headline
emphasized letter was "warning to Israel". In discussing letter
with journalists, Nasser stressed Egypt "had adopted pacific
attitude in spite repeated Israeli aggressions. Today it is clear
to whole world that Israel has always been the initial aggressor
and that policy of peace cannot be maintained unilaterally".

Editorial comment treats statement as putting Egypt on record
that if SC does not unequivocally "force Israel respect UN de-
cisions and truce terms she must be put in her place by armed
force". Editorials also call on United States to reject categori-
cally Israeli request for arms. AL AKHBAR concludes "balance of
peace and war is today in hands SC and United States". AL GUMHOURIYA
notes "Arabs are now resolved answer any further aggression from
Israel in only language Israel understands--that of force".

Comment: We believe Nasser's statement motivated by conviction
Egypt while in no way regretting submission Syrian incident to
United Nations and world opinion, must take strong public stand
in order:

- (1) Reaffirm to Syrian Government and public Egyptians continue
prepared implement Syrian-Egyptian pact
- (2) Protect regime against domestic charges of being "soft on
Israel"
- (3) Support anti-Baghdad Pact elements in Jordan by proving
Egypt's resolution defend Arabs against Israelis
- (4) Assist Syrian-Lebanese military negotiations

We have noted local interpretation Nasser's statement is that
it does not call for retaliation for Syrian incident but will

apply to

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-2- 1152, Decmeber 16, 10 p.m. from Cairo

apply to "future aggression". It seems clear that in such event Nasser will have to carry out his promise whatever the consequences unless Western action in SC and outside it (e.g. on supplying arms to Israel) now makes crystal-clear that West is no less concerned by Israeli aggressive actions than are Arabs and is equally prepared take effective measures against future occurrences. In absence such action we cannot expect GOE will again follow course of moderation which it adopted this time (my telegram 1136), and must anticipate speedy involvement of Iraq and other Arab States in what could easily become general war from which only Soviets would profit.

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DEC 27 1955

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1955 DEC 18 AM 6 15

Control: 8939
Rec'd: December 17, 1955
12:28 p.m.NEA
Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

PMR

TO: Secretary of State

CS

NO: 614, December 16, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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SENT DEPARTMENT 614, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 185, PARIS 146, CAIRO 243

USIA Director Streibert met Wednesday and Thursday with Ben-Gurion. Herzog and Charge were present at conversations.

Principal points made by Streibert were:

1. As result his conversations Cairo he greatly impressed with possibilities for peace settlement. For first time an Arab country admitted existence of Israel as state through public statements made by Egyptian Government regarding Eden's November 9 speech. Secondly, Nasser had told him he interested in settlement; that Eden's statement point from which matters could proceed and he prepared to discuss boundaries and compensation. Finally Streibert said in conversation Baghdad Nuri Said had also indicated this was good time for settlement.

2. He emphasized incidents such as Tiberias action put off peace and made its achievement more difficult. He pointed this up (with visible effect on Ben-Gurion) by describing funeral cortege, flowers on caskets and solemnity of crowds watching procession which he saw in Damascus.

Streibert added that some people in Arab States had doubts whether Israel really wanted peace and had suggested it interested in stirring up trouble to obtain funds from abroad.

Ben-Gurion in reply made following principal points:

1. Allegation to 3 was untrue. Israel wanted peace which apart from its intrinsic worth was essential to enable state to meet its two great problems of receiving immigrants and of integrating them into nation.

2. As regards 2 above Ben-Gurion restated traditional rationalization of doctrine of retaliation but avoided any reference to specific

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... December 16, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Tel Aviv
... incident to which Streibert had alluded.

... part Ben-Gurion's comments devoted to Streibert's
... situation in Cairo. Firstly, he doubted whether
... really wanted settlement. Israel had made numerous
... beginning with Naguib and continuing throughout
... regime with negative results. Referring to Sun-
... conversation with General Burns and Cairo radio reports
... gave as example Egyptian "rejection" UN Secretary
... proposals.

... is smiling at the US but he doesn't smile at Israel".
... Ben-Gurion, had to take into account possibility of attack
... Egyptians when they ready. His position was similar to
... if Russia possessed atomic bomb but US did not
... (repeat not). Would we under those circumstances believe
... remarks of Molotov? Ben-Gurion said "we are deadly
... Nasser will have 200 Migs and 50 Ilyushin bombers.
... already has superiority in heavy equipment. Israel
... superiority in quality of her men. All this means
... to think of possibilities of our settlements (border)
... of tens of thousands of flower of our youth
... their lives and of Tel Aviv and Haifa being destroyed
... from air". (Ben-Gurion expressed doubt whether
... would destroy Jerusalem mentioning holy places.)
... added "nevertheless I do not (repeat not) believe
... completely destroy us. We would fight too hard
... results would be ..." (He then repeated state-
... destruction of cities settlements and loss of

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FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 614, DECEMBER 16, 5 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

1955 DEC 18 AM 6 15

Control: 8871
Rec'd: DECEMBER 17, 1955
9:10 A.M.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 614, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 185, PARIS 146.

WHEN STREIBERT INQUIRED WHETHER HE COULD NOT RELY ON UN TO PREVENT SUCH AN AGGRESSION BEN-GURION REPLIED HE COULD NOT. IN 1948 WHEN THE UN WAS NOT AS DIVIDED AS IT IS TODAY NOT FINGER LIFTED TO HELP ISRAEL MEET ONSLAUGHT OF SIX ARAB ARMIES. FURTHERMORE DAMAGE WOULD BE DONE BEFORE ANY ACTION COULD BE TAKEN.

BEN-GURION TURNED TO QUESTION PEACE SETTLEMENT AND SAID HE PREPARED TO TALK WITH NASSER IMMEDIATELY. HE PROPOSED FOLLOWING SPECIFIC STEPS:

1. CEASE-FIRE BY EGYPT AND ISRAEL. BEN-GURION UNDERTOOK DURING WEEK OR SO WHICH USG WOULD REQUIRE TO GET REPLY FROM NASSER TO HIS PROPOSAL TO ABSTAIN FROM RETALIATIONS EVEN IN FACE OF PROVOCATION.
2. STRICT OBSERVANCE OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
3. ONCE THESE PREREQUISITES HAD BEEN MET DISCUSSIONS COULD COMMENCE. HE WAS PREPARED TO WORK FOR PEACE IN STAGES.
4. HE ACCEPTED AGENDA WHICH NASSER SUGGESTED TO STREIBERT. HE PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT COMPENSATION ALSO ABOUT BOUNDARIES "ON GIVE AND TAKE BASIS". BEN-GURION SEVERAL TIMES USED EXPRESSION "GIVE AND TAKE" RELATIVE TO BOUNDARIES.
5. WHEN STREIBERT MENTIONED NASSER'S APPARENT CONDITION RE USING EDEN'S STATEMENT AS STARTING POINT BEN-GURION SAID NASSER FREE TO INTERPRET EDEN'S STATEMENT AS HE WISHED; BUT HE, BEN-GURION,

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AP- 614, DECEMBER 16, 5 P.M., FROM TEL AVIV (SECTION 2 OF 2)

ALSO FREE TO PLACE HIS OWN INTERPRETATION ON IT OR TO USE ANY STARTING POINT HE DESIRED AND THAT IMPORTANT THING WAS START TALKING.

WHEN STREIBERT POINTED OUT THAT DIRECT CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN NASSER AND BEN-GURION PROBABLY IMPRACTICABLE AT THIS MOMENT BEN-GURION SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION IN EARLIER STAGES OF NEGOTIATION TO USE OF INTERMEDIARIES; HE BELIEVED HOWEVER THAT BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS COULD REALLY BE PRODUCTIVE DIRECT TALKS WOULD BE NECESSARY; BUT SUCH DIRECT TALKS IF THAT STAGE REACHED COULD BE HELD WITH SOME ISRAELI OTHER THAN HIMSELF.

COMMENT: IN MY JUDGMENT BEN-GURION'S PROPOSALS MARK SOME ADVANCE FROM SIMILAR OVERTURES WHICH HE MADE IN PAST. FIRSTLY, ON TERRITORIAL QUESTION HE HAS PROCEEDED FROM "NOT AN INCH OF TERRITORY" TO "MUTUAL MINOR BORDER ADJUSTMENTS" TO PROCESS OF "GIVE AND TAKE". CHECKING MY NOTES OF CONVERSATION THIS MORNING WITH HERIOP HE INDICATED HIS BELIEF THAT BEN-GURION'S POSITION ON TERRITORIAL QUESTION BEEN MODIFIED SOMEWHAT BY HIS STATEMENT TO STREIBERT.

SECONDLY, HIS UNDERTAKING TO ABSTAIN FROM RETALIATORY ACTIONS AGAINST EGYPT IRRESPECTIVE OF PROVOCATION WHILE GIVEN FOR ONLY SHORT PERIOD GIVES SOME EVIDENCE SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE WHEN CONSIDERED RELATIVE TO PUBLIC MOOD HERE AND POLITICAL HAZARDS WHICH HE WOULD ENCOUNTER IN ADHERING TO COMMITMENT SHOULD ONE OR TWO ISRAELIS LOSE THEIR LIVES DURING NEXT WEEK ALONG EGYPTIAN BORDER. STREIBERT AND I UNDERTOOK TO TRANSMIT HIS PROPOSALS TO THE GOVERNMENT BUT GAVE HIM NO ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT WOULD TRANSMIT THEM TO NASSER.

I ANTICIPATE BY TUESDAY NEXT FOREIGN MINISTRY WILL INQUIRE WHETHER NASSER HAS RECEIVED PROPOSALS AND BY END OF NEXT WEEK WILL BE PRESSING FOR HIS REPLY.

WHITE

SW:DR

SECRET

JAN 10 1956

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

~~TOP SECRET - ALPHA~~
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08786
1955 DEC 20 PM 5 32

DC/T

For DC/T only

SENT TO: Amembassy, TEL AVIV 431
RPT INFO: Amembassy, LONDON 3444
Amembassy, CAIRO 1306

Origin

Index

ALPHA

Your 614, last paragraph.

Dept has advised Shiloah that while Streibert was of course speaking to Ben Gurion as responsible US official, he was unaware of conversations initiated by Secretary and Sharett and carried forward by Russell and Shiloah. Shiloah indicated he would so advise IG,

DULLES

(F.H.R.)

Dist. Desired
(Offices Only)

EX-100-100000-1
X-005 1, 2, 3, 4
Auth'd by: Guy A. Lee - NEA
April 1, 1975

DC/T	
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Drafted by: NEA:NE:DCBertus/amb 12/20

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S. - Francis H. Russell

Clearances:

DEC 20 1955

B-91195

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Control: 8895
Rec'd: December 17, 1955
10:09 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 617, December 17, 2 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 617; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 284, PARIS 147

PARIS FOR SECRETARY

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ALPHA

With reference EMBTEL 614 to Department, Streibert in discussions with Ben-Gurion was unaware subject matter Washington discussions Secretary-Sharet and Russell-Shiloah. In view injunction contained DEPTTEL 375 to Tel Aviv, I was not (repeat not) free to inform him of them or of their possible relationship to proposals made by Ben-Gurion.

SW:LFS/1

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12/16/55
LFS 66*

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54
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Control: 9129
Rec'd: December 18, 1955
10:06 a.m.

Info
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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 195, December 18, 1 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 195, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 99, CAIRO 186,
LONDON 85, PARIS 86, TEL AVIV 148.

Burns has reported to UNSYG December 17 regarding UN proposals
El Auja current position as follows:

(1) Reply still awaited from GOE. Burns understands Fawsi had
contemplated asking him proceed Cairo next week for further
discussion after which latter would give GOE answer. Burns
understands GOE probably inclined accept points involving survey
by UNTSO of old international frontier boundary D/Z plus with-
drawal armed forces from zones involved, but object police re-
maining in D/Z. Burns believes any modification Egypt's position
unlikely in view Tiberias incident.

(2) Ben Gurion insists that Egypt must give firm assurances re-
specting cease-fire and cessation any raiding as prerequisite agree-
ment. Israeli position is that they have accepted UN proposals in
principal and subject condition that GOE remove defensive positions
in accordance GAA Article 8 paragraph 3. They had expressed will-
ingness wait until December 16 for statement Egyptian position.

(3) In light Nasser statement about reaction any further attacks
from Israel, assurance about cease-fire etc regarded as unlikely.
Burns of opinion that at least until after completion Security
Council consideration Tiberias case efforts conclude discussion
UN El Auja proposals would not meet with success. He proposes
therefore, subject UNSYG approval, urge parties maintain tran-
quillity El Auja area while informing them that negotiations those
proposals will be deferred until after action Syrian complaints
SC.

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OCB

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 622, December 19, 5 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 622, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 186, PARIS
CAIRO 285, ANKARA 21

ANKARA FOR STREIBERT

Following comments submitted re security aspects Ben Gurion's
comments transmitted Embassy telegram 614 to Department.

1. Prime Minister's statement of Israel's "deadly fear" Egyptian use Soviet armament genuine. It is comparable initially to persecution complex European Jews engendered by Eastern European pogroms and Nazi holocaust. This carried to period formation of state and over subsequent years greatly intensified by Arab psychological warfare, boycott and blockade which convinced Israelis Arabs would "do them in" when they could.

2. Counterbalance this "premonition of extermination" has been confidence Israelis that in man-for-man combat they more than match for Arabs. While this confidence (its correlative truculence) has been factor in GOI adoption and maintenance deplorable instrument increasingly severe retaliation to deal with border problem it has served salutary purpose preventing mass of Israelis arriving conclusion "second round" inevitable.

3. This balancing factor is in process being upset by spectre Jews against machine" replacing "Jew against Arab." Prospect confrontation masses of materiel, particularly jet planes has placed Israel public in such psychological state that if they polled simple question "should we hit Egyptians before too late?" Answer overwhelming majority would be affirmative.

4. Furthermore those Israelis who doubt Egypt's future ability completely annihilate them militarily, fear continuation present trends will result "Munich type" peace which would weaken Israel as to lead to her ultimate destruction. Intense preoccupation all groups to minimize loss Jewish lives is factor in widespread sentiment here "sooner the better" in having showdown with Egypt.

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December 19, 5 p.m. from Tel Aviv

Best information available to Embassy is GOI in latter part did consider preventive military actions; and that attention concentrated IDF proposal knockout Egypt's two divisions on grounds (a) it would take Egypt five or more years re-militarily and (b) would unseat Nasser who is regarded as most formidable adversary. Proposal at that time adopted with Ben Gurion's misgivings deciding factor reportedly because Prime Minister firstly feared such action would result "such deep gash Arab mentality, peace would never be possible." Secondly, it would place himself and MAPAI in politically impossible position between (1) irresistible pressures to keep additional territory occupied at conclusion action and acquired with loss of life, and (2) comparable pressures tripartite powers and UN to return to Israel soil. Alternative adopted was arms procurement program.

Key question at moment is what happens if arms not forthcoming. This difficult to appraise because Israeli mental processes (including Ben Gurion's becoming increasingly confused. Consensus of Embassy officers, including Service Attaches, is:

A. Anti-submarine equipment probably not too important this stage.

B. With-reference ground equipment Egypt, because of logistical problem has long way to go before Israel's fears would be justified on purely defensive basis.

C. Fear of anticipated Egyptian air power appears decisive consideration at moment as witnessed by Israel's request for radar. IDF unable obtain enough Mystere IV's from France or F-86's (whether from Canada or US) to cope with Egyptian Migs and in pushing it probably Israel will adopt military action against Egypt.

D. Time of decision and extent of such action not ascertainable because in part may depend on rapidity Egypt's accretion air strength and because likely operation this time would be closely linked some other initial action such as, but not limited to, opening Strait of Tiran or resumption Bnat Yaacov issues where Israelis believe righteousness their side.

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Control: 9675

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FROM: LONDON

Rec'd: DECEMBER 19, 1955
7:13 PM

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2523, DECEMBER 19, 6 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2523, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 103.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION.

GEORGE BROWN, LABOR MP AND MEMBER LABOR PARTY'S "SHADOW CABINET" TOLD EMBASSY LABOR ATTACHE THAT EGYPTIAN PRIME MINISTER NASSER IN LONG CONVERSATION WITH HIM ON DECEMBER 10 IN CAIRO SAID THAT HE HAS NO INTENTION OF GOING TO WAR WITH ISRAEL AND WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR RESETTLEMENT REFUGEES, MOSTLY OUTSIDE ISRAEL, AND THAT ISRAEL CEDE LAND IN SOUTHERN NEGEV TO PROVIDE EGYPT A LINK WITH JORDAN. WHEN ASKED BY BROWN AS TO OTHER TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS NASSER SAID "QUITE FRANKLY, I AM ONLY INTERESTED IN THIS LAND LINK WITH MY NEIGHBORS. I HAVE NO INTEREST IN GALILEE." ACCORDING NASSER, MOST PRO-WESTERN ELEMENTS IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY LEBANON, SYRIA AND IRAQ, WERE ONES WHO WERE PLAYING UP PROBLEM OF ISRAEL AND REFUGEES. HE CHARGED THAT WEST WAS RATHER RELUCTANT TO SEE LEADERSHIP OF ARABS IN EGYPTIAN HANDS AND SUSPECTED THAT WEST WAS TRYING TO ISOLATE HIM ON ISRAELI QUESTION IN ORDER TO REINFORCE BAGHDAD AS POSSIBLE LEADER ARAB WORLD. NASSER STATED THAT HE COULD NOT PUT SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL DIRECTLY TO ISRAEL AS HE DID NOT WANT ANYONE TO KNOW OF IT UNTIL AGREEMENT IS ARRIVED AT, BUT HE STATED IT WAS UP TO WEST, PARTICULARLY BRITAIN, TO CONDUCT TALKS WITH HIM AND WITH ISRAEL AT "TOP MOST LEVEL"

AS TO THE RECENT ARMS DEAL WITH EAST NASSER STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS FIRMLY ANTI-COMMIE AND THAT RUSSIA SO FAR HAS MADE NO ATTEMPT TO INFILTRATE AND HE IS QUITE SURE HE CAN LOOK AFTER IT. ACCORDING TO BROWN, NASSER ON THIS MATTER IS EXCEPTIONALLY NAIVE AND DOES NOT REALLY UNDERSTAND HOW RUSSIANS CARRY ON. NASSER STATED THAT HE HAD NO DESIRE TO

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- 2 - 2523, DECEMBER 19, 6 PM FROM LONDON.

CONCLUDE ANY OTHER DEAL WITH RUSSIANS UNLESS AMERICANS CONTINUE TO ARM ISRAEL AND WEST AGAIN "REFUSES" HIS REQUESTS. HE ALSO STATED HE HAS NO INTENTION ESTABLISHING CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES.

ACCORDING NASSER, BAGHDAD PACT WAS MISTAKE AND HE DESCRIBED IT AS "MACHIAVELLIAN TACTIC" ON PART PRIME MINISTER OF IRAQ. HE DOES NOT THINK, HOWEVER, THAT BAGHDAD PACT SHOULD BE SCRAPPED. INDEED, HE TALKED TO BROWN OF SETTING UP ARAB ARMY WITH UNIFIED COMMAND ARMED FROM WEST AND EVEN IN PART ADVISED AND TRAINED BY WEST PROVIDING WEST WOULD ACCEPT EGYPT AS DETERMINANT'S TO HOW MANY ARMS AND SOLDIERS ARMY NEEDED. SUCH AN ARMY, ACCORDING NASSER, COULD IN SOME WAY BE ASSOCIATED WITH BAGHDAD PACT.

WHEN ASKED ABOUT TRADE UNIONS NASSER STATED THAT HE FAVORS FREE UNIONS BUT THAT IN PRESENT CONDITIONS IN EGYPT UNIONS ARE EASIEST DOOR FOR COMMIE INFILTRATION. HOWEVER HE HAS NOW BEEN PERSUADED THAT NATIONAL TRADE UNION CENTER TO BE UP AND, THROUGH BRITISH GOVERNMENT, ASKED THAT BRITISH TUC (RPT TUC) SEND ITS ASSISTANT SECRETARY VICTOR FEATHER TO ADVISE ON FORMATION AND CONDUCT UNIONS. APPARENTLY TUC DECLINED UNTIL SETTLEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL IS CLOSER. NASSER EXPRESSED INTEREST IN ADVICE FROM ICFTU AND STATE THAT WOULD NOT BE ADVERSE WERE EGYPTIANS UNIONS TO AFFILIATE WITH LATTER IRRESPECTIVE WHAT RUSSIA OR WFTU THOUGHT ABOUT IT. NASSER TOLD BROWN THAT IF HE CARED TO REPORT HIS TO ICFTU HEADQUARTERS IN BRUSSELS, HE WOULD BE PLEASED AND WOULD SEE THAT MATTER WAS RAISED WITH HIS OWN PEOPLE. BROWN INTENDS COMMUNICATE ABOUT THIS WITH ICFTU GENERAL SECRETARY OLDENBROEK IN BRUSSELS OR WITH ICFTU PRESIDENT BECU IN LONDON. AS TO TRADT UNION LEADERS IN JAIL, NASSER STATED THAT ONLY PEOPLE INCARCERATED AS RESULT HIS REVOLUTION ARE COMMIES.

BROWN, DURING COURSE HIS TWO-DAY VISIT IN CAIRO, AT NASSER'S INVITATION, HAD CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT LEADERS

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- 3 - 2523, DECEMBER 19, 6 PM FROM LONDON.

AND ONE OF THEM DIFFERED EXCEPT IN MODE OF EXPRESSION FI-
COMMIE AND ADMIRER OF LATE ERNEST BEVIN OF WHOSE UNION HE
CONTINUES TO BE MEMBER. IN GENERAL HE TENDS TO SUPPORT
BEVIN'S POLICY ON MIDDLE EASTERN QUESTIONS WITH RESULT THAT
PRO-ISRAELIS IN LABOR PARTY HAVE LATELY BEGUN TO DUB
HIM AS PRO-ARAB.

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AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 634, December 22, 11 a.m.

PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR

SENT DEPARTMENT 634, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 290

IDF Foreign Liaison Office on two consecutive days informed
USAIRA of Egyptian jet flights over Nitzana area as follows:
December 20 two Egyptian Vampires flew over Nitzana and returned
to Egyptian territory.

December 21 two Egyptian jets, unnamed by FLO, in early morning
and again at Noon crossed border over Nitzana and returned.

Overflights up to now have provoked no (repeat no) interdiction
or other reaction by IDF. Press carried reports today without
comment.

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RSP:JMD

Control: 11287

Rec'd: December 22, 1955
11:52 a.m.

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Control: 13161

Rec'd: December 28, 1955
6:16 a.m.

NEA/ FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 647, December 27, 5 p.m.

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PRIORITY

EUR SENT DEPARTMENT 647, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 254, LONDON 198

OLI
CIA Foreign Ministry inquired today whether any report had been received by Embassy regarding proposals made by Ben Gurion (transmitted EMBTEL 614).

LAWSON

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RPTD INFO: Amembassy LONDON 3562
Amembassy CAIRO 1354

Origin

Info

You should inform FONOFF (URTEL 647) DEPT feels matters covered in
USIA under
Ben Gurion-Streibert conversations have been encompassed in discussions
between Secretary and Sharett.

Repetitive. of previous setting.

Decker
= JALLES

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Drafted by:
NEA:NE:DCBergus:crc 12/28/55

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: NEA - George V. Allen

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 650, December 28, 4 p.m.

Control: 14154

Rec'd: December 29, 1955
3:14 p.m.

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT 650, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 256, LONDON 299
PARIS 154, USUN 21.

GOI last night publicly disclosed its version of Nitzana D/Z negotiations, initiated with Hammarskjold's November 3. In a 1,500-word Foreign Ministry press release to which all news papers gave heavy frontpage attention today. Foreign Ministry informed Embassy in advance that release would have no (repeat no) objective other than to apprise Israel public of GOI's un- conditional acceptance of Secretary General's proposals in con- trast with Egypt's persistent refusal.

Local papers underscored statement in press release that Prime Minister had told General Burns December 5 that Israel intended to invoke Article XII of GAA asking Secretary General to convene conference between Egypt and Israel "with view to contributing to restoration of peace". Newspapers gave less attention and in ambiguous terms to BG's two conditions i.e., that Article XII would be invoked "after effective cease-fire had been achieved and GAA faithfully implemented by Egypt".

Embassy asked Foreign Ministry to clarify this ambiguity and was informed that while GOI did not (repeat not) preclude possibility of later invoking Article, even though Egypt had not (repeat not) met two conditions, it was not (repeat not) GOI's present intention to do so.

Press release first reviewed Secretary General's three proposals and recalled they had been submitted to two governments on November 3.

Israel, release continued, had accepted in principle, reserving only the right to clarify one relevant point if and when Egypt also accepted proposals. This was Secretary General's suggestion made in letter November 3, 1955 that marking of the Egyptian-Palestine frontier on West boundary D/Z be implemented by UNTSO alone. According to GOI this constituted departure from past methods under which frontier was marked "by Israel in cooperation with UNTSO". GOI charged Egypt had never expressed readiness to accept.

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-2- 650, December 28, 4 p.m. From Tel Aviv

to accept proposals, but had produced an entirely new set of its own demands. "Israel regretted UNTSO had so far not (repeat not) seen fit to place Egypt's attitude on record, constituting as it did a clear negation of Secretary General's proposals" press release declared. Egypt had challenged UN authority and initiated a new wave of violence before November 4 cease-fire had taken effect. Nasser had admitted organization Fedayeen scouts in Jordan for attacks against Israel. Subsequently violence had flared up along Gaza strip where Egyptian positions renewed attacks against Israel patrols protecting Israeli villagers in their fields.

As consequence Ben Gurion had found it necessary December 5 to stress to Burns importance of persuading GOE to accept "unreserved cease-fire" at that time Ben Gurion had defined Israel's position and had drawn Burn's attention to Egypt's failure to comply with Article I, Article II (2), Article V (4) and Article VIII (3).

He said that if Egypt agreed to insure effective cease-fire and "honor fully" all provisions GAA Israel would agree without further clarification that international frontier in Nitzana area be marked by UNTSO alone.

Prime Minister also stressed Israel demanded implementation by Egypt of Security Council's decisions regarding freedom of navigation in Suez Canal. Communique also stated that Ben Gurion had second meeting with Burns December 11 to review situation after latter's return from Cairo. Ben Gurion had concurred with proposal made by Burns at that time that Egyptian Government be given until December 15 to reconsider its attitude. Nearly two weeks passed but situation remains unchanged. "Armistice agreement" continues to be violated by Egypt as in past.

LAWSON

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JAN 10 1956

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Control: 14017

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Rec'd: December 29, 1955
11:37 a.m.

Info

FROM: Jerusalem

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 216, December 29

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SENT DEPARTMENT 216; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 118, CAIRO 151, DAMASCUS 72, LONDON 94, PARIS 93, TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED

UNTSO has issued press release December 28 referring meeting Burns and Gohar that date and to Israel press office communique of December 27 on subject Egypt-Israel relation. Summary follows

After mentioning topics discussed with Gohar, UNTSO release refutes impression given by Israeli communique that UNSYG proposals regarding El Auja D/Z have been rejected by Egypt but accepted by Israel. In fact both parties stipulated conditions.

Release points out the UNSYG proposals were made as step to ease tension D/Z and not to restore whole situation to accord with GAA which both parties have violated. While UNSYG's 3 proposals were made without prejudice to any provisions GAA premature introduction of questions beyond scope these proposals have complicated and delayed negotiations.

Release then outlines conditions made by each party with respect acceptance UNSYG proposals and states UNTSO has strong representations to Egyptians to prevent fire across boundaries while Israelis urged keep patrols away from them.

Release observes that disturbance public opinion in Arab countries following Tiberias incident December 11 made further progress El Auja proposals impossible until present time. Situation now is that GOE has not yet formulated final position respecting UNSYG proposals but considers negotiations still open.

Pouching text.

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RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 217, December 29, 4 p.m.

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C SENT DEPARTMENT 217, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 119, BEIRUT 64,
L CAIRO 152, DAMASCUS 73, LONDON 95, PARIS 94, TEL AVIV UNNUMBEREDTO
USUN According to Lucas UNTSO political adviser General Burns personally
P drafted entire text UNTSO press release of December 28. (CONTEL
UOP 216). It thus constitutes his commentary on Israeli Government
ND press office communique of December 27 so far as status nego-
OLI tiations on UNSYG proposals for El Auja D/Z concerned. Lucas
IOP added he and Vigier regard Israeli communique as unfortunate
OCB since inter alia it amounts to breach of confidence through
revealing (although in distorted form) Burns conversation with
Beh Garion (CONTEL 198) which Burns had assumed confidential.
It may well have inhibiting effect on future discussions with
top level Israelis.

Lucas expressed UNTSO view that Israelis announcement another try at direct talks with Egypt pursuant Article 12 GAA would only serve further becloud issue so far as negotiations on El Auja concerned. He said UNTSO is of opinion UNSYG proposals for adjusting El Auja situation no longer serve useful purpose in view deterioration Israel-Arab position following IDF attack December 11, eastern shore Tiberias for instance and through stand taken by each party with respect proposals. Gohar told Burns at meeting December 28 that Egyptian position respecting UNSYG proposals remains unchanged but that GOE attitude which must take Tiberias aggression into consideration has hardened. Room for negotiation on proposals now very restricted and Burns reportedly has very little hope any success this subject.

UNTSO officials regard over-all impression gained from Israeli communique as possibly rather ominous. Taken together with continuing unsubstantiated allegations (MYTEL 182) about Egyptian frontier incidents plus news account JERUSALEM POST December 27 to effect Israel being surrounded by Arab armies, communique appears as possibly constituting propaganda justification some new Israeli "activist" venture. News account for example speaks of deployment of 9 Egyptian battalions in Gaza strip amounting to "one third of Egypt's mobilized strength"

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-2- 217, December 29, 4 p.m., from Jerusalem

According reports believed reliable from UNTSO personnel no discernable increase in Egyptian troops Gaza strip has taken place although units are of course replaced from time to time. News story thus apparently mere propaganda hoax.

Lucas has said that Gohar yesterday signified GOE approval establishment UNTSO radio station Cairo and stationing liaison officer there. Burns understood hopeful this officer will be able cultivate informal associations other Egyptian officials besides Gohar thus broadening scope UNTSO contacts with GOE.

Will endeavor report Burns views above matters soon as practicable.

COLE

AB:LJ/11

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Department of State

ACTION COPY

53

Action

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 15058
 Rec'd: December 31, 1955
 8:53 a.m.

NEA FROM: Jerusalem

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 219, December 30, 5 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 219, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 121, CAIRO 121,
 LONDON 97, PARIS 95, TEL AVIV 159.

Re CONTEL 217.

General Burns gave me following comments today recent development
 Israeli-Egyptian affairs:

He considers Israeli communique December 27 possibly as warning
 signal of some kind, but does not take it too seriously for time
 being since earlier press statements paving way for Israeli
 "retaliation" attacks have been followed by action almost immedi-
 ately. In any event communique could prepare public opinion for
 some eventual further moves, which presumably unpredictable in
 view Ben Gurion's recklessness and apparent domination Israeli
 political scene. Communique might, on other hand, serve primary
 purpose of justifying retention Israeli forces in El Auja D/Z
 and closing door on efforts negotiate their removal. In any
 event Burns regarded publication account his talks with Ben
 Gurion as well as UNSYG proposals El Auja as scarcely calculated
 inspire confidence in those attempting deal with GOI.

Burns saw Eytan December 29 but discussion rather futile. Eytan
 insisted that GOI has accepted "unconditionally" UNSYG proposals
 for El Auja although acceptance in fact always predicated on
 prior acceptance by GOE of "cease-fire" and implementation
 Article VIII paragraph 3 GAA (CONTEL 180). Burns suggestion
 that Eytan write him a letter confirming Israel's "unconditional
 acceptance" terminated discussion this topic. Burns said that in
 view Israelis reiterated complaints about alleged Egyptian firing
 across Gaza D/L he urged again upon Eytan advisability discon-
 tinuing motor patrols few meters from armistice line. He told
 Eytan he would like discuss this and other matters with Ben
 Gurion, but has not seen latter recently.

Referring his meeting with Gohar December 28, Burns said Gohar
 seemed more affable than formerly but had nothing very fundamental
 to say. Gohar stated that Egyptian position UNSYG proposals un-
 changed. Egyptians not willing consider the matter further until

after

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-2- 219, December 22, 1956, 10:00 a.m., Salem, CN 15058

after SC has concluded consideration of aggression Lake
Tiberias. They might modify their proposals later on.
Meanwhile, they regarded subject as still open, since UNSYG had
not set time limit.

Burns said UNSYG proposals have served purpose of giving him
some concrete points to keep before parties, but he regards their
usefulness as probably now slight. He expressed idea that it might
be better for UNSYG to return to more broadly based theme of
implementation provisions GAA itself including freedom movement
observers.

COLE

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JAN 6 1956

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

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TELETYPE
UNITED STATES
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SENT TO: AmEmbassy CAIRO 1380
AmEmbassy TEL AVIV 454
AmEmbassy DAMASCUS 492
AmEmbassy AMMAN 301
AmConsul JERUSALEM 76

Origin

Info:

Israel Embassy handed Dept Jan. 3 list of border incidents which have been reported by them during period December 1, 1955 to January 2, 1956. List was described as catalog of misdeeds by Egyptians along Egypt borders with Israel and elsewhere. List notes jeep ambush of December 30 (Tel Aviv's 664) and alleges Cairo radio on December 31 gave full details of attack and attributed it to Egyptian fedayeen.

= DULLES

Dulles

(WJ)

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(Offices
Only)

674.84A/1-356

Drafted by: NEA:NE:DCBergus:bm
1/3/56

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NE - Fraser Wilkins

Clearances:

NE - P. Goren
(in draft)

JAN 3 1956 P.M.

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674.84A/1-356
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PRIORITY

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674.84A/1-356

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMCONGENERAL, JERUSALEM
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
REF : Congen telegram 216 of December 29, 1955

112
DESP. NO.

January 3, 1956
DATE

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION NEA	DEPT. Rmk-2 Lib P-1 4/0P-1 10-4 EAP-5
	REC'D 1/7	IN F OTHER Cia 5 USIA 10 OCB-2 London-1 Paris-1 Army-4 Navy-3 Air-3

SUBJECT: Transmitting Text of UNTSO Press Release of December 28, 1955

Supplementing the Consulate General's telegram No. 216 of December 29, 1955 there is transmitted as an enclosure hereto the text of the Press release issued by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization on December 28, 1955. This release constitutes comment by the UNTSO on a communique of the Israeli Government press office dated December 27 which sets forth the position of the Israeli Government with respect to the proposals made by the United Nations Secretary General regarding the El Auja Demilitarized Zone and other aspects of Israel's relations with Egypt. It is understood that Embassy, Tel Aviv, has reported on the latter subject.

I have been informed that Major General E.L.M. Burns, Chief of Staff, UNTSO, personally drafted the enclosed press release.


William E. Cole
American Consul General

Enclosure (Unclassified when withdrawn
from transmitting despatch)
Copy of Text of UNTSO Press
Release, 12/28/55

cc: Cairo, Tel Aviv

Dept: Please pouch London, Paris

WECole/hkm

REPORTER

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HEADQUARTERS
TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

Jerusalem, 28 December 1955

The Chief of Staff, UNTSO, met Colonel S. Gohar, the Director of the Department of Palestine Affairs in the Egyptian Ministry of War, in Gaza today. The position on the proposals for the lessening of tension in the El Auja Demilitarized Zone, set forth in the Secretary-General's letter of 4 November, incidents involving firing across the Demarcation Line bounding the Gaza Strip, the visiting and exchange of prisoners who have been taken in recent incidents involving Egyptian and Israeli troops, and the improvement of communications between UNTSO Headquarters and Cairo, were discussed. It is expected that further discussions on some of the points raised will be held shortly with the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

In a release of the Israel Government Press Office, on 27 December 1955, it was stated that "Egypt's attitude had been tantamount (sic) to a rejection of the Secretary-General's proposals". Like the two similar statements previously published, and which were followed by UNTSO dementis, this press release also creates the impression that the negotiations on the proposals contained in the Secretary-General's letter have finally broken down, having been rejected by Egypt, while being accepted by Israel. In point of fact, both Parties stipulated conditions for their acceptance of the proposals.

The proposals were initiated as a step towards easing the tension and removing some of the pressing dangers of the situation in the El Auja Demilitarized Zone area as it existed at the beginning of November. They did not extend to restoring the whole of the situation to accord with the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement which had been violated by both Parties: by Israel which has armed forces in the Demilitarized Zone contrary to Art. VIII, para 2; by Egypt which has defensive positions East of the line El Quseima-Abou Aoueigila, prohibited by Art. VIII, para. 3; and by both Parties having forces other than defensive in areas near the Western Front, where they are prohibited by Article VII.

The three proposals of the Secretary-General's letter of the 4th of November were made without prejudice to any of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, but the premature introduction of questions beyond the scope of the proposals for immediate action, set forth in the Secretary-General's letter complicated the negotiations and greatly delayed them.

The conditions put forward by Israel for the acceptance of the proposals were, as the Government Press Office release makes clear, (a), an

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Page _____ of
Desp. No. _____
From _____

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Page 2 of
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 112
From Jerusalem

assurance by Egypt of the acceptance "of a complete cease-fire"; (b), the implementation by Egypt of Art. VIII, para. 3 (no defensive positions East of Abu Aoueigila), and an assurance that she will implement the Articles relating to the promotion of permanent peace, the inviolability of the Demarcation Line and the international frontier, and the maintenance and enforcement of regulations prohibiting civilians from crossing the fighting lines (now demarcation lines).

Egypt wanted to extend the proposal that the Western Boundary of the Demilitarized Zone should be marked on the ground, to the marking of its boundaries on all sides. She further argued that the 30 Israeli civilian police proposed to be left in the Demilitarized Zone under reservations stipulated by the Chief of Staff in the agreement to secure evacuation of the Demilitarized Zone on the 2nd of October, were really armed forces and should be withdrawn, basing this argument on a decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission taken in 1953 but appealed by Israel and still pending before the Special Committee.

Strong representations have been made to the Egyptian Ministry of War to take necessary steps to prevent firing across the Demarcation Line on Israeli patrols in Israel territory. At the same time, the Israeli Authorities were urged to keep the patrols at such a distance from the Demarcation Line so as not to give Egyptian outposts cause to apprehend that they were about to be attacked, as has happened in various incidents in the past.

The disturbance of public opinion in the Arab Countries following the retaliatory action by Israeli forces on the Eastern shore of Lake Tiberias, has made it impossible to make further progress in these negotiations until the present time.

The present position is that the Government of Egypt has not yet formulated its final position on the Secretary-General's proposals and considers the negotiations still to be open.

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Action
NEA

Control: 1066

Rec'd: January 4, 1956
9:30 a.m.

Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 672, January 4, noon

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SENT DEPARTMENT 672, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 260, DAMASCUS 12
AMMAN 101, JERUSALEM 71.

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Re last sentence DEPTTEL 454, Foreign Ministry has advised Embassy
that Radio Cairo's statement December 31 was re-transmission
without comment United Press despatch from Tel Aviv giving facts
of jeep ambush and indicating Fedayeen might be involved.

LAWSON

LMS:MAA/13

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1956 JAN 8 PM 1 44

Control: 2302

Rec'd: January 7, 1956
10:43 p.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 675, January 4, 9 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 675, REPEATED INFORMATION JERUSALEM 72, CAIRO 262,
LONDON 205, DAMASCUS 128.

General Burns called on me yesterday afternoon at his request following luncheon given by Canadian Ambassador which we both attended. Burns said he desired to bring me up to date regarding his appraisal of recent developments in area.

Relative to Nitzana situation he felt a stalemate had been reached with neither party willing give unconditional agreement to three point program. He intended therefore to recommend to UN Secretary General this approach be abandoned and efforts be directed at obtaining compliance by both parties with provisions of armistice agreement.

Regarding Gaza situation he intended renew his efforts obtain cooperation of Israel Government in keeping their patrols 500 meters behind armistice line and expressed opinion if he could accomplish this the Egyptians would agree to eliminate any military positions which they had within similar distance from line.

General Burns said he had concluded things were moving toward general hostilities between Israel and Egypt. He believed Nasser was too smart to launch war against Israel until he was prepared which Burns thought would take two or three years but did not (repeat not) appear as certain the officers under Nasser would exercise same restraint. He referred to common belief GOI estimates June as point when Egypt will be prepared to utilize new arms. He thought there was good chance the Israelis would precipitate matters in coming months. In view of foregoing Burns was interested in ascertaining what consideration had been given by UK and US to employment of sanctions against Israel and whether any measures were contemplated to warn Israel of measures tripartite powers would adopt in case of hostilities. Burns added he might want to talk to American and British Embassy service Attaches re evidence they might have on questions whether Israelis were getting ready to start things and of Israel's capabilities vis-a-vis Egyptians in case of general hostilities.

General

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-2-675, January 4, 9 p.m. from Tel Aviv

General Burns also made reference to Banat Yaacov question, saying, "I am not (repeat not) so sure I share General Benneke's view the question of military advantage was involved in this issue".

In the course of this conversation we made the following comments to General Burns:

1. Believed Israelis at the moment were principally preoccupied with Egypt's impending preponderance air power and effect it would have on Israel's defensibility. Did not (repeat not) believe any decision for preventive action had been taken but it was probable if air problem not (repeat not) solved in near future pressures in Israel would reach point where government would find it necessary consider possibility preventive action. In any event there were several issues between Egypt and Israel with explosive possibilities which could easily develop into large scale hostilities without premeditation. Embassy agreed Banat Yaacov was one of these issues. Israelis believed they had done their full part along peaceful lines in this regard; that issue was unresolved because of political factors and GOI was publicly committed to recommence work this spring. In view public temper it was unlikely GOI could avoid discharging its obligation. Furthermore Mapam Party which within Cabinet was moderate force on most Arab issues was strongly in favor of Banat Yaacov project.

2. Embassy had no (repeat no) information regarding contemplated sanctions but pointed out likelihood in event hostilities developed it would be under circumstances making it very difficult to place responsibility.

3. Re General Burns suggestion for conference with service attaches, he was informed any discussion capabilities would require concurrence Washington. In view political and economic factors involved question whether Israelis getting ready to start things. Embassy believes any conference of that type should be under guidance of the Ambassador.

Would greatly appreciate Department's views on General Burns contemplated conference with US-UK service attaches.

LAWSON

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DEC 20 1956

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1956 JAN 18 PM 1 40

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SENT TO: AmEmbassy TEL AVIV 499

RPTD TO: AmEmbassy CAIRO 1512
AmEmbassy DAMASCUS 537
AmEmbassy LONDON 3937
AmConsul JERUSALEM 95

Origin

Info:

Tel Aviv's 675. Re Burns' indication that he might wish seek opportunity discuss with US and UK service attaches re Israel's capabilities.

Dept and Defense are aware that over a considerable period Chief of Staff UNTSO and his officers have exchanged views on a personal and informal basis on developments in Near East. Dept feels that these unofficial exchanges have been of mutual benefit. We therefore concerned at formal aspect of proposed conference. We believe it essential, in view Burns' status as agent of Security Council, that any talks between US service attaches and Burns be conducted under conditions which would not give appearance of official and detailed consultation.

Please inform Burns.

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674.84A/1-456

Drafted by: NEA:NE:DCBergus:bm
1/17/56

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: NEA - George V. Allen

Clearances:
NEA-Mr. Dixon (in draft) *ad*
UNP-Mr. Ludlow
Defense-Major Owen (in substance) *ad*

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JAN 18 1956 P.M.

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January 4, 1956

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: (Ambassador Lawson
(and
(Foreign Minister Sharett
Place: Foreign Minister's Residence, Jerusalem
Date: December 30, 1955.

SUBJECTS

1. Conduct of Business with Foreign Ministry
2. Alsop Article
3. Dulles-Sharett Talks
4. Trends in GOI thinking

1. Conduct of Business with Foreign Ministry:

Sharett said he had told British Ambassador Nicholls that his arrangement with the Big Three Ambassadors was not an agreement. It was his, Sharett's own unilateral declaration of an intention to apply common courtesy to his relations with mutually interested chiefs of mission. If chiefs of missions came to see him in Jerusalem, he would, by way of returning the courtesy, see those who had business to discuss with him on the occasions of his frequent visits to Tel Aviv. He could not, however, agree to come to Tel Aviv to keep appointments with those who under no circumstances would visit him in Jerusalem. The only Embassy thus far to suggest that all of their business should be conducted in Tel Aviv was the Turkish. He had declined.

2. Alsop Brothers' Article:

Sharett described as pure fabrication or serious distortion all elements of an article by the Alsop brothers, as quoted in Maariv for December 30, purporting to contain the gist of his last conversation in Washington with the Secretary. Sharett seemed particularly incensed with the implication in the column (as reported in Maariv) that the Secretary had tied a favorable answer to Israel's request for arms to concession of Israel territory. He said he felt he would be obliged to make a

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formal denial of the article for the sake of local opinion. The Secretary had mentioned both questions, but without correlation whatever.

3. Dulles-Sharet Talks:

Sharett said he had dwelt on the question of Nasser's sincerity in professing his willingness to negotiate. Mr. Dulles seemed rather optimistic despite the fact that the Czech arms deal had only recently been announced, and there was still shooting in the Sinai and Gaza which had since subsided.

He had told Mr. Dulles he hoped the Secretary was right in his optimism but he doubted it. Sharett believed it was probable Nasser was pretending readiness to negotiate to mislead the United States and blunt its reaction to the Czech deal. Another element was his desire to lull Israel into a feeling of false security while Egypt built up its strength and taught its people to use their new weapons. He had called Mr. Dulles' attention to one "notable case in point". Eric Johnston had told Sharett that Nasser had solemnly promised to obtain the agreement of the Arab states to the water plan. He had replied that he gave Nasser four months. Those four months would be up February 28. We should see then what Nasser's word is worth.

Mr. Dulles had told Sharett he did not want to wait that long; that surely some progress in the settlement of Arab-Israel difficulties could be made before then.

He had stressed to the Secretary the urgency of Israel's need for arms. Week by week, arms were pouring into Egypt. The Israelis could not negotiate from a position of weakness, which would be their position if they did not obtain arms to counter Egypt's growing strength. He had told Mr. Dulles that it was not the Secretary's policy to negotiate from weakness--that he had demonstrated in a very emphatic manner to the world the far-reaching value of negotiating from strength.

He had been told that they would have an answer to their request for arms. Ambassador Lawson started to interpose that they would have had an answer, Sharett interrupting to say that there was "this thing" (Kinneret-December 11) which upset it. He could tell the Ambassador in all confidence that he hadn't expected it. Nevertheless, he could fully see the reasons for it. It was not done in a spirit of military lust. Syria, with machine gun, mortar and artillery fire, was denying Israel the possibility of exercising control over its own territory. He could not imagine any state countenancing it. It was an effort, like Egypt's in the south, to get Israel accustomed to all sorts

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of encroachments. (His defense was not very spirited.) Israel would not acquiesce. The Ambassador remarked that this action had created unfavorable attitudes in the United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere. It brought speculation as to Israel's possible policy of preventive action. He then asked Sharett how he expected to persuade the United States to renew or speed up its consideration of the Israel request for arms. Sharett replied that Eban planned to seek an interview with the Secretary for that purpose immediately after the first of the year, and added that the Israel Ambassador certainly had the "green light from here".

4. Trends in GOI Thinking:

(Herzog came to Tel Aviv the following evening and visited the Ambassador at the Residence to ask, on Sharett's behalf, for any suggestions the Ambassador might have as to how early and favorable reconsideration of the Israeli arms request might be started.

(The Ambassador replied that he had no firm thoughts but he believed two things might be helpful (a) anything to reassure the United States that a recurrence of the Kinneret raid was not possible under similar circumstances, and (b) the GOI was making a sober reappraisal of the raid and the policy which made it possible.

(Herzog said he would suggest to Sharett that he may wish to give the assurances suggested above either through the Ambassador or through Eban or both.)

The Ambassador said that in addition to reaction abroad to Tiberias, Israel government pronouncements in the press were a factor in foreign conjecture about Israeli intentions. Only this week there had appeared in the press an obviously inspired report of Egyptian forces build-up.

Irrespective of their factual bases, when such articles appeared, questions invariably arose as to their motivation. Were they a prelude to military action of some sort, or to serve a propaganda purpose abroad? Was there any specific purpose in bringing the matter to the public attention at this particular time? The question arises, could it be a part of a program to justify an action like Tiberias?

Sharett professed ignorance of the article in question but said he wanted to make two things clear:

1. It was a natural thing to warn the public that its security situation is precarious.

2. The

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Page 4 of _____
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 417
From Tel Aviv

2. The Israel government is absolutely united against preventive war from its head down to the most junior cabinet member. Vehemently opposed. But from that position, the government must persuade its public that it is maintaining a balance in strength. If time passes without success in obtaining arms, it will have a very unsettling effect on public morale.

Ambassador Lawson agreed but pointed out that if the Government made too much of a point of convincing the public that obtaining arms was the better alternative to preventive action and at the same time strongly agitated the public with scare stories of Egyptian troop concentration on Israel's borders - troops which were being heavily armed, - then failed to obtain the arms, the public would be in a dangerous frame of mind and might exert heavy pressures on the Government of Israel to take action it might otherwise not be inclined to take.

Herzog interjected that on the other hand there was danger in permitting the public to continue believing, as had been true in the past, that Israel still had an advantage in arms over Egypt.

Ambassador Lawson said he thought there was a good tactical advantage for the Israelis in hammering away at their willingness to negotiate. Sharett made the reservation that such expressions should not create the impression in the minds of the Arabs that the Jews were seeking negotiations out of fear whereupon the Arabs would delay in the hope of weakening the Jews still further.

Sharett said his government was prepared to discuss any aspect of the problem at any time but not from the prior condition of a willingness to make concessions of territory.

Ambassador Lawson suggested talking in terms of exchange or exchanges of territory or assets and Sharett replied that was exactly the concept he wanted to urge. But, he remarked, both Dulles and Eden in their speeches had mentioned concessions.

As a matter of fact when the Knesset got around to debating the so-called "Israel peace plan" which Eban had announced in Washington, he, Sharett, would be charged with having made concessions. His reply would be that the suggestions weren't concessions at all but organic parts of any agreement to sit down at a conference table. The Israel offers were very elementary points of civilized behaviour between states. All states concerned would benefit from their acceptance.

WLHamilton, Jr:td

E. A. L.

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Action

Control: 2288

Rec'd: January 6, 1956
6:58 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 677, January 5, 2 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 677; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 264, LONDON 207

In reply to inquiry by Embassy counselor as to relationship JERUSALEM POST editorial January 4 (EMBTel 673) to Ben Gurion's announcement intention invoke Article 12 of GAA with Egypt (EMBTel 650) Raphael Foreign Ministry adviser on Arab affairs said when Prime Minister made this proposal to General Burns December 5 he had nothing more in mind than use of that device to get together with Egyptians on mutual problems. Raphael added GOI now considering invocation Article 12 without conditions precedent; namely cease-fire and faithful implementation GAA but no policy decision had as yet been made.

Pointing to Israel's experience with Jordan in similar case Embassy counselor inquired as to what would follow if Egypt refused to meet under Article 12. Raphael replied "this would throw open whole question of armistice agreement."

LAWSON

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AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 685, January 6, 8 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 685, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 266.

PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR.

IDF Liaison Office informed USARMA that January 6 Egyptian position fired automatic weapons at Israel patrol Nitzana area. Exchange of fire lasted one hour. No Israel casualties reported.

January 6, Israel weapons carrier traveling in Wadi Siran near Nitzana damaged by land mine. No casualties.

Comment: IDF particularly resentful opening operations. All incidents currently being fully reported to Embassy by IDF presumably for record purposes.

Control: 2810
Rec'd: January 7, 1956
6:00 a.m.

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Control: 2890
Rec'd: January 7, 1956
10:21 a.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 225, January 6, 4 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 225, REPEATED INFORMATION BEIRUT 68,
CAIRO 156, DAMASCUS 76, LONDON 98, PARIS 97, TEL AVIV 163.

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January 2-3 Ely, UNTSO operations officer, and Leriche, UNTSO legal adviser, visited Cairo to conclude negotiations for establishment UN radio station in Cairo. UNTSO officers maintained position that station should be available for use by all UN agencies, not just UNTSO. Principal other user would be UNRWA which now has sizeable commercial telegraph traffic. Egyptians refused to permit use of station except for UNTSO since they do not wish lose revenue from UNRWA traffic and insisted that station should be located in building under control of GOE, not in operators house. GOE offered provide locked room assessable only UNTSO personnel. CONGEN understands Burns will recommend to SYG acceptance of Egyptian conditions.

COLE

BB:CES/1

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37
**OUTGOING
TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

~~TOP SECRET~~ - ALPHA

Classification

02107

056 JAN 6 PM 8:14

DC/T

SENT TO: Amembassy TEL AVIV 466

Origin

Info

ALPHA

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

I wish to give you this advance information that recent discussions that have taken place through covert channels with both Israel and Egyptian Government representatives give us substantial hopes that it may be possible at an early date for some person who will be designated by the President and myself to meet secretly with Ben Gurion and ^{with} Nasser and commence an exchange of views between the two governments with a view to a settlement of the principle issues between the two countries. It is not clear at this time to what extent it may be wise and possible for our representative to be in touch with our embassies in Tel Aviv and Cairo. I will in any event let you know from time to time how the matter is developing. You should not however until further notice indicate to anyone connected with the Israel Government nor to any other member of the Embassy the fact that you have been informed that the talks ^{may} ~~will~~ be taking place.

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02034
100-100-NEA
APR 1 1976

Drafted by:

S/Sp.Ass't/FH Russell/amb

1/6/56

Telegraphic transmission and

Classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

~~TOP SECRET~~ - ALPHA

Classification

1 + 3
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~~TEL~~ TEL AVIV

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January 6, 1956

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~~S. Murphy~~

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P.O.

AIR POUCH

PRIORITY

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(Security Classification)

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : American Embassy, Cairo

731

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

January 6, 1956

DATE

REF : none

67 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
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	NEA 4	AMAR-2, CL-6, P-1, TL 4, E-AR-5
	1/9	CIA 4, U-31A-10

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. James Hadderson YOUNG of Baptist Hospital in Gaza.

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674.34A/1-656

Dr. James Hadderson Young, American medical missionary at the Baptist Hospital, formerly Sterling Memorial Hospital, in the Gaza Strip, called on January 5, 1956 at the Consular Section for consular services.

Dr. Young stated that when he had left Gaza last Monday the situation in Gaza was quiet although the Hospital still treats civilians who have received wounds due to border clashes.

Dr. Young further stated that since his residence in Gaza during the past year he has continuously heard from the residents as well as the refugees in Gaza that they wish to be incorporated in Jordan. There appears to be little love for the Egyptians. This feeling among the residents and refugees of Gaza was intensified after Eden's recent speech concerning the Near East with reference to Palestine. It is to be also noted that this feeling was still strong even after the recent disturbances in Jordan.

For the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.:

Larry W. Roeder
Larry W. Roeder
American Consul

CONFIDENTIAL FILE
LWC

LWRoeder/mrs

REPORTER

CONFIDENTIAL

JAN 6 1956

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *59* Department of State

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FROM: Sol

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 690, January 9, 3 p.m.

Control: 3929

Rec'd: January 10, 1967

RM/R
Central
Files

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674.34A/1-956

SENT DETACHMENT 690; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 268, LONDON 212

With reference to GOI's repeated allegations since Czechoslovak arms deal that increasing arms imbalance against Israel constitutes threat to peace in Middle East, Israel public's apprehensions appear to be based on following developments:

1. Since initial revelation in Israel press December 29 that 100 reconditioned World War II British tanks consigned to Egypt via Antwerp entire Israel press bannerlined each successive development this subject, including Vickers announcement sale 28 Centurion tanks to Egypt. Whereas principal Israel fear resulting from Czechoslovak arms deal entailed loss of air parity, large increment of tanks acquired by Egypt broadened new dimension in terms potential ground superiority as well.

2. Over weekend 6-7 January IDF units killed four armed Egyptians and wounded one in Israeli territory vicinity Ashkelon. Prisoner allegedly admitted and captured documents purportedly showed that group trained and directed by Egyptian intelligence and had for mission observation of data on Israeli military troop movements. It is noteworthy that these men labelled spies on military mission rather than Fedayeen bent on murder. While Fedayeen operations associated here by public with GOE, implication doctrine of retaliation emphasis gives military character these new incidents interpreted here as strong evidence Wasser's growing confidence in his capabilities to plan and carry out attack on Israel at earliest opportunity. This analysis will not be lessened by circumstance of two Egyptian jets making overflight January 8 approximately 10 kilometers South of Beer Sheva in what is believed to be deepest Egyptian aerial reconnaissance penetration to date.

LAWSON

AAL:ET

Note: Delayed in transmission

52433

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NEAControl: 3881
Rec'd: January 10,
6:56 a.m.This Document Must Be Returned to
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JAN 10 1956
PM 4 23Info
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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 692, January 9, 6 p.m.

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AIR

SENT DEPARTMENT 692; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 269, AMMAN 102,
BAGHDAD 33, BEIRUT 179, DAMASCUS 128, LONDON 213, JERUSALEM 100,
UNNUMBERED

Four Egyptians killed and two captured in Israeli apprehension on two small groups of "spies" over weekend and today in neighborhood Ashkelon according to press reports later confirmed by IDF and Foreign Ministry. First group consisted three men first detected Friday afternoon in orange grove three kilometers north of Ashkelon by civilian guard who summoned police. As police approached they opened fire. Two "spies" killed third wounded.

At noon Sunday another pair killed in exchange of fire four kilometers northeast of Gaza strip. This morning according to Foreign Ministry third member of latter group captured in same area.

Prisoner taken in Friday's accident identified as Mohamed Kahli Baroud who admitted according to GOI his party sent to spy specifically to watch movements of military vehicles and units on Israel roads and to study terrain. Foreign Ministry telephoned Embassy today to make three points in connection with raid:

1. Baroud confessed that on day of his apprehension two similar groups of three or four members in Ashkelon area for espionage purposes.
2. Baroud identified one of two men killed in Sunday's incident as person known to him because they in same espionage training unit.

Foreign Ministry considered these two points definitely established that units not "casual" mercenaries engaged for fedayee type activity but personnel carefully selected for rather large scale espionage project.

3. Foreign Ministry wished to point out in this connection that Ben Gurion had been informed by General Burns that

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Nasser

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-2- '692, January 9, 6 p.m., from Tel Aviv

Nasser had told Burns while he could not publicly adhere to cease-fire he prepared to practice it. Fact that "espionage parties" opened fire on being detected by Israelis should be noted in this connection.

LAWSON

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JAN 28 1956

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

January 7, 1956

THE SECRETARY:

A copy of the attached has

been sent to:

The Under Secretary
Mr. Russell

Bill —

[Signature]

R. P. G.

Should Allen

receive a copy or is one for
NEA enough? *[initials]*

3 **OUTGOING
TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

~~TOP SECRET - ALPHA~~
Classification

1033 JAN 11 11 8 03 AM '56
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SENT TO: Amembassy TEL AVIV #81 481

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ALPHA

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EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

Re EMBTEL 687.

Both Sharett and Eban had previously indicated to me Israel's lack of confidence in Nasser and the desire of IG to postpone negotiations for settlement. We have however within past two days been given firm assurance of Ben Gurion's willingness to talk with intermediary. We are under no illusions concerning difficulty of inducing IG to commence process of arriving at compromises essential for a settlement but believe we should take fullest advantage of willingness of leaders of both governments to talk with intermediary. Raphael has in past made exaggerated statements of IG position.

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~~TOP SECRET - ALPHA~~
CONFIDENTIAL
EO 1.28-2, 1.28-4
Authorized by: Guy A. Lee - NEA
11/11/75

674.842/1-1156

Drafted by:

S/FHRussell/amb 1/11/56

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

U - The Under Secretary
H.H. by F.K.D.

~~TOP SECRET - ALPHA~~
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Tel Aviv

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1/11/56

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 5270

Rec'd: January 12, 1956
9:03 a.m.

Info

RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 701, January 12, 11 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 701 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 271.

JERUSALEM POST January 11 in editorial, possibly Foreign Ministry inspired, dealing with recent killing and capture by IDF units of Egyptian spies, published editorial which compared present Egyptian tactics against Israel with those in past.

Significant highlights:

OBC

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

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NAVY

Recent Egyptian incursions into Israel are not (repeat not) spectacular. A spy caught or killed in one place does not deeply move anybody thousands of miles away. For Israelis, however, news that Egyptian spies have been apprehended and Egyptian aircraft are flying daily over Israel, has a definite meaning. They know it means this time the Egyptians are better prepared for real war than they were in 1948.

For many years Egypt tried to obtain information by sending scantily trained infiltrators, and, more recently, Feda Yeen. Feda Yeen idea did not (repeat not) succeed even though for a time Cairo presented them to public as spearhead of Egyptian NE-conquering army.

Tactics Egyptian military intelligence recently changed. Now real soldiers collect information on Israel and probe Israel's defenses by staging attacks here and there. This is regular military intelligence, along front line between two belligerents. When this front will start moving is anybody's guess. The west has never taken Egyptian threats seriously; this fact tended to anger Arabs.

Israel people are convinced there is only one way to prevent war. Israel asks arms not (repeat not) for Independence Day parades but for physical self-preservation. Moment arms arrive much danger of war eliminated.

Israeli more than once has had cause to feel it was being abandoned by world for political considerations. Soviet move in Security Council -- (poses) possibility of being faced once again

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1956 JAN 12 PM

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-2- 701, January 12, 11 a.m. from Tel Aviv

again with organized antagonism of whole world. Conclusion man in street has reached very different from that which many friends -- or pseudo friends, have advocated recently, namely suicide. Public is surprisingly calm -- because it has seen worse situations in its life.

Cassandras at home and abroad should stop helping us to lose battle ere it is begun by undermining nation's spirit. In this country miracles count for as much as facts. Especially if miracles are well prepared in serious practical manner without panicky warnings.

LAWSON

TT/2

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JAN 26 1956

JAN 27 1956

1

.....



THE ISRAEL ARAB BLOC,
P.O.B. 11,
HAIFA.

Text of the telegram transmitted to Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld,
the General Secretary of the United Nations, through
the Post Office at Haifa on 23.I.1956, against
receipt No. 339352/I.

Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld,
ex-Government House, Jerusalem.

In name of humanity and justice we appeal to you intercede
Israel Government stop oppression humiliation dispossession impoverishment
Israel Arabs. Thousands still unsettled owing cruel Government measures.
No serious effort ever made for their resettlement. Jewish villages esta-
blished on land belonging Israeli Arabs consequently becoming jobless and
landless. Over one million summa Palestine land taken from Arabs owners and
inevitable concentration centers. Military rule crushes a life in Arab
areas in Galilee and Negev. Eighteen thousand Arabs killed in
Nablus district. Diverse malpractices in land. Arab laborers work
poor. No opportunity for work done or constructed. Though during times,
times, as without loans and other incentives including contribution purchase
of land the Arabs are treated second class citizens. Muslim community,
unlike Christians, prohibited manage Muslim affairs and religious affairs.
None but a few are employed in unimportant government offices. Grievances
too numerous to enumerate. Generally, Arab conditions lamentable. We im-
plore intervention of United Nations find reasonable solution for serious
problem Israel Arabs.

Advocate Elias Moussa,
Secretary Israel Arab Bloc.

NND 897403
BOX 2676

15
1/11/C

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation

674.84 A/1-1656

Tel 715

Date

1/16/56

From

Tel Aviv

To

SecState

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:



Security-Classified Information



Otherwise Restricted Information

State
Authority

1/3/89
Date

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AIR POUCH

PRIORITY

SECRET

(Security Classification)

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674 84A/1-1756

+R 683.84A

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM AMEMBASSY, MOSCOW

335

COPY NO. 1 - SERIES A

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

January 17, 1956

REF :

TEL AVIV
CAIRO

DAMASCUS

DB

13 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	1-23	RM/R, GLT EUR IC S/S G S/P CIA ARMY NAVY AIR CSD

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation

There is transmitted herewith a report of a conversation between the Acting Army Attache and an officer of the Israeli Embassy on the subject of Israel's disputes with Egypt and Syria.

The Israeli officer concerned is a well-informed individual who presents the Israeli case persuasively. He has in recent weeks, in other informal conversations with Embassy officers, emphasized the point that, while it is true Israel has violated truce agreements these violations have been in response to a series of minor provocations. With respect to the attack on Syria, he has stated that all reasonable persons, including the Israelis, can only regret the bloodshed caused. However, since Israel does not use irregulars as do the Arab countries and cannot guard the whole frontier, they must respond to attacks in a manner designed to convince the Arabs they are too costly to be continued.

The enclosed memorandum reports the most methodical presentation made by the Israeli officer, and is therefore transmitted as a matter of interest to the Department.

For the Ambassador:

William A. McFadden
William A. McFadden
Second Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation

Department Please Pass:

Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Damascus

Copy No(s) 3

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Name OT Date 1/31/56

WAMcFadden:pm
REPORTER

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674.84A/1-1756

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(Classification)

OFFICE OF THE ARMY ATTACHE
AMERICAN EMBASSY

Moscow, USSR

TO: First Secretary

SUBJECT: Conversation with Israeli First Secretary

At a dinner party on 11 January 1956, I talked with Mr. A. Chelouche, First Secretary of Israeli Embassy, for about 45 minutes about Israel's border disputes with Egypt and Syria.

Mr. Chelouche made the following points:

1. Israel does not want war with the Arabs, as she would have nothing to gain and much to lose by war, even if she won.

2. Although Israel will not use force to change the status quo in the Middle East, she will resist the attempts of Arab states to change the status quo by force to Israel's disadvantage.

3. Egypt and Syria are the aggressors in the present disputes. Their immediate objectives are:

a. To gain for Egypt additional territory in the Gaza area.

b. To deny Israel the use of the Suez Canal - Red Sea line of sea communication. She does this effectively now by refusing Israeli ships the right to use the Suez Canal and by denying by gunfire Israeli access to the Gulf of Aqaba.

c. To establish Syria's right to the NE shore of Lake Tiberias. Mr. Chelouche believes that Syria has been encouraged in this by Egypt. He said that in the recent raid on Syrian positions here, documents had been captured which laid claim to a line in the water 250 yards from the shore of Lake Tiberias, rather than the present border. He thinks Syria's purpose is, by continual harassment, to get Israel to make concessions which will give Syria rights on the shores of Lake Tiberias.

4. He admitted that Israel has violated the truce agreements, but pointed out that a border cannot be open to violations by one side and closed to the other. He described Egyptian and Syrian policy as one of repeated incursions into

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(Classification)

Israeli territory by irregulars. He stated that since Israel does not use irregulars, and cannot physically guard their whole frontier, their only recourse is to conduct retaliatory punitive raids to persuade the Egyptians and Syrians that the irregular operations by small groups are too expensive to continue. He said the recent Israeli attack on Syrian positions on the East shore of Lake Tiberias was merely an instance of the implementation of this military policy. He described the operation as a difficult one militarily for the Israeli forces, and said it had been carried out only after a long series of provocations. He said "the drop that filled the cup" had been an incident just previous to the raid, in which the Syrians had fired on Israeli fishermen and an accompanying police launch. He made a special point of the fact that Israel never attempts to hold any territory gained by raids, but merely punishes Egyptian and Syrian raiders at the base of their operations and then withdraws. He also pointed out that Israeli forces had special instructions not to harm any civilians, but merely to hit Syrian positions, some of which were actually on Israeli territory. He justified Israeli retaliatory raids, not only as Israel's only means of combatting Egyptian incursions, but pointed out that Israel had to take such strong measures in order to give some sense of security to Israeli settlers along the Egyptian frontier or have them abandon their newly settled lands.

5. He said that he expects Egypt to feel strong enough within six months to adopt a more aggressive attitude toward Israel, in an attempt to win external victories to compensate for domestic failure. Although there are some voices in Israel calling for preventive war while Israel is still relatively stronger than Egypt, he characterized these people as irresponsible and in the minority. His government does not believe preventive war is a solution.

6. He does not believe that the Soviet Union would like to provoke an Arab-Israeli war but are merely "fishing in troubled waters." He seemed confident that Soviet technicians are training Egyptians in the use of new equipment, but said that I should know more about that than he.

7. Although he never said directly that the US should provide Israel with more arms, he did say that if the US would provide Israel with the necessary arms to defend herself and would sign a mutual security pact with Israel, the Arab bluff would then be called and they might abandon their aggressive designs.

I asked him whether providing more arms to Israel might not further alienate the Arabs and force them into the arms of

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Page _____ of
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From _____

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(Classification)

Page _____ of
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

the Communists. He scorned the suggestion, stating there are no real liberals in any of the Arab countries and that they all outlaw the Communists and ruthlessly hunt them down.

(Signed) Ira B. Richards, Jr.
Colonel, GS
Acting Army Attache

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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AIR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 266, January 20, noon

1956 JAN 22 AM 6 15

Control: 10535

Rec'd: January 21, 1956
9:26 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 266 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 170, TEL AVIV 173, AMMAN, LONDON UNNUMBERED.

Lucas, American political adviser with UNISO, has given me following details recent developments.

When Burns received letter from Eytan of January 4 (Tel Aviv's telegram 715 to Department) "confirming" acceptance UNSYG proposals for El Auja D/Z, he inquired as to status Foreign Ministry communique dated December 27 which indicated Israel's acceptance UNSYG's proposals conditional on Egypt's agreeing "to ensure an effective cease-fire and to honor fully all provisions IAA".

Replying Burns' inquiry Foreign Ministry informed him that Israel's acceptance as set forth in Eytan's letter of January 4 is "complete and self-explanatory." Reply continued with statement to effect that Israel now awaits similar acceptance from Egypt, pending which Foreign Ministry saw no (repeat no) point in implementing UNSYG proposals nor in entering into any discussions about them.

Burns saw Gohar on January 10. Gohar said Egypt interprets so-called unconditional acceptance by Israel as meaning that Israel will (1) maintain the kibbutz in El Auja D/Z (2) allow marking of western boundary only and (3) maintain 30 "police" in the D/Z. Upshot would be that Israel would come out of discussions El Auja with acquiescence her "right" to maintain "police" there which she did not (repeat not) have before and for which there is no (repeat no) basis. Burns took position that the three points just mentioned should be the subject of separate negotiations and not (repeat not) confused with acceptance of UNSYG proposals for El Auja.

Gohar indicated Egypt willing discuss above matter further when UNSYG visits Cairo. Burns proceeding Cairo with UNSYG January 21.

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-2- 266, January 20, noon from Jerusalem

Regarding Israel's continuing accounts Egyptian-instigated border incidents, Lucas said it is only in rare instances that Israel submits verbal complaints promptly and requests investigation. Most alleged incidents are subject of written complaints lodged some time after the event and not (repeat not) requesting UNTSO action.

COLE

TT/1

JAN 31 1956

52436

CONFIDENTIAL

PENINSULA NEWSPAPERS INCORPORATED

Palo Alto Times • Redwood City Tribune • Burlingame Advance-Star
P. O. Box 300, Palo Alto, California

ACTION
is assigned to

ELINOR V. COGSWELL
Editorial Writer

Jan. 21, 1956

Draft file

2/24-64

SSV
CHD

U.S. Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Request for information on Middle East area

Dear Sirs:

I am anxious to get exact information as to the boundaries of Israel as fixed by the armistice agreement of 1949, particularly the southern boundaries that are involved in relations with Egypt.

Can you refer my request to someone who could give me this information in terms that can be interpreted by reference to an ordinary map rather than in terms that require knowledge of meters between towns, topographical details, or other information not readily available to a newspaper?

My immediate concern is with the area reportedly suggested by Great Britain as a corridor for Arab World use at the southern part of the Negev Desert. Was this area assigned to Israel in the armistice agreement, or has it been acquired by the process of settlement and development?


Is it possible for me to secure through you, or from someone to whom you could refer my request, a copy of the Tripartite Agreement guaranteeing the armistice boundaries?

I shall be glad to pay any charges for this material. It will be helpful in making my editorial comments, which appear in three papers on the San Francisco Peninsula, more accurate and more helpful to our readers.

Sincerely,

Elinor V. Cogswell
(Miss) Elinor V. Cogswell

297856



674.84A/1-2156

CS/K

674.84A/1-2156

In reply refer to
SEV 674.84A/1-2156

March 16 1956

Dear Miss Cogswell:

I am sorry for the delay in replying to your letter of January 21 requesting information about the Middle East. I am enclosing copies of a map of Israel, background information publications on Israel and Jordan, and a copy of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. There is also enclosed a selection of material concerning United States policy in the Middle East.

In the event that you do not have them already, I suggest that you might wish to obtain copies of the United Nations Security Council Official Records, Fourth Year, Special Supplements which contain the texts of the General Armistice Agreements--Supplement No. 1, the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom and Israel, with map; Supplement No. 2, Israel and Syria, with map; Supplement No. 3, Egypt and Israel; and Supplement No. 4, Lebanon and Israel. These documents are available in many public and school libraries, or they can be purchased from the Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York, New York. The price of the complete set of
the supplements

Miss Eleanor V. Cogswell,
Peninsula Newspapers Incorporated,
Post Office Box 300,
Palo Alto, California.

DC/R

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1-2156

the supplements is \$1.15; or, individually--No. 1, fifty cents; No. 2, forty cents; No. 3, fifteen cents; No. 4, ten cents.

Sincerely yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State

John P. Meagher
Chief
Public Services Division

Enclosures:

As stated.

P:SEV:LMCampbell:DKP:fh 3-13-56

Perhaps you would also be interested in the enclosed selection of material concerning United States Policy in the Middle East.

Sincerely yours,

For the ^{acting} Secretary of State:

John P. Moagher
Chief
Public Services Division

Enclosures:

✓ AS stated.

P:SEV:LMCampbell:DKP:bc

3/5/56

51S-CR
MAR 16 1956 P.M.

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AIR

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1363, JANUARY 23, 10 AM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1363, REPEATED INFORMATION JERUSALEM 75,
PRIORITY TEL AVIV 166.

HAMMARSKJOLD TOLD ME LAST NIGHT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED RE
ALAUJA WHICH PROVIDED FOR "MARKING OF BOUNDARY", WITHDRAWAL
EGYPTIAN TROOPS FROM ZONE EAST OF AL AWEIGLA, REDUCTION ISRAELI
STRENGTH WITHIN D/Z TO STATUS PREVAILING OCTOBER 3, 1955. WAS
UNABLE (REPEAT UNABLE) OBTAIN DETAILS. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID PUBLIC
ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE JERUSALEM SHORTLY.

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MESSAGE CENTER
File - Paul Henry
150 JAN 23 AM 10 21

Control: 10884

Rec'd: JANUARY 23, 1956
6:13 AM

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8:53 a.m.

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RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 735, January 23, 2 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 735; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 280

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Press reported and IDF-FLO confirmed three exchanges fire in Negev Saturday January 21 (1) at 10:45 Egyptian position (at 0945 60255) directed machinegun fire at IDF patrol which returned fire. No (repeat no) casualties.

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(2) 11:10 Egyptian position El Auja directed mortar fire at IDF observation post in demilitarized zone. Initially shells fell 300 meters short. At 11:30 fire resumed with shells striking Israel position. IDF replied with heavy artillery (155 mm according to IDF-FLO). IDF unit observed direct hits on Egyptian position.

(3) IDF patrol at midday fired when shepherds in vicinity Kisufim refused to halt on request.

(4) IDF-FLO reported 3 overflights by Egyptian aircraft over weekend over Eilat Berotayim and Nitzana areas.

Comment: Precise location 155 guns not (repeat not) known no (repeat no) indication they within DZ. This first acknowledged instance when IDF used this caliber in any border incident.

LAWSON

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1956 JAN 23 PM 12 16

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Control: 11081

Rec'd: January 23, 1956
12:30 p.m.

Action

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 739, January 23, 6 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 739, REPEATED INFORMATION JERUSALEM 75, CAIRO 281
AMMAN 104, BEIRUT 106, DAMASCUS 130.

General Burns called on me this afternoon to discuss subject
Embassy's 174. British Ambassador is still present. After reporting
instance first two paragraphs reference telegram Burns said
he had transmitted GOI views to Hammerskjold and latter had
replied he would be unable attend reception in Jerusalem. While
we discussing matter word arrived from Foreign Ministry that
reception had been cancelled.

With reference to allegation by Foreign Ministry that Diplomatic
Corps had expressed desire meet Hammerskjold in Jerusalem and
were entirely agreeable to attending reception in that city
Nicholls and I pointed out that there had been no such wish
expressed by corps and no (repeat no) initiative taken by it;
that tripartite Ambassadors had consulted among themselves and
had assumed that in view of fact GOI had issued invitations UNSYG
had approved or arrangement. But of deference to his wishes in
matter the tripartite chiefs of mission had decided to attend.
We told Burns that this appeared to be another case where GOI
attempting fait accompli; that Israelis had been misleading both
in their approach to Hammerskjold and to members of Diplomatic
Corps; and we concurred in UNSYG's decision to cancel reception.
As general Burns left to meet UNSYG at airport he indicated he
would suggest to him that he, Burns, arrange small reception in
Tel Aviv tomorrow evening to give Hammerskjold opportunity to
meet members of Diplomatic Corps.

LAWSON

SW:CRH:13

NOTE: Reference Jerusalem's 174 is EMBTEL 282 to DEPT. cwo/PED

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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 282, January 23, 11 a.m.

Control: 10906

Rec'd: January 23, 1956
7:21 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 282, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 179, TEL AVIV 174, AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS UNNUMBERED.

General Burns returned to Jerusalem ahead of schedule (CONTEL 266 yesterday owing problem created by Israeli plans hold reception for UNSYG in Jerusalem to which diplomatic corps would be invited. UNSYG has stated that no reception was mentioned when his program arranged in New York and that in view UN resolution status Jerusalem he would refuse to attend. He asked Burns suggest reception be held Tel Aviv.

Burns told me yesterday that Israelis unwilling accept UNSYG suggestion, that Sharett is reportedly "very annoyed" at UNSYG attitude, and that Gideon Rafael of Foreign Ministry told him diplomatic corps have signified they would be entirely agreeable attend reception Jerusalem. Burns doubts veracity of latter statement.

With regard UNSYG visit Cairo Burns said Egyptians evidently reacting favorably toward UNSYG proposals for El Auja DZ. He hopeful results visit but appeared disinclined to discuss substantiative aspects for time being.

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1956 JAN 23 AM 11 15

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 741, January 24, 1 p.m.

Control: 13164

Rec'd: January 26, 1956
10:52 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 741; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 282, LONDON 226,
JERUSALEM 76

When calling on me yesterday regarding Jerusalem question (EMBTel 739) General Burns said that in discussions which he and Hammerskjold had in Cairo with Fawzi, latter had agreed to marking by UNTSO of the demilitarized zone boundary "at such points as UNTSO deemed necessary." He also said that Fawzi had agreed to Hammerskjold's second point on solving Nitzana problem; namely, restriction of all Egyptian check-posts, defense posts and personnel to positions west of the western boundary of DZ. With the foregoing developments and GOI's letter of January 4, it now appeared possible to proceed with implementation UN SYG's three proposals. Burns added that Hammerskjold believed and he concurred that these three points should be put into effect before proceeding with negotiations on remaining problems of Israel para-military forces in the DZ agreement on military positions west of the demarcation line.

LAWSON

AW:JJ

Note: 5 Delayed in transmission

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1956 JUN 27 AM 8

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SENT TO: USUN NEW YORK

GADEL 119 NIACT

12476

DEC 23 PM 2 04

Origin

Info:

RE: SYG Report on Israeli Withdrawal, DELGAS 571, 572, 575, 581, 583.

You are authorized seek cosponsors for following draft resolution:

QUOTE The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions of November 2, November 4, November 5, November 7 November 24, 1956, and January 19, 1957,

Having received the report of the Secretary General contained in Document A/

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Noting with grave concern the failure of Israel to withdraw all of its forces behind the armistice lines despite the repeated requests of the General Assembly,

Calls upon Israel to complete the withdrawal of its armed forces behind the armistice lines without further delay;

Calls upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the 1949 armistice agreement;

Approves the recommendations and measures proposed by the Secretary General in his report, which are to be implemented upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces and

Urges all Members to observe and respect these recommendations and measures and to extend their full cooperation in giving them effect. UNQUOTE

If nec

Drafted by:

IO:UNP:SDelPalma:rs 1/25/57

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: H. Hooper

Clearance:

IO

NEA - Mr. Rountree

S/S-CR

JAN 25 1957 R.M.

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If necessary to obtain two-thirds majority, or if you think it tactically wise,
third ~~preamble~~ preambular paragraph: QUOTE Condemning the failure of Israel to
comply with the repeated requests of the General Assembly that it withdraw all of its
forces behind the armistice lines UNQUOTE.

Separate telegram follows concerning SYG's comments and Pearson's suggestions.

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(70w)
DULLES

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Action
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Control: 13067
Rec'd: January 26, 1956
8:40 a.m.

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Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 748, January 26, 10 a.m.

Following our talk on Israel's arms request January 24 (EMBTel 743) Sharett in apparent anecdotal vein told me following fragment from his conversation with Hammerskjold.

Hammerskjold said he hoped to leave area with adherence of all governments he had visited to declaration of their "determination to abide by charter; to carry out provisions armistice agreements and settle their differences by peaceful means". Garrett said he found this very interesting but had Nasser made it clear to Hammerskjold what his adherence to declaration meant in terms of Egypt's Suez blockade and was it clear to HKJ that there would be some inconsistency between its restrictions on travel to Scopus and Mount of Olives and its adherence to declaration? Hammerskjold had replied to effect that he could not expect impossible to which Sharett commented that declaration then was actually no more than collection of pious wishes. Hammerskjold said, "no, this wasn't quite true, like preamble of charter declaration would represent certain contribution in moral tone" he considered it something more than "a zero". Sharett said above was in strictest confidence.

LAWSON

BB:JJ

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
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Dr. ROUSSA.



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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 764, January 31, 6 p.m.

Control: 81

Rec'd: February 1, 1956
3:31 a.m.

Foreign Ministry yesterday gave Embassy officer following oral account, another phase Hammerskjold's conversation with Ben Gurion and Sharett (Embassy telegram 748.). Account was characterized as sensitive and highly confidential.

Ben Gurion told Hammerskjold that he had been thinking about requesting a meeting between Israel and Egypt under provisions Article 12 of the Armistice Agreement and inquired as to UN Secretary General's view. Hammerskjold replied that if Article 12 were invoked it would be his duty to convene such a meeting but expressed doubt that use of this device was the best means of improving the situation between Egypt and Israel. Hammerskjold continued that he had been giving thought to the possibility of requesting "quadripartite intervention" in working towards an Arab-Israel settlement and that perhaps this would be a better approach than the invocation of Article 12.

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Control: 1871

Rec'd: February 3, 1956

Copy No(s) 9:06 a.m.

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Name CHDate 2/14/56

FROM: Tel Aviv 1956 FEB 5 AM 6 03

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 772, February 2, 5 p.m.

General Burns met earlier this week with Embassy Counselor and Service Attaches in pursuance of subject EMBTEL 675 and DEPTTEL 499. Consulate General Jerusalem also present. Burns said he desired to set forth his appraisal Egyptian-Israel situation and to raise several questions for Department consideration. He had informally discussed same questions in part with Hammerskjold during latter's recent visit but did not (repeat not) feel he could set forth matter to UN Secretariat because of danger leaks from that body.

Burns said that in his judgment there was enough danger of war in the area to require immediate decisions by tripartite powers regarding preventive measures or means of intervention if the former failed. As Burns saw situation hostilities could originate from either land invasion or air attack. If the former most probable that initiative would come from Israel; if the latter, from Egypt. As a preventive measure against land action he was thinking of proposing a buffer in the form of United Nations forces to be established in the demilitarized zone and in the Rafah-Khan Yunis area. In view of fact invading forces would have to overrun UN Forces, this would counter any possibility of developing a minor incident on the demarcation line into major hostilities or a staged "casus belli".

Re possible air attack by Egypt, Burns recognized that Egyptian possession Jet bombers was Israel's telling argument for being given more arms. He doubted whether Egypt would initiate air action unless she could resist an Israeli counterblow on the ground. He was not (repeat not) certain as to when this point would be reached, it depending on the length of time necessary for Egypt obtain and become efficient with new Czech weapons. Burns said he was unclear as to the form of tripartite intervention against air attack. He raised the question of another radar warning system and possible counter-attack on air bases.

Burns concluded by saying that he was aware of his responsibility in the current situation as head of UNTSO but badly needed

guidance.

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-2- 772, February 2, 5 p.m., from Tel Aviv

guidance. He said he would be most grateful any comment the Department could give him discreetly regarding the situation, as well as any information regarding such subjects as staff talks or other preparations to prevent wars; and whether prior action of the Security Council would be needed. He inquired about the location of US and UK Forces in the Middle East which might be in a position to intervene. Burns said he recognized that there were many political difficulties in trying to set up preventive forces through Security Council action now.

Embassy representatives informs Burns foregoing would be transmitted to Department and that Embassy appraisal situation remained unchanged from that set forth January 3 (EMBTel 675). Burns left the impression that he would be greatly relieved if he learned that the problems he mentioned were being actively worked on by the tripartite powers.

LAWSON

SW:CES/1

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FROM: Tel Aviv

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 772, February 2, 5 p.m.

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Date 2/14/56

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Burns said that in his judgment there was enough danger of war in the area to require immediate decisions by tripartite powers regarding preventive measures or means of intervention if the former failed. As Burns saw situation hostilities could originate from either land invasion or air attack. If the former most probable that initiative would come from Israel; if the latter, from Egypt. As a preventive measure against land action he was thinking of proposing a buffer in the form of United Nations forces to be established in the demilitarized zone and in the Rafah-Khan Yunis area. In view of fact invading forces would have to overrun UN Forces, this would counter any possibility of developing a minor incident on the demarcation line into major hostilities or a staged "casus belli".

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Burns concluded by saying that he was aware of his responsibility in the current situation as head of UNTSO but badly needed guidance. He said he would be most grateful any comments the Department could give him discreetly regarding the foregoing, as well as any

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-2-772, February 2, 5 p.m. from Tel Aviv

information regarding such subjects as staff talks or other preparations to prevent wars; and whether prior action of the Security Council would be needed. He inquired about the location of US and UK Forces in the Middle East which might be in a position to intervene. Burns said he recognized that there were many political difficulties in trying to set up preventive forces through Security Council action now.

Embassy representatives informs etserga* foregoing would be transmitted to Department and that Embassy appraisal situation remained unchanged from that set forth January 3 (EMBTel 675). Burns left the impression that he would be greatly relieved if he learned that the problems he mentioned were being actively worked on by the tripartite powers.

LAWSON

SW:CRH:13

Note: *As received. Correction to follow.

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674.84a/2-256 Tel#772 from- Tel Aviv

F 1. 772 Fr. Tel Aviv dtd. Feb. 2, 1956 (corrected copy)

re. Egyptian-Israel Situation

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Mr. Allen	NEA				
		Keystone	2/6	2/6	2/6
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Message Ctr	NEA	Led DGG	2/9		
Mrs Sparrow	RM/R	R-91341	2/9		
Princeton	RM/R	Catherine Harris	2/10/56		
		Abbott	1/31/57		

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AmConsul JERUSALEM PRIORITY 180

RPTD TO: AmEmbassy LONDON 4414
USUN 482

Tel Aviv's 772. By now Burns will have seen Eden-Eisenhower
communique which indicates US-UK-France will be consulting on measures to be
taken against aggressor. Basic philosophy remains that in event NE aggression
three powers will make every effort act through appropriate UN organs.
Communique also indicates willingness support possible Burns request re
enlargement and improvement his organization. Burns' informal views in this
respect in advance formal communication to SYG would be useful at this stage

Dulles
for

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674.84A/2-256

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E O 11652 : XDSO 2, 3, 4
Authorized By : CDR A. Lee - NEA
April 1, 1975

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2/6/56
Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: NEA-George V. Allen

Clearances:
UNP-Mr. Ludlow (in draft)

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1956, Control 1871)

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Egyptian - Desert situation

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EUR:BNA:Ernest A Lister/llw 2/10/56

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Control: 4378

Rec'd: February 8, 1956
4:31 a.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 340, February 7, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 340, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 144, CAIRO, JIDDA, DAMASCUS TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED.

Discussed with Brigadier Galatlly today news stories appearing JERUSALEM POST February 6 and 7 to effect Arab Legion searches in Hebron region have uncovered "thousands of gold and silver Saudi Arabian coins" and that Legion "confiscated 88 rifles..."

Galatlly, Arab Legion Area Commander, said no (repeat no) coins discovered, but a quantity of Egyptian currency notes were found in course of search. Locals in possession these notes gave unconvincing explanations about having earned them in course routine smuggling activities. Galatlly said a number of arrests made since riots on basis Legion and police blacklists plus information supplied more recently by various village elders. While some fire arms were confiscated he did not (repeat not) think this especially significant. There was no (repeat no) indication that fire arms imported recently, and rifles are normal possessions of some of local population.

Galatlly added that persons arrested were sent to Zerka and afterward (unless released) to prison camp in southern Jordan. Similarly, evidence substantating accounts subversive activities forwarded Amman. Hence, he could not (repeat not) well corroborate foregoing type of information by actual exhibit of impounded materials, etc.

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1956 FEB 8 PM 4 29

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1956 FEB 8 PM 12 02

Control: 4539

Rec'd: February 8, 1956

7:59 a.m.

Info

RMR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

SS

* NO: 342, February 8, noon

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SENT DEPARTMENT 342 REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY LONDON 107,
PRIORITY TEL AVIV 175.

Burns has just given me following comment regarding DEPTTEL 180:

He has not (repeat not) yet received request from Secretary General for expression views re possible enlargement UNTSO. He agreed provide informal statement his thoughts for Department later today or tomorrow.

Meanwhile, his preliminary thinking is to effect that usefulness enlarged observer corps would appear require Israel and contiguous states refrain from interference activities observers. As Department aware Israelis and Egyptians have both placed severe restrictions on freedom movement, and former have not (repeat not) allowed observers to be stationed along their side Gaza Strip D/Z. Egyptians have permitted UNTSO maintain a few observation points their side, but are "a bit sticky" about this, and have also impeded work observers. In circumstances just outlined, there would appear but little point in mere enlargement corps of observers subject such limitations and even complete ban on movements as imposed by Israelis, for instance, just before attack at Khan Yunis. As prerequisite enlargement UNTSO some arrangement with Israel and other states, ensuring freedom its activities appears essential.

Burns opined that enlargement observers corps should be based on SC mandate to observe and maintain the cease-fire (SC resolution August 11, 1949) rather than on supervision of execution armistice agreements.

Will telegraph Burns further comments soon as available.

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4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) (Origin, subject, reference no. or other pertinent data)

674.84a/2-856 Tel#324 342 from Jerusalem
Tel. 342 fr. Jerusalem dtd. Feb 8, 1956.
re. Possible Enlargement UNTSO

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ACTION COPY 1 ☒ INFORMATION COPY _____

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		<i>Bergus</i>	<u>2/8</u>	<u>2/8</u>	<u>2/8</u>
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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 791, February 9, 1 p.m.

Assume action proposed Department's 547 has been taken care of by Jerusalem 342. If Department desires me take any further action in matter please inform.

LAWSON

SW:GWL/8

Control: 5282
Rec'd: February 9, 1956
8:05 a.m.

674.84A/2-956

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Control: 5463
Rec'd: February 9, 1956
11:56 a.m.

NEA
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FROM: Madras

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 209, February 9, 3 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 209, REPEATED INFORMATION NEW DELHI 230,
BOMBAY AND CALCUTTA UNNUMBERED.

Source close to Krishna Menon states that Menon envisages
himself as mediator in Egyptian-Israeli dispute, which will
be one of subjects to be discussed during Secretary's visit
to Delhi.

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Control: 5989

Rec'd: February 10, 1956
8:17 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Jerusalem

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 346, February 10, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 346 TEL AVIV 178 REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 108

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Burns has now informed me of message he has received from UNHQ to effect that UN has as yet received no (repeat no) approach from powers regarding enlarging UNTSO. UN would therefore prefer "go slow" in considering matter and contemplate taking no (repeat no) action prior return SYG to New York.

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In view foregoing Burns said he did not (repeat not) wish provide any comments additional those already reported CONTEL 342 for time being.

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KR 774.56

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FROM : Amembassy, Tel Aviv

511

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

February 15, 1956

REF :

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	2-21	CIA-7 USA-4 DEB-2 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3

SUBJECT: Attached Memorandum of Conversation.

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There is attached a memorandum of conversation between Yaacov Herzog, Chief, North American Division, Foreign Ministry and the reporting officer.

The argument pursued by Mr. Herzog, one familiar to the Embassy and the State Department, through frequent reiteration, is that Nasser would pursue a policy of playing one power bloc off against the other regardless of the existence of the Arab-Israeli problem; that he is opening the door to Soviet penetration in the Middle East and Africa for his own ends, but is too naive to know where this course leads.

Herzog admits in passing, that Israeli acts may have contributed to speeding Soviet moves in the area but hastens to add that Soviet efforts along this line were inevitable anyway.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
 First Secretary of Embassy

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1956 FEB 21 PM 1 23

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Enclosure:

✓ Memorandum of conversation,
 as stated.

cc to Cairo, Egypt.

W.L. Hamilton, Jr.:td
 REPORTER

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1956 FEB 23 PM 3 26

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(Classification)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: (Yaacov Herzog, Chief, North American
(Division, Foreign Ministry
(William Hamilton, First Secretary of
(Embassy

Date: February 13, 1956

Place: Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem

Subject: AN ISRAELI ESTIMATE OF NASSER

After remarks addressed to the "psychological importance" of obtaining either Sabre Jets or Mysteres" in at least 25% of the number of MIGs which Egypt is receiving from behind the curtain, Herzog soliloquized on Nasser and his successes in playing the two Power blocs off against each other. He described as superficial and tragically mistaken what he believes to be a United States conclusion that the West can win Egypt's firm allegiance by engineering settlement of the Israel-Arab question on terms acceptable to Nasser. It is easy to come to the conclusion, he said, that Nasser is obliged, by the circumstances of the Arab world's hatred of Israel, to resist Western blandishments and play one power bloc off against the other until a peace is achieved which the Arabs will regard as another diplomatic victory of the type they are becoming accustomed to see him win. Thereafter, according to this thesis, it will not be difficult for Nasser to swing Egypt into the Western camp where all her natural impulses would lead her save for Israel.

The truth is, however, that Israel is the chief instrument of a foreign policy which Nasser would pursue even if Israel did not exist. His ambition is to achieve hegemony in the Arab world. Adherence to the Western camp has no part in his plans. He has been impressed by Nehru's independent role and entertains hopes of achieving a similar status himself. He is cute and cunning but ignorant and without comprehension of the strength of the forces he is attempting to bend to his own purposes. He is the harbinger quite unwittingly, of Soviet penetration of the Middle East and Africa.

The Gaza incident on the Egyptian side and the Baghdad Pact on the Russian probably produced the Egyptian-Czech deal somewhat prematurely but it was inevitable anyway. If these factors had not been present, given Nasser's receptiveness and ambitions, the Soviets would have made these or similar overtures in the

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area sooner or later.

Herzog said he could not understand how the United States could so completely deceive itself when it had the example of the Suez bases. At that time there was no suggestion that the Israel problem prevented the establishment of a firm and enduring friendship between Nasser and the West. It was merely the alien presence of the British, encroaching on Egyptian sovereignty, that barred the way. The West must learn soon that Nasser will continue to go beckoning down the road of new concessions, something like the Pied Piper, just as long as that pays dividends.

He said the Foreign Ministry is appalled by the thought of the impression Nasser's successes are probably creating everywhere in Asia and Africa. He must be regarded as the most favored by Fortune of any ruler of a second or third rate power. He got arms from the Soviets; the West countered with the Aswan Dam loan; the Soviets replied with an offer of an atomic reactor. The Israelis assume that Ambassador Byroade will once again cover up for Nasser, persuading the United States Government, just as he apparently did in the Czech arms deal, that the gift of the reactor is really not a serious matter, or to be taken as evidence that Nasser finds the Soviets at least as much to his liking as the West.

Herzog said that of course the Israelis cannot speak of Nasser without being accused of subjective judgments. Nevertheless, they were convinced any serious study of the situation must lead inevitably to the conclusion that Nasser should be jerked firmly into line and shown clearly that the West has reached the limit of its patience. The West's present policy of cajolery and bribery is only going to whet his appetite. The trouble is that Nasser has no capacity for comprehending where his course is leading. He has no idea that he cannot stop when he wishes; that he is running down a one-way street leading to disaster not only for Egypt but the entire free world.

WJH
WJHamilton, Jr:td

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1956 FEB 23 PM 4 26

Control: 12926

Rec'd: February 23, 1956
12:38 p.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 358, February 23, noon

SENT DEPARTMENT 358, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 155, BEIRUT 82, CAIRO 198, DAMASCUS 87, LONDON 110, PARIS 104, TEL AVIV 183.

General Burns gave me afternoon February 22 account his recent activities which substantially as follows:

Burns saw Sharett about outstanding matters February 21. With regard SYG proposals El Auja area, latter said Eytan addressing letter to Burns giving GOI current position. Burns received letter February 22, but it contained nothing new. Letter justified GOI inaction on grounds that Egyptians have done nothing as yet toward implementing proposals. Burns expects see Sharett again February 23 when he will suggest, in view negative character Eytan's letter, GOI give some kind of undertaking or expression intention (in view their "unconditional acceptance" proposals) to implement proposals by a certain date. If that were done Burns would use it as argument endeavor persuade Egyptians agree similar undertaking in effort break deadlock. Burns added that Ben-Gurion appeared as prime obstacle any progress and reiterated that latter apparently under erroneous impression SYG proposals included stipulation Egyptians should withdraw any forces from area established by Article 8 paragraph 3. GAA.

In discussing Banat Yacub project, Sharett referred to SC resolution 1953 on subject as out of date. He inquired whether Burns considered that Bennike's order to cease work in D/Z could still be regarded as in force, in view passage of time. Burns replied to effect that in absence any specific expiry date, he would construe order as remaining effective until cancelled. Sharett reasserted Israeli "right" to resume work in D/Z, but said GOI willing give Johnston further opportunity seek agreement Arab states. Burns gained impression Israelis willing wait until possibly about April first, but not indefinitely.

On previous day, February 20, Burns had seen Syrian Minister

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-2- 358, February 23, noon, from Jerusalem

Defense and Shuqyar in Damascus. They referred Bigart-Ben-Gurion interview and asked him what Israelis were going to do about Banat Yacub. He replied that he knew nothing of this subject except what he read in the newspapers. They then asked what he could do should the Israelis resume digging. He said question was hypothetical but that subject now being reviewed in UN. He could assure Syrians that he would report promptly to SC upon any resumption work in D/Z. He suggested that Syrians put any such questions they might have for him in writing, to avoid misunderstandings. He would do his best to obtain answers and give them a written reply.

With regard Lake Tiberias matters, Burns said Israelis displaying no great interest suggestions for improving situation which he made pursuant SC resolution January 19. They were not prepared go beyond terms GAA prohibiting firing across D/L or crossing by persons. However, Israeli position did not preclude their attending conference with Syrians "for discussion" Burns other suggestions (reference Damascus telegram 693 to Department). Negotiations regarding exchange prisoners being carried on with parties by MAC chairman still in preliminary stages. Israelis have included in list persons they wish returned several possible deserters of whom Syrians claim have no knowledge. Syrians including names civilian crew vessel captured by Israelis.

In summary, Burns views Israeli attitude toward outstanding issues as discouraging. He said that he is making no appreciable progress at present. He described his last meeting with Sharett primarily as lecture or harangue delivered by the Foreign Minister, rather than as a discussion.

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MAR 20 1956

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Tel 360
Date 2/24/56
From Jerusalem
To SecState

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Action

Control: 14382

NEA

FROM: Jerusalem

Rec'd: February 25, 1956
1:26 p.m.

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 361, February 25, 10 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 361, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 157, BEIRUT
CAIRO 200, DAMASCUS 89, LONDON 112, PARIS 106, TEL AVIV 185.

Paraphrase of Burns telegram to UN SYG regarding his conversation with Sharett February 23 transmitted by CONTEL 360 to Department. Burns also made following comments on matter while at CONGEN February 24.

While Eytan's letter of January 4 "confirmed" acceptance UN SYG proposals for El Auja, Israelis have continued "stalling tactics" ever since with regard implementation. Burns therefore assumes either Eytan neglected clear his January 4 letter with Ben Gurion or was merely being deceitful in belief Egyptians would never accept proposals. In any event, Eytan's letter of February 21 (CONTEL 358) in addition stating that Egyptians have not yet implemented proposals further stipulates that as precondition GOI action GOE must also implement article 8 paragraph 3, GAA. Thus condition attached to "unconditional acceptance" at last emerges clearly. Burns told Sharett that some time ago Gohar had stated GOE would implement article GAA just cited if Israelis would remove "police" from D/Z.

Burns said Sharett appeared to have little enthusiasm for subject under discussion, and described him as somewhat evasive. Sharett had observed at one point that "he only came into this business in the later stages," indicating possibly that he shouldn't be blamed for mess made by Eytan. Latter "conspicuously absent" from Burns-Sharett meetings. For a time Sharett endeavored maintain argument that one could draw definite distinction between "unconditional acceptance" and "implementation." He thereafter dropped that theme in favor of thesis that new situation has now arisen because Egyptians have augmented their forces and equipped them with Czech weapons. Burns maintained that such considerations should not invalidate acceptance UN SYG proposal but gained impression Sharett doing his best enmesh them in broader context of provisions GAA. Burns recalled that UN SYG had especially wished make progress through obtaining acceptance proposals for El Auja before tackling problems involving wider considerations of Israeli-Egyptian relations. For that reason

Burns

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-2- 361, February 25, 10 a.m., from Jerusalem

Burns has refrained from endeavoring see Ben Gurion in order suggest, for instance, possible obtainment "cease fire" Gaza area from Nasser on basis Israeli agreement draw back motor patrols from D/L (CONTEL 338). He had feared chances implementing El Auja proposals would be lost amid discussion other outstanding issues.

Burns said that his February 23 conversation with Sharett was limited to above matters and did not include problems with Syrians nor reports Syrians shooting at Israeli fishermen Tiberias February 23. Burns added observers now investigating Israeli complaint, while Syrian MAC delegate has informed chairman orders against firing across D/L will be "reinforced" if allegations verified.

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MAR 20 1956

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674.84a/2-2556

FROM : AmEmbassy BENGHAZI

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DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

February 25, 1956

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SUBJECT: BEN HALIM'S VIEWS ON POSSIBILITY OF WAR BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

Prime Minister Mustafa Ben Halim made the following observations on the possibility of war between Israel and Egypt to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. during a flight between Tripoli and El Adem on February 23.

Prime Minister Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser would do everything within reason to prevent becoming involved in a war with Israel. However, Nasser would not flinch at administering a sudden blow with an atom bomb on Tel Aviv should circumstances warrant. The Prime Minister believed that the Soviet Union would not only provide the bomb but also would lend post-attack support to the Arabs.

EMBASSY COMMENT:

The above seems fantastic but may reflect the thinking of the Egyptian Ambassador here and of other Egyptians with whom Ben Halim has close relations.

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1956 MAR 14
1516
1956 MAR 14

Rodger P. Davies
Rodger P. Davies,
First Secretary of Embassy

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Subject: Palestine

Drafted by:

IO: UNP: JMLudlow:her 2/29/56

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

UNP - Mr. Bond

Clearances:

NE

Cleared with USUN - Mr. Barco (in substance)

6/5-CR

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FEB 29 1956 P.M.

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Action

Control: 177

Rec'd: March 1,

6:25 a.m. 1956

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 861, February 29, 5 p.m.

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At social event yesterday evening, Colopel Neeman, Deputy Chief IDF intelligence, made following comments USARMA;

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(1) Practically the entire Egyptian Army is now in the Sinai area, most elements being close to Israel's borders.

(2) Much of the same situation prevails in Syria, with Syrian Army in process mobilization.

(3) Israel is taking precaution short of substantial mobilization which is extremely expensive and disruptive to her economy and daily life. Israel has been through this before and was learning how to live with such a situation.

(4) Neeman commented on the extreme vulnerability of the Egyptian forces in Sinai, adding that at time of Nitzana incident the army had urgently advised Ben Gurion that an opportunity existed to destroy the Egyptian Army, requesting permission to attack. Ben Gurion who, he said, has traditional and biblical outlook and morality despite the fact he is not a religious man, refused permission to attack.

(5) In view of vulnerability Egyptian forces, the army is now urging Ben Gurion to allow it to strike and destroy Egyptians before it is too late; that within a very short period of time Egyptians would be in a strong position. The Prime Minister has given no answer to date to this IDF advice. After referring to the increment in Egyptian tank strength, Neeman stated the real danger to Israel was Egyptian Air Force rather than Army. IDE knew Egyptian Air Force could bomb Israel in a matter of three minutes from bases close to Israel's border

and that all

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-2- 861, February 29, 5 p.m., from Tel Avia

and that all of the aircraft and fighter strength in the world would not prevent them from bombing. He added that Israel desired interceptor aircraft despite this fact, she was willing to take bombing losses but knew that with interceptor aircraft, she could intercept Egyptian aircraft returning from their mission and ultimately wipe out Egyptian Air Force due to pilot rather than plane losses.

In conversation previous evening with Embassy counselor, Colonel Harkabi, Chief IDF intelligence, gave a similar estimate of the concentration of Egyptian and Syrian forces on Israel's borders. In response question as to why IDF believed Egyptians would eventually take initiative in attacking Israel, Harkabi, said this conclusion was based largely on intelligence information as to what Nasser was telling his own officers. According Harkabi, Nasser was taking line that destruction Israel was the keystone to establishment Egypt's leadership throughout Arab world, which when accomplished would lead to Egyptian dominance Africa and Islamic world.

Embassy comment "Neeman's comments re exchange between IDF and Ben Gurion at time Nitzana incident is consistent with reports received by Embassy other sources which indicated that IDF regarded situation at that time as a "golden opportunity" but that Ben Gurion did not go along because he and cabinet had already adopted alternative policy obtaining additional arms to offset Czech arms shipment to Egypt.

While Embassy has no information to indicate that IDF intelligence sources are any better than those of USG as they relate to Nasser's intentions, we believe Harkabi's appraisal is of interest because of propensity GOI to rely on its own intelligence estimates rather than assurance Western Powers re Nasser's pacific intentions. Sources close to Ben Gurion report that his current thought (#) subject run along following line. While willing to give limited credence to Nasser's expressions to westerners of his good will toward Israel his final decisions when he is militarily strong enough will be strongly conditioned in first instance by General Amer and RCC colleagues; in the second instance by the free officers; and, finally, by pressures from the other Arab States. Ben Gurion reportedly believes that somewhere along the line the pressures will become so great on Nasser as to force him to take the military initiative against Israel.

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(#) Omission. Correction to follow

-Noté: Passed DEPTAR, NAVY, AIR, 3/1/56 9 a.m. RRC

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3/2/56, 9 p.m.
CORRECTED PAGE 2.

-2-1861, February 29, 5 p.m., from Tel Aviv. (CN 177).

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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 365, February 29, Noon.

SENT DEPARTMENT 365, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 202, AVIV 186.

Reference CONTEL 363

Burns has now shown me text Eytan's letter February 21. While somewhat verbose overall effect is definitely to link UNSYG's three proposals with GAA provisions, especially Article VIII.

Letter states inter alia that implementation of UNSYG proposals "depends upon further clarification of a number of important details...". Letter refers to the proposals as being put forward "within the framework of Article VIII" and to the need for Burns to clarify with GOE its "willingness to implement Article VIII and the other matters referred to in UNSYG's letter of November 3." Letter also argues that GOE in effect had imposed conditions of acceptance proposals by "linking Article VII with Article VIII and by "requesting" postponement of "restoration of Article VIII to its efficacy.

Aide-memoire which Burns left with Sharett February 22 (CONTEL 360) refers unconditional acceptance proposals by both parties and states that he would certainly conclude either party had not accepted proposals "if it should now reveal previous condition or set a new condition to its acceptance."

Burns seeing Sharett again February 29.

AW/8

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Control: 16436

Rec'd: February 29, 1956
11:11 p.m.

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Control: 727

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Rec'd: MARCH 1, 1956
6:24 PM

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FROM: CAIRO

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1715, MARCH 1, 7 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1715, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 143,
BEIRUT 210, DAMASCUS 150, TEL AVIV 198, JERUSALEM 108,
LONDON 269, PARIS 153, NEW YORK 50.

GOHAR TOLD TOMLINSON TODAY THAT EGYPTIAN MAC REPRESENTATIVES
PROCEEDING TO MAC MEETING SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 28 AT
AL AUJA HAD BEEN MET BY ISRAELI PATROL WHICH INSISTED ON
ESCORTING EGYPTIANS TO MEETING PLACE. EGYPTIANS REFUSED
ESCORT AS INCOMPATIBLE DEMILITARIZED STATUS OF ZONE AND
THEREFORE DID NOT ATTEND MEETING. GOHAR POINTED OUT MAC
HAD PREVIOUSLY MET AT KILO 95 "FOR CONVENIENCE" HOWEVER
GAA CALLED FOR MEETINGS AT AL AUJA. IF THIS IMPOSSIBLE
MAC SYSTEM BECAME POINTLESS FOR IF EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN MET
BY UNIFORM NOVEMBER OBSERVERS THEY WOULD NOT HAVE OBJECTED
HOWEVER OBSERVERS NO MORE FREE THAN EGYPTIANS TO TRAVEL IN
ZONE. COMMENTING ON SINAI PROJECT, GOHAR INDICATED BE-
LIEF THAT PROJECT COULD BE UNDERTAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
WITH COMMENCEMENT OF HIGH DAM. HOWEVER PROBLEM MIGHT BE
ACADEMIC SINCE "SETTLEMENT OF ONE KIND OR ANOTHER" MIGHT
WELL OCCUR BEFORE THAT TIME, PERHAPS DURING THIS YEAR.
GOHAR GAVE TOMLINSON SAME IMPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE IN EGYPT
CAPACITY TO HANDLE WHATEVER SITUATION MIGHT ARISE AS EMBASSY
HAD RECEIVED FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER EGYPTIAN OFFICERS
DURING PAST MONTH.

BYROADE

JMD

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FROM: Jerusalem

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 366, March 2, 4 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 366 REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 160 BEIRUT 88
CAIRO 203 DAMASCUS 91 LONDON 113 PARIS 108 TEL AVIV 187

Re CONTEL 351

Burns has given me following account his conversation with Sharett February 29 with further reference UN SYG proposals El Auja D/Z. Burns regards Sharett's remarks as amounting to Israeli withdrawal tacit acceptance proposals.

In course discussions Sharett indicated Israeli viewpoint was that UN SYG proposals envisaged compliance by GOE with article VIII paragraph 3 of GAA, which not (repeat not) forthcoming. Burns referred to a conversation between Hammarskjold and Ben Gurion during UN SYG's recent visit Israel from which Hammarskjold understood Ben Gurion had given assent orally to proposals. Sharett replied that Ben Gurion viewed matter as mere conversation about the proposals not (repeat not) involving any commitment. Sharett again argued that while GOI had accepted proposals they had not (repeat not) given any undertaking to "implement" them and that in any case a new situation has now (repeat now) arisen owing to increased arms available to Egypt. In addition, he said Egypt has increased numbers her troops in Gaza strip and neighborhood D/Z thus making withdrawal IDF from D/Z impracticable. Burns commented that GOI was aware any increase Egyptian forces in area at time proposals accepted.

There was some further conversation about the GAA with Burns pointing out that if Israel felt it necessary hold out for Egyptian compliance article VIII paragraph 3 Egypt would undoubtedly link that with observance by GOI of article VII. Matters would thereupon become somewhat complicated in view of impediments placed in way of observers who are not (repeat not) able in existing circumstances to verify compliance with article VII, for instance. The role of observers should be to observe and not (repeat not) merely to await an invitation to check upon an allegation made by one party against the other. Sharett

agreed to

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-2- 366, March 2, 4 p.m., from Jerusalem.

agreed to send Burns a letter outlining present GOI position with regard proposals.

In talking to me today Burns expressed opinion that Israeli attitude possibly related in some way to continuing failure obtain arms from US, or possibly merely result fact that original acceptance not (repeat not) in good faith but made simply with idea Egyptians would not (repeat not) accept proposals.

Burns had intended going to Cairo now (repeat now) that GOI attitude proposals reasonably clear. However, he has just received message stating Fawsi and Amer will not (repeat not) be able to see him for next ten days but that Gohar prepared receive him instead. Burns has replied to effect he considered it important that he meet with Amer and Fawsi without delay. He told me that he does not (repeat not) wish to see Gohar in Cairo, or even Gaza for that matter. Since Gohar never assumes any responsibility talking to him is largely a waste of time.

Burns said there were no (repeat no) new developments with respect suggestions for improving situation Lake Tiberias (CONTEL 358).

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JM

NOTE: Message delayed in transmission.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 884. March 5, 4 p.m.

Control: 4034

Rec'd: March 8, 1956
1:30 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 884 REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 114, CAIRO 298, LONDON 263, PARIS 191.

Supplementing last paragraph my telegram 876.

Sharett introduced deliberately subject Feda Yeen activity; did not (repeat not) enumerate alternative actions which Egypt might take; and left impression he considered marauder activities most likely. After saying Egypt might again send Feda Yeen into country he leaned forward and said gravely "This is something Israel could not live with".

Department will recall (EMBTLS 169, 172, 188, 189, 190, 198, and 200) that Feda Yeen activities with their deep penetrations and civilian death (which culminated in Khan Yuni's reprisal) drive Israel public into near hysteria. Furthermore, GOI is aware (EMBTLS 535) Nasser has constructed Feda Yeen apparatus in other neighboring Arab states and removal British officers control Arab Legion may provide opportunity for their use across Israel's long and exposed Jordanian frontier. Sharett's comment may have been inspired by some GOI intelligence report predicting resumption Feda Yeen activities. In any event it may be taken as warning this is one point of solidarity at which Israel public and Gen-Gurion with his philosophy of state's obligation to ensure absolute security of its citizens would reach conclusion there is no alternative to having it out with Egyptians and quickly.

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FROM : AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTONREF : Department Telegram 1763
Embassy Telegram 1256

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SUBJECT: Legal Opinions on Peace with Israel and Multilateral Defense Agreements
Handed Down by Top Religious Authorities

Sometime after Prime Minister Eden's Guildhall speech dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, a group of professors from Al Azhar, the foremost Islamic university in the Arab World, requested the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Hasan Ma'moun, to prepare a "fatwa" (religious legal opinion and ruling) on the questions of concluding peace with Israel and signing multilateral defense agreements with non-Arab states. The Grand Mufti reviewed Islamic law and practice on the two points, and handed down his fatwa on 5 January 1956. It was published the following day in Al Ahram. (Enclosure 1)

During the same period, a study of the two questions was also undertaken by the religious and legal scholars of Al Azhar. The university officials grouped into the Committee on Fatwas constitute the supreme authority on Islamic law and practice. They represent the four major schools or traditions in Islam and as a result their rulings are binding on all Moslems. The University Committee, under the chairmanship of Sheikh Muhammad Hasanein Mahlounf, met on January 9, 1956 and approved the final draft of the fatwa on the Israeli and the military pact problems. The complete text of the fatwa was published in Al Qahira the following day. (Enclosure 2)

Fatwa of the Grand Mufti - Palestine

The Grand Mufti defined Palestine as part of the "Dar al Islam" and from this definition proceeded to outline in accordance with traditional Moslem legal thinking the duties of Moslems when a part of the "Dar al Islam" is attacked by non-Moslems. According to the Mufti such an attack creates an obligation on the part of the inhabitants of all Moslem territories, and particularly the inhabitants of the area attacked, to carry out a "jihad" until the territory has been regained. From the Mufti's phraseology it may be concluded, however, that he does not advocate the adoption of aggressive measures at present since he emphasizes the necessity for the preparation by the Moslems for defensive war.

Having stated the basic premise that Moslems may not rest until Moslem territory has been "regained", the Mufti discusses the question of the conclusion of peace with the aggressors. In theory, he says, the conclusion of a peace treaty would be acceptable providing it involved the restoration of the territory of the Moslems to its rightful owners. As though aware such an arrangement is unlikely, the Mufti then discusses the acceptability of a truce. (By truce the Mufti apparently means some form of political arrangement going beyond the present armistice agreements.) The

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Mufti concludes that a truce is acceptable providing it is "in the interest of the Moslems, but disclaims any capacity for determining what conditions might be included in a truce which would make it advantageous. This problem he leaves to "others who have been dealing with this problem". He clearly excludes, however, any provisions which would tend to recognize Israeli rights to "that part of Palestine they have stolen".

Pending the resolution of the Palestine problem (i.e. the restoration of Arab sovereignty), the Mufti requires the Moslems to strengthen themselves militarily by obtaining arms "from all arms-producing countries" and to maintain and extend the blockade so as to weaken Israel's military capacities. It is not clear whether these strictures would pertain during a period of "truce" but there appears to be an implication that they would.

The Azhar Fatwa - Palestine

The Azhar Fatwa adopts the same basic premise as that of the Mufti. It states that peace is not permissible if it allows the continuation of a Jewish state in Moslem territory. Such a peace would not only be contrary to Moslem law but would sanction aggression and legitimize the stealing of property. The Azhar Fatwa does not discuss the possibility of a truce. Like the Mufti Fatwa, that of Al Azhar calls on all Moslems to cooperate in restoring a Moslem territory to its inhabitants by force of arms and in every other way. The Azhar Fatwa does not, however, refer to "jihad". At the same time Moslems are called on to prevent, by force if necessary, the execution of any "projects" which would be helpful to Israel. (This would appear to be a veiled reference to the Jordan diversion scheme.)

Pacts

The Mufti, in discussing the legitimacy of pacts between Moslem and non-Moslem states approved of such arrangements providing they were in the interest of the Moslems but he preferred the conclusion of pacts with other Moslem states so as to avoid any possibility of supporting "the aggressors" in Palestine. The Fatwa of the Azhar Committee is much more negative. It accuses the "imperialist states" of supporting Israel and therefore concludes that no support should be given to pacts with such states since this would be equivalent to supporting the enemies of the Moslems.

COMMENT:

Both fatwas appear solidly grounded on traditional Islamic beliefs which may be summarized according to the fatwas as follows:

1. Moslem territory ("Dar al Islam") - defined as territory primarily inhabited by Moslems - must be defended by every possible means against invasion.
2. No permanent legal sanction can be given to non-Moslem occupation of Moslem territory. However if the strategic situation warrants, a "truce" is permissible provided the political authorities determine it to be "in the interest of the Moslems". Such a truce does not prejudice permanent principles, is not an end in

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itself, and need not be maintained if it is violated by the other side or if it no longer serves the Moslem interest.

3. During a period of occupation of Moslem territory (whether a truce exists or not) all Moslems are obliged to refrain from aiding the invader directly or indirectly and should avoid dealings with the invader's allies, in the hope that the invader will grow weak. At the same time Moslems must unite and strengthen themselves militarily and politically so as to be able to prevent further occupation and eventually to recapture the occupied territory.


This classic Moslem attitude towards "foreign occupation of Moslem territory" is not limited, of course, to the problem of Palestine. It has been frequently reiterated since the days of the crusades not only as regards the Near East but concerning North Africa and India as well. We do not consider, therefore, that the latest fatwas on this subject represent a new departure. Consequently, their significance seems to lie less in their content than in their timing. The Lufti's Fatwa seems to mirror Nasser's attitude towards the problems of Palestine and the Baghdad Pact of the period following Eden's speech in that it condones a settlement short of permanent peace, and while placing intra-Arab pacts ahead of inter-area groupings does not completely outlaw the latter. It would seem, therefore, that the Lufti may have been given the task of providing a theological justification for further action by Nasser should the latter see fit to develop his generally favorable attitude toward Eden's Guildhall speech.

The Azhar Fatwa seems on the other hand primarily designed for consumption in other Arab countries to convince them that Egypt is not seeking a separate peace with Israel and to support the Egyptian thesis that the Baghdad Pact aids Israel. Such a measure might have seemed particularly necessary in view of the equivocal language of the Lufti's Fatwa and may also reflect the hardening in Nasser's attitude which may have taken place following Templer's mission to Jordan.

Neither fatwa had any perceivable impact in Egypt although it is possible that the Azhar Fatwa may have been slightly helpful to the regime in Ikhwan circles.

The fatwas were ignored by editorialists; the Azhar Fatwa was not even published in full in the morning papers. Some of this indifference may be attributed to the fact that Egyptian public life is heavily secularized and the opinions of the Ulama carry little weight in the eyes of the politically sophisticated. At the same time a public discussion of the "loop holes" in the Lufti's Fatwa or of the more extreme phrases in that of Al Azhar would have embarrassed the Government. Having published the texts the Government is probably content to keep them "on ice" to be defrosted when necessary, to justify either a campaign against Israel, if Israel should attack, or a settlement with Israel short of "peace" if one can be worked out which the Government is prepared to defend as "in the interest of the Moslems".

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:


Alexander Schnee
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

Enclosures 

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Al Ahrar, 6 January 1956

FATWA OF THE GRAND MUFTI OF EGYPT
Concerning Peace with Aggressive Israel

Following Eden's statement about the Palestine question and the concluding of peace between the Arabs and the Jews, a number of Al Azhar Ulama called on the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Hassan Ma'moun, and asked him to hand down a fatwa embodying Islamic law and practice on the point of concluding peace with the aggressive Jewish state, and on alliances with foreign and imperialist powers which antagonize the Arabs and Moslems and support the aggressive Jews.

After a thorough investigation, the Grand Mufti yesterday released the following important official fatwa which reads:

The question put to us reveals that the land of Palestine has been conquered by the Moslems who have lived there for a long time, and has thus become a part of the Moslem territory where minorities of other religions dwell. Accordingly, Palestine has become a territory under the jurisdiction of Islam and governed by Islamic laws. The question further reveals that the Jews have taken a part of Palestine and there established their non-Islamic government and have also evacuated from that part most of its Moslem inhabitants.

To know the ruling of Islamic law and practice about concluding peace with the Jews in occupied Palestine, irrespective of political considerations, we have firstly to consider whether the attack of an enemy on any country of the Moslems is, or is not, allowed; and should the attack be not allowed what actions the Moslems will be required to take against the attack.

Any attack by the enemy on any Moslem country is not allowed by Islamic law, no matter what the motives or causes of such an attack may be. Moslem territory should remain in the hands of its owners.

In the event of an attack on any Moslem country, Moslems do not differ as to the necessity of fighting the enemy by force. Al Moghni says: "Jihad (i.e. religious war) is necessary in three cases: (1) when the two forces meet; (2) if the infidels occupy a (Moslem) country, in which case its inhabitants must fight and repel them; (3) when the Imam appeals to (Moslems) for help they must answer the call."

Therefore, God has made it a duty for all Moslems to be ready to repulse any attack from the enemy on their territory. God has said in the Koran: "Prepare all the force and cavalry you can to terrify God's enemy and yours".

Therefore, preparedness for defensive war is the duty of all Moslem governments against any one who attacks the Moslems because of their religion, and against those who have ambitions in the countries belonging to Moslems. Without that preparedness the Moslems will be a weak nation and thus become an easy prey for the attackers.

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Moslem legal scholars and judges may disagree somewhat about the requirement for the Jihad when non-Moslem countries are attacked, but the Jihad is an absolute necessity when Moslem territories are attacked.

In his work on Jihad, Al Hafiz Ibn Hagar says that Jihad is a duty, according to the most acceptable theories; it becomes inevitable if the enemy attacks Moslems. Jihad against the infidels is the duty of every Moslem who should carry it out by his hand, his tongue, his money, or his heart.

In light of those rulings, the action taken by the Jews in Palestine is an attack on an Islamic country. It is the duty of the Moslems therein to repulse the attack by force until the country has been liberated and restored to the Moslem owners. In this case the Jihad is the duty of all Moslems, not just those who can undertake it. And since all Islamic countries constitute the abode of every Moslem, the Jihad is imperative for both the Moslems inhabiting the territory attacked and Moslems everywhere else because even though some sections have not been attacked directly, the attack nevertheless took place on a part of the Moslem territory which is a legitimate residence for any Moslem.

Now, that we are acquainted with the ruling about attacks on Moslem countries, we proceed to the findings of the Moslem law about whether concluding peace with the aggressor is, or is not, allowed.

The answer is that peace is acceptable if it is based on the restoration of the lost part of the country to its rightful owners. But peace will be void and false if it is based on the toleration of the attack and the seizure by the attacker of what he has taken by force.

Moslem legal scholars and jurists have allowed the conclusion of a truce for a fixed period of time with the people of the Dar al Harb or a group of them, if this is in the interest of the Moslems. For God has said in the Koran: "If they tend towards peace, tend thou also towards peace and rely on God".

It is said, however, that though this Koranic verse does not involve restrictions, the majority of commentators say that this inclination towards peace stipulates that there should be some advantage to Moslems. This is borne out by another Koranic verse which says: "Do not become so easy as to call for peace while you are the stronger party". Truce, therefore, is not permissible unless there is some advantage to Moslems.

It is our opinion then that concluding peace with the Jews on the basis of their retaining that part of Palestine they have stolen without restoring it to its rightful owners will only realize a benefit for the Jews with no advantage to Moslems. Accordingly, we shall not allow it except under certain conditions and restrictions which will achieve the interests of the Moslems.

It is not in our capacity to put forward those conditions and restrictions, because others who have been dealing with this problem are more able in their knowledge of it and of its characteristics in a detailed way than we are and to dispose of it according to the interpretations from us.

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Our answer to the second question is that pacts or alliances which Moslems may conclude with non-Moslem states, are allowed according to the Islamic law and practice provided that such pacts and alliances are in the interest of the Moslems. But if those pacts or alliances are intended to support an aggressive state such as the Jews who attacked Palestine, then they are not allowed by Islam since they will strengthen the attacker who will utilize that added strength to carry out further aggressive actions.

It is preferred that Moslems cooperate with each other to repulse any attack they may be subjected to rather than indulging in such pacts. They should conclude among themselves pacts of their own which will show that the Moslems are of one opinion and will work hand in hand to destroy any one who may contemplate attacks on any Moslem country.

If, to these pacts and alliances which are not meant for aggression but for the prevention of aggression, we add efforts to buy arms from all arms producing countries so as to strengthen the allied Moslem armies, such an act would be necessary to guarantee peace which every Moslem wishes for his country and all Moslem countries, nay, for non-Moslem countries as well.

The Jews in Palestine are in an odd position because neither the Palestinians nor any of the Islamic governments have concluded peace with them. Those Jews have not yet given up the occupied territory, but remain there according to the armistice agreement which a number of powers have imposed on the Arabs and the Jews. That armistice to which the Islamic countries have submitted until a justified solution for the problem has been reached has not been accepted nor respected by the Jews who continually violate it.

The only measures which have been taken by the Moslems, and which the Jews consider as trespasses on their rights, are the imposing of a blockade on the Jews and the stopping of arms and ammunition from reaching the Jews via Moslem countries.

To know the ruling of Islam in that question we wish to explain that Moslem jurists have ruled that weapons should be prevented from reaching the enemy because they help the enemy to fight the Moslems. Efforts should also be made to prevent shipments of iron and wood and all materials used for making weapons from reaching the enemy whether before or after an armistice agreement. The Jews have violated the armistice agreement. This being the case, the other party should necessarily be relieved of its obligations under that agreement.

In his wars Prophet Mohamed has ordered the prevention of food from reaching his enemies with the exception of the people of Mecca because they were his relatives although fighting against him. The Jews in Palestine are no relatives of the Moslems and thus we rule that food should not be sent to them according to precedent practiced by the Prophet, because food will still help the Jews and make them more stubborn in their attitude which is against the law of Islam.

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(Classification)

Al Qahira, 10 January 1956

AL AZHAR COMMITTEE FATWA
On Question of Peace with Israel

The Fatwa Committee of Al Azhar has considered the request for an Islamic ruling on:

1. The conclusion of peace with Israel which has usurped Palestine from its people, driven them out and scattered the women, children and young men to the four corners of the earth, stolen their property and committed the worst crimes against places of prayer and Islamic relics and antiquities.
2. Friendship and cooperation with the imperialist states which have helped Israel in her criminal attacks and supplied her with political and material aid to set up a Jewish state in that Islamic country and among Islamic states.
3. The pacts which the imperialist states advocate and which aim at enabling Israel to remain in the land of Palestine to execute the policy of the Imperialists.
4. The duty of Moslems toward Palestine, its restoration to its people; duty of Moslems towards the projects by which Israel, with the help of the Imperialists' states, is trying to extend her domain and to bring in immigrants and thus strengthen her existence and authority and tighten the noose around her neighbours, increase her threat to them and facilitate their destruction.

The Committee hereby says that peace with Israel as envisaged by those who advocate it is not legally permissible because it would authorize the usurper to continue the act of usurpation; would be a recognition of his right to keep what he has usurped, and would allow the aggressor to retain the fruits of his aggression.

All religious and civil laws are unanimous in condemning usurpation and insist upon the restoration of what has been usurped to the rightful owners. They also urge the possessor of any right to defend it and claim his right. The Prophet said: "He who dies in the defence of his property is a martyr, and he who dies in the defence of his honor is a martyr". The Prophet also said: "The hand which has taken must be punished until what has been taken is returned".

Therefore, Moslems cannot conclude peace with those Jews who have usurped the territory of Palestine and attacked its people and their property in any manner which allows the Jews to continue as a state in that sacred Moslem territory. Moslems should cooperate regardless of differences in language, color or race to restore the country to its people and to secure the Aqsa Mosque which is the place where revelations were made, where prophets prayed, and which God has blessed. They should protect Islamic relics and monuments against those usurpers and help the warriors with arms and other means to fight for this cause and, in furtherance of this, exert every effort and means until the country is purified from the vestiges of those aggressors and despots.

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(Classification)

Those who fail to do so, refuse to help the Moslems, advocate what leads to division, thus enabling the imperialist states and Zionists to execute their plans against the Arabs and Islam and against the Arab and Islamic country, are heretics in terms of the teachings of Islam, and by this they commit the worst possible crime.

Everyone knows that from the early days of Islam to the present day the Jews have been plotting against Islam and Moslems and the Islamic homeland. They do not propose to be content with the attack they made on Palestine and on Al Aqsa Mosque, but they plan for the possession of all Islamic territory from the Nile to the Euphrates.

Islam requires that Moslems stand as one indivisible unit in defence of Islam. It is therefore the duty of Moslems to unite to ward off this danger, defend the country and save it from the usurpers.

As to cooperation with those states which support that group of aggressors and supply them with money and equipment in order to enable them to continue living in that territory, this is legally not permissible because it means helping that group in its aggression and supporting it in its enmity to Islam and the territory of Islam.

The Koran says: "God forbids you to have relations with those who fight your religion, drive you out of your country, or help drive you out because they are oppressors. You should not accept them as masters."

There is no doubt that dealing with the enemies and befriending them is equal to supplying them with help whether this help be in advice, ideas, weapons or force - secretly or openly - directly or indirectly, because this strengthens them and sustains their existence. All this is not permissible to Moslems whatever excuses or justifications they may resort to.

From this we deduce that no Islamic state should show any sympathy for or join the pacts advocated by the imperialist states which are working hard to conclude those pacts in order to divide the Moslem countries and create trouble among them thus giving the imperialists a chance to control the Islamic states and carry out their policy toward the Arabs, because such action spells a great danger to the Islamic countries. It is especially a danger to martyred Palestine which those imperialist states have handed over to the aggressive Zionists for the purpose of harming Islam and its people, and for the creation of a state in the heart of the Arab world upon which the imperialists can depend to carry out their designs - designs which are harmful to Moslems, their property, and their country. Acceptance of such political domination is the worst type of offense which Islam proscribes.

~~The law of Islam also prohibits~~ Moslems from enabling Israel and the imperialist states which have guaranteed its protection and continued life to execute those projects which aim at bringing prosperity to the state of the Jews, provide it with an easy life and fertile land and thus continue as a state which fights the Arabs and Islam over their dear country, brings the worst evils to that country, and plots against Moslems who should prevent with force the

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execution of those projects and stand as one in defence of what is in the possession of Islam, foiling those evil conspiracies especially the harmful projects. Those who fail to do this or help in the execution of those projects, or who take a passive stand, commit a very serious crime.

Moslems should adopt the example of the Prophet when the people of Mecca drove him and his men from Mecca, stopped them from using their property and practicing their religious rites, and desecrated the Holy Kaba by worshipping idols in it. God ordered the Prophet to get ready to save the Kaba from the aggressors and make life difficult for them until they yielded.

The Prophet restricted their economic life until war broke out between the armies of the believers and those of the infidels, until the Prophet triumphed and entered Mecca, the bastion of the infidels.

He helped the weak men, women and children, purged the Ka'ba of the idols, and destroyed aggression and heresy although Mecca belonged to the infidels while Palestine belongs to the Moslems, and the Jews have no right to rule it or establish a state in it.

God said: "Kill them wherever you find them and drive them from where they have driven you". He also warned Moslems to reply to attack by saying "When you are attacked, reply in the same manner".

This is the ruling of Islam in the Palestine case and with regard to Israel and the imperialist states which support it. This is also the ruling of Islam with regard to the duties of Moslems in this matter as found by the Fatwa Committee of Al Azhar.

The Committee calls on Moslems generally to believe in God and rise to attain glory and honor. They should realise the results of weakness before the attack of the aggressors and the conspiracy of the intriguers. They should come together to do service to God and the coming generations in compliance with their religion.

Signed by Hasanein Mahdlouf, Chairman and Ex-Mufti of Egypt

Isa Mannum, ex Sheikh of the Shari'a College (Shafi Sect)

Mahmoud Shaltout (Hanafi Sect)

Muhammad at-Tanikhi, Director of Religious Guidance
(Malki Sect)

Muhammad Abd Al Latif as-Sabki, Director of the Azhar
Inspectorate (Hanbali Sect)

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Department of State

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 894, March 6, 4 pm

PRIORITY

Control: 3499

Rec'd: March 6,
5:30 pm1956
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NEASENT DEPARTMENT 894 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 302 DAMASCUS 143
BAGHDAD 38, LONDON 269, JERUSALEM 81, BEIRUT 211, JIDDA 13, AMMAN 118

In accordance with DEPTTEL 624 I sought immediately and obtained appointment with Sharett in Tel Aviv late afternoon Monday, March 6. Prior to making strong representation along lines of DEPTTEL, I expressed my deep regret and profound sympathy for families of police killed in deplorable incident. Sharett was obviously pleased and expressed sincere thanks. He then went on to explain that shock of mortality among police officers was greater than it would have been among soldiers who by very nature their profession engage in greater risks.

Following my representation he said that incident was rewarded by Israel as "extreme provocation". He said Department's statement would be taken into account and he gave impression that Department's counsel designed to avoid action which would heighten tension and lead to hostilities was generally good move. Apparently referring to US representations made to Damascus for that purpose, he said Israel did not share Department's optimism. Sharett said on other hand, by selling arms to Israel the US would greatly enhance chances of peace and urged arms for Israel without delay saying "arms and time are of the essence". He remarked he knew Secretary held different view about arms and he regretted such was the case but his (Sharett's) views were as stated.

In discussing arms question he said he felt that such essentially defensive arms as, unarmed reconnaissance planes, anti-tank guns, radar equipment, anti-aircraft guns and similar equipment could have been released to Israel without any reasonable challenge. While there were important needs for tanks and other ground weapons he said, the great need was for jets. He referred to the tremendous advantage in the air held by Egypt and said "we are not asking for 200 jets to meet the 200 MIGS Egypt is receiving -- we are asking for 24 F 86's from the US. We are going to ask France for another 12 Mysteres, thus giving us total of 48 jets of approximate character of MIGS".

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- 2 - 894, March 6, 4 pm from Tel Aviv

At this point I inquired as to possibility of Israel receiving some Meteors from the British. He waved question aside pointing out that they did not meet present requirements of Israel. He then mentioned the British GNAT and described it as light weight jet, faster than MIGS but deficient in other respects such as its very limited airflight time. He said he was not sure whether the IDF had approached the British for some of these planes.

Comment: Throughout the conversation it seemed apparent to me that Sharett's emotions had not as yet been greatly aroused by the Tiberias police boat incident. It also seemed evident that he had not been in such close touch with this development as might have been the case had he not been on his present short vacation which I interrupted. I do not believe he has experienced the full pressures he otherwise might have received from the IDF, members of his own party and other political elements which have been urging the government to take strong line. He did confirm that the GOI had informed UNTSO prior to the departure of the second police boat in support of the grounded boat, but it seemed quite clear to me that he expected no fundamental change in the Syrian - Israeli situation to develop from United Nations action in this instance. But there was no emotional outburst or usual excited reference to "Israel's impossible position" or the highly agitated public sentiment factor.

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MAR 20 1956

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Action

Control: 3904

Rec'd: March 7, 1956
8:23 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 896, March 6, 4 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 896 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 303, DAMASCUS 144,
LONDON 270, PARIS 195.

PASS ARMY, NAVY AND AIR

Following three incidents reported USARMA and USAIRA by IDF FLO:

1. During (#) Egyptian unit of three scouts was surprised by IDF patrol near Hatserim (MR 123072). (About 30 kilometers from Egyptian border and 6 kilometers from Beersheba) in exchange of fire one Egyptian killed and two captured. Egyptians not (repeat not), in uniform, were armed with Sten guns.
2. IDF jeep struck mine in Israel territory 0540 hours March 6 near Halutzak (MR 9835/0634). One soldier killed.
3. March 5 IDF plane flying over Israel territory near Ein Hashloshah fired upon three times by Egyptians from Gaza Strip positions apparently with 20 mm. anti-aircraft. No (repeat no) hits scored.

Comments: Above incidents occur against background slow but perceptible step up in number fire exchanges along Gaza Strip reported from February 1 to March 6. According GOI during this period: (a) Egyptian positions opened fire on IDF patrols or posts total of 20 separate times. All but four these attacks in vicinity either Beerli or Kissufim. Only Israel casualty reported one "slightly wounded". (b) IDF discovered Egyptian mine vicinity Nir Igzak (repeat Nir Itzak) and later tender blew up on mines same area "slightly wounding five soldiers".

Increased number these incidents has received growing press publicity so that on March 5 DAVAR refers to "increased tension on Gaza border." Foreign Minister Sharett also expressed his concern this development.

Embassy believes Egypt/Israel Gaza Strip incidents bear close watching because of: (a) Tendency GOI and press to tax Nasser with overall blame for recent aggressive actions of Syria and Glubb episode Jordan. (b) Immediate emotion and impact on average Israeli of deep penetration Egyptian units into Israel as at Hatserim. Although not (repeat not) identified as Feda Yeen this incident connotation always present public mind.

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-2- 896, March 6, 4 p.m. from Tel Aviv

(c) Fact that most firing done on patrols Department will recall that Egyptian attack on IDF patrol on August 22 resulting Egyptian casualties was immediate incident which triggered chaotic deterioration along Strip leading to Khan Yunis raid. (EMBTel 143, August 23) fortuitous avoidance casualties during past five week period in IDF patrol versus Egyptian firing may not (repeat not) continue indefinitely and with present mood if they occur both sides may again take progressively stronger "on spot" military measures which could spread into larger scale hostilities.

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(#) Omission. Correction to follow.

* As received. Correction to follow.

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MAR 20 1966

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3/12/56, 8:51 a.m.

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Control: 3904

Rec'd: March 7, 1956

8:23 a.m.

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FROM: Tel. Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 896, March 6, 4 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 896; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 303, DAMASCUS 144, LONDON 270, PARIS 195

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PASS ARMY, NAVY AND AIR

Following three incidents reported USARMA and USAIRA by IDF FLO:

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1. During night 5th March Egyptian unit of three scouts was surprised by IDF patrol near Hatserim (MR 123072). About 30 kilometers from Egyptian border and 6 kilometers from Beersheba) in exchange of fire one Egyptian killed and two captured. Egyptians not (repeat not) in uniform, were armed with Sten guns.

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Comments: Above incidents occur against background slow but perceptible step up in number fire exchanges along Gaza Strip reported from February 1 to March 6. According GOI during this period: (a) Egyptian positions opened fire on IDF patrols or posts total of 20 separate times. All but four these attacks in vicinity either Beerli or Kissufim. Only Israel casualty reported one "slightly wounded". (b) IDF discovered Egyptian mine vicinity Nir Igzak (repeat Nir Itzak) and later tender blew up on mines same area "slightly wounding five soldiers".

Increased number these incidents has received growing press publicity so that on March 5 DAVAR refers to "increased tension on Gaza border." Foreign Minister Sharett also expressed his concern this development.

Embassy believes Egypt/Israel Gaza Strip incidents bear close watching

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-2- 896, March 6, 4 p.m., from Tel Aviv

watching because of: (a) Tendency GOI and press to tax Nasser with overall blame for recent aggressive actions of Syria and Glubb episode Jordan. (b) Immediate emotional impact on average Israeli of deep penetration Egyptian units into Israel as at Hatserim. Although not (repeat not) identified as Fedayeen this incident connotation always present public mind. (c) Fact that most firing done on patrols Department will recall that Egyptian attack on IDF patrol on August 22 resulting Egyptian casualties was immediate incident which triggered chaotic deterioration along Strip leading to Khan Yunis raid. (EMBTEL 143, August 23) fortuitous avoidance casualties during past five-week period in IDF patrol versus Egyptian firing may not (repeat not) continue indefinitely and with present mood if they occur both sides may again take progressively stronger "on spot" military measures which could spread into larger-scale hostilities.

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 Control: 3305
 Rec'd: March 6, 1956
 12:05 p.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 371, March 6, 1 p.m.

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 SENT DEPARTMENT 371, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 165, BEIRUT
 CAIRO 206, DAMASCUS 94, LONDON 117, PARIS 109, TEL AVIV 188

General Burns proceeding Cairo today. He told me yesterday evening that Israeli position El Auja proposals remained as described CONTEL 366. He recently saw Eytan who had informed him in that sense. Burns intends explore Egyptian attitude toward UNSYG proposals plus Articles VI and VII GAA. He had impression Israelis did not entirely wish allow subject lapse, possibly since they stood to gain right station police force in D/Z if proposals finally implemented.

Burns said UNISO did not yet have complete facts re Tiberias incident of March 4. He skeptical of Israeli motives in sending boats to far shore of lake.

With regard incident March 5 when Israeli air plane forced down by gunfire from Syrian positions, Burns said he had again reminded Tekovh his previous warnings to Israelis about their overflights and aggressive patrolling along border. He added that Israelis could avoid easily such incidents by use of a little discretion in conduct their border patrol activities if they had any genuine wish reduce tensions along border.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 6, 1956

THE ACTING SECRETARY

Attached (Tab A) is the Secretary's reply to the draft message to Sir Anthony Eden forwarded to him last night (Tab B) and a message from Ambassador Aldrich reporting a conversation with Eden on this same subject (Tab C).

I have sent action copies on both messages to NSA-Mr. Rountree and information copies to Mr. Murphy, Mr. Merchant and Mr. Russell. Do you wish me to forward a copy of the telegram from London to the President now or would you prefer to include it in a memorandum proposing a draft reply to Eden?

PR
R. G. B.

Now _____

Later _____

Robert G. Barnes

Copy to
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to Hoover
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Control: 4930

Rec'd: MARCH 8, 1956

12:18 PM

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674.84A/3-856

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 911, MARCH 8, 1 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 911, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 308.

FOREIGN MINISTER SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT MARCH 6 ISRAEL DEMANDED EMERGENCY MEETING ISRAEL-EGYPTIAN MRC CONCERNING INCIDENTS REPORTED EMBTEL 893.

ACCORDING ANNOUNCEMENT, MEETINGS REQUESTED BECAUSE INCIDENTS NOT (REPEAT NOT) ISOLATED BUT SERVED HIGHLIGHT GROWING VOLUME EGYPTIAN ACTS AGGRESSION AGAINST ISRAEL. SPOKESMAN CONTINUED THAT THESE ACTS HAVE TAKEN VARIOUS FORMS, INCLUDING:

PENETRATION OF ISRAEL BY ARMED EGYPTIAN PATROLS; SYSTEMATIC SHOOTING AND SHELLING POSITIONS IN ISRAEL TERRITORY; SNIPING ACROSS DEMARKATION LINE FIXED EGYPTIAN POSITIONS; CONSTANT HARRASSING IDF PATROLS MOVING WITHIN ISRAEL'S TERRITORY; MINING OF ROADS WITHIN ISRAEL TERRITORY WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN CASUALTIES.

INCIDENTS MAY BE VIEWED, ACCORDING SPOKESMAN, AGAINST BACKGROUND PERSISTENT EGYPTIAN REFUSAL ORDER GENERAL CEASE FIRE; INCREASINGLY BELLIGERENT TONE OF PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS OF NASSER; AND GROWING EVIDENCE MASSING OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY FORCES WITHIN GAZA STRIP, IN SINAI PENINSULA AND PARTICULARLY IN PROHIBITED AREA BEYOND ABU AGUIELLA EL QUSEIMA LINE.

PRESS REPORTS MARCH 8 THAT REQUESTED MEETING OF ISRAEL-EGYPTIAN MAC SUPRA, TO HAVE BEEN HELD KILOMETRE 95 GAZA, DID NOT (REPEAT NOT) TAKE PLACE BECAUSE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION FAILED TO APPEAR. REPORTED REASON GIVEN BY EGYPTIANS FOR NONAPPEARANCE WAS THAT COULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) USE ISMAILIYA ROAD TO ENTER DELTA ZULUA FOR REGULAR MEETING MAC FEBRUARY 29. PRESS ALLEGES REASON

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-2- 911, MARCH 8, 1 PM, FROM TEL AVIV

FOR NONAPPEARANCE EGYPTIANS WAS DESIRE TO ESCAPE ACCUSATION
LATEST SERIES AGGRESSIVE ACTS COMMITTED AGAINST ISRAEL.

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Control: 6962
Rec'd: MARCH 12, 1956
9:44 A.M.

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FROM: TEL AVIV

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 930, MARCH 12

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SENT DEPARTMENT 930, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 311,
LONDON 278.

FOLLOWING GOI PRESS RELEASE ISSUED MARCH 11:

"ISRAEL DEMANDS UN INVESTIGATION OF EGYPTIAN TROOP CONCENTRATIONS
ALONG ISRAEL BORDERS, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED
TONIGHT." A COMPLAINT ON MENACING EGYPTIAN TROOP CONCENTRATIONS
HAS BEEN LODGED TODAY BY ISRAEL WITH ISRAEL-EGYPTIAN MAC.
INCREASING NUMBERS OF EGYPTIAN FIGHTING FORCES HAVE BEEN MASSING
IN RECENT WEEKS IN GAZA AND EL ARISH AREAS ALONG ISRAEL'S BORDERS
IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE ROMAN IV OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
"THESE TROOP CONCENTRATIONS COMPRISE HEAVY ARMOUR AND OTHER
OFFENSIVE ARMS FAR IN EXCESS OF DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS AND
CONSTITUTE DIRECT THREAT TO ISRAEL SECURITY." THE ISRAEL COMPLAINT
CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION BY UN MILITARY OBSERVERS OF
THESE EGYPTIAN ARMISTICE VIOLATIONS." ABOVE ITEM HEADLINED
MOST MARCH 12 PAPERS.

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Control: 7211
Rec'd: MARCH 12, 1956
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FROM: JERUSALEM

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 375, MARCH 12, 4 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 375; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 158, BEIRUT 95, CAIRO 209, DAMASCUS 97, LONDON 118, PARIS 110, TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED.

GENERAL BURNS GAVE ME FOLLOWING COMMENTS MARCH 12 ON RECENT UNTSO DEVELOPMENTS.

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IN COURSE HIS MEETINGS GOE OFFICIALS DURING VISIT CAIRO LAST WEEK EGYPTIANS REITERATED THEIR WILLINGNESS ACCEPT UNSYG THREE PROPOSALS RE ELAUJA AND EMPHASIZED WITH CONSIDERABLE RELISH CONTRAST BETWEEN THEIR ATTITUDE THIS MATTER AND THAT OF ISRAELIS. WITH REGARD SHOOTING ALONG GAZA BORDER AMER INDICATED HE WOULD INSTRUCT SNIPERS REFRAIN FROM SHOOTING AT ISRAELIS FIXED POSITIONS. HE COULD NOT HOWEVER HELP MUCH WITH REGARD SHOOTING AT MOTOR PATROLS UNLESS THESE WILLING REMAIN 500 METERS FROM D/S. BURNS SAID QUESTION ISRAELIS "FACE" INVOLVED. THEY COULD NOT VERY WELL WITHDRAW MOTOR PATROLS UNDER "THREAT" EGYPTIANS SHOOTING. IF EGYPTIANS COULD KEEP THINGS QUIET FOR TIME BURNS COULD AGAIN RAISE SUBJECT WITH ISRAELIS. AMER NOT VERY FORTHCOMING ABOUT THIS AND BURNS LEFT WITH IMPRESSION THAT "NOTHING MUCH WOULD BE DONE IMPROVE SITUATION ALONG D/L".

BURNS HAD JUST SEEN SHARETT DISCUSS OUTCOME HIS TRIP TO CAIRO SHARETT MAINTAINED POSITION PREVIOUSLY REPORTED (CONTEL 366) TO EFFECT WHILE HAVING "ACCEPTED" UNSYG EL AUJA PROPOSALS ISRAEL COULD NOT "IMPLEMENT" THEM UNLESS GOE IMPLEMENTED GAA PROVISIONS. BURNS LEFT MEMORANDUM WITH SHARETT POINTING OUT LACK OF LOGIC IN ISRAELI ARGUMENTS SUBSEQUENT "UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE" PROPOSALS. SHARETT AGREED STUDY IT WITH VIEW TO ANOTHER MEETING IN NEAR FUTURE. HOWEVER

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-2- #375, MARCH 12, 4 PM, FROM JERUSALEM

BURNS HAS NO ESPECIAL HOPES OF IMPROVEMENT IN GOI ATTITUDE. HE OPINED SHARETT MIGHT WISH REACH SOME ACCOMMODATION BUT BEN GURION IS DOMINANT AND APPARENTLY UNCOMROMISING FACTOR IN SITUATION.

WITH REGARD ISRAELI PRESS ACCOUNTS THAT "ISRAEL WILL ASK UN PROBE MASSING OF SINAI ARMY" BURNS SAID NO SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN GOE TROOPS GAZA STRIP OCCURRED RECENTLY ACCORDING HIS INFORMATION. FORCES THERE NOW BELIEVED CONSIST ONE BRIGADE PLUS TWO BATTALIONS. LARGEST ARMAMENTS ARE THREE INCH MORTARS AND 40 MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS. AS OBSERVERS NOT PERMITTED IN "NON DEFENSIVE ZONE" WEST OF ELAUJA BURNS WITHOUT OWN SOURCES INFORMATION SITUATION THERE. HOWEVER HE UNDERSTANDS FROM MILITARY ATTACHES THAT EGYPTIANS HAVE ABOUT TWO DIVISIONS PLUS AN ARMORED BRIGADE IN AREA. HE HAS IN MIND MAKING SOME ANNOUNCEMENT TO EFFECT THAT IN VIEW REPORTED MILITARY BUILD-UP HE CONSIDERS THAT PARTIES SHOULD CALL FOR INVESTIGATION OF FACTS BY UNTSO ON CONTINUING BASIS TO AVOID POSSIBILITY THAT TROOPS WOULD BE MOVED AWAY TEMPORARILY JUST BEFORE INVESTIGATION.

RE OTHER MATTERS BURNS SAID ON BASIS INFORMATION NOW DEVELOPED HE THINKS IT PROBABLE ISRAELI POLICE BOATS ON TIBERIAS WERE SEARCHING FOR NETS OF SYRIAN FISHERMEN WHEN INCIDENT MARCH 4 OCCURRED. THERE HAD BEEN SOME EARLIER MINOR INCIDENTS INVOLVING FISHING BY SYRIANS. ISRAELIS HAD DISCOVERED THEM AND TAKEN THEIR NETS. SYRIANS RETALIATED BY SEIZING NETS BELONGING ISRAELI FISHERMEN. BURNS THOUGHT ISRAELIS HAD BEHAVED STUPIDLY IN BECOMING INVOLVED IN SHOOTING INCIDENT THROUGH EFFORT RECOVER GROUNDED BOAT. THEY COULD HAVE REPORTED SITUATION AND PERMITTED OBSERVERS PAVE WAY FOR BOATS RECOVERY WITHOUT SHOOTING AND LOSS OF LIFE.

I ASKED BURNS FOR HIS VIEWS INCIDENT INVOLVING MURDER ISRAELI FARMER AT MOSHAV NOHIM MARCH 9 SINCE REFUSAL CHAIRMAN HJK-I MAC GRANT ISRAEL REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY MEETING CAUSING ADVERSE COMMENT ISRAEL PRESS. BURNS SAID CHAIRMAN DID NOT CONSIDER INCIDENT WARRANTED EMERGENCY MEETING. HOWEFER PAST PRACTICE HAD BEEN CONSIDER ANY CASE OF KILLING AS "EMERGENCY". HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN BETTER FOR LOW ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT IN THIS CASE BUT MATTER COULD BE ARGUED EITHER WAY.

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-3- #375, MARCH 12, 4 PM, FROM JERUSALEM

SUMMARIZING OVER-ALL SITUATION BURNS SAID HE COULD PER-
CEIVE "NO GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM" RESPECTING ANY OF MATTERS
WITHIN PURVIEW UNTSO.

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1830, MARCH 13, 3 P.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1830, REPEATED INFORMATION JERUSALEM 112, AMMAN 153, BEIRUT 224, DAMASCUS 161, LONDON 286, PARIS 160, TEL AVIV 213.

REFERENCE: JERUSALEM'S 209, MARCH 12.

COL. ELY INFORMS US BURNS HAS JUST ISSUED PRESS RELEASE CALLING ON BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL PERMIT FREE MOVEMENT OF OBSERVERS IN PRESENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS. ELY DOUBTS REQUEST WILL BE HEEDED SINCE EGYPTIANS WILL CERTAINLY INSIST ON RECIPROCITY AND HE INCLINED DOUBT ISRAELIS WILLING PERMIT FREE MOVEMENT OBSERVERS IN WESTERN FRONT OR ON OTHER THAN PAVED ROADS WITHIN D/Z.

ELY BELIEVES THAT TECHNICALLY SPEAKING EGYPTIANS ON FAIRLY GOOD LEGAL GROUNDS IN MOST RESPECTS. SPECIFICALLY, HE CONCURS GOHAR'S VIEW WESTERN FRONT LIMITED ISRAELI CONTROLLED TERRITORY AND DOES NOT INCLUDE GAZA STRIP. ALSO FROM TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW PROHIBITION OF ESTABLISHMENT MILITARY POSITIONS IN EGYPTIAN TERRITORY WEST OF D/Z COULD BE INTERPRETED AS NOT COVERING TROOP BUILDUP AS LONG AS NO FIXED POSITIONS INVOLVED IN ANY CASE ISRAELIS IN BAD BARGAINING POSITION SINCE GOE BUILDUP WEST OF D/Z WAS RESPONSE TO ISRAELI MILITARY OCCUPATION OF D/Z. BUILDUP THEN PROBABLY COUNTERED BY ISRAELIS IN WESTERN FRONT AREA WHICH EGYPTIANS HAVE MET BY REENFORCING THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH IN SINAI GENERALLY.

IN RESPONSE QUERY RE RECENT REFUSAL EGYPTIANS ATTEND MEETING AT AL AUJA ELY SAID GOHARA GAIN TECHNICALLY CORRECT UNDER GAA. HOWEVER, GOHAR HAD NOW REFUSED ATTEND EMERGENCY MEETING AT K95 ALTHOUGH MAC DECISION OF SOME YEARS AGO IN WHICH BOTH PARTIES CONCURRED HAD AUTHORIZED CHAIRMAN DESIGNATE TIME

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-2- 1830, MARCH 13, 3 P.M., FROM CAIRO,

AND PLACE OF EMERGENCY MEETINGS. IN PRACTICE AL AUJA HAS ONLY BEEN USED FOR REGULAR MEETINGS. ELY THOUGHT THAT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS UNLIKELY MAC MEETINGS COULD BE HELD DURING FORESEEABLE FUTURE AND DREW PARALLEL WITH SITUATION IN SYRIA.

IN RESPONSE QUERY RE STATUS COMPLIANCE BURNS REQUEST TO ELIMINATE INDISCRIMINANT SHOOTING, ELY SAID SHOOTING HAD IN FACT CONTINUED AND HE HAD BROUGHT THIS TO GOHAR'S ATTENTION POINTING OUT LISTS OF SUCH INCIDENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN BURNS REPORTS. GOHAR REPLIED THAT INCIDENTS WERE UNCONFIRMED ALLEGATIONS BUT PERHAPS ORDERS HAD NOT YET REACHED FRONT LINES. HE SEEMED CONCERNED AND SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO MATTER.

BYROADE

WDR

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FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1832, March 14, 10 a.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1832, REPEATED INFORMATION JERUSALEM PRIORITY 113, TEL AVIV PRIORITY 214, AMMAN 154, BEIRUT 225, DAMASCUS 162 LONDON 288, PARIS 162.

Please correct reference to "MAC decision of some weeks ago" in paragraph 3 MYTEL 1830 to read "some years ago". Department please pass MYTEL 1830 to USUN.

BYROADE

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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 377, March 13

Control: 8378

Rec'd: March 14, 1956
7:07 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 377, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 212, TEL AVIV 191, AMMAN UNNUMBERED.

Following is summary UNTSO release March 12.

Israel lodged complaint March 11 alleging breach by Egypt Article VII GAA and requesting immediate investigation. Attention Chief UNTSO repeatedly called by either party situation other side armistice line areas where GAA authorizes defense forces only. Both parties have contended other maintaining troops and armaments these areas in excess GAA authorization. Both have submitted complaints and requested investigations which still pending. In present tense situation, allegations about troop concentrations in violation GAA which have been given much publicity cause great anxiety. Most desirable complaints be investigated and any illegal forces be withdrawn and Chief of Staff will propose to both parties simultaneous investigation areas involved.

Single investigation following complaint will not correct situation for long. Chief of Staff opines present situation calls not only for an investigation at prearranged time following complaint, but rather for system periodic visits unmilitary observers with complete freedom movement. Such system alone could assure both parties that GAA limitations being continuously respected.

Touching text.

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Rec'd: MARCH 14, 1956
7:13 PM

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1835, MARCH 14, 4 PM (SECTION 1 OF 2)
PRIORITYSENT DEPARTMENT 1835, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 155,
BEIRUT 226, BAGHDAD 140, DAMASCUS 163, JIDDA 128,
LONDON 289, TEL AVIV 215.NASSER ASKED ME VISIT AT HIS HOME LAST EVENING. IMPORTANT
SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WILL BE SENT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE SEPARATE
CABLES.

DISCUSSION SOON TURNED TO POSSIBILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF
WAR IN THIS AREA. HE EXHIBITED A STATE OF RELAXATION AND
CONFIDENCE QUITE UNLIKE HIS APPEARANCE OF APPREHENSION AND
TENSION DURING LAST SUMMER PRIOR TO CZECH ARMS DEAL. HE
STATED HE DID NOT REALLY BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE WAR. HE
DIDN'T THINK WAR WOULD COME IF ARABS WERE STRONG. I TOLD
HIM IT OBVIOUS THERE INCREASING SUSPICION WITHIN GOVERNMENTS
AND IN WORLD PUBLIC OPINION, IN WAKE OF IMPORTANT MEETINGS
HERE AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN ARAB WORLD, THAT ARABS THEM-
SELVES MIGHT START WAR. HIS REPLY WAS CATEGORIC. HE SAID
THAT HE WOULD NOT START A WAR WITH ISRAEL AND HE FELT OUR
PRESIDENT KNEW THIS THE CASE. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT DECEIVE
OUR PRESIDENT AND HE WOULD GIVE ME AND HIM HIS WORD ON THIS
ISSUE, NOT AS A POLITICIAN, BUT AS A SOLDIER. HE ALSO SAID
THIS, WHICH IS EXACT QUOTE: "IT MUST BE APPARENT TO YOU
ANYWAY THAT WE COULD NOT REALLY WIN A WAR IF WE WERE FOOLISH
ENOUGH TO START ONE. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS YOU WOULD FEEL
YOU HAD TO MOVE IN. I WOULD THEN IN EFFECT BE FIGHTING THE
U.S. AND BRITAIN AS WELL AS THE ISRAELIS. IN SUCH AN IMPOS-
SIBLE POSITION I MIGHT BE COMPELLED TO TAKE RUSSIAN HELP
AND THEN WHERE WOULD I BE GOING, AND WHERE WOULD MY PROGRAM
TO BUILD MY COUNTRY END UP. I DO NOT WANT TO GAMBLE SO
FOOLISHLY WITH THE FUTURE OF MY OWN COUNTRY." I ASKED IF HE
THOUGHT ANY OTHER ARAB STATE WANTED WAR WITH ISRAEL. HIS

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-2- 1835, MARCH 14, 4 PM FROM CAIRO (SECTION 1 OF 2)

ANSWER WAS EQUALLY POSITIVE THAT THEY DID NOT.

NASSER REALIZED DURING THIS CONVERSATION THAT HE WAS SPEAKING FOR THE RECORD AND DID SO DELIBERATELY AND SLOWLY THUS FACILITATING MY WRITING HIS EXACT WORDS (WHICH I HAVE NEVER DONE BEFORE). THERE HAVE BEEN RUMORS HERE THAT RECENT TRIPARTITE MEETING MIGHT HAVE AGREED UPON ARAB ATTACK LATER IN SUMMER. FOR MY PART I AM WILLING TO BELIEVE THAT DISCUSSION MIGHT HAVE TAKEN PLACE AS TO HOW ARABS MIGHT LAUNCH ATTACK IF THEY CAME TO SUCH DECISION FOLLOWING NEW DEVELOPMENTS, SUCH AS WORD OF LARGE AMOUNT OF ARMS TO ISRAEL. I DO NOT BELIEVE HOWEVER ANY SUCH DECISION FOR ATTACK WAS TAKEN OR SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED. I DO NOT BELIEVE NASSER VALUES U.S. FRIENDSHIP SO LIGHTLY AS TO SO DELIBERATELY DECEIVE US ON THIS VITAL ISSUE.

NASSER, WHO FOR REASON NOT FULLY UNDERSTANDABLE TO ME, DOES NOT SEEM TO SHARE FULLY OUR CONCERN REGARDING PREVENTIVE WAR BY ISRAEL, SAID WAR COULD COME IN ONE OF TWO WAYS. THE FIRST WAS BANAT YACOB ISSUE. SYRIA FELT BOUND TO RESIST THIS PROJECT. AS AN INSIGHT ON THIS PROBLEM IN SYRIA HE TOLD ME THAT QUWATTLY HAD STATED HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE. SHISHAKLY IN 1953 HAD SUCCESSFULLY OPPOSED THIS DIVERSION AND HAD GOTTEN AWAY WITH IT. HIS POSITION WOULD BE UNTENABLE IF HE FAILED WHERE SHISHAKLY HAD SUCCEEDED AND HE WOULD BE FACED WITH AN ARMY COUP. (HIS REMARKS ON JVP ANOTHER CABLE). THE OTHER POSSIBILITY WAS AN INCIDENT ALONG THE BORDER WHICH WOULD GET OUT OF CONTROL. NO RAIDS WERE PLANNED FROM THE ARAB SIDE-ALTHOUGH RETALIATION FOR ISRAELI RAIDS INSIDE ARAB TERRITORY COULD NOT BE AVOIDED. HE SAID THIS TRUE FOR SYRIAN FRONT, AS ELSEWHERE. ARRESTS INSIDE ISRAEL WHICH ISRAELIS LABEL FEDAYEEN WERE REALLY INTELLIGENCE SCOUTS BUT HE COULD NOT ADMIT THIS PUBLICLY. AS LONG AS ISRAELIS RETAIN THEIR POSITION REGARDING AL AUJA, AND AS LONG AS THEIR POSTURE IN NEGEV AS A WHOLE WAS SHIFTING AND UNCLEAR, HE FELT HE HAD OCCASIONALLY TO SEND RECONNAISSANCE GROUPS INSIDE.

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-3- 1835, MARCH 14, 4 PM FROM CAIRO (SECTION 1 OF 2)

IN DISCUSSION OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES HE SAID NONE WERE PLANNED AND NO SINGLE ONE COULD BE SENT ON A MISSION WITHOUT HIS PERSONAL APPROVAL. THIS IS A MATTER IN WHICH HE WOULD NOT DELEGATE AUTHORITY TO ANY ONE, NOT EVEN GENERAL HAKIM AMER. FURTHERMORE, IF TIME CAME WHEN HE DECIDED USE FEDAYEEN IN RETALIATION, HE WOULD TELL ME FIRST.

BYROADE

JMD

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1835, MARCH 14, 4 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1835, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 155,
BEIRUT 286, BAGHDAD 140, DAMASCUS 163, JIDDA 128, LONDON 289,
TELAVIV 215.CIA
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ON QUESTION OF BORDER INCIDENTS AND RAIDS THERE AT LEAST WAS AN ANSWER, IF ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS. HE HAD FAVORED THIS POSITION FOR MONTHS BUT ESPECIALLY WANTED IT NOW, AS MEANS OF PREVENTING INCIDENTS AND ALSO, FOR OTHER REASONS, TO ENABLE HIM TO BRING HIS ARMY BACK TO CANAL ZONE. HIS STRIKING FORCE WAS NO LONGER THERE BUT HE STILL HAD TOO MANY TROOPS ACROSS THE CANAL. IN ADDITION THERE WERE ADMINISTRATIVE AND MORALE PROBLEMS WHICH COULD BE SOLVED BY GETTING HIS TROOPS OUT OF SINAI DESERT.

NASSER SAID THAT OUR MAIN EFFORTS SHOULD NOW GO INTO QUESTION OF EASING TENSION ALONG BORDERS. THIS HE FELT COULD BE DONE THROUGH UN. CARDINAL FEATURE OF THIS WOULD BE SEPARATION OF TROOPS BUT OTHER MEASURES SUCH AS INCREASED OBSERVERS PROBABLY WOULD BE HELPFUL. I ASKED IF HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT EASE TENSION SOMEWHAT IF HE WERE AGAIN TO PUBLICLY GIVE HIS VIEWS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS. HE SAID HE READY DO THIS AT ANYTIME AND MIGHT DO SO TODAY WITH VISITING AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS. HE LATER SAID HE MIGHT WAIT FOR NEW YORK TIMES INTERVIEW ON FRIDAY. IF I HAD ANY SPECIFIC IDEAS AS TO WHAT HE MIGHT ACTUALLY SAY HE WOULD BE GLAD RECEIVE THEM.

SUCH RECOMMENDATIONS AS WE HAVE ON SPECIFIC ACTION THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN ALONG BORDERS WILL FOLLOW SEPARATELY.

BYROADE

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FROM: Jerusalem

Control: 8696

Rec'd: March 14, 1956
3:18 p.m.

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 380, March 14, 1 p.m.

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LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

General Burns has commented substantially as follows with respect to DEPTTEL 196: As regards likelihood of major hostilities attitudes of Israel and Egypt should prove conclusively with other Arab States in secondary role.

Statement recently made in Knesset by Ben Gurion to effect "while Israel would not start war she would fight through to victory if attacked" appears valid as presentation Israeli position at present time. That position could change on short notice since Ben Gurion is impulsive and army leaders such as Dayan, etc. are believed likely to press for policy of force in dealing with Arabs and might be glad to see things "come to head" this year. Another source danger is inherent in circumstance that IDF controls intelligence sources and can manipulate information reaching public about military affairs giving it an alarmist character unwarranted by facts or at least based on no overt evidence. In this way military leaders foster impression Israel "threatened" from all sides. Despite such considerations Burns' appreciation is Israel will not herself initiate large scale aggression but should be expected to react vigorously to any aggressive action of neighbors.

Egyptians now cocky and feel confident of themselves but improbable that responsible officers really believe Egypt ready for war. On basis discussion with General Amer and other Egyptian officials Burns has not gained impression Nasser and his associates seriously contemplate taking offensive this year. Egyptians have done little to discourage firing incidents along Gaza strip however apparently wishing to maintain state of tension for political reasons. These incidents nevertheless represent continuing danger since they could get out of hand and lead to hostilities of larger scope. Danger of serious trouble in El Auja area does not appear very great although of course the separation of forces envisaged by armistice agreement no longer exists.

While Burns

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-2- 380, March 14, 1 p.m., from Jerusalem

While Burns has no specific information re equipment or present state of training of Egyptian armed forces or of technical ability of their high command he doubts they have yet had time to absorb into their forces arms received from Soviet bloc. He therefore considers it unlikely they will initiate war this summer. In any event it would seem foolish of them to do so.

Removal of restraining influence of British officers from Arab legion obviously constitutes an added threat to peace but still too early to formulate predictions re ultimate effect. Border incidents of last few days would appear to justify fears of resurgence of shooting episode along Jordan frontier with added possibility Arab Legion may be sooner or later committed in course of such incidents to ill-considered retaliatory action.

Most dangerous single threat to peace is however to be found in project at Banat Yacub. On one hand there appears practically no likelihood Arab states will accept Johnston plan within next few months; on other, Israelis have indicated they will not wait much longer. Syrians may now believe that they can block Israel's use of Jordan River simply by leaving matters in status quo indefinitely. Should Israelis insist on resuming work in D/Z it would probably be unavoidable to bring issue before Security Council. This should delay reaction of Syria and obtain indication of attitude of other powers toward Israel's legitimate need to utilize Jordan waters.

Number of danger spots in area together with uncompromising attitudes of parties directly concerned makes outbreak of hostilities distinctly possible. US is in position to influence Israel toward maintaining policy of restraint by applying pressure on Israeli Government when required plus firm indication of sanctions Israel might expect should she determine upon attack against Arab states.

To summarize Burns considers major hostilities this year as within real of possible but accumulation of dangerous factors does not appear sufficient at present time to warrant conclusion that outbreak is probable.

COLE

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CONTEL 380. ~~Dept commends Cole~~ for succinct and cogent reporting
of Burns views. ~~Also please~~ Express appreciation to Burns.

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3/15/56

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMCONGENERAL, JERUSALEM
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
REF : Congen Telegram 377, March 13, 1956

150
DESP. NO.

March 14, 1956
DATE

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SUBJECT: Transmitting Text of UNTSO Press Release

Supplementing Contel 377 there follows below the text of the Truce Supervision Organization Press Release of March 12, 1956 respecting allegations by both Israel and Egypt that the other was maintaining excessive arms or troops in areas where limits had been fixed by Article VII of the General Armistice Agreement.

"On 11 March 1956 a complaint was lodged by Israel concerning an alleged breach by Egypt of Article VII of the General Armistice Agreement. An immediate investigation was requested.

"The attention of the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO has been repeatedly called by either Party to the situation on the other side of the armistice line in areas where defensive forces only can be maintained. Both Parties have, at different times, contended that the other Party had in these areas troops and armaments in excess of what is permitted by the General Armistice Agreement. Both Parties have submitted complaints in this respect to the Mixed Armistice Commission, requesting an investigation by the UNTSO and these complaints await investigation.

"In the present tense situation, allegations of troop concentrations in violation of the General Armistice Agreement, to which much publicity has been given, cause very great anxiety and it is greatly to be desired that the complaints should be investigated, and if found to be substantiated, the troops or weapons illegally present should be withdrawn.

"The Chief of Staff will propose to both Parties a simultaneous investigation of the zones in which defensive forces only as described in the General Armistice Agreement can be maintained.

"But a single investigation following a complaint will not correct the situation for long. Experience has proved that even when investigation has shown that illegal arms or troops have been removed, complaints of their presence may again be registered, after a very short time. The present situation calls, in the opinion of the Chief of Staff, not only for investigation following a complaint, at a pre-arranged time, but rather for a system of periodic visits by UN Military Observers, with

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complete freedom to move in these areas. Such a system alone could give an assurance to both Parties that the limitations on troops and armament were continuously being observed by the other side."


William E. Cole
American Consul General

cc: Amman, Cairo, Tel Aviv

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1844, MARCH 15, 2 PM

Control: 9464

Rec'd:

MARCH 15, 1956

3:53 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 1844, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 292, PARIS 163, TEL AVIV 218, JERUSALEM 115, AMMAN 158, DAMASCUS 167, BEIRUT 229, NEW YORK 52.

APPEARS TO US THAT EFFORTS BURNS REDUCE TENSION ALONG EGYPTIAN ISRAELI BORDER REQUIRE MORE CONCRETE AND PUBLIC SUPPORT THAN HAS BEEN POSSIBLE TO DATE. WE THINK THIS CAN BEST BE DONE THROUGH UN AND RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN PUBLIC APPEAL BY SECRETARY GENERAL OR APPROPRIATE UN BODY TO BOTH PARTIES FOR IMMEDIATE EXECUTION MEASURES REDUCE TENSION LISTED BELOW WHICH IN MY OPINION AND THAT OF BRITISH AMBASSADOR SHOULD SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE PRESENT TENSE SITUATION. APPEAL WE THINK SHOULD DEMAND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND STATE THAT UNTSO HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH REPORTING AS TO COMPLIANCE AND THAT THESE REPORTS WILL BE CIRCULATED TO ALL UN MEMBERS. IMPLICATION SHOULD BE CLEAR THEY WILL ALSO BE WIDELY PUBLICIZED IN PRESS. PURPOSE SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE TO MOBILIZE WORLD OPINION FAVOR CONCRETE MOVES REDUCE TENSION IN AREA. SPECIFICALLY APPEAL SHOULD INCLUDE:

1. MUTUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL FORCES 500 METERS ON EITHER SIDE BORDER. NASSER HAS TOLD ME HE STILL FAVORS THIS AND IS READY SAY SO PUBLICLY. WE RECOGNIZE SUCH WITHDRAWAL FROM ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW RAISES PROBLEM OF COPING WITH INFILTRATORS. THIS MIGHT BE MET BY INCLUDING APPEAL FOR JOINT PATROLS AND STATIONING OF MORE OBSERVERS IN BORDER AREAS.
2. SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS REFERENCE ALAUJA. AT SAME TIME WE BELIEVE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE BROADENED TO ELIMINATE EGYPTIAN MILITARY BUILDUP IN SINAI AND ALLEGED ISRAELI BUILDUP IN WESTERN FRONT AREA.

52477

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SECRET

-2- 1844, MARCH 15, 2 PM FROM CAIRO

3. INCREASE IN AUTHORITY AND MOBILITY OF UN OBSERVERS. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THESE MEN ARE AGENTS OF SC WHICH UNDER UN RESOLVING THIS IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITY IN SEEING TO IT THAT NO (REPEAT NO) THREAT TO PEACE EXISTS IN ARAB-ISRAELI BORDER AREAS. NO (RPT NO) STATE SHOULD BE PERMITTED HAMPER AGENTS OF SC IN CARRYING OUT THEIR DUTIES. COMPLIANCE BURNS REQUEST OF MARCH 13 FOR "SYSTEM OF PERIODIC VISITS BY UN MILITARY OBSERVERS WITH COMPLETE FREEDOM TO MOVE IN THESE AREAS" SHOULD BE INSISTED ON NOT (RPT NOT) ONLY FOR PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION BUT AS PREVENTATIVE MEASURE.

ABOVE LISTS COULD BE EXPANDED INCLUDE OTHER SPECIFIC MEASURES TO REDUCE TENSION.

WE HAVE IMPRESSION SITUATION ALONG BORDER IS SO TENSE AND POSSIBILITIES SO DANGEROUS THAT PAST APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS WHICH HAS BEEN ONE OF DETAIL IS NO (RPT NO) LONGER VALID. ISRAELI POSITION THAT FREEDOM OF GOVERNMENT FOR UN OBSERVERS IS DEROGATION OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY CANNOT (RPT CANNOT) BE ACCEPTABLE TO WORLD OPINION NOR (RPT NOR) CAN ARAB (AND ISRAELI) TWISTING OF LETTER OF GAA TO JUSTIFY POSITION WHICH PROVOKE RATHER THAN DECREASE TENSION. WHILE OBVIOUSLY GAA MUST CONTINUE GOVERN RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELI'S, IT CANNOT (RPT CANNOT) BE PERMITTED TO BE USED AS EXCUSE TO PREVENT ADOPTION EFFECTIVE MEASURES IN THIS FIELD. WE URGENTLY RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT NEW (RPT NEW) APPROACH TO ITS EXECUTION BE ADOPTED ALONG LINES SUGGESTED ABOVE.

BYROADE

JMD

MAR 20 1956

SECRET

52478

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

53

Action
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Control: 9236
Rec'd: March 15, 1956
9:26 a.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 382, March 15, 11 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 382, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 171, BEIRUT 97, CAIRO 213, DAMASCUS 99, LONDON 119, PARIS 111, TEL AVIV 194.

Supplementing CONTEL 375 Burns has given me following details with reference his visit Cairo. He discussed with Fawsi question of Israeli interest in enlarging consideration UNSYG El Auja proposals to include Article VIII. Fawsi showed but little interest in this matter and observed GOE could not remove troops from non-defense zone because Israeli troops occupying D/Z. He also argued that in any case Egyptian sovereignty included non-defensive zone. Burns pointed out that latter argument involved departure from provisions GAA and could lead to raising of other questions on basis similar reasoning with attendant complications. Fawsi said Egypt needed maintain troops there anyway since Israeli forces are in D/Z or any how if removed would remain in vicinity D/Z. However Fawsi offered to consider matter together with any further proposals which UNSYG might wish to put forward. Burns said he gained impression Egyptians had no especial intention "considering" matter seriously. He thought Fawsi's comments which couched in most vague and general terms probably represent nothing more than "stalling".

Vigier who was also present has told me that there was practically no discussion of Article VII. Burns mentioned need for period of inspection in "western front areas" by observers and fact he intended pursue this subject actively (CONTEL 377). Fawsi showed no discernable interest in this matter but Burns' memorandum of this conversation with Fawsi indicates latter agreed "consider" it. Vigier said Burns doing his best keep parties talking which is doubtless best strategy in existing unpromising atmosphere.

Vigier said UNTSO interprets area mentioned Article VII paragraph 3 GAA as including Gaza strip (Cairo's telegram 1830 to Department).

COLE

MGG-WDR/14 52479

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File Designation

674,84 A/3-1656

Desp 965 W/ATTCH

Date

3/16/56

From

CAIRO

To

State

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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54-H

Action, no / L. Waller

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Control: 11645

Rec'd: MARCH 19, 1956
8:29 PM

IO

FROM: NEW YORK

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 742, MARCH 19, 7 PM

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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

RE PALESTINE

EBAN (ISRAEL) CALLED ON ME AT HIS REQUEST. HE SAID THAT ISRAEL CONSIDERED THAT SC ACTION ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN PALESTINE WAS UNREALISTIC AND DANGEROUS. THE REAL SOURCE OF TENSION WAS THE PRESENT SUPERIORITY OF EGYPTIAN FIGHTING FORCES OVER ISRAELI FORCES AND THE HOSTILITY OF THE ARABS TO THE ISRAELI STATE. HE SAID THAT EGYPT NOW HAD 40 TWIN-ENGINE BOMBERS AND 110 SOVIET FIGHTER BOMBERS AND WOULD SOON HAVE 200 MORE. THIS MEANT THAT ISRAEL WAS AT THE MERCY OF THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE, AND NOTHING THAT THE SC COULD DO COULD CHANGE THIS SITUATION. THE SC WAS NOT EQUIPPED TO GET AT THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM AND A MEETING WOULD IN FACT INCREASE THE TENSIONS. THE CONFLICTS IN THE COUNCIL BETWEEN THE USSR AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, AND BETWEEN THE PARTIES THEMSELVES WHO WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE COUNCIL DEBATE COULD NOT FAIL TO MAKE THE SITUATION WORSE. HE FELT THAT THERE WERE NO COMPENSATING FACTORS FOR THE INCREASE IN TENSIONS THAT THE SC WOULD PRODUCE. GENERAL BURNS WOULD NOT BE AIDED BY A COUNCIL MEETING; HE COULD DO ALL THAT WAS POSSIBLE WITHOUT COUNCIL ACTION; NOR WOULD THE SYG BE HELPED BY A COUNCIL MEETING. HE, TOO, HAD SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO ACT WITHOUT COUNCIL CONSIDERATION.

EBAN THEN SAID THAT UNLESS THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE AREA WAS RESTORED, HE BELIEVED THAT THERE WOULD BE AN OUTBREAK OF WAR BY AUGUST. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD INDEED HAVE TO DECLARE A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND LOOK TO ITS DEFENSES, IF ISRAELI DEFENSES WERE NOT RESTORED BY APRIL.

I TOLD EBAN THAT I AGREED WE COULD NOT GO INTO THE SC WITHOUT

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- 2 - 742, MARCH 19, 7 PM FROM NEW YORK

CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND PREPARATION, BUT THAT IN AN ORGANIZATION DESIGNED TO PRESERVE THE PEACE IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO SIT IDLY BY WHEN THERE WERE SUCH DISTURBING SITUATIONS AS NOW EXISTED. I TOLD HIM WE WERE STUDYING ALL THE POSSIBILITIES BUT HAD NOT ARRIVED AT ANY FINAL CONCLUSIONS. WE WOULD OF COURSE CONSIDER HIS POSITION AND I WOULD REPORT HIS REMARKS TO THE DEPT.

LODGE

OW

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(20)
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File Designation 674.84A/3-2256
Tel 4148
Date 3/22/56
From London
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File Designation 674,84A/3-2256
Tel 1885
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From Cairo
To SecState

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1956 MAR 22 PM 12.16

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RE EMBTEL 931. -NC

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NAC 11-20-69

Spencer

US representative referred to in DEPTTEL 568 has completed for time being at least, his discussions with top officials Israel and Egypt. While they provided means for exchange of views and elucidation of positions both sides, they have reached impasse for the present. Ben Gurion insists on direct meeting between self and Nasser or other top representatives both sides and is unwilling reveal to intermediary IG's QUOTE paying price for peace UNQUOTE. Nasser, while prepared discuss all questions with intermediary, not willing hold direct meeting at this time. Department pouching to you reports of conversations. Both Ben Gurion and Sharett took part in discussions, which culminated ~~last week~~ ~~last week~~. As renewal of effort achieve settlement would be jeopardized by revelation to officials of either government that others than very few who were engaged in operation had knowledge of it, you should confine to yourself information contained this tel and pouched materials.

While Ben Gurion stated to representative IG's position with respect IG's arms needs, he was informed that question outside scope of representative's authority.

Dist. Designated
(Offices Only)

674.842/3-2256

H. R. L. L. S.

ACTING

(F. R. R.)

Drafted by:

S/FHRussell/amb 3/16/56

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

S/S JAS.

TOP SECRET

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DOT:MG

March 22, 1956

THE ACTING SECRETARY

A copy of this telegram is with the Secretary in conjunction with a memorandum Mr. Russell has prepared for him on this project. Mr. Russell himself will also get a copy. No other distribution will be made.

Fish *si* Howe

9

TOP SECRET

696

March 22, 1956

111.75

[illegible]

OTHER:

2 (Russell)

U/O (H/egg)

(Richards)

Subj: [illegible]
C# [illegible]
[illegible] destroyed 1-17-58
EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

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2, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8
Kellenger
3-1-57
P. 20

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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58-51

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NAVY

AIR

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1899, MARCH 23, 3 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 1899, REPEATED INFORMATION DAMASCUS 170, AMMAN 161, BEIRUT 237, JERUSALEM 118, TEL AVIV 222, LONDON 294, PARIS 166, NEW YORK 53.

PRESS FRONT PAGING SPECULATIVE REPORTS AS TO MOTIVES OF UNITED STATES IN SEEKING SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON PALESTINE QUESTION. GOE PRESENTLY STUDYING LINE IT PROPOSES ADOPT. MEANWHILE GOHAR MARCH 22 RELEASED STATEMENT "ENUMERATING EXAMPLES EGYPT'S COOPERATION WITH BURNS TO EASE TENSION". STATEMENT RECALLED EGYPT EARLY IN APRIL 1955 HAD PROPOSED TO BURNS ESTABLISHMENT OBSERVATION POSTS IN GAZA STRIP ALONG D/L. UNTSO HAD AGREED ON APRIL 11 AND OBSERVERS HAVE OPERATED THERE SINCE THAT TIME. EGYPT HAD SUGGESTED SIMILAR PROCEDURE FOR ISRAELI CONTROLLED AREA BUT WITHOUT RESULT. (GOHAR TOLD EMBASSY OFFICER MARCH 21 THAT SIX POSTS HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED BUT ONLY TWO WERE PRESENTLY OCCUPIED BY UNTSO).

EGYPT HAD ALSO ACCEPTED SECRETARY GENERAL PROPOSALS REGARDING AL AUJA AND "IS READY AT ANY TIME IMPLEMENT THEM SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ISRAEL". FURTHERMORE EARLY IN MAY 1955 EGYPT PROPOSED SEPARATION BOTH FORCES BY FIVE HUNDRED METER WITHDRAWAL ON EITHER SIDE D/L "THUS REMOVING TENSION LIKELY ARISE FROM ARMED FORCES BEING IN SIGHT EACH OTHER". (GOHAR ALSO RECALLED TO EMBASSY OFFICER EGYPT HAD ACCEPTED FOUR BURNS PROPOSALS FOLLOWING GAZA UC RESOLUTION.)

STATEMENT INTENDED (1) COUNTER ISRAELI TACTIC OF "DIVERTING ATTENTION FROM ISRAELI REFUSAL IMPLEMENT SECRETARY GENERAL AL AUJA PROPOSALS" BY CLAIMING EGYPTIANS MAINTAINING OFFENSIVE FORCES IN RAFAH-AL ARISH AREA CONTRARY DECISION MAC SPECIAL COMMITTEE DECISION OF AUGUST 1949 WHICH GOE DENIES FOUNDED ON

Control: 14650

Rec'd:

MARCH 23, 1956

4:01 PM

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-2- 1899. MARCH 23, 3 PM FROM CAIRO

ANY PROVISION OF GAA (2) REAFFIRM FOR WORLD OPINION GOE DESIRE
REDUCE BORDER TENSION.

STATEMENT PROBABLY INDICATES LINE WHICH EGYPT AND SYRIA-
SEE DAMASCUS 884) WILL TAKE IN REFERENCE SC ACTION IF THEY
HAVE ACCEPTED ALL PROPOSALS MADE BY BURNS AND HAMMARSKJOLD UNDER
GAZA AL AUJA AND TIBER AS RESOLUTIONS. BUT ISRAEL HAS REJECTED
THEM DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY.

DURING MARCH 21 CONVERSATION WITH GOMAR EMBASSY OFFICER HAD
CLEAR IMPRESSION EGYPTIANS CONCERNED OVER BORDER SITUATION.
THEY DOUBT DANGER SPOTS WHICH THEY FEEL ARE RAFAH AND AL AUJA
CAN BE ELIMINATED SHORT OF (1) DEPARATION FORCES (2) STATIONING
AND FREE MOVEMENT OBSERVERS THROUGHOUT WESTERN FRONT (3)
RESTORATION OF DEMILITARIZED STATUS AL AUJA. THEY NOT SANGUINE
ISRAELIS WILL AGREE THIS PROGRAM.

ABOVE APPLIES FULLY CONSISTENT NASSER'S OBSERVATIONS ON BORDER
SITUATION (EMBTET 1835) AND OUR ANALYSIS GENERAL SITUATION
(EMBTET 1885).

BYRCADE

JMD

MAR 27 1956

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11/4/89

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Date 3/26/56
From London
To Sec State

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TOP SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 28, 1956

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Recent Middle East Developments

PARTICIPANTS: U. S. Government

The Secretary
The Under Secretary *W.H.H.*
Mr. Allen - NEA
Mr. Russell - S

Israel Government

Ambassador Eban
Minister Shiloah

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Ambassador Eban called at the Secretary's request. The Secretary said he had handed Prime Minister Ben Gurion's letter of March 16 to the President while he was at White Sulphur Springs. The President had read it carefully and in due course will make a reply. The Secretary said he would suggest that Eban not press the proposal which the Prime Minister had made that Eban see the President. Such a meeting would become known and the various Arab ambassadors would want to present their points of view also to the President. The Secretary said the Prime Minister can count on President Eisenhower being fully aware of the Israel Government's position. Indeed, the letter itself was an eloquent statement of it.

The Secretary said that following the negative results, for the time being at least, of the Anderson mission, we are re-examining our policies toward the Middle East. That re-examination is based on the premise that Nasser may no longer be entitled to the preferential treatment he has been getting on the anticipation that he would cooperate in achieving an Arab-Israel settlement. What the practical results of this re-examination may be cannot be disclosed at this time. In fact, it is not yet completed. The Secretary said he wished the Israel Government, however, to know that it was going on. He said that he doubted that it would lead to a position of identity of the U. S. with Israel in antagonism to the Arabs as a whole. Such a position would not be to the real interest of Israel. It is our hope to devise and follow policies that will lead to an increase of U. S. weight in the Arab world as a whole.

The Secretary

S/FHRussell/arb
March 30, 1956

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- 2 -

The Secretary said that with respect to the Israel Government's request to purchase arms from the U. S., he hoped that it would look to its customary sources in Europe and that it would not look to the U. S. for arms which it could get from European countries. The Secretary said we had taken a sympathetic attitude toward the Israel request to the French Government to purchase Mysteres and we might be able to do more along that line.

The Secretary said he wished to urge in the strongest possible terms that Israel not take action in commencing construction at Banat Yaacov which could lead to an outbreak of hostilities. He understood that the Israel Government has applied to the Export-Import Bank for a \$75,000,000 loan for construction of water development along the coastal plain. Without making any commitment with respect to the action which the Bank would take or the amount of any loan which might be made, the Department would take a sympathetic point of view as far as the political aspect of the question was concerned. If such a loan could be granted, it should permit the Israel Government to utilize its construction resources without undertaking the work at Banat Yaacov at this time. Action at the latter point would be particularly unfortunate at a time when our policies toward the area were in the process of review.

Ambassador Eban said that recent developments have borne out the Israel Government's diagnosis of Nasser's goals. It is clear that a settlement with Israel is low on Nasser's list. The collapse of the Anderson mission only serves to highlight Israel's sense of insecurity. Egypt's acquisition and absorption of arms is proceeding at a disturbingly fast rate. It takes about seven months to train a MIG pilot and it is worthy of note that North Korea attacked seven months after it first received Russian MIGs. With respect to the Secretary's suggestion that Israel look to its customary sources of supply for military equipment, Ambassador Eban said that it was hard to envisage Israel getting any substantial amount of arms unless the U. S. took part. The world knows of Israel's application to the U. S. The November 16th application was filed on the basis of the Secretary's statement to Sharett in Geneva that the U. S. would "give sympathetic consideration" to any application made by Israel. The Israel Government's experience in Europe was that unless there is U. S. action other countries hesitate to provide arms to Israel. The French had informed the Israelis they could not act again in furnishing Mysteres if they were to be acting alone. Ambassador Eban said that if the position of the U. S. is that it is sympathetic in principle with Israel's plight but wants Israel to look to Europe for its arms: (1) the Israel Government would like to have an indication of that given to the European countries; and, (2) the Israel Government would press now especially for 24 F86's and some anti-tank guns from the U. S. If these requests could be granted, the matter would be resolved as far as the Israel Government is concerned, at least for the moment. The Secretary said that the latter request could not be met at the moment, at least while this Government is in the process of reviewing its policies. Ambassador Eban inquired whether that meant there would be no action at all on the Israel Government's request and the Secretary

replied

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- 3 -

replied that it was not possible to give an answer on that now. The Secretary said that he wished to re-emphasize our belief that we have influences in the Arab world, which, if properly asserted, could help in achieving security and peace for Israel. Until those influences have been proved to be of no value, we do not wish to throw them away. It seems obvious that a clear-cut alliance between Israel and the U. S. would not be in Israel's long-term interest. Ambassador Eban commented that Israel did not aspire to that.

might
The Secretary said that he was aware that the Israel Government had forecast the failure of the Anderson mission. While the primary responsibility for its failure rests with Hasser, it had to be noted that the Israel Government had not given complete cooperation. With the issues at stake as grave as they are, this Government must make its own evaluation and analysis. The Secretary said that the Israelis might think our assets in the Arab world useless but we must use our own best judgment. We do not believe we can afford to assume we have no influence with the Arab countries, or even with Egypt. We have tried to play it one way. We can try another. We believe we are serving not only the best interest of this country, but those of Israel.

Ambassador Eban said that with respect to construction at Panat Yasev, it would be important for Israel to know whether it would have the backing of the U. S. in diverting water from the Jordan after the necessary construction outside of the demilitarized zone was completed. The Secretary said that we would go quite a ways to meet that problem. He was not in any way suggesting any permanent renunciation by Israel of its rights in the Jordan. He suggested that this problem be taken up more in detail when Ambassador Johnson returns in about ten days. In the meantime, he said, the Department would be formulating some written suggestions as to how the matter might be dealt with.

Ambassador Eban said that with respect to the Secretary's statement that Israel had not cooperated fully with the Anderson mission, the Israel Government had made clear its full willingness to approach the problem of a settlement on the basis of a direct meeting; it had felt that it was justified in not agreeing to the method of an intermediary because that approach had been tried in connection with the Jordan Valley Development negotiations and had not, as yet, succeeded. He said that Prime Minister Ben Gurion had, all during the time of the Anderson mission, been preoccupied with the problem of arms. If that matter were adequately dealt with, he felt there may be a good possibility of Israel approaching the problem of a settlement at that time through an intermediary.

Ambassador Eban said he hoped that the Department would consider taking action on some one or more of the items in the November 16th list. The Secretary said that we would give consideration to that request.

Ambassador Eban inquired whether there was anything to the reports that the United States would be giving more explicit expression to its responsibilities under the Tripartite Declaration. Mr. Hoover said that in considering

that whole

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- 1 -

that whole question it had been decided to move under U. N. procedures before taking any action pursuant to the Tripartite Declaration. Ambassador Eban said that one of the Israel Government's problems is that the people of Israel do not believe that Israel can rely upon the United States actually taking military action even if there should be an outbreak of hostilities. He said that the discussion in the Security Council over the past few days on the U. S. proposal had confirmed Israel's fears that the Soviets would support any Arab position and could, therefore, be expected to veto any Security action designed to stem Arab aggression. Ambassador Eban said that Israel feels that it is falling seriously behind in the arms situation and that it cannot rely upon outside assistance in the event of aggression; it is, therefore, in an alarming position. The Secretary said that he agreed that the situation was serious and that the Israel Government could be assured that we were taking it seriously. If we do not agree on methods, it does not mean that we do not have the same objectives.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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33

Action

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Control: 17801
Rec'd: MARCH 29, 1956
11:43 AM

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FROM: CAIRO

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1927, MARCH 29, 1 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1927, REPEATED INFORMATION BEIRUT 246, DAMASCUS 177, AMMAN 171, TEL AVIV 230, USUN 58.

REGARDING CURRENT SC (REPEAT SC) ACTION, FAWZI LAST NIGHT SAID "EGYPT FULLY PREPARED COOPERATE TO UTMOST ANY EFFORT AIMED AT ELIMINATING INCIDENTS AND VIOLATION AT DEMARCATION LINES AND IN DEMILITARIZED ZONES AND AIMING AT FULL EMPL-
MENTATION OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND SC RESOLUTIONS CONCERN-
ING THEM. EGYPT EQUALLY READY TO WELCOME VISIT BY HAMMARSKJOLD AND HAD ALREADY SENT HIM MESSAGE TO THAT EFFECT".

IN DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED FAWZI SAID THAT EGYPT ASSUMED THE ABOVE CORRESPONDED TO OUR PURPOSE IN SUBMITTING RESOLUTION. STATED HOWEVER SOME OF NORTHERN STATES EXTREMELY SUSPICIOUS RESOLUTION WAS COVER PLAN FOR SOME OTHER TYPE OF OPERATION, PARTICULARLY PUSHING JORDAN VALLEY PLAN. HE WISHED BE ASSURED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. I TOLD HIM I CERTAIN THE RESOLUTION MEANT EXACTLY WHAT IT SAID AND WAS FINEST EFFORT REDUCE DANGERS ALONG BORDERS. I REGRETTED ARABS HAD SEEN FIT TO DRAW OUT DEBATE, AS THIS GAVE MORE OPPORTUNITY RUSSIA TO CREATE MISCHIEF AND DELAY IMPLEMENTATION. HE REPLIED HE THOUGHT RESOLUTION COULD HAVE GONE THROUGH WITH NO DEBATE HAD WE CONSULTED GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED PRIOR TO OR EVEN AT TIME OF SUBMISSION IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE THEIR SUSPICION THAT SOMETHING HIDDEN IN RESOLUTION.

ECM



BYRQADE
MAY 19 1958

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HBS 74.844/3-2958

674.844/3-2956

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NEA

FROM: CAIRO

Control: 17941

Rec'd: MARCH 29, 1956
2:13 PM

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1930, MARCH 29, 3 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1930, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 170, LONDON 302, TEL AVIV 231, AMMAN 173, BAGHDAD 148, BEIRUT 247, DAMASCUS 178, JIDDA 136.

JOINT STATE-ARMY MESSAGE.

REFERENCE PARAGRAPH TWO EMBTEL 1885.

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IN CONCLUSIVE REPORTS RECENTLY RECEIVED BY ARMY ATTACHE INDICATE THAT NO LOGISTICAL BUILD UP EXISTS IN SINAI SUFFICIENT SUPPORT HEAVY COMBAT UNITS AND MATERIAL NOW DEPLOYED THERE IN EVENT LARGE SCALE MILITARY OPERATIONS.

COMMENT: THIS SEEMS INDICATE EITHER (A) FAILURE APPRECIATE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OR (B) MORE LIKELY, CALCULATED RISK ISRAEL WILL NOT LAUNCH ALL-OUT ATTACK.

BYROADE

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Date 4-1-56

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March 31, 1956
12:30 p.m.

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674.84A/3-3056

54
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NEA

Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1021, March 30, 5 p.m.

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USUN

SENT DEPARTMENT 1021; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 227, LONDON 302, AMMAN 138, BAGHDAD 50, BEIRUT 235, DAMASCUS 166, JIDDA 19

PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE

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In view of fact Embassy Cairo in its 1930 to Department refer to its reports as inconclusive this Embassy submits following supplementary information available USARMA here re Egypt logistical build-up Sinai. Colonel Hommel US Deputy to General Burns states UNTSO observers have seen very large supply dump vicinity Al Arish. Harkabi Commander in Chief IDF Intelligence states Egyptians have chain large dumps along roadways Sinai to canal.

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Control: 18931

Rec'd: March 31, 1956
10:17 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Paris

Info

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 4533, March 31, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4533, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 727, CAIRO 87

We are hearing French speculation that in event of Arab-Israeli hostilities, Egyptian MIG's would be piloted by "Soviet volunteers". As far as we can ascertain this speculation unsupported by specific intelligence.

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We have punched to Paris the pertinent airm telegram, no. 1839 9 2/10/56

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Action

Control: 2251

NEA

Rec'd: April 5, 1956
8:08 a.m.

Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1031, April 4, 5 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1031, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 337

PASS ARMY NAVY AIR

According IDF-FLO and Israeli 3-man patrol was fired on at dusk April 2, by two Egyptian positions located in Israel territory. (MR 09030802) IDF reinforcements entered area, found two dug in positions for LMG's connected by communications trench. One soldier killed, one wounded of patrol. Body dead Israeli soldier found 500 yards within border with "hand cut off", submachine gun and watch stolen, according to IDF. Apparently shot from close range. Ten empty Karl Gustav machine gun cartridges found on scene. Incident headlined April 4 in local press, which reports Israel has requested emergency MAC meeting. Press accounts do not (repeat not) mention allegedly amputated hand.

Following explanation of action written by military correspondent YEDIOTH CHADASHOTH (German language independent):

"At harvesting time great increase Egyptian infiltration always occurs purpose theft of grain. When IDF patrols endeavor capture infiltrators Egyptian covering fire facilitates their escape. Present maneuver represents enlargement this covering activity to extent ambushing and killing patrolling soldiers within Israel. Karl Gustav ammunition indicates soldier was killed by Egyptian army". Herut, however points out Karl Gustav guns used in past by Fadayeen.

April 3, before incident was announced, Foreign Ministry official briefed Embassy officer to effect that Egyptian illegal harvesting and herd grazing infiltration was being stepped-up along Gaza strip. Official took line infiltrators were forced to these actions by Egyptians, who at same time accorded them fire cover.

Comment: Illegal crop harvesting along strip is seasonal and

heavy

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-2- 1031, April 4, 5 p.m., from Tel Aviv

heavy. Israelis claimed 70 percent Kibbutz Kissufim harvest stolen in 1952. Since then loss kept low by technique intensive local patrolling by IDF regulars and Kibbutzniks. For instance IDF tactical units are also stationed Kissufim, Nahal Ox, and other Kibbutzim, additional to regular Kibbutz reservist units.

Israel claims illegal harvesting covered by Egyptian military not (repeat not) new. In spring 1954 IDF similarly charged they afforded both fire cover and accompanying soldier escort (CF EMBTEL 1112, April 26, 1954). 1955 activities this respect not (repeat not) typical due Gaza raid and subsequent Egyptian resort to minings.

This, however, first use of ambush this purpose along strip reported this year. Israelis may respond by strengthening patrols and possibly by sending retaliatory raiding patrol across lines. Strong Israeli patrolling for crop protection and increased infiltration enhance possibility further incidents coming weeks.

LAWSON

MS:CES/1

Note: PASSED ARMY, NAVY, AIR 4/5/56, 10 p.m. RW

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NEA

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 11:00 AM

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FROM: TEL AVIV

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

38

NO: 1036, APRIL 5, 4 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1036, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 339.

SECOND SERIOUS BORDER INCIDENT HEADLINED IN LOCAL PRESS APRIL 5. ACCORDING JERUSALEM POST THREE ISRAELI SOLDIERS KILLED AFTERNOON APRIL 4 WHEN IDF RPT IDF PATROL MOVING VICINITY KISSUFIM IN ISRAEL TERRITORY FIRED ON BY RIFLE, MACHINE GUN AND MORTAR FIRE FROM EGYPTIAN POSITIONS. PATROL RETURNED FIRE, WAS PINNED DOWN, AND HAD TO BE EXTRICATED BY IDF ARTILLERY FIRE ON EGYPTIANS. TWO KILLED ON SPOT, ONE DIED WAY TO HOSPITAL. FIRE DUEL LASTED THREE AND HALF HOURS ACCORDING IDF FLO, WHO SAID DETAILS BEYOND THOSE IN POST NOT YET AVAILABLE. UN REPORT ON INCIDENT ALSO NOT KNOWN HERE.

PRELIMINARY OFFICIAL COMMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL TO EMLASSY OFFICER WAS THEY CONSIDERED "INCIDENT GRAVE AND EXTREMELY AWKWARD" FOLLOWING EGYPTIAN CHIEF OF STAFF'S REJECTION OF GENERAL BURNS REQUEST TWO WEEKS AGO TO CEASE ALL FIRE IN BORDER AREA. SPOKESMAN SAID "DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER EGYPTIAN INTENT WAS PROVOCATION AND CANNOT TELL WHERE IT WILL LEAD". FURTHER DETAILS WILL BE FURNISHED WHEN AVAILABLE. COMMENT: UNCUSTOMARY DELAY IN IDF MAKING ITS REPORT AVAILABLE TO EMEASSY MAY INDICATE THAT FACTS OF INCIDENT ARE NOT AS BLACK AND WHITE AS PRESS AND FOREIGN MINISTRY WOULD HAVE US BELIEVE.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

APR 6 - 1956

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FROM : AMEMBASSY, TEL AVIV

612
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

April 5, 1956

REF : -

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SUBJECT: Nasser's Alleged Fear of Israeli Commando Troops

Yedioth Hayom (German language independent) of March 29 carried a story to the above effect, citing the "New York correspondent of the London Daily Express". The story was reported in Israel by INA (Israel News Agency). The paper's story is brief:

"Nasser is afraid to attack Israel because he fears Israeli paratroop commandos, who are particularly trained to blow up dams, thereby causing large floods, writes the New York correspondent of the London Daily Express."

"Besides the commando units stationed near the Egyptian border and a bomber squadron specially maintained for this purpose (blowing up dams), it is related that Israel also has saboteurs stationed near the Nile, in Eritrea."

"These Israeli commando troops are supposed to blow up the Aswan Dam and the dams protecting Cairo as soon as a war breaks out."

COMMENT: Regardless of its origins and purely speculative nature, the story does pinpoint a mode of warfare in which the Israeli's are very well trained and to which it is generally believed they will extensively resort. Israeli "café strategists", heretofore have generally visualized the paratroopers being used for purposes of blocking strategic roads, seizing isolated communication centers, or seizing airports. The seizure of airports particularly is conceived of as a prime function.

Such conversation, although by "civilians", probably has significance; Israel is a very small country and most of the young civilian population has some military connection.

The reference in this article to Eritrea gives pause, since a sizeable Israeli firm operates out of there. This is the meat packaging company Hervrat Yam Suf (Red Sea Company), which is jointly owned by the GOI (51%) and Incode (45%), the latter a Swiss

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firm founded by Yaacov Meridor and Arie Ben Eliezer, both former deputy commanders of the IZL (Irgun Zvai Leumi, a mandate terrorist organization) and present members of Knesset (Parliament) for Herut. This firm had earlier confined its operation to Eritrea, but it has now expanded some of its activities to Djibuti.

The drafting officer, however, has never heard any rumors locally that Herut, or the GOI, might be using Eritrea as a base for discreet preparation of commando or terrorist activities, and in view of its distance from Egypt the entire concept may be far-fetched. The same applies to Djibuti. The U.S. Army Attache also doubts whether any activity in Eritrea would escape the attention of the Ethiopian Palace police, in which case it would be stopped and could seriously affect the company's status there.

Still, if any advantages could accrue from use of Djibuti, it is probable that the Israel organization would have both the inclination and the ability to utilize it.

For the Ambassador:



William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

CC: Asmara, Cairo, London.

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

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4:05 P.M.

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WITH REGARD TO YESTERDAY'S REPORTED ARTILLERY DUEL STARTING AT 1:00 P.M. ALONG BORDERS FOLLOWING MAY BE OF INTEREST.

MY CALL ON NASSER LASTED FROM 12 NOON TO 2:35 P.M. IN COURSE OF EXTREMELY RELAXED CONVERSATION HE RESPONDED TO REFERENCE BY ME ABOUT FISHING BY STATING THAT GENERAL HAKIM AMER WAS ON VACATION AT RED SEA DOING JUST THAT. HE WAS NOT (REPEAT NOT) INTERRUPTED (WHICH IS OFTEN THE CASE) BY ANY TELEPHONE MESSAGE. WHOLE ATMOSPHERE WAS SUCH THAT I FEEL CERTAIN THAT NASSER DID NOT (REPEAT NOT) KNOW FIGHTING WAS TAKING PLACE.

BYROADE

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FROM: CAIR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1994, APRIL 6, 5 PM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1994, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY TEL
AVIV 234, PRIORITY JERUSALEM 123, PRIORITY USUN 62, LONDON,
PARIS, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT UNNUMBERED.

THE SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED LAST NIGHT 29 MEN 11 WOMEN TWO CHILDREN
KILLED AND 59 MEN 25 WOMEN AND 19 CHILDREN WOUNDED RESULT
ISRAELI ARTILLERY SHELLING OF GAZA DEIR AL BALAH AND KHAN
YOUNES AFTERNOON APRIL FIVE. SPOKESMAN SAID ISRAELI PATROL
OPENED FIRE ON EGYPTIAN POSITION AT 1:00 PM FOLLOWED BY
ARTILLERY FIRE ON DEIR AL BALAH AND LATER ON OTHER TOWNS.
EGYPTIAN ARMY "IMMEDIATELY REPELLED AGGRESSORS AND SHELLED
ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS KISSOUFIM, AIN ALLOUSHA, AND AN-NOUAYIF".

SPOKESMAN ADDED THAT IN FURTHER "CLASHES" LASTING UNTIL
6:30 PM SEVEN EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS WERE WOUNDED. REGARDING
ISRAELIS USE ARTILLERY HE SAID "ISRAEL USUALLY ATTACKED
EGYPTIAN POSITIONS WITH SMALL ARMS FIRE. ISRAEL OBVIOUSLY
MEANT TO CAUSE GRAVE LOSSES AMONG CIVILIANS IN TOWNS CROWDED
WITH PALESTINIAN REFUGEES".

ABOVE DESCRIBED AS BASED ON "PRELIMINARY REPORTS". PRESS
SAID EGYPTIAN UNITED NATIONS DELEGATE LUTFI HAD SENT URGENT
LETTER UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL THIS SUBJECT FOR
TRANSMITTAL SC PRESIDENT.

MAJOR SIDQI (PALESTINE AFFAIRS OFFICER IN CHARGE DURING
GOHAR'S ABSENCE) SAID DEATHS HAVE NOW REACHED 60. WOUNDED
FIGURE ABOUT THE SAME ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE GREATER. SIDQI HAS
MADE ORAL COMPLAINT TO MAC WHICH NOW INVESTIGATING ON SPOT.

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-2- 1994, APRIL 6, 5 PM FROM CAIRO

HE WAS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER EGYPT WOULD FILE WRITTEN COMPLAINT AND ASK EMERGENCY MEETING "WHAT IS THE USE", HE SAID.

ACCORDING SIDQI ISRAELIS USED 25 POUNDS AND 120 MM MORTARS. LATTER, FROM WHICH MOST CASUALTIES CAME, ARE PROHIBITED FROM THIS AREA UNDER ARTICLE SEVEN OF GAA AND MAC HAS PREVIOUSLY CONDEMNED ISRAEL FOR USING THEM.

SIDQI OBVIOUSLY DEEPLY DISTRESSED BY INCIDENT. HE POINTED OUT ISRAELIS HAD DELIBERATELY SHELLED CIVILIAN POPULATION AND COMMENTED: "THIS IS THEIR ANSWER TO HAMMARSKJOLD'S MISSION. THIS IS THEIR REPLY TO UNITED NATIONS".

SIDQI SAID ISRAELIS HAD SHELLED TWO EGYPTIAN MILITARY POSITIONS BETWEEN 8:00 AM AND 8:30 THIS MORNING BUT ALL WAS NOW QUIET IN AREA.

BYROADE

JMD

NOTE: PASSED OSD, ARMY, NAVY & AIR 4/6/56 4:45 PM JEF
: Mr. Bergus' office (NE) notified 5:20 p.m. 4/6/CWO-JRL

APR 20 1956

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 UOP SENT DEPARTMENT 1039, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY
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 SCA PASS ARMY, NAVY AIR
 OLI

 OCB IDF FLO FURNISHED USARMA WITH FOLLOWING CHRONOLOGY EXTENDED
 USIA ARTILLERY AND MORTAR BATTLE ALONG GAZA STRIP APRIL 5: 0830.
 CIA IDF PATROL (KISUFIM 094091) RECEIVED RIFLE AND MG FIRE ABOUT
 OSD 20 MINUTES. 0925. SAME OCCURRED, SAME PATROL. 1015. NUMBER
 ARMY EGYPTIANS CROSSED BORDER (098090) BEER. IDF PATROL OPENED
 NAVY FIRE, DROVE THEM BACK. 1130. INFANTRY PATROL FIRED AT WITH
 AIR RIFLE AND MG (MESALFIN AREA 107102) EXCHANGE OF FIRE LASTED
 15 MINUTES. 1215. IDF PATROL FIRED AT KISUFIM AREA. 1335.
 SAME PATROL OPENED FIRE WITH MG PATROL IN OPEN TERRAIN. IDF
 USED ARTILLERY SUCCESSFULLY TO GET PATROL OUT. 1500. EGYPTIANS
 USED 120 MM ON KISUFIM AND EIN HASHLOSHA (MR 903084)
 WHEN FIRE OPENED ON KIBBUTZ IDF USED ARTILLERY FOR COUNTER
 BATTERY. EGYPTIANS HIT CHILDREN'S HOUSE AT KISUFIM, CASUALTIES
 UNKNOWN. 1630. EGYPTIANS OPENED FIRE WITH 120 MM ON NAHAL OZ
 (MR 102098). 1645. IDF OPENED WITH ARTILLERY COUNTER BATTERY
 FIRE AND EGYPTIAN FIRE STOPPED.

UN OBSERVERS IN AREA. FIRE CEASED 1845 HOURS.

 SOME OF ISRAELI PRESS REPORTS EGYPTIAN CHARGE IN UN APRIL 5
 THAT ISRAELIS OPENED FIRE 1230 AM. IDF FLO DENIED THIS,
 CHARACTERIZED IT AS "LYING IN TEETH" AND INSISTED ABOVE
 CHRONOLOGY STRICTLY ACCURATE.

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-2- 1039, APRIL 6, FROM TEL AVIV

RELIABLE SOURCE CONTACTED USARMA 1800 HOURS APRIL 5, ADVISED ISRAELI "MORTAR FIRE" HAD HIT NEAR BUS STATION IN GAZA, CAUSING BULK OF CASUALTIES. WHEN QUERIED FLO COMMENTED IDF FIRST USED ARTILLERY COUNTER FIRE AT 1515 HOURS ("EEZ# ROUNDS AGAINST 120MM MORTARS") AGAIN AT 1645 HOURS ALSO AGAINST SAME. HE SAID 120 MM MORTAR POSITIONS WERE IN "OUTSKIRTS GAZA". ACCORDING FLO ONLY 120 MM MORTARS USED BEFORE THIS. (NB 120 MM MORTAR HAS RANGE TO REACH GAZA.)

CONFLICTING REPORTS MAKE IT STILL UNCERTAIN WHERE AND WHEN IDF FIRE BEGAN, WHERE AND FROM WHAT WEAPONS MOST CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OCCURRED. EMBASSY ENDEAVORING FURTHER CLARIFY THIS.

FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN COMMENTED APRIL 5 AS FOLLOWS: "REPORTED REGRETABLE LOSS OF LIFE AT GAZA IS INEVITABLE BOOMERANG EFFECT OF EGYPTIAN RECKLESS FOLLY.

"IN FACE REPEATED WARNINGS EGYPTIAN FORCES HAVE HARASSED ISRAEL BORDER DAY IN, DAY OUT FOR MANY MONTHS. DESPITE REPEATED ADMONITIONS BY UN THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT OBSTINATELY REFUSED TO ISSUE A CEASE-FIRE ORDER."

"EGYPTIAN FORTIFIED POSITIONS ALONG GAZA BORDER PERSISTENTLY OPENED FIRE WITHOUT SLIGHTEST PROVOCATION ON ISRAEL PATROLS MOVING ON FOOT ALONG CUSTOMARY BEAT INSIDE ISRAEL TERRITORY AND ON ISRAELS STATIONARY OBSERVATION POSTS.

"WEDNESDAY SUCH A PATROL WAS TAKEN UNDER MACHINE-GUN AND MORTAR FIRE. TWO SOLDIERS KILLED OUTRIGHT AND ONE MORTALLY WOUNDED. ARTILLERY HAD TO BE USED TO EXTRICATE SURVIVORS FROM DEATH-TRAP."

"DAY BEFORE ANOTHER SOLDIER LOST LIFE IN AN EGYPTIAN AMBUSH. TODAY SIMILAR UNPROVOKED ATTACK OCCURRED AND SEVERAL ISRAEL VILLAGES WERE SHELLED FROM EGYPTIAN POSITIONS SUFFERING CASULTIES AND DESTRUCTION."

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-3- 1039, APRIL 6, FROM TEL AVIV

"RETURN FIRE BECAME IMPERATIVE AND UNAVOIDABLE." FONMIN SHARETT CALLED GEN BURNS FOR INTERVIEW APRIL 5, AND ACCORDING "JERUSALEM POST" "POINTED TO GRAVE CONSEQUENCES LIABLE TO RESULT FROM UNCEASING EGYPTIAN ATTACKS IF THEY NOT STOPPED. ISRAEL MUST RESERVE TO HERSELF AS MATTER OF COURSE FREEDOM OF ACTION IN SELF DEFENSE."

LAWSON

VMM

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1040, April 6, 11 a.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1040, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 341

PASS ARMY NAVY AIR.

Re EMBTEL 1039.

Reliable source referred to reference telegram UN observer.

On April 6 USARMA ascertained from UNTSO that so far they believed IDF began firing 120 m.m. mortars at 1150 hours (40 rounds), followed by five rounds 120 m.m. at 1335 hours. Bulk of civilian casualties caused by these shells striking within Gaza town. UN observer said his only casualty figures so far derived Egyptian reports.

He confirmed IDF-FLO account to effect IDF first used artillery circa 1515 hours.

In response USARMA's inquiry latter subject FLO said artillery used "probably 25 pounders".

LAWSON

SW:JHF/7

Note: Passed Army, Navy, Air 4/6/56, 12:20 p.m. HJP.

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TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1041, April 6, 11 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1041, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 342, LONDON 305, PARIS 229.

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Reference EMBTEL 1039.

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It has been apparent since March 5 (EMBTEL 896) that Egypt in efforts interdict Israel activities along Israeli side Gaza border would, if continued, result in IDF counter-measures. Egyptian tactics intermittent firing at Israel patrols, fire cover for infiltrators and mining activities clearly posed the question whether Nasser would be permitted to deny to Israel effective control and use of its own territory along the border.

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Decision this issue appears to have been precipitated by incident April 2, EMBTEL 1031 which disclosed new Egyptian ambush technique. There is strong evidence that senior IDF officers were convened Tel Aviv morning April 4 and it appears probable in light subsequent developments that new instructions were issued. Previous orders here to return Egyptian fire with same type weapon at target from which Egyptian firing had emanated.

As anticipated in paragraph 7, EMBTEL 970, I believe yesterday's events reflect Israeli conviction that they must react firmly and if necessary violently to breaches GAA and that, unless they do, Arabs with their newly-acquired confidence will make life unbearable along Israel's long and exposed frontiers. GOI and Israel public are aware of risks involved but are prepared to accept them, perceiving no alternative if they are to survive.

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MESSAGE

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38-36

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1046, April 6, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1046, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 343

PASS ARMY NAVY AIR

Foreign Ministry official advised Embassy officer Egyptians broke cease-fire of previous evening with MG fire on IDF patrol near Kissufim Circa 0800 hours April 6. Intensive firing developed which stopped 0915 hours. Official explained April 5 incident as Egyptian effort stop Israel border patrolling which considered essential against persistence Arab infiltrators and espionage agents. Prime Minister repeatedly made cease-fire offers since September 15 but all rejected by Egyptians. He said situation considered very serious by GOI and unconditional cease-fire along entire border binding on both sides required to preserve peace.

Due gravity situation and continuance of firing April 6 I have requested on own initiative appointment with Sharett for this afternoon. In absence further instructions I will stress critical importance strict cease-fire observance, emphasize US interest most genuine cooperation with General Burns of both sides and elicit as much information as possible.

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Rec'd: April 7, 1956
10:36 a.m.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1047, April 6, 7 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1047. REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 344, AMMAN 139, BEIRUT 237, DAMASCUS 167, LONDON 306, PARIS 230.

At interview requested by me April 6 Sharett, after reviewing background and April 5 Gaza incident, said he wished to discuss what he termed "a very serious situation"--the possibility renewal Fedayeen attacks.

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He said that GOI had received report from reliable source that within past few days Nasser had ordered renewal of Fedayeen activities, raids however to be made from other Arab countries, not Gaza or Egypt. Information did not reveal whether contemplated action would be sponsored by governments involved or carried out by private agents of Nasser in those countries. GOI interpretation of this report was that in all probability Nasser planned primarily to utilize Jordan, in which connection following is known:

(1). Jordan already "infested" with Egyptian agents since Nasser "playing big game" for instance, head of operations (sic) Arab Legion is agent for him in Amman, although unclear whether out of financial or political opportunistic considerations.

(2). Long Jordan-Israel border is easily penetrable, and adjoins most thickly populated areas of Israel, and effect of terrorist attacks increases in direct ratio to density of population.

He had passed this information to General Burns morning April 6 urging strongest possible warning by UN to Egypt and other countries. He said decision whether or not to make this information public had been difficult one, but GOI had decided not to do so for time being. This was "calculated risk", but GOI did not wish to rouse public yet latter would be deprived of warning. (I informed him his comments would be transmitted to Department without delay for which

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-2- 1047, April 6, 7 p.m., from Tel Aviv.

for which he seemed grateful, feeling that no opportunity to impress Nasser and other neighboring governments of seriousness such attacks regardless of origin should be missed).

Comment: After terminating discussion April 5 firing, Sharett said he had "even worse news" his earlier comments on Fedayeen forays (EMBTLS 510, 532, 535) have already made clear he regards them as most dangerous resort used to date by Arabs.

Department will recall accuracy of August 1955 GOI intelligence prediction along this line (EMBTLS 172) and that GOI blamed Egypt for instigation and direction short November 1955 Fedayeen flare-up emanating Jordan. Strong convictions expressed referenced cables, and Sharett's present remarks, indicate GOI immediately would meet any new outbreak terrorist attacks with full-blown prima-facie case against Nasser.

It is suggested that Department may wish support UN approach to have governments possibly involved with warning of almost certain very vigorous reaction Israel to renewal Fedayeen operations whether officially or privately inspired and regardless of base used. Sharett fully aware Arabs may utilize this method in endeavor provoke military action by Israel and thus have latter branded as "aggressor".

LAWSON

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1048, April 6, 11 p.m., (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1048, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 345, PARIS 231, LONDON 307, AMMAN 140, BEIRUT 238, DAMASCUS 178.

At my request (EMBTel 1046) Foreign Minister Sharett received me in Tel Aviv afternoon April 6. I opened conversation by explaining that I was calling on my own initiative because of the recent outbreak, in order to stress the critical importance of strict cease-fire observance and to emphasize US interest in cooperation with General Burns of both sides. I added that I also wished to obtain information, and particularly his appraisal of events.

Sharett thanked me for this interest, and proceeded to review episodes of April 5 and GOI latest contacts with General Burns re cease-fire.

His rationale followed outline Foreign Ministry statement included EMBTEL 1039. He examined bona fides of explanations and proposals of Nasser on subject of firing on patrols as follows:

1. Nasser's earlier explanation he could not order no firing across border by his troops and that firing performed only on IDF vehicle patrols because of natural fear his forces these patrols were in act of launching attack was "rabid nonsense." No soldiers in right mind would initiate attack across open country openly exposed in vehicles. Furthermore most IDF patrols were on foot, and Egyptians have now crystallized standard practice of firing on them. Such fire also not limited to patrols but directed at fixed observation points from which attack could not be expected. Thus Nasser's explanation completely nullified.

2. Nasser's conclusion this context that forces should be withdrawn 500 meters from line was based on present disposition Egyptian forces, since their outposts are situated about 500 meters from border. Nasser therefore could "implement plan" with no change his system, whereas Israelis would have make

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1048, April 6, 11 p.m., (Sig 1 of 2) from Tel Aviv

substantial alterations.

After dwelling at some length on his experience of almost daily firing of Israeli patrols which fortunately produced no casualties, and then underscoring April 4 incident which 3 young soldiers killed in Egyptian mortar and machine gun fire, he gave detailed timetable of (#) Egyptians opened fire on Israeli settlements for first time with mortars at 1500 hours. IDF returned artillery fire to several outposts issuing mortar fire. Meantime Egyptians extended front by firing on other Kibbutzim. Since IDF artillery bombardment Egyptian outposts failed stop their fire, "at 2 p.m. we directed fire at their villages".

Commenting on April 4 meeting with Burns, Sharett repeated substantially same account as in Jerusalem 398 to Department but made several amplifications. He felt it would not break confidence to reveal that in response to Sharett's questions concerning large number Israeli complaints submitted on firing across line, General Burns replied that he felt in general GOI complaints were justified, although he might have differences on details. When in past General Burns had proposed "collative measures" to calm border he did so with assumption both sides wanted to cooperate. He now no longer assumed other side was interested.

The Burns-Sharett chat was interrupted by phone call Chairman Egyptian MAC demanding GOI stop fire. General Burns proposed midnight as cease-fire deadline, Sharett communicated this to Ben Gurion, and "Ben Gurion had already given orders to stop fire, propose testing Egyptian reaction." Sharett added this was at dusk.

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(#) Caution. Correction to follow.

Note: Mr. Frye (NEA) notified 6:30 p.m., 4/7/CWO-JRL

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APR 20 1956

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CORRECTED PAGE -2

4/8/56 3:10 p.m. (BB)

-2- 1048, April 6, 11 p.m., (Sec 1 of 2) from Tel Aviv

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substantial alterations.

After dwelling at some length on lone experience of almost daily firing on Israeli patrols which fortunately produced no casualties, and then underscoring April 4 incident which 3 young soldiers killed by Egyptian mortar and machine gun fire, he gave detailed timetable of separate incidents April 5. Sharett said Egyptians opened fire on Israel settlements for first time with mortars at 1500 hours. IDF returned artillery fire to silence outposts issuing mortar fire. Meantime Egyptians extended front by firing on other Kibbutzim. Since IDF artillery bombardment Egyptian outposts failed stop their fire, "at 5 p.m., we directed fire at their villages".

Commenting on April 4 meeting with Burns, Sharett repeated substantially same account as in Jerusalem 398 to Department but made several amplifications. He felt it would not break confidence to reveal that in response to Sharett's questions concerning large number Israeli complaints submitted on firing across line, General Burns replied that he felt in general GOI complaints were justified, although he might have differences on details. When in past General Burns had proposed "palliative measures" to calm border he did so with assumption both sides wanted to cooperate. He now no longer assumed other side was interested.

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Note: Mr. Frye (NEA) notified 6:30 p.m., 4/7/CWO-JRL.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1048, April 6, 11 p.m., (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1048, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 345, PARIS 231,
LONDON 307, AMMAN 140, BEIRUT 238, DAMASCUS 168.P
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April 6 General Burns made special request to Israelis temporarily to suspend patrolling, with understanding this would only be extraordinary temporary measure not to be considered precedential. Ben Gurion agreed to this as measure cooperative action and in view of Hammarskjold's visit to area and as quid pro quo for Secretary General to endeavor obtain Egyptian consent to issue orders no firing across borders. Sharett commented this was not easy decision for Ben Gurion since "it prejudices our position and gives appearance of yielding under pressure criminal violence". In reply my question as to time limitation this agreement he indicated no specific time but in nature few days trial. Sharett said he had recommended as agenda for Secretary General in order decreasing importance:

1. He endeavor secure complete cease-fire covering all surrounding countries (Sharett especially feared Jordan this respect and cited March 30 Wadi Ara ambush).

2. Obtain reduction forces in defensive zones to conformity with GAA provisions.

3. Obtain complete observance all details GAA. Sharett commented Arab States are now expressing negative view they do not wish anything added to area guarantees beyond GAA. GOI desires that GAA at least be rigidly observed, whether or not supplemented by additional arrangements.

I expressed gratification at GOI agreement to General Burns proposal to withdraw patrols and cease-fire, and disposition to work closely with General Burns these critical times. Sharett said he was grateful for my call and pleased to discuss situation.

Comment: Sharett appeared relatively relaxed at interview, and although he mentioned resumption of firing this morning he did not

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-2- 1048, April 6, 11 p.m.. (Sec 2 of 2) from Tel Aviv

magnify it into portending further deterioration. He seemed anxious to underline basic and continuous provocations which took form of Egyptian firing on foot patrols ultimately resulting Israeli mortalities and especially to point up fact Egypt first shelled Israeli villages before IDF turned artillery fire from Egyptian gun positions to Egyptian villages. Although not specifically gained at interview my impression is that GOI regards reported heavy loss Arab life as retaliation enough and are not planning any further specific moves. Attitude now is probably "wait and see" to judge nature and magnitude Egyptian response, which Israelis believe may be in form Fedayeen (EMBTel 1047). There also some speculation as to ability or desire Egypt to control highly excited Gaza refugees.

Although slight mobilization civilian trucks observed today, there has been no large scale action discernible. Foreign Office informs me "all quiet" Gaza front as of 1800 hours tonight.

PASS ARMY NAVY AIR.

LAWSON

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Note: Mr. Frye (NEA) notified 6:30 p.m., 4/7/CWO-JRL

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NEAControl: 2735
Rec'd: April 5, 1956
11:18 p.m.Info
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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 397, April 6, 1 a.m.

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L SENT DEPARTMENT 397, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY AMMAN 180,
IO PRIORITY BEIRUT 101, PRIORITY DAMASCUS 102, PRIORITY CAIRO 220,
USUN PRIORITY TEL AVIV 200.UOP
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Serious incidents Gaza area and related developments report in this and immediately following NIACT telegrams.

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Following is substance UNTSO report UNHQ April 5 incidents Gaza area on April 4 and 5. On April 4 Israeli MAC delegation alleged that at 1300 local time an Israeli Army patrol came under machine gun and light (#) fire was directed at Egyptian controlled territory. 38 shells said to have landed in Deir El Balla village and vicinity.

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Four more complaints were lodged by Israelis, one alleging that unexploded mine was found, three alleging firing across D/L by Egyptian position at Israeli patrols.

Only results investigation concerned second Egyptian complaint. Observer found 48 impacts in Deir El Balla village and vicinity and some noses of 25 pounder shells.

On April 5 at 1320 local time shelling began in vicinity Hill 8 at MR892878 in Egyptian territory. At 1520 observer stationed in observation post reported concentrated shelling of Deir El Balla village. At 1639 mortar shells reportedly landing Gaza town. Several casualties were reported there together with firing on several places along D/L, with mortar shells landing Gaza main street. MAC chairman requested both parties order immediate cease-fire. At 1714 heavy firing still heard south of Gaza. Chairman estimated some 8 mortar shells landed in Gaza town. At 1928 he again requested cease-fire effective 2000 local time. After reported all quiet.

Colonel Hommel of UNTSO informed me at 2300 April 5 that according

Egyptian

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-2- 397, April 6, 1 a.m., from Jerusalem

Egyptian statement 42 persons killed in Gaza, of whom 17 were children. In addition 102 reportedly wounded. These figures not confirmed, but Hommel expects further record from MAC chairman very shortly.

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(#) Omission approximately 500 characters. Correction to follow.

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 397, APRIL 6, 1956

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SENT DEPARTMENT 397, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY AMMAN 180,
PRIORITY BEIRUT 101, PRIORITY DAMASCUS 102, PRIORITY CAIRO 220,
PRIORITY TEL AVIV 200.

SERIOUS INCIDENTS GAZA AREA AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS REPORT IN THIS
AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING NIACT TELEGRAMS.

FOLLOWING IS SUBSTANCE UNTSO REPORT UNHQ APRIL 5 INCIDENTS GAZA
AREA ON APRIL 4 AND 5. ON APRIL 4 ISRAELI MAC DELEGATION ALLEGED
THAT AT 1300 LOCAL TIME AN ISRAELI ARMY PATROL CAME UNDER MACHINE
GUN AND LIGHT MORTAR FIRE IN NUSEIRAT AREA. TWO ISRAELI
KILLED AND THIRD HAS DIED OF WOUNDS. REINFORCEMENTS SENT TO
SCENE WERE ABLE EVACUATE DEAD AND WOUNDED BY HEAVY FIRING.

AT 1245 LOCAL TIME APRIL 4 (ACCORDING TO STATEMENT OF EGYPTIAN
DELEGATE) ISRAELI POSITION IN DEIR EL BALLA AREA (MR 942905)
OPENED AUTOMATIC FIRE ON EGYPTIAN POSITION WHICH LASTED UNTIL
1700 HOURS. ONE EGYPTIAN SOLDIER KILLED. IN A SECOND COMPLAINT
EGYPTIANS CLAIMED THAT AT 1820 HOURS ARTILLERY FIRE WAS DIRECTED
AT EGYPTIAN CONTROLLED TERRITORY. 38 SHELLS SAID TO HAVE LANDED
IN DEIR EL BALLA VILLAGE AND VICINITY.

FOUR MORE COMPLAINTS WERE LODGED BY ISRAELIS, ONE ALLEGING THAT
UNEXPLODED MINE WAS FOUND, THREE ALLEGING FIRING ACROSS BY
EGYPTIAN POSITION AT ISRAELI PATROLS.

ONLY RESULTS INVESTIGATION CONCERNED SECOND EGYPTIAN COMPLAINT.
OBSERVER FOUND 48 IMPACTS IN DEIR EL BALLA VILLAGE AND VICINITY AND
SOME NOSES OF 25 POUNDER SHELLS.

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-3- 307, APRIL 6, 1 AM FROM JERUSALEM

ON APRIL 5 AT 1300 LOCAL TIME SHELLING BEGAN IN VICINITY HILL 86 AT 61 892878 IN EGYPTIAN TERRITORY. AT 1520 OBSERVER STATIONED IN OBSERVATION POST REPORTED CONCENTRATED SHELLING OF DEIR EL BALLA VIL. VOL. AT 1639 MORTAR SHELLS REPORTEDLY LANDING GAZA TOWN. SEVERAL CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED THERE TOGETHER WITH FIRING ON SEVERAL PLACES ALONG D/L, WITH MORTAR SHELLS LANDING GAZA MAIN STREET. MAC CHAIRMAN REQUESTED BOTH PARTIES ORDER IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE. AT 1714 HEAVY FIRING STILL HEARD SOUTH OF GAZA. CHAIRMAN ESTIMATED SOME 8 MORTAR SHELLS LANDED IN GAZA TOWN. AT 1938 HE AGAIN REQUESTED CEASE-FIRE EFFECTIVE 2000 LOCAL TIME. LATER REPORTED ALL QUIET.

CORONEL HOMMEL OF UNTSO INFORMED ME AT 2300 APRIL 5 THAT ACCORDING EGYPTIAN STATEMENT 42 PERSONS KILLED IN GAZA, OF WHOM 17 WERE CHILDREN. IN ADDITION 102 REPORTEDLY WOUNDED. THESE FIGURES NOT CONFIRMED, BUT HOMMEL EXPECTS FURTHER RECORD FROM MAC CHAIRMAN VERY SHORTLY.

COLE

VLMMA:GAK

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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 399, April 6, 10 a.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 399; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY AMMAN 182,
PRIORITY BEIRUT 103, PRIORITY DAMASCUS 104, PRIORITY CAIRO 222,
PRIORITY TEL AVIV 202, PRIORITY LONDON 122, PRIORITY PARIS 114.

Reference: Consulate General telegram 398, Gaza incidents.

General Burns has just given me (0900 local time) summary situation
which as follows, based on reports from MAC Chairman.

Firing in progress morning April 6 southeast of Gaza consisting
Israeli mortar fire against Egyptian position. MAC Chairman has
again called for cease-fire and Burns has been in contact with
Eytan same purpose. Burns expressed fears firing may again become
widespread unless appeals heeded without delay. He described
situation in Gaza town as bad. Crowds have formed and their
attitude is threatening. As result, observers unable investigate
Egyptian reports of casualties said to total 42 killed and 102
wounded. Pending verification, Burns thought these figures should
be viewed with reserve.

Burns has cancelled plans proceed Rome today.

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MAM:WEB/12

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11:09 AM

FROM: JERUSALEM

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 400, APRIL 6, 3 PM.

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REACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 400, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY AMMAN 183, PRIORITY BEIRUT 104, PRIORITY DAMASCUS 105, PRIORITY CAIRO 223, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 203, PRIORITY LONDON 123, PRIORITY PARIS 115.

COLONEL HOMMEL OF UNTSO HAS GIVEN ME FURTHER DETAILS REGARDING GAZA INCIDENTS AS AVAILABLE AT 1100 LOCAL TIME APRIL 6.

ACCORDING ISRAELI STATEMENTS IN RETALIATION FOR KILLING OF 3 SOLDIERS ON PATROL, ISRAELIS ON APRIL 4 AND FIVE DIRECTED WEAPONS FIRE, INCLUDING ARTILLERY AND 120MM MORTARS AT GAZA, DEIR EL BALAH, AND PROBABLY TWO OTHER VILLAGES IN GAZA STRIP. SOME EIGHT MORTAR SHELLS (OF 120 MM SIZE) LANDED.

GAZA TOWN EVIDENTLY ARMED AT BUS STATION. EGYPTIANS NOW CLAIM 46 CIVILIANS KILLED AND 104 INJURED IN GAZA ALONE, BUT UNTSO ANTICIPATES DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING CONFIRMATION SUCH FIGURES. GAZA POPULATION IN UGLY MOOD WITH INDICATIONS AT 0900 HOURS TODAY OF POSSIBLE RIOTING LATER, ALTHOUGH EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE INDICATED THEY PREPARED CONTROL RIOTING.

OBSERVERS REPORTS INDICATE ISRAELI FIRING INTO GAZA STRIP WAS RESUMED ABOUT 0900 APRIL 5. OBSERVER COUNTED 40 ROUNDS ABOUT 1130 HOURS AND FEW MORE ROUNDS ABOUT 1330, CONSISTING MORTARS OR ARTILLERY LANDING IN EGYPTIAN CONTROLLED TERRITORY. DEIR EL BALAH AREA SHELLED AGAIN ON APRIL 5 AT ABOUT 1430 HOURS. OBSERVER SAW EGYPTIAN POSITION FIRING ON KIBBUTZ AT KISSUFIM, PROBABLY WITH MORTARS, ABOUT 1600. HOMMEL POINTS OUT, HOWEVER, THAT IN CONTRADICTION GAZA FOR INSTANCE,

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400, APRIL 6, 3 PM., DROM JERUSALEM.

INSTANCE, KISSUFIM IS A REST CAMP AND WEAPONS POSITIONS OFTEN LOCATED ITS IMMEDIATE VICINITY.

REPORTS FROM OBSERVERS HAVE BEEN DELAYED BY JAMMING OF LOCAL UNTSO RADIO CHANNELS IN GAZA AREA. THEY HAVE VERIFIED KILLING OF THREE ISRAELI SOLDIERS APRIL 4 BUT HAVE NOT VERIFIED EGYPTIAN ALLEGATION THAT EGYPTIAN SOLDIER KILLED. ISRAELI DELEGATION ASSURED MAC CHAIRMAN THIS MORNING THAT ISRAELI FORCES WILL OBSERVE CEASE-FIRE WHETHER EGYPTIANS DO SO OR NOT.

WANTON FIRING ON CIVILIANS IN GAZA TOWN AND IN VILLAGES APPEARS REPRESENT DEPARTURE MORE RECENT ISRAELI POLICY OF CONFINING RETALIATION EFFORTS TO MEMBERS ARMED FORCES AND IS EVIDENTLY LARGEST ATTACK DIRECTED AGAINST CIVILIAN POPULATION SINCE QIBYA INCIDENT. UNCLEAR WHY ISRAELIS HAVE CHOSEN PRESENT MOMENT FOR THIS LARGE-SCALE "RETALIATION".

COLE

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APR 20 1956

INCOMING TELEGRAM

John KB
 Department of State

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Control:

Rec'd:

3207

April 6, 1956

1:34 p.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 401. April 6, 5 p.m.

NIACT

SAINT DEPARTMENT 401; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY AMMAN 184,
 PRIORITY BEIRUT 105, PRIORITY CAIRO 24, PRIORITY DAMASCUS 106,
 PRIORITY LONDON 124, PRIORITY PARIS 116, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 204.

With reference CONGEN telegram 400 and previous, UNTSO has now
 given me following figures Egyptian casualties April 5 shooting
 as verified by observers:

Civilian dead, according hospital records: men 30; women 15;
 children 10; total civilian dead 55.

Military dead seen by observers, 1; wounded 4. In addition,
 Egyptians claim 3 dead removed to Cairo.

Civilian wounded, seen by observers: men 56; women 33;
 children 13; total 102.

UNTSO understands observers reports cover total of casualties
 FOA Gaza strip and not (repeat not) merely for town of Gaza.
 Observers counted 69 craters of 120 millimeter mortar shells
 in Gaza and immediate vicinity. Egyptians claim 82 such mortar
 shells fell that area. Baptist Hospital Gaza hit and several
 persons injured there. No casualties to Americans so far as known.

Verified Israeli casualties 5 April were 4 civilians and 2 mili-
 tary personnel wounded.

UNTSO has received no further reports firing since this morning

COLE

BB:GWL/2

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CENTRAL

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Control: 3216

Rec'd: April 6, 1956
1:25 p.m.

FROM: Amman

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 542, April 6, 2 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 542 REPEATED INFORMATION BAGHDAD 93, BEIRUT
180, CAIRO 167, DAMASCUS 152, TEL AVIV 84, JERUSALEM, LONDON
UNNUMBERED.

Press reports Israeli's shelled Gaza Khanyunis, Deirbalah
yesterday resulting death 42 and wounding 103 Egyptian
civilians.

FALASTIN headline runs: "Jewish cannon reap harvest of innocents
in Gaza while Immkalthum sings love songs to Arabs" i.e. Egyptians
asleep at switch.

AL URDON editorial says have heard much of Soviet arms to Egypt
but see no (repeat no) sign of them now. Why did not (repeat not)
you (Egyptians) use your planes and tanks? Tired of speeches and
threats, yesterday was time to fight fire with fire.

These comments may be reflection tentative local doubts sincerity
Nasser's intentions.

MALLORY

PVB/8

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Action

Control: 2989

NEA

Rec'd: April 6, 1956
8:05 a.m.

Info

FROM: USARMA Tel Aviv

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 060637Z April (Army Message)

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U-11. Information follows: 050830 local IDF patrol at coordinate 094091 received rifle and machine gun fire for 20 minutes and again at 0925 local. At 1015 hours number Egyptian crossed border at coordinate 098090 and were fired on by IDF patrol. At 1130 hours IDF patrol received rifle and machine gun fire at 107102, replying for 15 minutes. Action repeated at 1215 hours area Kissufim. At 1335 hours Egyptian opened machine gun fire on IDF patrol, pinning down, necessitating artillery fire to extricate. At 1500 hours Egyptian position opened 120 mm mortar fire on Kissufim and Ein Bashlosha, coordinate 093084, IDF opening counter battery fire with artillery. Children's house at Kissufim hit CAS unreported. At 1630 hours Egyptians opened 120 mm mortar fire on Nasal Oz, and at 1645 IDF counter battery artillery fire silenced Egyptian position. Firing ceased at 1845 hours local. Damage to several Israel towns reported.

Israel CAS stated as 4 military and 2 civilian wounded, 1 civilian severely. Journals state 40 Egyptians killed and over 100 wounded. SIGNED QUERY.

CWD:ECM/12

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Ludlow UND 4/6/56

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Action

Control: 2942

NEA

Rec'd: April 6, 1956

Info

7:02 a.m.

RMR

FROM: USARMA TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 00920Z, April (Army Message)

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U-12. IDF FLO report as follows:

060800 Egypt opened strong fire region Kissufim. 060900 Egypt opened strong fire region Kissufim, IDF responded with fire. All times local. Signed QUERY.

SW:CRH

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Ludlow UNP 4/6/56.

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Control: 3886
Rec'd: APRIL 7, 1956
4:10 PM

FROM: CAIRO

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2004, APRIL 7, 4 PM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2004, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY JERUSALEM
126, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 237, USUN 63, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, LONDON
PARIS UNNUMBERED.

PRESS FRONT PAGES "NEW ISRAELI AGGRESSIONS" STATING ISRAELIS
OPENED FIRE ON EGYPTIAN POSITION 8:00 AM APRIL SIX "IN SPITE OF
CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT OF APRIL FIVE". FIRING REPORTEDLY HALTED
BY UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER AT EGYPTIAN REQUEST APPROXIMATELY
10:00 AM. ONE EGYPTIAN SOLDIER KILLED.

ELABORATING ON INCIDENT APRIL FIVE PRESS REPORTED DEATHS NOW
63 INCLUDING FOUR SOLDIERS, WOUNDED 102 INCLUDING NINE SOLDIERS,
SOME HOUSES DEMOLISHED GAZA, KHAN YOUNES AND DEIR ALBALAH
AND BAPTIST AND EGYPTIAN HOSPITALS DAMAGED. PRESS CHARGES ATTACK
BEGAN WITH EXCHANGE OF FIRE FROM AUTOMATIC WEAPONS WHICH EGYPTIANS
IMMEDIATELY RETURNED. ISRAELIS THEN USED ARTILLERY AND MORTARS.

GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET ALLOWED CORRESPONDENTS PROCEED GAZA
BECAUSE, ACCORDING PRESS, "FEELINGS WERE RUNNING HIGH AMONG
REFUGEES". PRESS REPORTS MAJOR GENERAL RIFAAT (GOVERNOR GENERAL
OF GAZA) ISSUED STATEMENT AT FUNERALS YESTERDAY "THANKING
POPULATION FOR ITS SELF-CONTROL AND HIGH MORALE".

MUSTAFA AMIN (NASSER CONFIDENT) IN AL AKHBAR CALLED BEN GURION
"WAR CRIMINAL" AND "MURDERER OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN" WHO HAD
ARRANGED "RECEPTION COMMITTEE OF SHELLS AND SKELETONS OF DEAD
CHILDREN" FOR "DISCIPLE OF PEACE" (HAMMARSKJOLD). "PUBLIC
OPINION IN THIS REGION WANTS TO KNOW WHAT UNITED NATIONS WILL DO.
UNITED NATIONS SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF "WE START MUTILATING ITS

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-2- 2004, APRIL 7, 4 PM FROM CAIRO

INNOCENT CHILD AND ENFORCE UNITED NATIONS DECISIONS WITH SAME SINCERITY ISRAEL IMPLEMENTS THEM. ALL PEOPLE OF MIDDLE EAST ARE ABOUT TO EXPLODE. THEY ALSO WANT GREET UNITED NATIONS DELEGATE WITH GUN FIRE".

AL GUMHOURIYA SPECULATES THAT ISRAELIS HAVE REDUCED FROM SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE THAT (A) SOME COUNTRIES CHAMPION THEIR AGGRESSION AND DISREGARD SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS OR (B) SECURITY COUNCIL IS REALLY DETERMINED TO "END THE ISRAELI COMEDY AND ZIONIST AGGRESSION AGAINST ARABS", AND THAT THEREFORE "THEY MAY HAVE LOST THEIR NERVES".

SUBJECT OF COMMANDOS RAISED WHEN AL AKHBAR REPORTED SHARETT SENT MESSAGE BURNS LATE LAST NIGHT STATING, "WE HAVE RECEIVED INFORMATION INDICATING EGYPT INTENDS SEND COMMANDO GROUPS INTO ISRAEL. WE REQUEST YOU OBTAIN ASSURANCES FROM EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT THAT THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN AND THAT CEASE FIRE ALSO APPLIES TO ANY COMMANDO ACTIVITIES ON ISRAELI TERRITORY". AL AKHBAR SAYS BURNS REFERRED TELEGRAM TO EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES "WHO REFUSED ANSWER".

MAJOR SIDQI REPORTS NEW INCIDENT TOOK PLACE TODAY WHEN ISRAELI POSITION AT DAMRA OPENED FIRE ABOUT 6:00 AM AGAINST EGYPTIAN POSITION AT BEET HANOUN (NE OF GAZA). HE SAID SPORADIC FIRE CONTINUED UNTIL ABOUT 10:00 AM WITH NO CASUALTIES.

BYROADE

JMD

APR 10 1956
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Department of State

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37-H

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Action
NEAControl: 3970
Rec'd: April 8, 1956
8:02 a.m.Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1049, April 7, 7 p.m.*

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1049, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 346,
AMMAN 141, JERUSALEM 86, BEIRUT 239, DAMASCUS 169,
LONDON 308, PARIS 232.

PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR

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Foreign Ministry official advised Embassy officer that further fire exchanges took place along Gaza strip April 7 between 0600-0630 hours. He said Egyptian outposts opened rifle and machine gun fire on IDF observation posts close to border near three points of Eres, Nouserat, and Mefalsim. Fire returned no casualties reported. Intermittent rifle and machine gun fire had also developed later along strip, but he had no details yet.

He commented that Foreign Minister "greatly concerned" and feared Egyptian firing could develop into same pattern as April 5 with step-wise increase in fire calibre. "We are afraid they will use same provocative tactics as before".

USARMA spoke with IDF FLO this morning, and was told Israeli Government had "most definite information" that Nasser had ordered Fedayeen activity to begin immediately. Result GOI had "very greatly" increased police and IDF patrolling "everywhere", including all borders.

Comment" Given excitability both sides in present crisis daily firing outbreaks on strip may continue occur. Under such circumstances they can easily assume major dimensions. Restraining factor on Israelis may be increasing dismay at unfavorable foreign reaction to heavy toll civilian lives concerning which Sabbath news blackout has left me uninformed). I do not believe however, this would prevent either strong IDF counteraction on local scale against military targets if they consider "provocation" has built

up sufficiently

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42- 1049, April 7, 7 p.m., from Tel Aviv

up sufficiently, or violent reaction to Fedayeen terrorist activities.

Still no signs mobilization, but for first time my experience orthodox officials Foreign Ministry working and press statement released on Sabbath, which afford evidence serious assessment.

If GOI has stepped up patrolling to extent mentioned the necessary orders are bound refer to Fedayeen, while case difficult to see how information to be kept secret as related by Sharett (EMBTTEL 1047).

LAWSON

BB:CES/1

Note: Passed ARMY, NAVY, AIR 4/8/56, 9 am RW

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APR 20 1956

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Control: 3822

Rec'd: April 7, 1956

12:01 p.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 402, April 7, noon

PRIORITY

 SENT DEPARTMENT 402, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY AMMAN 185,
 PRIORITY BEIRUT 106, PRIORITY CAIRO 225, PRIORITY DAMASCUS 107,
 PRIORITY LONDON 125, PRIORITY PARIS 117, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 205.

On evening April 6 Burns gave me comments along following lines expressing his opinions most recent Gaza incidents (CONGEN telegram 401 and previous). The Egyptians were clearly in the wrong during earlier stages. Burns had warned them on various occasions against promiscuous shooting across border, stating that such actions would doubtless at some point evoke vigorous and, for them, troublesome Israeli reaction. He had expressed this view at least five different times recently, either to Gohar, Amer, or Nasser. Arguments they had given him to effect that Egyptian posts must be allowed fire their discretion owing fear of attack by approaching Israeli patrols (whether or not actually across D/I) were not valid since Egyptians had also continued firing at Israelis in fixed positions, despite Amer's assurance to Burns that he would have this practice stopped. He considered Egyptians themselves responsible for initiating latest spiral of incident and reprisals.

While Israelis initially had strong case against Egyptians they had later thrown it away, demonstrating their usual genius for putting themselves in the wrong. Burns did not believe Israeli slaughter of civilians on this occasion was result any high-level policy decision. He considered the Israelis had simply blundered into the situation through their eagerness retaliate, presumably in accordance with standing orders. Thus, original Egyptian firing at patrol and killing three soldiers had evolved into series retaliations and counter-retaliations, included exchanges fire against villages, which had culminated in, unfortunate mortaring Gaza town. Owing to population concentrated in Gaza latter action was not at all analogous to shelling of frontier Kibbutz in open country, for instance, although Israeli military personnel may not have borne such fine distinctions very clearly in mind at the time.

52503

With regard

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-2- 402, April 7, noon, from Jerusalem

With regard hit on Baptist Hospital, Burns said it was not clear that hospital itself was directly involved. He understood it was possibly annex to hospital in some other building which was hit. Although there was some small arms fire this morning situation believed generally quiet. Civil population Gaza reported under control. Curfew lifted this morning until 1600 hours local time today.

If things remain quiet Burns expects proceed Rome April 8.

COLE

BB:PVB /8

APR 20 1956

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Tel 2012
Date 4/8/56
From CAIRO
To SecState

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Date

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

Control 3137

April 8, 1956
7:57 p.m.

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SENT TO: Amembassy CAIRO NIACT 2447
RPTD INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY 747
: Amconsul JERUSALEM PRIORITY 214

Origin

Info

In light of your 2012 you should approach GOE soonest and in most effective manner support Burns' request for soonest cease fire (Jerusalem's 404).

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Drafted by:

NEA: NE: DCBergus

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

ML Donald C. Bergus

Clearances:

In substance
NE: FWilkins

UNP: JLD: low

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Classification

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Info

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**OUTGOING
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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

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Classification

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1956 APR 8 PM 7 57

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SENT TO: Amembassy CAIRO NIACTM 2447
RPTD INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY 147
: Amembassy JERUSALEM PRIORITY 214
AMCONSUL

Origin

Info:

In light your 2012 you should approach GOR soonest and in
most effective manner support Burns' request for ^{SOONEST} cease-fire
(Jerusalem's 404).

Shuller DIIIIES "
ewo-jnr

Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:DCBergus

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

JCL Donald C. Bergus

Clearances:

In Substance:

NE: Mr. Wilkins

JCL UNP: JCL:LOW

SECRET

Classification

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NIACT - SECRET

To: Cairo Rpt Tel Aviv - Priority
Jerusalem - Priority

In light your 2912 you should
approach GOE soonest and in most
effective manner support Burns' request
for cease-fire ~~by 1200 loc~~ (Jerusalem's
404)

Cleared in substance
NE - Mr. Wilkins

Donald C. Beyne

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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54-L
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Control: 4064
Rec'd: APRIL 8, 1956
9:56 P M

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2013, APRIL 8, 8 PM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2013, REPEATED INFORMATION JERUSALEM PRIORITY 128
TEL AVIV PRIORITY 239, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, LONDON, PARIS
UNNUMBERED.

DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS USUN AS CAIRO'S 65.

FRONT PAGES TODAY HEADLINED NEW EXCHANGES OF FIRE. GOE SPOKES
MAN ANNOUNCED THAT FOLLOWING DAMRA (REPEAT DAMRA) EXCHANGE
(EMETEL 2004) ISRAELI FORCES HAD ATTACKED EGYPTIAN POSITIONS
BETWEEN 1300 AND 1340 WITH EGYPTIANS REPLYING IN KIND. SPOKES
MAN ALSO ANNOUNCED ISRAELI PATROL APPROACHED D/L NEAR KHANYOUNES
(REPEAT KHANYOUNES) AT 1810 AND OPENED AUTOMATIC FIRE ON EGYPTIAN
POSITIONS. NO (REPEAT NO) CASUALTIES ANNOUNCED EXCEPT DEATH
OF ONE "PALESTINIAN SOLDIER" WOUNDED ON APRIL 5.

SECOND POSITION GIVEN LOUTFI (REPEAT LOUTFI) LETTER TO SC
ATTRIBUTING TO ISRAEL "OBJECTIVE" SINCE FEBRUARY 28, 1955 OF
"KILLING AS MANY ARABS AS POSSIBLE".

THIRD POSITION GIVEN AP REPORT FROM TEL AVIV CITING ISRAELI
SPOKESMAN'S LIST OF NINE COMMANDO ACTIONS. (SAMPLE HEADLINE:
"EGYPTIAN COMMANDOS LESS THAN 40 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF TEL AVIV".

EDITORIAL COMMENT LED BY ANWAR SADAT (REPEAT ANWAR SADAT)
IN AL GUMHOURIYA. "BEN GURION'S MOTTO HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO DEAL
WITH BARBARISM AND SAVAGERY LARGEST POSSIBLE NUMBER OF ARABS--
MEN WOMEN AND CHILDREN... RELYING ON HIS FRIENDS WHO GUARANTEED
BANNING OF ARMS TO ARABS SO LATTER WOULD REMAIN IN POSITION
ALLOW PROTEGE BEN GURION KILL AND OPPRESS THEM... AT EACH OCCUR-
RENCE WE HOPED CREATORS OF ISRAEL WOULD REALIZE MUST BE AN END
TO OUR PATIENCE AND BEN GURION'S HALLUCINATIONS WOULD END.

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-2- 2013, APRIL 8, 8 P M, FROM CAIRO

HOWEVER OUR PATIENCE ONLY SERVED INCREASE HIS TYRANNY, HOSTILITY AND APPETITE FOR BLOOD. IT IS TIME THE WRETCH SOBERED UP... MASTER BEN GURION YOU WILL WITNESS FOR YOUR SELF POWER AND RESOLUTION OF ALL THE ARABS. EGYPT WILL CRUSH YOU AS SHE CRUSHED ALL VAIN AND AMBITIOUS WHO CAME BEFORE YOU".

SECOND EDITORIAL AL GUMHOURIYA "ADDRESSED TO BIG POWERS... WHO DO NOT HEAR SEE OR SPEAK... IS BEN GURION YOUR SPOILED CHILD NOT TO BE PUNISHED EVEN IF HE WERE TO KILL... ARABS WILL NEVER FORGIVE YOU FOR KEEPING SILENT IN FACE OF TREACHERY".

AL AKHBAR SPECULATED AS TO REASONS "ISRAELS AGGRESSION" DURING PAST DAYS. IT NOTES THEORY REPORTED DAMASCUS THAT ISRAEL SOUGHT LURE ARABS INTO WAR AND THEREBY "PAVE WAY FOR WESTERN INTERVENTION". "IT IS KNOWN FACT" THAT U.S. AND FRANCE DO NOT AGREE WITH BRITAIN ON NEED DESPATCH TROOPS TO MIDDLE EAST. "ARAB COUNTRIES HAVE CONFRONTED THE AGGRESSION WITH FIRMNESS ALERTNESS AND PROPER EVALUATION... WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND HOW U.N. ENVOY WILL ACCOMPLISH HIS DUTIES IN THIS HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE CREATED BY ISRAEL. WE ALSO DO NOT KNOW WHETHER ISRAEL ACTING ON HER OWN OR ON ACCOUNT OF ANOTHER PARTY AS WELL. TIME HAS COME FOR ANSWER THIS QUESTION." (COMMENT: IMPLICATION IS U.K. MAY BE BEHIND ISRAELI ATTACK AS PART RECENT MOVES TO DISCOMFIT NASSER).

BYROADE

Aw

NOTE: PASSED USUN 4/8/56, 10 P M (CTW).

Mr. Bergus (NE) notified 10:45 p.m., 4/8/CWO-JRL

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APR 10 1956

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

36-H

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

NEA

Control: 4040

Rec'd: APRIL 8, 1956
12:58 P.M.

Info

RMR

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1050, APRIL 8

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1050, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY
CAIRO 347, AMMAN 142, DAMASCUS 170, BEIRUT 240, LONDON 309,
PARIS 233.

PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR.

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APRIL 7 AM 2330 HOURS TEKOA OF FONMIN ADVISED EMB
OFFICER OF RESUMPTION HEAVY FEDAYEEN ATTACKS GENERALLY
EMANATING FROM GAZA STRIP. ACCORDING IDF FLO THERE WERE
THREE CIVILIANS KILLED, EIGHT CIVILIANS AND EIGHT SOLDIERS
WOUNDED BUT HE EXPECTS CASUALTY ROLL TO MOUNT WITH MORE COMPLETE
REPORTS. KNOWN ATTACKS NUMBERED 13 AND WERE DIRECTED AT INDIVIDUAL
HOUSES, KIBBUTZ INSTALLATIONS, ARMY VEHICLES, CIVILIAN CARS AND
PEDESTRIANS. LOCATIONS WERE ROADS INCLUDING MAIN HIGHWAYS
MAABAROT YA TRANSIT CAMPS YA, KIBBUTZIM AND TOWNS AT ASHKELON,
ACHUZAM, NITSANIM AND FALUJA AREA.

ARMY SPOKESMAN COMMENTED: "COORDINATION OF ATTACKS MAKES IT
PLAIN THEY WERE CARRIED OUT ACCORDING CAREFULLY PREPARED PLAN
AND BY PERSONS BASED ON GAZA STRIP. FEDAYEEN CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN
RESUMED ON MORE SERIOUS SCALE WITH INTENTION MURDERING CIVILIANS,
TERRORIZING POPULATION, INTERRUPTION TRANSPORT AND SABOTAGING
WATER SUPPLY."

FONMIN SPOKESMAN QUOTED APRIL 8 JERUSALEM POST THAT ISRAEL
HAD URGED FEDAYEEN RAID BE INCLUDED IN PROPOSED TALKS FOR CEASE
FIRE ALONG EGYPTIAN BORDER. HOWEVER "CAIRO NEWSPAPER AKHBAR EL-YOM
SAID EGYPTIANS HAD REJECTED GENERAL BURNS REQUEST TO THAT EFFECT"

CES

LAWSON

NOTE: PASSED ARMY, NAVY, AIR 4/8/56

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Department of State

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12:35 p.m.RM/R
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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1051, April 8, 4 p.m.

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1051, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO PRITY 348,
AMMAN 143, DAMASCUS 171, BEIRUT, 241, LONDON 310, PARIS 234

PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR

Re EMBTEL 1050.

OCB

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Spontaneous Fedayeen attacks by Egyptians exceed in recklessness incidence and results the August 1955 series, which, as opposed last night previous assaults were 1-3 per night and limited obscure and "safe" target areas such as isolated orange groves. Present raids achieved "deep penetration" first night at Achuzam and Nitsanim. GOI accurately forecast timing of tactic (EMBTEL 1049), but so far contrary to prediction most raiders seem to have come from Strip instead of Jordan (although Achuzam is closer to Jordan).

Possibility Israel reaction as well as timing and magnitude probably depends on whether raids continue tonight and subsequently. If tempo and casualty rate of attacks remain constant, let alone increase, situation may well deteriorate very rapidly to same stage extreme crisis as before Khan Yunis and additional other complicating factor is continuation Egyptian firing across border which Israelis combine with Fedayeen outbreak as clear evidence Egyptian intention non-observance of cease-fire. In view Sharett's emphasis obtaining cease-fire as first task for Hammarskjold (EMBTEL 1048), and his frequent references serious attitude toward Fedayeen terrorist activities, Israelis certain actively to push their interpretation of Fedayeen raids constituting violation both GAA and cease-fire.

Meanwhile, sharp and critical build-up of public apprehension and intensification consideration by GOI and IDF re effective positive means of meeting Israel's almost defenseless position against Fedayeen action will continue. However, no apparent change in mobilization situation as yet.

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15-6-19-56

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Note: Passed Army, Navy, Air 4/8/56 3:30 p.m. RW

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54-1
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NEAControl: 4051
Rec'd: April 8, 1956
5:05 p.m.Info
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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1052, April 8, 11 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 1052, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO PRITY 349,
JERUSALEM 87

Chief, American Division, Foreign Ministry, Herzog, gave me following summary of GOI account Gen Gurion's conversation this evening with General Burns. Sharett also present.

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CIA

1. Burns said he had sent 5 exhortations to GOE to adopt cease fire but had received no reply. He hoped for reply by tomorrow but pending its receipt urged restraint by Israelis.

2. Ben Gurion pressed for early cease-fire decision. He told Burns Israel "must reserve to herself freedom of action if no unequivocal and unreserved assurances were obtained from GOE that it would refrain from all hostile acts and would conform to the CAA." Ben Gurion agreed to wait "until Tuesday" for a reply from Egypt.

3. Herzog said, under strictest injunction of secrecy, that Burns told Ben Gurion late yesterday afternoon (prior to actual operations) that he had received word from Chief UNTSO observer in Gaza that "Fedayeen would begin" activities. Burns was quoted as saying to Ben Gurion this evening that "if investigation revealed Fedayeen operation had been ordered by GOE, it would constitute an act of aggression".

4. Pineau's visit has been postponed. Reasons given: (1) Gaza incident (2) possible conflict with SYG's visit to area.

5. Foreign Minister requested that I convey to Department GOI's deep regret that in Thursday's shelling of Gaza, Baptist Mission was hit by shrapnel.

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AW/2

Note: Relayed OSD, ARMY, NAVY & AIR 7:30 p.m., 4/8/CWO-JRL

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Control: 4053
Rec'd: April 8, 1956
5:28 p.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 404, April 8, 8 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 404, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO PRITY 227,
AMMAN PRITY 187, BEIRUT PRITY 108, DAMASCUS PRITY 109,
LONDON PRITY 127, PARIS PRITY 119, TEL AVIV PRITY 207.

Reference CONGENTEL 403.

Burns saw Ben Gurion at 4 o'clock this afternoon. He met with
British Consul General and myself thereafter and gave us follow
ing account interview.

Burns found Ben Gurion in a reasonable frame of mind and stated that he had nothing especial to add to letter he had sent Ben Gurion this morning. Letter pointed out that Burns had protested Fedayeen activities to GOE and asked their recall assuming they were sent into Israel by Egyptian authorities. Letter mentioned that extent casualties caused by Gaza shelling had shocked world opinion and urged Israel refrain any further retaliations, especially since Egypt has now put herself in position of, in fact she ordered Fedayeen raids. Ben Gurion expressed idea that Burns should endeavor obtain unconditional "cease-fire" from Egyptians. He stated that Israelis willing wait until 1200 hours local time April 10 for obtainment GOE undertaking that effect. Unless GOE accepted this proposition by foregoing deadline, Israel would "reserve its liberty of action." Burns suggested that in interests accuracy proposed undertaking should specify observance article II paragraph 2 GAA in its entirety rather than "cease-fire." Gurion agreed and indicated GOI prepared give such an undertaking.

Burns has sent telegram to Fawsi recounting above and asking whether Nasser prepared give undertaking in question as soon as possible and not later than time limit stated.

With reference UNTSO investigation Fedayeen activities Colonel Hommel informed me at 1700 local time today that observers have confirmed blowing up of tractor and water tower Ashkelon area and hand-grenade attack against house same vicinity, with killing one woman and injuries two children. Observers have also reported

railway

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-2- 404, April 8, 8 p.m., from Jerusalem

railway track and bridge as blown up plus ambush of army vehicle. However, no complaints received from Israel respecting latter incidents. Investigations continuing.

COLE

AW/1

Note: Messrs Bergus (NE) & Ludlow (UNP) notified 6:45 p.m.
Relayed OSD, ARMY, NAVY & AIR 7:30 p.m., 4/8/CWO-JRL

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NEAControl: 3940
Rec'd: April 8, 1956
3:32 a.m.Info
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FROM: USARMA Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: DTG 080030Z April (Army Message)

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TO AC&I AFOIN CNO AND STATE: INFORMATION USARMAS BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JORDAN, USDOCOSOUTH, USDOCOLAND, USCINCEUR, USNMR PARIS, CINCNELM, CINCUSAFE, COMIDEASTFORCE, COFS 8604 DU ASMARA.

Embassy called by Israel Foreign Minister at 072330 with statement "Fedayeen Act breaking out all over". IDF flo states following act to 080030: 072100 at point 10km South of CR Faluja-Iraq Sweidan car ambushed but exact number wounded not known. 072130 grenades thrown into Kibbutz Nitzanim -- no further details available. 072140 water pipes blown up number Ashkelon. 072140 pedestrians on way to Maabara Ashkelon ambushed -- number wounded not known. 072150 army truck on road Beersheba-Faluza shotup-two soldiers wounded. 072150 two civilians on road Faluza-Iraq wounded-one probably dead. 072150 tractor shed near Nitzana damaged by grenades-no casualties. 072150 Kibbutz Nitzana shotup -- no casualties. 072150 pedestrians on road to Migdal Maabara shotup -- number wounded not known. 072200 civilian truck shotup north of Shuval-one dead, one wounded. 072215 car shot up near Achuzam-three wounded, car burned. 072315 car ambushed three km south of Aaja-no casualties.

Comment: Multiple simultaneous Fedayeen attacks on main highways, Kibbutzim, Maabarot and towns display recklessness and incidence far exceeding past pattern. August 1955 series limited 1-3 per night and aimed obscure target areas such as isolated orange groves. Continuance current casualty rate means August 1955 record will be exceeded in two-three days. SIGNED QUERY

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M-598

32-123

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: April 8, 1956

SUBJECT: Frontier Outbreaks at Gaza; Israel Arms Procurement.

PARTICIPANTS: Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Benven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
NEA - George V. Allen
NE - Donald C. Berges

COPIES TO: NEA(2), NE(3), S/S, U, G, C, OLI, MC, Tel Aviv, Cairo, London, Paris, Rome, Ottawa

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APR 20 1956

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The Israel Ambassador asked late Saturday night, April 7, to see Mr. Allen on the following day. Mr. Eban was received by Mr. Allen at his home at 11 a.m. on Sunday April 8.

Frontier Outbreaks at Gaza. Mr. Eban summarized the Israel version of the events at Gaza over the past few days. He read from telegrams from Israel various paragraphs including a report of the discussion between the Israel Foreign Minister and the American Ambassador. After the heavy exchange of mortar and artillery fire on April 5, Israel had undertaken to General Burns to keep its patrols back from the armistice lines temporarily. Intermittent firing across the frontiers had continued, however, Egypt had now launched a wave of Fedayeen activity into Israel. The Israelis had had information that Egypt would attempt this course of action and had so informed General Burns on April 6. Israel intelligence had stated that the major source of the Egyptian Fedayeen attacks would be Jordan. The Israelis had been wrong on this point, since the attacks had come from Gaza.

Nasser's support of the proposal that troops of both sides be withdrawn 500 meters was not based on a sincere desire to relax tensions. Nasser's troops were stationed in fixed defensive positions just over 500 meters behind the armistice lines. Israel did not have the manpower to organize her own defenses in this fashion. Israel had to rely on mobile patrols. Furthermore, an Israel withdrawal would endanger the security of the inhabitants of the kibbutzim close to the armistice line.

Mr. Eban speculated as to what Nasser's motives were in precipitating the Gaza events. Perhaps he wanted a total conflict with Israel now. Israel had thought that Nasser would prefer to wait until July or August when he would have assimilated his Soviet arms. On the other hand, perhaps Nasser was beginning to feel that Israel would soon be getting arms from somewhere and that his present preponderance would be short-lived. But it was hard to believe that Nasser would "send the balloon up" while the UN Secretary General was in the area. Mr. Eban still thought Nasser preferred to wait

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- 2 -

until midsummer before starting a war. He believed that Nasser's present desire was to stimulate a demand among his own people that he use his airpower against Israel.

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Israel Arms Procurement. Mr. Allen asked if the Israelis had received any word from Ottawa. Mr. Eban replied not since last Thursday when the Israel Ambassador there had been informed that the Israel request to purchase 24 F-86 jet aircraft would be discussed by the Canadian Cabinet. Mr. Allen informed Mr. Eban that the Department had late on Friday informed the Canadian Ambassador that the U.S. would have no objection to Canada's selling these planes to Israel. Mr. Allen said there were two aspects to the Canadian position. One was a sudden manifestation of a desire to await U.S. leadership. This was an interesting and touching development which had taken place in the U.K. and France as well. Oddly enough, Messrs. Eden, Mollet, and Pierson had from time to time indicated in public utterances the determination of their Governments to pursue independent policies in one matter or another. In this particular problem, however, there seemed to be a disposition to see what the U.S. would do. The U.S. was drawn into these transactions only by such questions as the off-shore procurement program, U.S. patent arrangements, etc. The U.S. had been aware that its position with respect to the Israel arms request had had the effect of a de facto Western embargo on Israel. In order to make it clear that we felt the question of selling arms to Israel was a matter for each individual country to decide, we had been willing to make sure that the technical problems raised by OSP and license matters would not become obstacles to the sales. What would work in Israel's favor was that there now seemed to be developing a commercial competition to supply arms to Israel among Canada, France and Italy.

Mr. Eban said that with respect to Italy, Israel had asked to purchase F-86 aircraft there as well. Mr. Allen pointed out that this transaction was a bit different from that of the Mysteres. The F-86's which Italy might furnish were not wholly Italian aircraft, but aircraft assembled by Italians from U.S. components. Mr. Eban stated that the Italian Foreign Office had told the Israelis that the Italians had sought U.S. permission for such a sale to Israel some two weeks ago. Mr. Allen said that to the best of his knowledge the Italians had not in fact formally requested such permission from the U.S. He would, at an early opportunity, point out to the Italian Ambassador that Israel representatives have advised the U.S. that the Italians have stated they were seeking U.S. permission for this transaction.

Mr. Eban asked that the U.S. take the initiative with the Italians along the same lines as the Secretary's discussions in Washington with the Canadian Foreign Minister. In the course of the discussion he indicated that Israel sought to reach a fighter strength of 72 jet aircraft: 24 Mysteres from France; 24 F-86's from Canada; 12 F-86's from Italy and 12 from the U.S.

Messrs. Eban and Shiloah also raised in some detail the outstanding requests for export licenses for spare parts, trucks, aircraft engines, and the like. Mr. Allen undertook to look into these matters.

Mr. Shiloah thought it would be useful if a high ranking officer of the Department could be entrusted with all matters relating to Israel arms procurement.

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1956 APR 10 AM 7 44

Control: 4578

Rec'd: April 9, 1956
8:07 p.m.

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2019, April 9, 6 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2019, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY TEL AVIV 24
PRIORITY JERUSALEM 129, AMMAN 181, BEIRUT 255, DAMASCUS 184,
LONDON 309, PARIS 174, USUN 66.

Colonel Ely, representative of General Burns Cairo, returned
today from trip Jerusalem and Gaza. Following is his impression
recent sequence events based on his own observation and detailed
conversations with Colonel Bayard, American Chairman E-I MAC.

1. Israelis made special effort draw attention problems in
filtration during coming harvesting season (Tel Aviv 1031).

2. Incident April 3 (Tel Aviv 1036 and Jerusalem 398, paragraph
2) may actually have taken place on DL or in Egyptian territory.

3. "Retaliation" shelling Gaza April 4 preceded by intensifi-
cation patrolling close DL under "provocative" circumstances.

4. Bayard learned from Egyptian military source that decision
had been made send 700 commandos into Israel as retaliation for
shelling. Bayard immediately informed Burns (Tel Aviv 1052,
paragraph 3).

5. Perhaps as result Burns message Fawzi re commandos (Jerusal
403 and EMBTEL 2004) number sent sharply reduced. Bayard believes
commandos did not start out from Gaza strip itself but probably
crossed border south Al Auja or perhaps between Al Auja and Gaza
strip. Ely noted Lt. Colonel Mustafa, officer in charge commando
training, now in Gaza strip but stated he apparently there "to
receive reports" rather than to direct operations.

6. Israeli request cease fire even if accepted by Egyptians may
not be able be carried out fully since commandos carry no commun-
ications equipment and may well remain Israel beyond cease fire
date which, according Ely has been set by Burns at noon April 11
with GOE acceptance to be communicated Burns prior noon April 10.

7. In this

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7. In this case new Israeli move can be expected (perhaps night April 11-12). Move might have nature hit and run attack on Khan Younes pattern. Ely and Bayard speculate attack would not be toward Rafah but perhaps further north in region Gaza itself.

8. They expect that in this case Egyptians would send more commandos into Israel.

9. Situation Gaza including refugees was calm yesterday. No sign military build-up Gaza strip although probably Egyptian positions south Rafah being strengthened. No dramatic build-up Israeli side but UN observers sense mounting preparedness "for something".

10. No clear understanding in UNTSO as to Israeli motivation behind recent chain incidents but considerable speculation it involved Hammarskjold's trip. According Ely, Hammarskjold had not as of Sunday given UNTSO any indication steps he proposed take in immediate present.

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2021, APRIL 9, 8 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2021, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV NIAC 241, JERUSALEM 130, DAMASCUS 185, AMMAN 182, BEIRUT 256, BAGHDAD 154, LONDON 310, PARIS 175, USUN 67.

NOFORN.

FYI ONLY.

IN VIEW FACT COMMANDOS NORMALLY OPERATE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT EFFECTIVE CEASE FIRE MOST UNLIKELY NEXT 48 HOURS. I AM NOW CONVINCED ON EXCELLENT AUTHORITY THAT IF ISRAELIS STAGE ANOTHER ATTACK AGAINST EGYPTIAN FORCES IN RETALIATION FOR CURRENT EGYPTIAN COMMANDO ACTIVITIES EGYPTIANS WILL RESPOND ON SCALE WHICH WILL SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE POSSIBILITY OF AVOIDING FULL SCALE CONFLICT. REQUEST ALL ADDRESSEES SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVE FYI ONLY RESTRICTION.

HOWEVER, I DO THINK IT IMPORTANT ISRAELIS BE ADVISED WE THINK WAR LIKELY OCCUR IF THEY STAGE ANOTHER KHAN YUNIS OR SIMILAR STRONG ATTACK AGAINST GOE FORCES AND THAT ONLY CHANCE REDUCING DANGER FULL SCALE WAR LIES IN ISRAELIS CONCENTRATING ON COUNTERING COMMANDO ACTIVITIES AND IN ACHIEVING SUFFICIENT SUCCESS TO WITHSTAND PRESSURE FOR SECOND ROUND RETALIATION.

52511

BYROADE

JMD

Note: Read by Messrs Blackiston (NE) & Ludlow (UNP) 5:30 p.m., Passed OSD 6:30 p.m., 4/9/CWO-JRL

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<i>G. M. R. Dougall</i>	<i>HD</i>				<i>11-12-57</i>

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Rec'd: April 9, 1956
10:54 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1055, April 9, 1 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1055, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 350, AMMAN 144
JERUSALEM 88

PASS ARMY NAVY AIR

Fedayeen attack continued night April 8-9. Following details according IDF FLO : Locations: North of Affula, Shfar Am, Shafir (NW Negev), Galon, Moshav Itzhak (between Ashkelon-Rehovot) Mekorot labor camp near Nitzana, Yad Mordechai Givat Am and Nabi Rubin

Israeli casualties: One dead, six wounded. FLO claimed one Fedayeen killed, one wounded near Yad Mordechai, and Israel police engaged band "12-12" Fedayee at Nabi Rubin, on coast near Rishon Le Zion. Among unusual security measures taken was closure Jerusalem/Tel Aviv road to night traffic, stranding several hundred persons in Jerusalem who left there to commemorate memorial for Jewish victims of Nazis. Apparently most minor roads in country also closed. According to Foreign Ministry measure imposed both to avoid civilian casualties and to facilitate military control. Jerusalem's last Tel Aviv road reopened at dawn.

Comment: Nabi Rubin closest (12 kms) to Tel Aviv ever achieved by Fedayeen.

Difficult to say whether Shfar Am and Affula attacks in Galilee denote (1) participation local Arabs caught in enveloping psychology or (2) infiltrating raiders from Syria or Jordan. View Shfar Am's distance from border even latter interpretation implies possibility assistance from local Arabs, so they stand to face increasingly severe control measures either case.

Israeli killing Arab civilians April 5 in Gaza may well generate family "blood feuds" stimulating scattered retaliations against Jews which at times will be indistinguishable from "Fedayeen" attacks, and which may not (repeat not) be susceptible formal Egyptian control. This connection every Israeli Arab village contains relatives Gaza strip residents who may reject similarly as names victims become known.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1057, April 9

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1057 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 351, JERUSALEM
UNNUMBERED.

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PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIRFORCE.

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IDF Foreign Liaison Officer informed USARMA 1600 hours today
that nine Fedayeen were killed and three taken prisoner today
in engagements with IDF patrols as follows:

Yad Mordechai -- 2 killed, 1 captured;

OCB
USIA
CIA

Nir Galim (north of Askelon) -- 5 killed;

OSD
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AIR
NAVY

Lachish -- 2 killed and 2 captured.

IDF reports that total Israel casualties caused by Fedayeen
since beginning of activities Saturday evening were six killed
and 21 wounded. Mortalities included one killed today in
engagement at Nir Galim.

LAWSON

TT/14

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FILE-100

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Department of State

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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 405, April 9

SENT DEPARTMENT 405, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 228, AMMAN,
TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED

Following is substance UNTSO press release April 8:

"UN observers have been investigating attacks and acts sabotage perpetrated last night (7 April) in Israeli territory by groups infiltrators.

A sector roughly delineated by a line starting from Migdal to Faluja to the East and Showal to the South has been so far surveyed. Out of eight separate Israeli complaints submitted on 7 April, 5 were investigated by UN on 8 April.

(1) Observers found that a woman has been killed, one girl of 10 and a boy of 16 wounded by two hand grenades thrown into a house at Migdal.

(2) Observers were shown one heavy tractor damaged, a water pumping station and a railway bridge damaged.

(3) Observers found the water tower of Ashkalon damaged by explosives.

(4) Observers saw a small section of the railroad track Tel Aviv-Beersheba blown up.

(5) Observers interrogated a wounded passenger of a land rover.

Statements of some of the 15 wounded were taken by observers.

Israeli authorities reported that 4 people were killed during the raids.

Investigation proceeding."

COLE

MDG-6

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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 407, April 9, 4 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 407, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 229,
AMMAN 189, BEIRUT 109, DAMASCUS 110, LONDON 128, PARIS 121,
TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED

At 1500 hours local time April 9 UNTSO had received reports from
EIMAC of following Fedayeen-type incidents which occurred night
of April 8 according complaints lodged by Israeli MAC delegate:

1. Marauders threw grenades into house at Moshav Shafir north
of Ashkelon, wounding one child.
2. Marauders also entered Moshav Shitufi Masuot Itzhak and threw
hand grenades.
3. In firefight between Israeli security forces and marauders
one marauder killed.
4. Marauders attacked pipe-layers camp near Nitzanim settlement.
One man killed, three wounded.
5. Well blown up near Gevar-am.
6. Electric light pole blown up in settlement Gaza strip area.
7. Command car blown up by mine at Beerotin, same area.

Israeli MAC delegate said he could not (repeat not) give exact
times above incidents in most cases, but these would be developed
by investigations, which are in progress. According UNTSO observers
have reported seeing body alleged Fedayeen (incident number 3)
and one dead body and one badly wounded man (incident number 4)

COLE

SW:BLB-8

Control: 4325

Rec'd: April 9, 1956

11:59 a.m.

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SENT TO: Amembassy CAIRO NIACT 2453
RPTD INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV NIACT 752
Amconsul JERUSALEM NIACT 215
Amembassy DAMASCUS 826
Amembassy AMMAN 595
Amembassy BEIRUT 1769
Amembassy LONDON 5986
Amembassy PARIS 3744
Amembassy BAGHDAD (VIA POUCH)
USUN NEW YORK (VIA POUCH) *EMC*

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Your 2021. 674.840/4-956

1. USG has made clear to Israelis at highest level on several occasions in past few weeks that major reprisal raid could risk general outbreak of hostilities.
2. IG advises Department they conducting extensive operations against Fedayeen.
3. You might wish to suggest to GOE that they advise Burns of willingness to accept cease fire but practical problems involved require brief extension of time limit, as indicated reftel.

Dulles
(R) DULLES

674.84A/4-956 CS/W

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Drafted by: NEA:NE:DCBergus:crc 4/9/56
Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: NE - Fraser Wilkins

G/S-CR
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11-631
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 9, 1956

SUBJECT: Report of Dinner Conversation with the Egyptian Ambassador
and Madame Hussein

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Robert Simpson - S/S - RO

Mr. Fraser Wilkins - NE

COPIES TO: NEA(cc), NE(2 cc), OLI(cc/2), Cairo(cc), Tel Aviv(cc), USUN(cc) UNP(cc)
MCA() AF ()
Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, London, Paris, Rome,

1-1493

Mr. Simpson said he had been present at a dinner which the Egyptian Ambassador and his wife had given for Ambassador Jefferson Caffery. Only the four of them had been present. Mr. Simpson said that the Egyptian Ambassador was preoccupied by two questions in the following order:

1. Nasser's general position in the Near East as a result of the Israeli attack on Gaza. The Ambassador feared that it would be essential for Nasser to take some counter action to restore his position. For the time being, however, he thought it a good sign that Nasser was speaking in moderate terms and was placing emphasis on UN activities for a cease-fire and observation of the general armistice agreement.

2. British and Zionist propaganda would have an effect upon the Department and would bring about a change in U. S. policy toward Egypt.

Describing the wife of the Egyptian Ambassador as well informed and thoughtful Mr. Simpson said that she had observed during dinner that the receipt of U. S. arms by Israel would be significant politically as well as militarily. She was convinced that Israel was as interested in U. S. political support as it was in guns and tanks. We had also observed Egypt, by too active support of the Nationalists in French North Africa, would be making enemies needlessly. In other words, the French North African countries would continue their efforts for self-determination without open Egyptian aid.

NEA:NE:FWilkins:crc
4/16/56

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APR 26 1956

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FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2024, April 10, 3 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 2024, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT TEL AVIV 242, NIACT JERUSALEM 131, DAMASCUS 186, AMMAN 183, BEIRUT 257, LONDON 311, PARIS 177, BAGHDAD 155, USUN 68.

Department's telegram 2453.

Have urged Nasser speak to Hammarskjold along line paragraph three, reference telegram, and believe there good chance he may agree cease fire under these conditions.

BYROADE

LR/2

Note: Mr. Bergus' office (NE) and Mr. Ludlow's office (UNP) notified 4/10/12:55 p.m. LWH

Control: 5026

Rec'd: April 10, 1956

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Control: 5349

Rec'd: April 11, 1956
12:57 a.m.

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2032, April 10, 8 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT PRIORITY 2032; REPEATED INFORMATION JERUSALEM PRIORITY 132, TEL AVIV PRIORITY 243, USUN 69, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, LONDON, PARIS UNNUMBERED.

Press continues headline activities of "Egyptian Commandos" yesterday and "Commandos" (today) as reported by Israeli spokesmen and wire agencies from Israel. All papers front-paging maps showing incursions. GUMHOURIYA and ALAHKBAR front-paged yesterday gruesome pictures of Gaza casualties. Test air-raid warnings conducted Saturday and Sunday nights and Monday morning. All officers' leaves cancelled, unit commanders ordered rejoin their units, all units on training exercises ordered return their regular stations.

Sadat in GUMHOURIYA April 9 called Egypt victim conspiracy by America, Britain, France. However, Egypt has powerful ally in Soviet Union. Those who say Soviets seek introduce Communism in Middle East are "traitors and enemies of Arabs and agents foreign states". Soviets and bloc are only states who have defended Arab causes and "who have not conspired against Egypt or supplied Israel with arms to massacre refugees". American insistence on original text her resolution makes conspiracy clear. Situation in Middle East should be described as tense; then Israel should act to make it so; then America, Britain and France can intervene to safeguard their imperialist interests. We now know our friends and our enemies. We have no alternative but to show friendship to those for us and hostility to those against us".

Second editorial GUMHOURIYA April 9 entitled "where is Security Council?" said UN adopted decision send Hammarskjold only, "when it was conscious of Arab force threatening Israel. SC becomes tangible fact when free gain upper-hand; it becomes illusion "when ever tyrants, pirates and highwaymen hold them victims at bay... Egypt holds world to witness SC and UN harbor injustice, inequity and aggression, the allegation of SC regarding peace only dagger to stab Arabs but dagger will come to rest in heart Israel and those who

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1031, April 10, 8 p.m., from Cairo

to see the report for--imperialist states, Security Council and

At AFRAM editorialized along same lines -- "conscience UN very similar conscience of imperialism... does UN think all well with Israel as long as all well with Israel?"

SAADAT today hailed commandos as "our SC and UN. They undertake punishment aggressor so long as UN judges hesitate in executing sentence on criminals ... every attack on borders will be returned by attack inside borders. Commandos will undertake task UN and SC until they come to life".

At AFRAM greeted Hammarskjold with charge "tension in Middle East has increased to safeguard Israel from Arab giant". It did not exist when "Israel had upper-hand" but only after recent arms deal.

Sadat in GUMHOURIA continued combined attack Britain and particularly British press but changed tune towards America. He praised Eisenhower's announcement of "futility arming Israel" and refusal "tie US to imperialist chariot" (i.e., concur in British anti-Nasser campaign). "We Arabs welcome all who seek understand our course. We should like shake hands all those who respect our freedom and will. We will welcome liberal American policy freed from Zionist influence and refraining from applying imperialism and domination. We hope Eisenhower will be privileged set such policy".

In indication meaning "our course", Sadat said "Nothing will stop Nasser from smashing Israel. This means extermination of Israelis, a fact which State Department does not comprehend and until it does peace cannot be established".

Comment: Reference Anwar Sadat editorials. Sadat one of few writers Egypt whose articles not subject to prior censorship. Nasser called my attention yesterday to first Sadat article before I had knowledge of it. Stated he much upset about article which was "very bad". Said he had reprimanded Sadat. We have heard information that there was considerable discussion yesterday between Nasser and his confidants as to what to do about Sadat and article, and assume his somewhat changed tune (at least as regards America) in second article may be result. Am told Sadat's only defense was that he had personally neither written nor seen first article prior to publication.

BYROADE

APR 13 1956

MAM:SRH/1

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Control: 4862

Rec'd: APRIL 19, 1956
8:21 A.M.

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1059, APRIL 10

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1059, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 352, JERUSALEM
UNNUMBERED.

PASS OSD, ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

OCB
USIA
CIA

FEDAYEEN ATTACKS APRIL NINTH-TENTH SUBSEQUENT TO THOSE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED AS ANNOUNCED BY IDF FLO TO USARMA NUMBERED TWELVE MOSTLY CONCENTRATED AREA NEAR GAZA STRIP. ISRAELI CASUALTIES, ONE KILLED, THREE WOUNDED ONE ADDITIONAL FEDAYEEN CAPTURE BRINGING TOTAL TO FOUR. SEVEN OF LAST NIGHTS ATTACKS WERE OF SABOTAGE CHARACTER ~~INDIA~~ ~~ECHO~~ AGAINST WATER PIPES AND PUMPS.

MORNING PRESS CARRIES "CONFESSIONS" OF FEDAYEEN ALLEGEDLY MADE PRESENCE UN OFFICERS. ACCORDING JERUSALEM POST CAPTIVES "STATED WERE SENT INTO ISRAEL EARLY EVE APRIL SIX CROSSING LINES NEAR BEIT HANUN SOUTH YAD MORDECHAI AFTER SQUADS BRIEFED IN GAZA BY CAPT MUSTAFA GAMSH OF EGYPTIAN ARMY. THEY RECEIVED ORDERS BLOW UP BRIDGES MURDER ISRAELIS MINE ROADS AND SHOOT TRAFFIC. KILLERS INSTRUCTED TO RETURN GAZA STRIP, IF NOT POSSIBLE, TO MOVE EAST AND CROSS IN TO JORDAN".

MILITARY CORRESPONDENT YEDIOTH HAYOM WRITES IDF HAS CHANGED TACTICS COUNTERING FEDAYEEN. HEAVY TRAPS BEING PLACED ON JORDAN BORDER TO CATCH FEDAYEEN AT EGRESS FROM ISRAEL AND "ENTIRE SOUTH OF COUNTY BEING FURTHER SYSTEMATICALLY COMBED. MILITARY AUTHORITIES HOPE TO CONVERT FEDAYEEN ACTION INTO TOTAL FAILURE."

RADIO ISRAEL ANNOUNCED MILITARY COURT PRONOUNCED DEATH SENTENCE ON SINGLE FEDAYEEN CAPTURE IN JANUARY TRIED AND FOUND GUILTY

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-2- 1059, APRIL 10, FROM TEL AVIV

ABOUT THREE WEEKS AGO.

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APR 20 1956

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FROM: TEL AVIV

Control: 5408

Rec'd: APRIL 11, 1956
3:41 AM

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1061, APRIL 10, 4 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1061; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 353,
AMMAN 145, DAMASCUS 172, BEIRUT 242.

CIA

PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR.

OSD

ARMY

IDF FLO GAVE USARMA FOLLOWING ACCOUNT FEDAYEEN BASED ON
PRISONER INTERROGATION AND FIELD INTELLIGENCE: HEADQUARTERS:
MAIN POLICE STATION, GAZA.

NAVY

AIR

ORIGIN AND ROUTES: FROM GAZA STRIP (1) TOWARDS NORTH, (2)
FROM DEIR EL BALAH AREA TOWARDS EAST. FROM JORDAN (3)
FROM HEBRON AREA WEST, (4) FROM JENIN AREA NORTH. BCO 1 GROUP
LONG RANGE OPERATIVES; OTHERS PENETRATE, OPERATE, AND RETURN
OVERNIGHT.

COMPOSITION: BANDS OF 3-7. MIXED PALESTINIAN/JORDANIAN
AND PALESTINIAN/EGYPTIAN. MANY FELLAHEEN INCLUDED WHO
"RELATIVELY USELESS" AND IMMEDIATELY "TELL ALL" WHEN CAUGHT.
NOT EGYPTIAN TRAINED NATIONAL GUARDSMEN, BUT SEPARATE UNITS
ASSIGNED SPECIAL COMMAND.

NUMBERS: ESTIMATED 200 ENTERED ISRAEL FIRST NIGHT, NOW MAIN-
TAINED ABOUT 100 PER DAY, INCLUDING BOTH "OVERNIGHTERS" AND
"LONGRANGERS". IDF "POSITIVE" NUMBER DAILY ENTRIES HAS
DECLINED 50 PERCENT.

FOOD: NO FOOD FOUND ON FEDAYEEN. SUPPOSITION THEY RELY ON
(A) FOOD CACHES ALREADY MADE BY INFILTRATING SPIES, OR (B)
STEALING. "NOT ONE STITCH EVIDENCE LOYAL ARABS ARE GIVING
ASSISTANCE".

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PL. PM. FROM TF. AMIV

EQS BELIEVE: ... SOVIET DETONATORS AND
MATCHES. ... DISTINCTIVE HATS.

PROGNOSIS: IF NASSER GIVES ... ORDER RAIDS WILL
CONTINUE DECLINING SCALE 2-3 DAYS UNTIL "LONGRANGERS"
RETURN. NO EVIDENCE "BLOOD FEUD" PRIVATE KILLINGS, THOUGH
STILL POSSIBLE.

COMMENT: ABOVE DATA GIVEN FRANKLY AND IS PROBABLY OF
CONSIDERABLE ACCURACY.

ISRAELIS COMFORTED BY KILLING 10, CAPTURING 4 FEDAYEEN FOR
FOLLOWING REASONS: (A) CONFESSIONS OF PRISONERS FURNISH
NORMAL PROOF EGYPTIAN IMPLICATION TO UN; (B) DEATH SENTENCE
FOR 18 YEAR OLD FEDAYEEN CAPTURED IN JANUARY AND EXCESSIVE
CASUALTY RATE WILL SERVE AS DETERRENTS TO FUTURE OPERATIONS;
(C) RESULTS MAY INDICATE ISRAELIS TO SOME EXTENT HAVE "FOUND
ANSWER" TO HITHERTO BAFFLING FEDAYEEN PROBLEM BY DEVICE "THICK
PATROLLING" WHICH NOW WORKING UP TO COVERAGE LITERALLY EVERY
SQUARE MILE OF NON-URBAN ISRAEL; AND DELTA. UNFAVORABLE
CASUALTY RATION WILL ROB FEDAYEEN TACTIC OF NIMBUS OF SUCCESS
IN MIND OF ME (REPEAT ME) ARABS, DISCREDITING NASSER, AND PRE-
SENTING HIM WITH SECOND HUMILIATION (GAZA ARAB CASUALTIES
WAS FIRST) WITHIN FEW DAYS.

LAWSON

WFB

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APR 20 1966

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Control: 5316

Rec'd: April 11 1956
12:19 a.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1062, April 10, 7 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 1062; REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT CAIRO 354,
JERUSALEM 89, DAMASCUS 173, AMMAN 146, BEIRUT 243, BAGHDAD 52,
LONDON 311, PARIS 235, USUN 30.

NOFORN.

Believe GOI under no illusions re danger war in staging strong attack against GOE forces. It is concentrating every effort on countering Fedayeen terrorist activities and with some success. Therefore, believe developments last 24 hours have reduced danger of precipitate action by GOI. Initial successes IDF/police countermeasures against Fedayeen have brought noticeable relaxation. If trend of successful defense continues emotional impact of raids on man-in-street will further ease and extremists (including Herut) will lose large potential for incitement.

GOI fully aware difficulty for Nasser communicate with Fedayeen operators in Israel especially "long-range" groups and possibility of short delay transmission his recall orders. However, GOI will assume those Fedayeen making nightly incursions there-after returning to bases in Arab territory (whom it estimates constitute about 75 percent present total) are within reach GOE control.

As indicated Embassy telegram 1063, Ben Gurion's patience and restraint would not endure much strain placed on it by Nasser's failure to exercise his control of this element.

Think best prospect for continued reduction threat of hostilities lies in Egyptian assent to Hammerskjold/Burns request for cease-fire and adherence to Article II, GAA.

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Tel. 1062 fr. Tel Aviv dtd. April 10, 1956.

re. Egyptian-Israel Situation

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Control: 5315

Rec'd: April 11 1956

12:15 a.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1063, April 10, 8. p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 1063, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT CAIRO 355,
PARIS 236, LONDON 312, AMMAN 147, DAMASCUS 174, BEIRUT 244.

I delivered President's letter to Ben Gurion at his Tel Aviv office at 11 o'clock this morning. He looked tired from strain of recent days and spoke very quietly but nevertheless forcefully and in manner revealing he is still personally very much in control situation.

He said he would convey letter's content to his colleagues as soon as possible probably tomorrow and because it was from American President it would be given serious consideration it therefore deserved. Personally, however, he found message most disappointing. He could not believe President fully realized situation in which whole population was daily terrorized. (I injected comment that I was confident President well aware of terrorist character of Fedayeen operations within Israel.) He said he would really like to know what we thought his people should do. If people of US terrorized by neighboring countries... by marauders sent by neighboring government... would they be expected just to take it? There no doubt Fedayeen sent by Nasser.

Perhaps he could ask President of US but he would ask me "would you expect us just to take it"? Right of self-defense is first right of human beings.

He spoke at length of difficulties of effective defense against Fedayeen. It not possible to accompany everybody everywhere and against such tactics people wouldn't be safe if accompanied by whole company or battalion.

He could not tell his people they must sit helplessly by. They wanted to know why Nasser could not be told that he was aggressor and would be dealt with as aggressor.

Ben Gurion recalled his conversation with Burns (Jerusalem 404 to Department) in which he asked Burns to urge unconditional

cease-fire

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 1063, April 10, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Tel Aviv

cease-fire from Egyptians. Burns had asked him to exercise restraint for 24-hours Ben Gurion stating that he replied he would wait until noon April 10 or 48-hours. It was Burns who had suggested cease-fire was not enough but request should specifically include observance Article II, paragraph 2 of 1948 in its entirety. He said in another half-hour (it was then 11:30, 48 would have expired).

He said he knew there was battalion of Fedayeen near Gaza and furthermore "this kind of people" were based in all countries surrounding Israel. (He specifically named Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.) Israel knew they planning something "against Tel Aviv" although they had not been able to find out just what.

He repeated Fedayeen incursions from Jordan even though new commander of Arab Legion had said he opposed to such tactics. He had been prepared to believe him and believe him now (inference Jordanian control).

At this point I informed him that we doing all possible to get Nasser to agree to cease-fire and stop Fedayeen terrorism and President had addressed personal letter to Nasser who should feel obliged to regard it most seriously.

Ben Gurion replied he saw no reason why Nasser would take it seriously. He said obtaining help from Moscow and he knows Secretary of State who he said Nasser was only trying preserve his independence he had refused arms to Israel. For similar reasons Ben Gurion had no real hope of Hammarskjold's mission. After all Nasser had paid no attention to man with much greater authority... special envoy of President Eisenhower.

He said it difficult not to accept advice of President of US but he convinced President with all his responsibilities simply could not know details he would not limit himself to advice contained in his letter.

At this point argued that President did not question any country's right to self-defense but was suggesting Israel avoid action which would jeopardize chances of obtaining peaceful solution in near future.

Ben Gurion said if Hammarskjold did come back with Egyptian agreement to comply with GAA that would be something but he had failed in his previous attempt so had Burns and so had Allen.

LAWSON

VE:SPH/1

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Control: 5331

Rec'd: April 11, 1956

12:44 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1063, April 10, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

Destroyed in RM/R

Name: C. H. Date: 4/12/56

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 1063, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT CAIRO 355, PARIS 236, LONDON 312, AMMAN 147, DAMASCUS 174, BEIRUT 244.

If he did not succeed he could say quite frankly that third paragraph of President's letter would be absolutely meaningless. If Nasser were to launch Fedayeen raids from three countries (excluding Lebanon) or Tel Aviv were attacked he would not tell his people to be quiet, that US was going to come to their rescue.

Israel was once attacked by six states. One helped her. There had been complete embargo in US on arms to Israel. There was embargo again despite fact Arabs receiving aid from Soviets.

In his "humble view" to ask Israelis to rely on US would mean to give them false hopes.

Present situation could not go on. Settlements being sabotaged nightly, people being killed on roads, Israel had to stop travel two nights (Embassy telegram 1055). Nasser did not think he going to be punished or reprimanded, in view of which he ordered Fedayeen attacks.

He could not reconcile President's November 9 statement in Denver and his earlier letter with US denial of arms to Israel at time when US sending tanks to Saudi Arabia. Every tank to Saudi Arabia is tank for Nasser who is chief of staff of Syria and Saudi Arabia. Against this background he could not understand President's letter.

I asked if it not possible Nasser using Fedayeen tactics in effort to provoke Israel into response that would put Israel in role of aggressor and that was it not reason for Israel to exercise restraint while efforts made to find peaceful solution? Ben Gurion asked rhetorically if that meant we advised him to tolerate Fedayeen. "Should we send murderers into Gaza to perpetuate

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to perpetuate

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1/16/56 - 1/16/56

TOP SECRET FILE

~~TOP SECRET~~

1063, April 10, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Tel Aviv
to perpetuate similar outrages? No Israel could act only
against armed forces and (#) be against armed forces."

I replied that I not suggesting patience beyond limit of
endurance but until present efforts had been fully explored.

Comment: Ben Gurion spoke in reasonable vein I thought without
excitement but leaving no doubt he means to act as he thinks
circumstances dictate.

He convinced President for whom his respect and affection tracing
from association in Frankfurt remain undiminished, not fully
aware of shattering effect of Fedayeen on people of small
besieged country.

I think he deeply earnest about two remarks he made this morning:

(1) He will give Hammarskjold "A little time" to come up with
peaceful solution. (I believe although he did not say so that
he would require announcement Nasser's agreement to cease-fire
and strict compliance with Article II, paragraph 2 GAA before
Hammarskjold leaves Cairo).

2. If and when GOI decides to act it will be by applying military
action against military forces and not response "in kind" to
Fedayeen incursions.

Although it evident Ben Gurion's patience not without limits
and he spoke decisively and firmly I think pressures on him have
somewhat subsided. Tension here both within government and
public has fallen off peak it attained over week-end (Embassy
telegram 1062). It appears GOI for moment contemplates no
extraordinary action if Fedayeen operations are stopped promptly
and in absence new provocation.

LAWSON

TH:DE

(#) Omission. Correction to follow.

~~TOP SECRET~~

47
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INCOMING TELEGRAM

DATE: 4/11/56

REF: CH
~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTROL: 5331
CORRECTION ISSUED
4/11/56, 10:45 a.m.

-2- 1063, April 10, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Tel Aviv
CORRECTED PAGE 2

SS
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O

to perpetuate similar outages? No Israel could act only against armed forces and if it struck it would be against armed forces."

I replied that I not suggesting patience beyond limit of endurance but until present efforts had been fully explored.

Comment: Ben Gurion spoke in reasonable vein I thought without excitement but leaving no doubt he means to act as he thinks circumstances dictate.

He convinced President for whom his respect and affection tracing from association in Frankfurt remain undiminished, not fully aware of shattering effect of Fedayeen on people of small besieged country.

I think he deeply earnest about two remarks he made this morning:

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LAWSON

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RMR 4/11/56
1956 APR 12 AM

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TOP SECRET COVER SHEET

1. TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER

RM/R-F-536-1A

5331

4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) (Origin, subject, reference no. or other pertinent data)

674.84a/4-1056 Tel#1063 From- Tel Aviv
Tel. 1063 fr. Tel Aviv dtd. 4/10/56 (See 2 of 2)
re. Delivery of President's letter to Ben Gurion

2. COPY INFORMATION

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TELEGRAMS, DESPATCHES, ETC.

COPY NO. 1 OF 5 COPIES recd.

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4/11/56 4/11/56
(Date)

LEO DOLOFF L. Doloff
(Top Secret Control Officer)

3. DATE AND NAME OF PERSON PREPARING FORM

6. PERSONS TO WHOM ROUTED OR READING DOCUMENT	7. OFFICE SYMBOL	8. SIGNATURES	9. DATE RECEIVED	10. DATE READ	11. DATE RELEASED
		<i>McHenry</i>	4/11		4/11
Fraser Wilkins	NE				
		<i>Bone Langham</i>	4/11		
<i>Tel. 1063</i>	NE	<i>Burgis</i> <i>McShurtan</i>	4/11 4/11	4/11 "	4/11 "
<i>McHenry</i>	NE	CRC	"	"	"
<i>Message Ctr</i>	NEA	<i>J. S. ...</i>	4/11		
Mrs Spanow	RM/R	R-91365	4/16/56		
	RM/R	<i>Catherine Harris</i>	4/16/56		
		<i>Princeton</i>	1/31/57		
Released to HD- 2/27/57 - #537639		<i>Geneabonnan</i>			2/27/57
Helene De Long	HD	<i>Helene De Long</i>	3-1-57		3-1-57
G.M.R. Dougall	HD				11-12-57

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) (Origin, subject, reference no. or other pertinent data)

Tel. 1063 fr. Tel Aviv dtd. April 10, 1956.
(corrected page 2). (Sec 2 of 2).

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(Date)

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(Top Secret Control Officer)

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		CK Cheney	4/12	4/12	4/12
Proctor Willson	NE	Bon	4/12	"	"
Mr Berque	NE	Oct 3	"	"	"
CK Cheney	NE	CRC	4/12		4/12
Message Ctr	NEA		4/13		
File	RM/R	F Carter			
Mrs Sparrow	RM/R	R-91365	4/16/56		
	RM/R	Carterman	4/16/56		
Precedin		Autograd	1/31/57		

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4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENTS (Origin, subject, reference no. or other pertinent data)

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TELEGRAMS, DESPATCHES, ETC.

COPY NO. 1 OF 5 COPIES recd.

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4/11/56
(Date)

LEO DOLOFF
(Top Secret Control Officer)

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		<i>CR</i>	<i>4/11</i>		
Fraser Wilkins	NE	<i>McLaughlin</i>	<i>4/11</i>		
<i>DeGuz</i>	<i>NE</i>	<i>DeGuz</i> <i>DeGuz</i>	<i>4/11</i> <i>4/11</i>	<i>4/11</i>	<i>4/11</i>
<i>DeGuz</i>	<i>NE</i>	<i>CRC</i>	<i>"</i>	<i>"</i>	<i>"</i>
Message Ctr	<i>NEA</i>	<i>H/Spanow</i>	<i>4/11</i>		
Files	<i>RM/R</i>				
Mrs Spanow	<i>RM/R</i>	<i>R-91365</i>	<i>4/16/56</i>		
	<i>RM/R</i>	<i>Catherine</i>	<i>4/16/56</i>		
Princeton		<i>subpratt</i>	<i>12/20/56</i>		

**OUTGOING
TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

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DC/T

SENT TO: USUN, NEW YORK
EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

592

(CODE ROOM: Please repeat TEL AVIV's [redacted] 1063 Sections I

and II of April 10 to USUN, NEW YORK.)

res. letter to Be Yaron

674.84A/4-1056

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674.84A/4-1056

Origin

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Info:

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Cat

Drafted by:

IO:UNP:JML:sep 4/11/56

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

IO - Francis O. Wilcox

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Howe

TOP SECRET

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INCOMING

OUTGOING XX

FILE 592

DATE April 11, 1956

CONTIN. 4904

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Subject: Telephones

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**OUTGOING
TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

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RESTRICTED

Classification

04906

1956 APR 11 PM 8 53

DC/T

SENT TO: AmEmbassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY 763

Origin

Info

FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY.

Your 1063 referred to private and personal message of the President and ~~other~~ matters of particular sensitivity. We have asked Chiefs of Mission at posts ~~in which you reported message~~ to restrict knowledge of contents to themselves. Request you confine ~~to Dept only~~ this ~~message~~ to Dept only ~~message~~ to Dept only

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DULLES

Dist. Desired
(Offices Only)

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ONLY

DA/R
Ans. <u>2</u>
Rev. _____
Est. _____

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:DCBergus:bm
4/11/56

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/S - Fisher Howe

Clearances:

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Department of State
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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 408, April 10, 4 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 408, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT CAIRO 230, PRIORITY AMMAN 190, PRIORITY BEIRUT 110, PRIORITY BAGHDAD 17, PRIORITY DAMASCUS 111, PRIORITY LONDON 129, PRIORITY PARIS 122, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 208

Reference: CONGENTEL 404 to Department.

In response Burns' request Egyptians give undertaking observe article II paragraph 2 GAA in order establish "cease-fire" as proposed by Ben Gurion, who also stated Israelis would wait until 1202 local time April 10 for GOE reply. UNTSO has now (repeat now) received message from Fawsi. Message informs Burns that his forthcoming visit to Cairo together with UNSYG will create an appropriate occasion for a comprehensive discussion of all the points which Burns raised in his recent communications. Fawsi's message continues by stating that "meanwhile GOE will continue to take all measures necessary for the maintenance of security around the demarcation line".

Above message received at UNTSO headquarters about 1030 local time today after departure Burns to meet Hammarskjold at Tel Aviv airport. UNTSO courier expected deliver message to Burns at Tel Aviv about 1230 today. Assume Burns or Hammarskjold will ask GOI to leave above time limit in abeyance in order give them opportunity confer with Egyptians.

Understand Burns will accompany Hammarskjold to Cairo today.

COLE

SW:CRH:1

NOTE: Relayed OSD, ARMY, AIR, NAVY 4/10/56 1:20 p.m. LWH


Mr. Bergus' office (NE) and Mr. Ludlow's office (UNP) notified 4/10/56 12:55 p.m. LWH

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11:38 a.m.



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Department of State

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Control: 5135

Rec'd: April 10, 1956

3:20 p.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 409, April 10, 5 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 409, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT CAIRO 231, PRIORITY AMMAN 191, PRIORITY BEIRUT 111, PRIORITY BAGHDAD 18, PRIORITY DAMASCUS 112, PRIORITY LONDON 130, PRIORITY PARIS 123, TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED

UNTSO has apprized me of message which now (repeat now) being sent from Hammarskjold to Fawsi for Nasser with reference Fawsi message to Burns of April 10. (CONGENTEL 408). Paraphrase follows.

UNSYG message refers Burns communications to Fawsi April 6 regarding Fedayeen (CONGENTEL 403) and April 8 re Ben Gurion's proposed "cease-fire" (CONGENTEL 404). In addition UNSYG refers to a personal message which he sent to Nasser on April 9 endorsing Burns stand in requesting strict compliance with Article II paragraph 2 GAA in its entirety and to his further message indicating that he would reach Cairo night of April 10. UNSYG then expressed disappointment at contents Fawsi reply of April 10 to Burns, pointing out that it should be obvious his talks with GOE - which he is undertaking on basis mandate of Security Council - could not be conducted with the necessary basis lacking an assurance by the parties that they would observe provisions GAA as just cited.

UNSYG message continues to effect that such an assurance as mentioned in preceding paragraph is a necessary pre-condition for his mission. If GOE will not give it UNSYG states that he would have to reconsider his present loan to enter into discussions with GOE in implementation SC resolution. He therefore expresses hope that upon arrival Cairo he will receive assurance in question. He also voices confidence that Egyptian Prime Minister comprehend gravity of foregoing representations and will extend needed co-operation.

COLE

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56-L
ActionControl: 5793
Rec'd: April 11, 1956
12:59 p.m.NEA FROM: USARMA Tel Aviv
Info
RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: CX 131, April 10 (Army Message)

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L TO DEPTAR FOR ACSI AFOIN AND CNO, INFORMATION USARMAS, AMMAN,
IO BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, CINCNELM, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE,
P USDOCOSOUTH, USDOCOLAND COFS 8604 DU ASMARA COMIDEASTFORCE,
UOP COMSIXTHFLT AND USNMR PARIS.O
OLI JOINT SITREP NO. 24.

A. (All times local) IDF FLO report following incidents not previously reported:

091320 Water pipes blown up coordinate (#) time UNK police car shot up coordinate 131070--one policeman wounded.

091315 Auto fire opened on tractor and operator wounded, rescue party attacked -- no casualties, but tractor saved after dark.

092010 Coordinate 130130 civilian jeep shot up -- one dead, one wounded.

092100 Water pipes at Beit Reim coordinate 098088 blown up.

092100 Civilian car fired on coordinate 100090 -- one killed, one wounded.

090949 Fedayeen captured, coordinate 3161097.

100300 Water installation Kibbutz Gvulot blown up. Same at Zar Maoz and Magen.

100600 Water installation at Tkuma coordinate 110096 blown up.

101100 Fedayeen killed Lachish. Gaza border quiet -- no shooting.

100530 Fedayeen captured 15 kilometers NE Beersheba. One Fedayeen killed same action. Time UNK three Fedayeen intercepted Mount Gilboa, but escaped across Jordan border. Mobilization two companies observed in Tel Aviv 091700. Jerusalem-Ramle road and

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-2- CX 131, April 10 (Army Message), from USARMA Tel Aviv
ancillary roads closed night 9-10 April. IDF currently
estimated 100 Fedayeen operating daily in long and short
range groups of three to seven.

F: IDF denies Cairo radio story that Israel AF plane over
Suez 9 April.

J: Personnel in IDF FLO states IDF has information secret
source Fedayeen seeking strike against Tel Aviv City. Ben
Gurion agreed wait additional 24 hours for Nasser reply re-
garding cessation all hostile acts. Signed Query ARMA and P
Peterson AIRA.

SW: MDG-6

(#) Omission, correction to follow.

APR 20 1956

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *2* Department of State

Mr. Bagley

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33 36

Action

SS

FROM: Tel Aviv

Control: 5623

Rec'd: April 11, 1956
9:32 a.m.

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1064, April 11, Noon

PRIORITY

Re DEPTTEL 753 and EMBTEL 1063.

The text of Prime Minister Ben Gurion's reply to President Eisenhower's message. The original of reply, which was dated April 10 and delivered to me late last night, follows by air pouch.

"Dear Mr. President,

"I hasten to reply to your personal message conveyed to me this morning by Ambassador Lawson.

"I wish to express my deep appreciation of the motives which prompted you to communicate with me and to issue the April 9 statement from White House. With you, I see in war a tragedy not only in the physical sense, but also for the human spirit.

"We shall, of course, extend the fullest cooperation to Mr. Hammarskjold. At the same time, reality impels me to inform you of my grave doubts as to the outcome of the Secretary General's mission. The essential question is whether Colonel Nasser is prepared to issue an order to his troops, regular and irregular, to refrain from hostile acts. General Burns over many months, and Mr. Hammarskjold on his last visit to the area two months ago, have tried in vain to influence Colonel Nasser to take this preliminary and elementary step to bring about quiet on the frontiers. All attempts to obtain from him an undertaking to observe faithfully all the provisions of the armistice agreement, as we are unequivocally prepared to do, have also failed. As you are aware, Colonel Nasser has rejected all the proposals put to him by your personal emissary, including the request for a cease-fire order.

"During the past three nights, murder gangs have been sent from the Gaza Strip by the Egyptian military authorities to kill innocent civilians, to sabotage installations, and to terrorize the peaceful countryside. The responsibility of the Egyptian

authorities

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-2- 1064, April 11, Noon from Tel Aviv

authorities is clear to the UN observers. I feel confident that if the situation in all its details were brought to your attention, you would not have confined yourself merely to an expression of hope that we avoid retaliatory action. I cannot conceive that in the event of continuing Egyptian aggression you would expect us to abandon our country and people to the perils and blood-ridden consequences of a sustained campaign of terror by the murder gangs of the Egyptian Government. I am confident that no other country would passively submit to such a situation.

"The Government of Israel and I recognize to the full the sincerity of your statement from the White House that the United States will oppose any aggression in the area. However, I would be less than frank towards you and failing in my duty to my people, were I not to say, in all friendship, that this statement does not allay our acute anxiety regarding the security of Israel. As things stand at present, Egypt is perfecting her war machine with large supplies of Soviet arms, and is united with Syria and Saudi Arabia in pledged determination to seek the destruction of Israel. On the other hand, Israel is denied the possibility of obtaining essential arms for self defense as a result of an embargo maintained by the Government of the United States. The charter of the United Nations to which the White House statement refers existed already in 1948. Yet no member of the United Nations came to Israel's aid when, on emerging into statehood, she was subjected to invasion by the armies of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan.

"Your denunciation of acts of hostility and of war evoke a deep echo in our hearts. May I, however, say again in all frankness and friendship, that it appears to us paradoxical that this declaration is not accompanied by a positive response to our application for arms for self defense. In the logic of the situation, this is the only effective way of deterring Egyptian aggression and thus saving the area and the world from the horrors of war in the Middle East.

"Colonel Nasser's refusal to cooperate with your personal emissary, on the one hand, and the extent of his military preparations, on the other, unfortunately bear out fully our assessment of his motives in concluding his arms agreement with Czechoslovakia last September. In these circumstances the lack of response from the United States Government to our urgent appeal is source of gravest disappointment to my Government and my people.

"Sincerely yours,

"David Ben Gurion."

LAWSON

MDG-13

52521

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MAY 8 1964
9551 - 8 AM

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Department of State

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54-L
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Control: 5782
Rec'd: April 11, 1956
2:18 p.m.

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674.84A/4-1156

NEA FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 1065, April 11, 2 p.m.

SP SENT DEPARTMENT 1065, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 356, JERUSALEM
C UNNUMBERED.

L For third successive night (April 8-10) Jerusalem corridor road
IO and all roads south of Rehovot closed to private travel from
P dusk to dawn. Relatively small number casualties to date among
UOP travelers probably due complete interdiction civilian traffic
O during dark.

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CIA LMS:CAB
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MESSAGE CENTER

1956 APR 12 AM 7 32

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APR 24 1956

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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674:84A/4-1156

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NAVY

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1066, April 11, 1 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1066, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 357
JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.There follows supplementary list incidents reported by IDF FLO
and press for last 48-hour period and not previously reported
by Embassy:

April: Vehicles destroyed by mine, no casualties.

Yakron-Negev water pipe line blown up at Revivim, estimated
damage IL 40,000.Policeman wounded in clash with infiltrators 3 KM north of
Beersheba.April one ten*: Three soldiers wounded when army vehicle
struck mine vicinity Kissufim.Three soldiers wounded when army vehicle struck mine vicinity
Magen.

Electric pylon blown up at Kfar Am north of Gaza strip.

Railway line blown up at two points 3 and 5 KM north of Beersheba-
lengths 200 and 400 meters.

Shots fired on Kibbutz Zikim, north of Gaza strip, no casualties

Watchman fired on with auto weapons at Mivtahim Hahadasha, east
of southern Gaza strip, no casualties.JERUSALEM POST also reported that "water towers and pipes were
sabotaged before dawn at Gvulot, Tekuma, Tsor-Maon, Magen and Nir
Za (all Kibbutzim) in northern and western Negev."

LR/1

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Control: 5691

Rec'd:

April 11, 1956
11:41 a.m.MESSAGE CENTER
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Control: 5779
Rec'd: April 11, 1956
2:04 p.m.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1067, April 11, 1 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1067, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 358, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

Reference EMBTEL 1057

Latest report IDF FLO to USARMA is 11 Fedayeen killed and 6 taken prisoner; Israeli casualties from Fedayeen 6 dead 23 wounded. In addition and possibly not attributable to Fedayeen 6 soldiers injured when 2 army vehicles struck mines April 10 in vicinities Kissufim and Magen.

LAWSON

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1956 APR 12 AM 7 32

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Department of State
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Action.

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Control: 7955
Rec'd: April 15, 1956
8:55 a.m.

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674,84A/4-1156

NEA
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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1070, April 11, 4 p.m.

Request cables 1065, 1066, 1067 be passed Army, Navy, Air.

LAWSON

MEM/2

Note: Copies of EMBTELS 1065, 1066 and 1067 were sent to
Army, Navy and Air. CWO/FED

Note: Message delayed in transmission.

NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

1956 APR 16 AM 7 28

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Department of State

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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 411, April 11, Noon

Control: 5893

Rec'd: April 11, 1956
6:05 p.m.

1956
APR 12 AM 7 39

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674.84A/4-1156

SENT DEPARTMENT 411, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 232, TEL
AVIV 209.

Afternoon April 10 UNTSO officer gave me list 6 additional
complaints Fedayeen activities received from Israelis by
EIMAC since those reported CONGENTEL 407. These included
4 cases water pipes blown up, 1 water reservoir blown up
and attack on command car said to have taken place 6 kilo-
meters north of Beersheba on Tel Aviv road.

UNTSO officer stated that considerable number fragmentary
reports of investigations by observers had reached UNTSO
headquarters. These had not been collated, owing lack time
or personnel deal with matter, which primarily a subject
for EIMAC. He explained that Egypt does not allow the 5 ob-
servers in the Gaza Strip, who are busy manning observation
posts, to cross into Israel territory. Of the 8 observers
in southern part of Israel 2 are working in vicinity El Auja.
Remaining 6 have "been run ragged" following up allegations
and complaints about Fedayeen. Therefore they have not
prepared comprehensive reports as yet covering individual
investigations. Such reports will probably be completed
within next day or two.

With regard interrogations of captured Fedayeen UNTSO had
only following information from observer: 1 Fedayeen stated
he was member of group of four. He is a Palestinian. Before
crossing D/L he received instructions from Captain Hamesl at
the Gaza police station.

UNTSO source stated that Burns would doubtless issue report in
due course covering various aspects incidents, including any
statements made by Fedayeen in presence observers. Meanwhile,
details are simply not available as yet. However, UNTSO officer
believed information reported Embassy Tel Aviv by IDF-FLO in
general substantially correct with respect details Fedayeen activi-
ties, since observers findings appear to be corroborating Israeli
allegations.

AW/2

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Action

Control: 5588

Rec'd: April 11, 1956
8:44 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Jerusalem

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 412, April 11, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 412, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 233,
PRIORITY TEL AVIV 210.

As of noon today UNTSO had received no indication of further
incidents last night. Chairman EIMAC has reported all quiet
Gaza strip area.

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1956 APR 11 AM 10 21

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File Designation 674,84A/4-1156
Te 1837
Date 4/11/56
From New York
To Sec State

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- ☒ Security-Classified Information
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

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Authority

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Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

(27)

**OUTGOING
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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

04905

1956 APR 11 PM 8 50

DC/T

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SENT TO: USUN, NEW YORK

593

Origin

IO

Info:

RM/R

S/S

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

(CODE ROOM: Please repeat DEPTELS 2454 and 2463 to CAIRO
dated April 9 and 10 respectively and TEL AVIV's 1064 dated April 11
to USUN, NEW YORK.)

674.844/4-1156
Ben Davis' update p. 2

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None

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Drafted by: IO:UNP:JML:law:scp 4/11/56

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

IO - Francis O. Wilcox

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Howe

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674.844/4-1156

Mr. C. J. McCarthy 8
Master File & Copy 8

EYES ONLY

POST New York

INCOMING

COMMUNIST AX

593

DATE April 11, 1956

CONTROL 4905

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Jackson

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#8 S/S master

EYES ONLY
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Subject repeats
of Tel Aviv
12/64 and
Can 04/54, 2463

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**OUTGOING
TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

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1956 APR 11 PM 8 54

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SENT TO: CIRCULAR

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Origin

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Tel Aviv's 1063 to Dept (rptd Cairo 355, Paris 236, London 312, Amman 147, Damascus 174, Beirut 244) referred to a personal and private message of the President; ~~request to subjects of~~ Request particular sensitivity. ~~Request to subjects of~~ knowledge of content be restricted to Chief of Mission only.

*Presidents
letter to Ben Gurion
Dulles*

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CONFIDENTIAL

CC

674.84A/4-1156

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:DMBergus:bm
4/11/56

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/S - Fisher Howe

Cleanances:

52702

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AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

APR 1956
DATE OF TYPE IN SPACE

674.84A/4-1156

XR 684a.86

COPY NO. 1

SERIES A

April 11, 1956 784a.56
DATE

FROM : Amembassy, Tel Aviv

631

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF : Embtels 1063 and 1064

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674.84A/1

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION REC'D 4/18	DEPT. IN F O	OTHER u/PR S/S H C S/P EUR IO
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SUBJECT: Prime Minister David Ben Gurion's Reply to President Eisenhower's Letter of April 10, 1956 to the Israel Prime Minister.

There is attached for transmittal to the White House the original of Ben Gurion's reply to the letter he received from President Eisenhower.

Text of the letter was also transmitted in Embassy's telegram no. 1064.

For the Ambassador:

William Hamilton
William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

As stated.

Date

136 APR 18 AM 11 43

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WLHamilton:jd
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674.84A/4-1156
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(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

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APR 13 1956

674.840/4-1156

COPY NO. 1

SERIES A

FROM : Embassy, Tel Aviv

633

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

X-12 7440-00
April 11, 1956

DATE

REF :

17 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION REC'D 4/18	DEPT. 1 Sink PPT ob' to R P 0 C. 252	File Rm	DB Files
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SUBJECT: American Kibbutznik's Description of New Israeli Technique for Apprehension of Fedayeen

There is attached a memorandum by Mr. Clarence J. McIntosh, chief of the Embassy's Consular Section, relating his conversation with a 30-year-old American citizen, resident in a kibbutz on the Gaza Strip, on her experiences and observations during the spate of Fedayeen incidents of early April.

Of particular interest to the Embassy was her description, as reported in the fifth paragraph of Mr. McIntosh's memorandum, of a new technique devised for the detection, pursuit, and apprehension of Fedayeen against whose tactics the Israelis have been rather ineffectual in the past. While such diligent and unrelenting patrol probably would over-tax kibbutzim manpower if it had to be maintained as a regular practice, it would appear to be a technique easily put into operation with each new outbreak of Fedayeen activity. If it continued to exact as heavy a toll of Fedayeen as the Israelis attained in the early April outbreak, new Fedayeen may not be easily recruited.

Other sources describe this or related techniques as "thick patrolling." In this connection the Department may wish to review Embtels 1059 and 1061.

For the Ambassador:

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

Memorandum for the Record,
dated April 9, 1956.

WLHamilton:jd

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674.84A/4-1156

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APR 11 1956

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Date
1956
173 APR 13 AM 11 41

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(Classification)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: American Kibbutznik's Description of New Israeli Technique for Apprehension of Fedayeen

DATE: April 9, 1956

This morning I had occasion to interview a resident American citizen of a kibbutz in connection with her citizenship case. I took advantage of the opportunity to get her idea on the general situation in that area.

Informant said that the recent shelling along that border seemed to stem from a planned action of retaliation on the part of Israel. She explained that following the Egyptian firing on an Israel patrol on Tuesday (April 3) in which an Israeli was killed, the Israel Army decided to teach the Egyptians a lesson if they fired on a similar patrol the following day. Through a mistake, however, the patrol of the following day was made up of inexperienced Nahal boys (para-military - farmers) and when fired upon it bogged down and was unable to extricate itself. Three of the men were badly wounded and by the time assistance reached the patrol from Kissufim, during the course of which a half track and also a tractor had difficulty with mud, the men were too far gone and they died in Kissufim.

As I recall, a general action involving heavy fire started on Thursday (April 5), again as the outgrowth of Egyptian firing on an Israeli patrol. The members of the patrol are reported to have said that even before they could raise their own rifles to return fire on the Egyptians, Israeli heavy guns went into action. This firing spread with the general flare up all along the border as reported in the press.

As of additional interest I learned that all of the kibbutzim have what they call ambush parties, and on the orders of local army commanders word is spread from one kibbutz to another by way of sending up flares to send out these parties to search for raiders. When ambush parties are on the prowl, all roads in the vicinity are closed and checks are made on the identity of all people moving in the area. I also learned that the trenching work in the border kibbutzim facing the Strip is not yet complete and will require another three weeks or so. This work involves V-shaped fighting trenches and communications trenches. In the latter it is rumored that such modern equipment as telephones will be installed.

Some kibbutz inhabitants can see into the Gaza area and note that there is a train twice a day from Egypt. She said that this was a passenger train but in all probability it carries mixed cargo. This would indicate, however, that the road between Egypt and Gaza is being maintained. This is the same line that formerly continued on to Ashkelon and Tel Aviv.

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Page _____ of _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

SECRET
(Classification)

Page 2 of 2
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 633
From Tel Aviv

The feeling in the kibbutzim among the kibbutz members is that the border tension which has carried on for some time now cannot continue to be borne and there is feeling that regardless of whether the Egyptians or the Israelis occupy the Gaza Strip, a quiet must prevail. Apparently the nerves of the kibbutz residents are beginning to fray. I am informed also that Egyptian jets fly frequently over these settlements sometimes so low that pilots can be seen.

My informant noted that large scale action of the Nitzana, Khan Yunis type seems to occur about once every three months, and she thinks that the Gaza border will now be relatively quiet until June.

CJMcIntosh: eh/jd

SECRET

Blue
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
April 28, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Ben Gurion

674.842/4-1156

Following your conversation with Under Secretary Hoover I send you herewith a revised draft letter to Mr. Ben Gurion which I hope meets the points you raised.

*no doubt you
can steel
urging*



John Foster Dulles

Enclosures:

1. Suggested reply.
2. Letter from Ben Gurion.

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674.842/4-1156
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674.842/4-1156
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DC/R
May 57
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123
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Number of 6 copies, Series A.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 4/11/56

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Israeli Ambassador Eban
Israeli Minister Shiloah
Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy *DM*COPIES TO: S
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NEA

Ambassador Eban and Minister Shiloah called at my house briefly last evening at their request. As I was about to go out to an official dinner there was only a few minutes available, but they seemed to be insistent.

They said they had seen Mr. George Allen earlier in the afternoon and I believe Mr. Francis Russell earlier in the day, so there seemed to be no particular point in their visit except to indicate their disquiet and anxiety over the developing situation in the Gaza Strip area. They read to me the contents of a message they had just received from Tel Aviv which described the Egyptian command operations in the Gaza area and which was full of foreboding that this might lead to large-scale operations. I said that from reports we had been receiving during the day it looked to me as though some form of truce or cease-fire might develop and that it was necessary for both sides to exercise restraint; that I hoped that Mr. Hammarskjold's conversations might be having some effect. Their reply to the latter point indicated that they have but little faith in Mr. Hammarskjold's mission.

The foregoing was simply a prelude to insistence on the U.S. supplying defensive arms to Israel. They said Mr. Allen had informed them of our indication to Paris that we would have no objection to delivering 12 French Mysteres IVs. They complained that their representative in Ottawa is getting nowhere with the Canadians, who seemed to be waiting on some signal from this country. I mentioned that I had understood also that they were obtaining 6 Meteors from the U.K. and also anti-aircraft equipment. This they confirmed but said it was for later delivery. They complained also that according to information from Rome, Mr. Jernegan had informed the Italian Government that we were opposed to Italy supplying military equipment to Israel. I expressed surprise and they said this had also been confirmed by Ambassador Brosio. I promised that we would inquire into this, and they said they had also discussed this with Mr. Allen.

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SECRET

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4/11/56

①

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL A. J. GOODPASTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

xP-13
7840/13

SUBJECT: Ben Gurion Reply to President
Eisenhower's Message

I am enclosing a copy of Prime Minister Ben Gurion's
response to President Eisenhower's message to him of April 20.

FISHER HOWE
DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Fisher Howe
Director
Executive Secretariat

674.84A/4-1156

Enclosure:

Cable 1064 from Tel Aviv,
Copy Number 3, dated April 11.

674.84a/4-1156 secut file

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APR 11 1956
A true copy of
signed original.

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S/S-RO:JSCottman:mas 4/11/56

APR 26 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL A. J. GOODPASTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Ben Gurion's Reply to President
Eisenhower's April 9th Message

Deep # 631 from Tel Aviv
674.84A/4-1156
See file

I am enclosing the original of Prime Minister Ben
Gurion's response to President Eisenhower's message to
him of April 9th. The text of Ben Gurion's message as
cabled to us from Tel Aviv was transmitted to you on
April 11.

FISHER HOUSE
DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Fisher House
Director
Executive Secretariat

Enclosure:

Letter from Prime Minister
Ben Gurion, April 10.

S/S-RO:RKirk:ldac 4/26/56

S/S-RO:EVMcAuliffe:emb

S/S-RO
APR 6 1956
A true copy of
signed original.

674.84A/4-1156

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674.84A/4-1156

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SECRET

April 11, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL A. J. GOODPASTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Ben Gurion Reply to President
Eisenhower's Message

I am enclosing a copy of Prime Minister Ben Gurion's
response to President Eisenhower's message to him of
April 9.

Fisher Howe
Director
Executive Secretariat

Enclosure:

Cable 1064 from Tel Aviv,
Copy No. 3, dated April 11.

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Department of State

ACTION COPY

53-L
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Control: 6503
Rec'd: APRIL 12, 1956
1:39 P.M.NEA FROM: CAIRO
Info
RMR TO: Secretary of StateSS NO: 2048, APRIL 12, 3 P.M.
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CEUR PRIORITY
IOUSUN SENT DEPARTMENT 2048 REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY
P JERUSALEM 136 PRIORITY TEL AVIV 246, USUN 72, DAMASCUS, AMMAN,
UOP BEIRUT, LONDON, PARIS UNNUMBERED.
O
OLIOCB ALGUMHOUR!YA TODAY HEADLINES "RETURN OF THE HEROES-50 RE-
USIA TALITARY RAIDS-300 COMMANDOES, 290 RETURN, 10 MARTYRS".
CIA ALAHAM "RETURN OF COMMANDOES TO THEIR BASES AFTER 50 RAIDS
OSD RETALIATIONS FOR ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST CIVILIANS IN
ARMY GAZA". AL AKHBAR "COMMANDOES TELL HOW WE TERRORIZED ISRAEL".
NAVY
AIR

EDITORIALS STRESS COMMANDO MISSION OF "REVENGE" ACCOMPLISHED SUCCESSFULLY. AL AKHBAR SAID "WE COULD HAVE LOOSED OUR FORCES TO TEAR ISRAEL TO BITS BUT WE CHOSE TO DISCIPLINE HER IN HER OWN METHOD ... COMMANDOES SHOWED ISRAEL ARABS ARE CAPABLE SPREADING TERROR IN HER TERRITORY--PUNISHMENT IN SAME NATURE HER AGGRESSION." AKHBAR DENIED USE OF COMMANDOES WAS ACT AGGRESSION. "OUR PROGRAM DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR PROVOCATION OF WAR ITS SACRIFICES AND HOW AIMLESS AND FUTILE RESULT IS ... WE ARE EQUIPPING NOT FOR WAR BUT TO PUNISH ADVOCATES OF WAR AND EXPANSION AND KEEP THEM CONFINED ... HAD ISRAEL NOT COMMITTED THIS TREACHERY COMMANDOES WOULD NOT HAVE MOVED... WE GAVE SC AND CIVILIZED WORLD OUR WORD WE DID NOT WANT WAR OR AGGRESSION, BUT WE WILL MAINTAIN OUR RIGHTS AND OUR HOME-LAND."

HAMMARSKJOLD TENTATIVELY PLANNING LEAVE CAIRO APRIL 13 FOR BEIRUT. HE PLANS REMAIN THERE UNTIL APRIL 15 WHEN HE PLANS LEAVE FOR ISRAEL.

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APR 13 1956
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-2- 2048, APRIL 12, 3 P.M., FROM CAIRO

COMMENT: GOE PLAINLY ENDEAVORING PLAY DOWN TENSION AND
STRESS HAMMARSKJOLD MISSION. QUITE CLEAR HOWEVER THAT NEW
ISRAELI MOVE ALONG LINES GAZA SHELLING WOULD BRING SIMILAR
RESPONSE.

BYROADE

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APR 1 9 1956

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2051, APRIL 12, 7 P.M.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 2051, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT TEL AVIV 247,
NIACT JERUSALEM 137, PRIORITY LONDON 314, PRIORITY PARIS 180.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY.

REFERENCE TEL AVIV 359.

EMBASSY RELIABLY INFORMED -- ALTHOUGH BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT WE
HAVE NOT HAD CONTACT WITH SYG MISSION ENABLING US OFFICIALLY
CONFIRM -- THAT IN RESPONSE TO MESSAGE DESCRIBED REFTEL SYG
PROMPTLY FORWARDED REPLY REJECTING SHARETT'S ACCUSATION
NASSER ACTED IN BAD FAITH IN AGREEING CONFORM ARTICLE II
GAA AND POINTING OUT OBVIOUS TIME FACTOR.

PROMPTNESS AND STRENGTH OF ISRAELI REACTION TO HAMMARSKJOLD'S
COMMUNICATION OF EGYPTIAN ACCEPTANCE RAISES QUESTION WHETHER
ISRAEL NOT LOOKING FOR SOME WAY SABOTAGE HIS MISSION.

BYROADE

TT

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Tel. 2051 fr. Cairo dtd. April 12, 1956.

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<i>Mrs Spanaw</i>	<i>RMR</i>	<i>R-91365</i>	<i>4/16/56</i>		
	<i>RMR</i>	<i>Cairman Harris</i>	<i>4/16/56</i>		
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Tel 1075
Date 4/12/56
From Tel Aviv
To SecState

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Department of State

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Control: 6507
Rec'd: April 12, 1956
1:29 p. m.56-L
Action

NEA FROM: Tel Aviv

Info RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 1076, April 12, 3 p. m.

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SP
C PRIORITY

L IO SENT DEPARTMENT 1076, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 360

P UOP PASS ARMY, NAVY AIR

OLI Fedayeen carried out 8 new attacks night April 11 all within 15 kilometer radius Tel Aviv. Three schoolboys and teacher killed, 5 wounded, 2 seriously, while at evening prayers in Synagogue at agricultural boarding school at Shafrir, 5 kilometers from Tel Aviv city limits; family of three seriously wounded their house and six passengers wounded in bus near Ramle; raiders shot up main gate IDF headquarters camp at Sarafand (Tserifin).
ARMY Total casualties last night 4 killed, 15 wounded. Negev area relatively quiet.
NAVY
AIR

Comment: Savage aspect of murders, their unprecedented proximity Tel Aviv and insolence Sarafand attack have caused complete reversal two day downward trend of tempers. One source reports IDF "wild with rage" public appalled and emotionally upset by cumulative effect five nights Fedayeen activities.

Shift of attacks to Tel Aviv, where civilian population not psychologically or otherwise so well equipped to bear up as Negev settlers, has had most dangerous impact. Earlier feeling Israelis would "ride it out" predicated on assumption decline in incidents; increasing effectiveness countermeasures, and indications early cessation of raids.

It appears probable Israelis very close to "cannot live with it" stage mentioned by Sharett (Embassy telegram 884).

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ActionControl: 6288
Rec'd: April 12, 1956
8:45 a.m.

NEA FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMT TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1077, April 12.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1077, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 361, JERUSALEM
UNNUMBERED.

Following is Jerusalem post, April 12, version of three statements by "foreign Ministry spokesman", one "at midnight last night" and two earlier same evening re latest Fedayeen activities (Hebrew and foreign language press carry similar but not textually identical stories):

"Tonights round aggression by Egyptian murder forces in Israel has caused toll three killed and 16 wounded by midnight tonight. Among casualties are three boys killed and six children wounded. Loss life might very well have been much larger since among targets murderous attacks were crowded bus and agricultural boarding school for children. Especially grave aspect situation is that incidents have occurred in heart of Israel territory and that obvious purpose their perpetrators was to kill". Foreign Ministry spokesman said at midnight last night.

"Egypt has despatched new forces to engage in murder and sabotage inside Israel", earlier statement had said.

"UN Chief Staff has been appealing to Egyptians since last Friday to stop hostilities. For past 24 hours UN Secretary-General has been in Cairo together with General Burns in effort persuade Egypt honor its obligations under armistice agreement to refrain from all acts of hostilities," he said.

"Tonight Egypt has given a clear answer to Mr. Hammarskjold's appeal. The answer has been vicious and calculated renewal of aggression against Israel," spokesman emphasized.

Last night the southern area of Israel was quiet because the Israel security forces had succeeded in rounding up a number of the Egyptian murder forces which had been unleashed against Israel, he said.

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Control: 6344
Rec'd: April 12 1958
10:35 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1078, April 12, 2 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1078, NIACT CAIRO 362; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 150, DAMASCUS 175, BEIRUT 245, PARIS 238, LONDON 316.

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On invitation Ben Gurion Tuesday I joined him at his home Tel Aviv last night for after-dinner coffee and chat on existing critical conditions. We were alone.

Although he made effort include wide range general social topics he spent most of hour discussing arms question Fedayeen terrorism and Hammarskjold conversation with Nasser which proceeding that moment. He very tense, jumping up quickly when telephone rang or when messengers knocked at front door which was frequent. He wasted not (repeat not) 1 minute retiring to another room to talk with Chief of Staff Dayan who arrived during my short visit.

While affable and friendly he did not (repeat not) hesitate to express opinion US taken in by Nasser and making big mistake placing confidence there repeating at some length his usual line of reasoning; indicated US (President) only can by quick and strong warning to Nasser reduce immediate danger war and also ultimate Soviet penetration NE area and Africa.

However most immediate concern was Fedayeen terrorism which continuing unabated. He said earlier reports such attacks planned for Tel Aviv (EMBTEL 1063) now supplemented by report they delayed until Saturday. However Dayan brought in report of heavy attacks in vicinity Tel Aviv (EMBTEL 1076) which may indicate step-up in Fedayeen approach to Tel Aviv. I noted last night and this morning heavy police-soldier patrolling of main highway entrances to Tel Aviv with machine guns prominent and all traffic stopped and searched.

When Ben Gurion cited earlier radio report received in Tel Aviv that Nasser had turned down Hammarskjold's demand for agreement conform article

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-2- 1078, April 12, 2 p.m., from Tel Aviv.

conform article II GAA I cautioned him not (repeat not) to believe report until confirmed as it too early in my opinion for any authentic report to come out of Cairo. I also expressed opinion Hammarskjold would of necessity take firm line with Nasser in that agreement on article II would be essential to Hammarskjolds entire mission. He thought this logical but waiting anxiously for next news broadcast over radio. He again described at length extreme dangers Fedayeen attacks to Israel and reasons Israel could not (repeat not) long endure them.

I left him tired but tense man awaiting further messages during night from his advisors. I unable determine particular reason for his invitation to visit him other than to reiterate and underscore extreme seriousness of Israel's present position under Fedayeen attacks and need for US arms. I left with impression he thinking of extent of Israel enduring current conditions more in terms of hours rather than days but he gave no (repeat no) indication of having actually reached final decision to take violent action. But I felt that action would be triggered if Fedayeen attack reaches Tel Aviv on Saturday or before unless there immediate evidence incursions stopped.

LAWSON

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Control: 6866

Rec'd: April 13, 1956

5:52 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1079, April 12; 4 p.m.

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View of tense Fedayeen situation and in order to encourage continuation of patience and restraint I departed from text my prepared address at dedication ceremonies yesterday Bar-Ilan University. I made following introductory remarks:

"This is special occasion for me. I am at this moment deeply moved by great admiration for people at moment of great anxiety profound admiration for courage and fortitude and patience so clearly exhibited at this hour of trial. If there is one characteristic that marks people as great it is their conduct in moments great emotional stress and acute danger. You have met test in face of constant terror of marauding gangs which march by night . . . terrorism that strikes directly at individual life of nation. There has been most remarkable restraint and composure under most challenging circumstances. Life of country has moved in its uninterrupted flow of progress. This very ceremony testifies to that great national character that permits academic as well as economic and security progress of nation to move forward despite critical and threatening events. For this world will commend you and I feel honored I can be part of program which so clearly illustrates this outstanding national characteristics."

It will be noted that I was careful to refer to public reaction Fedayeen dangers only and made no reference whatever to Gaza. Initial reception of foregoing has been good and Ben Gurion seemed to appreciate it when I saw him last night.

LAWSON

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9:33 a.m.

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NEA FROM: Tel Aviv
Info
RMP TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 1080, April 12.

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EUR L SENT DEPARTMENT 1080, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 363.

IO
USUN P According IDF FLO one Egyptian Vampire shot down near Sde Boker
P in central Negev about noon April 12.

UOP ND Pilot killed. Vampire one of flight of four entering Israel
O air space from Nitzana area intercepted by Israeli fighters.

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AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1082, April 12

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1082, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 364

Following supplements and corrects EMBTEL 1080.

Vampire was one of flight of four of which two piston driven,
two vampire jets. IDF FLO reports pilot wounded not (repeat
not) killed.

Control: 6484

Rec'd: April 12, 1956
1:27 p.m.

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CRH:7

1956 APR 12 PM 4 28

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AIR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 414, April 12, noon

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 414, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT CAIRO 234, PRIORITY AMMAN 192, PRIORITY BEIRUT 112, PRIORITY BAGHDAD 20, PRIORITY DAMASCUS 113, PRIORITY LONDON 131, PRIORITY PARIS 124, TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED

Colonel Hommel of UNTSO has given me morning April 12 following details respecting messages exchanged between UNSYG and Israelis in course his talks with Nasser.

In message sent April 11 UNSYG apprised Ben Gurion that Nasser had accepted proposals regarding cease-fire through observance Article II, paragraph 2 GAA in its entirety (CONGENTEL 404).

A second message was received at UNTSO headquarters from UNSYG for Ben Gurion somewhat later along following lines. UNSYG expressed himself as pleased Ben Gurion's agreement keep patrols 500 meters back from D/L while Hammarskjold-Nasser talks in progress. Referring again Nasser's acceptance cease-fire UNSYG pointed out that since both sides have accepted he urged steps be taken at once implement undertaking.

However, before arrival second message Hommel had received Sharett's reply to first message. Reply referred renewed outbreaks Fedayeen activities night April 11 and stated inter alia utter falseness Nasser's assurances stands exposed thereby, etc (Understand full text already transmitted by Tel Aviv) Hommel has not therefore delivered UNSYG second message to GOI. He is reporting fully to UNSYG and expects some further communication in response Sharett's message.

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AIR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 416, April 12, 4 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 416, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO PRITY 236,
 TEL AVIV PRITY 212, AMMAN 194, BEIRUT 113, DAMASCUS 114.

In addition details given CONGENTEL 414 Colonel Hommel has
 given me additional background recent incidents.

UNTSO has received 4 complaints from Israelis of Fedayeen ac-
 tivities night April 11 similar reports appearing today's
 Israeli press including shooting, grenade episodes and am-
 bush of bus. These took place in Tel Aviv, Ramle, Lydda area.
 Proximity these places Jordan borders suggests possibility Fedayeen
 entered Israel from some point east of Lydda. Alternate possi-
 bility is that Fedayeen involved worked way up during past day
 or two along coastal area from Gaza Strip, turning east in neigh-
 borhood Rishon-le-Zion. First possibility based on theory that
 Fedayeen began travels from Gaza Strip, entered Jordan in Hebron
 district and were thereafter transported to some point northwest
 Jerusalem for subsequent border crossing.

With reference Israeli sense outrage over Fedayeen activities and
 call for "public condemnation on behalf UN" as mentioned by Sharett
 in his April 12 message to UNSYG, Hommel pointed out that it might
 at some point be pertinent to draw attention Israelis again to
 aggressive character their bombardment of civilian population
 Gaza April 5. This matter was so obvious that, as Hommel recalled,
 Burns did not stress it overly in his communications with Ben
 Gurion. Latter however had made statement to Burns that Israeli
 mortar battery shelled two specific military targets in Gaza vi-
 cinity; the Taggaert police station west of Gaza, and certain
 military installations at Jebel Muntar south of Gaza. However,
 UNTSO has now plotted on map craters mortar explosions. It
 should be of interest to note that no mortar shell fell within
 one kilometer of police station nor within 800 meters of Jebel
 Muntar. Some 70 craters observed all within radius of 1-1/2
 kilometer within Gaza environs. In circumstances Ben Gurion's
 assertions about military character mortar targets appear untrue.

In addition

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-2- 416 April 12, 4 p.m., from Jerusalem

In addition Chairman EIMAC has given as his opinion that mortar fire was carried on in manner calculated inflict maximum casualties civilians; that Israeli fire was opened at time large numbers persons would be in streets; a few shells were lobbed over initially as though attract curious crowds; and remainder fired after an interval into crowd which had gathered view results of earlier firing.

At 1400 hours April 12 UNTSO had information from Israelis of aerial flight over El Auja D/Z. One Egyptian plane said shot down.

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APR 20 1956

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FROM: NEW YORK

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

MESSAGE CENTER

SS

NO: 841, APRIL 12, 1 PM

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PRIORITY

RE-PALESTINE



EBAN CALLED ON ME AT HIS REQUEST THIS MORNING. HE OPENED THE CONVERSATION WITHOUT FORMALITIES OF ANY SORT BY STATING TO ME IN MY CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF SC THAT "ISRAEL IS THE VICTIM OF AN ARMED ATTACK". HE SAID HE USED THOSE WORDS IN THE CHARTER SENSE.

EBAN THEN WENT ON TO REFER TO THE MOST RECENT ATTACK BY EGYPTIAN MARAUDERS ON ISRAELI CHILDREN AT PRAYER, AT A PLACE 20 MILES FROM TEL AVIV, WHICH ATTACK WILL BE SUBJECT OF A FURTHER LETTER TO COUNCIL MEMBERS LATER TODAY.

EBAN STATED THAT "THE AIR ARM" HAS NOW BEEN BROUGHT INTO PLAY, ALLEGING THAT AN EGYPTIAN VAMPIRE JET HAD BEEN BROUGHT DOWN AND IS NOW IN ISRAEL'S CUSTODY.

EBAN OUTLINED TWO ALTERNATIVES WITH WHICH WE ARE FACED AT THE MOMENT. IF EGYPT WANTS WAR NOW, THEY SHALL HAVE IT. ISRAEL IS DETERMINED, HE SAID, NOT TO HAVE WAR UNLESS EGYPT INSISTS. ILLUSTRATING ISRAEL'S INTENTION IN CIRCUMSTANCES, HE POINTED TO ISRAELI OFFER TO COMPLY WITH GENERAL BURNS' REQUEST FOR CEASE-FIRE AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO EXTEND THE DATE LINE 24, 48, 72, AND NOW, HE SUPPOSED 96 HOURS, WHILE AWAITING EGYPT'S RESPONSE.

THE OTHER ALTERNATIVE, AS HE SAW IT, WAS TO POSTPONE PRESENT CRISIS. THIS WOULD MERELY PASS THROUGH ONE "GLOOMY HORIZON" TO FACE ISRAEL WITH A SECOND AND MORE GLOOMY ONE. IN A MONTH OR TWO, EGYPT'S AIR ARM WOULD BE DEVELOPED TO POINT OF

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-2- 841, APRIL 12, 1 PM FROM NEW YORK

PREPONDERANCE OVER ISRAEL, AND EGYPT WOULD THEREAFTER NO LONGER RELY ON MARAUDER GANGS WHICH OPERATED AGAINST SMALL GROUPS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, BUT WOULD PLACE IN JEOPARDY THE LIVES OF EVERY CITIZEN OF ISRAEL.

SHOULD THERE BE A RESPITE, ISRAEL MUST TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT BY BUILDING UP A DETERRENT FORCE IN THE AIR COMPARABLE TO HER DETERRENT FORCES ON GROUND.

EBAN ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY INFORMATION REGARDING EGYPT'S INTENTIONS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OR ANY IDEAS REGARDING SC ACTION.

I TOLD HIM THAT, AS PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL AND AS US REPRESENTATIVE, I WOULD TAKE NOTE OF HIS OPENING STATEMENT ABOUT ISRAEL'S VIEW THAT IT WAS VICTIM OF AN ARMED ATTACK AND WOULD, OF COURSE, RELAY TO WASHINGTON EVERYTHING HE HAD TOLD ME. I HAD NO FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING EGYPT'S INTENT AND NO ONE HAD SUBMITTED A REQUEST FOR FURTHER MEETING OF COUNCIL.

EBAN SAID ORDINARILY THEY WOULD BE CLAMORING FOR A MEETING BUT, IN VIEW OF HAMMARSKJOLD'S MISSION, THEY FELT THEY MUST RESTRAIN THEIR NORMAL DESIRES IN THIS REGARD. EBAN ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY WORD REGARDING ACTIVITIES OF SECRETARY-GENERAL, HAVING HEARD FROM CORDIER ALREADY TODAY THAT HAMMARSKJOLD HAD SENT IN CERTAIN DOCUMENTS FOR DISTRIBUTION. I HAD NOT RECEIVED THEM AS OF THAT MOMENT, AND PROMISED TO PROVIDE ISRAELI DELEGATION WITH ANYTHING WE COULD CONCERNING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OPERATIONS.

AS FOR QUESTION OF ARMS, I TOLD EBAN THIS WAS A MATTER ON WHICH HE MUST OBVIOUSLY ADDRESS HIMSELF TO WASHINGTON. I WENT ON TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT AS I UNDERSTOOD POSITION OF DEPARTMENT, WE FELT ISRAEL WAS ENTITLED AND SHOULD RECEIVE ARMS FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS. EBAN SAID THAT WHILE OTHER GOVERNMENTS DID NOT NEED US APPROVAL TO GIVE ARMS TO ISRAEL, THEY NEED AN EXAMPLE

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-3- 841, APRIL 12, 1 PM FROM NEW YORK

BY US. HE SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS OF CANADA AND FRANCE HAD INDICATED AS MUCH BY SAYING THAT IT WAS HARD FOR THEM TO DO WHAT THE US WOULD NOT DO. HE FELT A SYMBOLIC ACT WAS NEEDED TO REMOVE IMPRESSION OF AN AMERICAN EMBARGO AND THAT A "VERY SMALL KEY COULD OPEN UP VERY LARGE DOORS".

EBAN MENTIONED RUMORS THAT SC MIGHT BE MEETING OUTSIDE NEW YORK TO HEAR SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT AND ASKED FOR ANY INFORMATION I HAD ON SUBJECT. I TOLD HIM WE HAD HEARD MUCH TALK ABOUT IT BUT NO ONE HAD ANY DEFINITE VIEWS AND NO ONE HAD MADE ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. I SAID WE WOULD NOT FIGHT PROPOSAL OF THIS SORT, BUT WE WERE NOT IN ANY WAY PROMOTING A MOVE.

EBAN AGAIN EXPRESSED DESIRE TO BE KEPT INFORMED TO EXTENT POSSIBLE OF ANY INFORMATION REGARDING CAIRO'S ATTITUDE AND ACTIVITIES OF SECRETARY-GENERAL.

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46-41
ActionControl: 6677
Rec'd: April 12, 1956
2:30 p.m.

NEA

FROM: USARMA Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: CX 136, April 12 (Army Message)

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TO ACSI AFOIN AND CNO WASH REPEATED INFORMATION USARMAS AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS, CINCNELM, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, USDOCOSOUTH, USDOCOLAND CO FS 8604 DU ASMARA, COMIDEASTFORCE AND COMSIXTHFLT, DEPT STATE

Mobilization report my CX 135 apparently confined Tel Aviv. Estimate Fourth Brigade, other battalions, reserve paratroops and final increments Hq troops GHQ, corps and division, including known intelligence personnel called up. About 50 sherutim (large public taxis) and large number civilian trucks called up, sherutim standing by or being used in call up, but trucks later despatched immediately. 11th Armored Infantry Brigade departed Camp Tserefin sometime during past two days for unknown destination. Ramat Gan Motor Park largely empty of military vehicles, but those reserve under camouflage nets. Possible some elements above called for use anti-Fedayeen activity, which is on very large scale with even CHEN (WAC) being used on patrols. Road blocks at every cross road in country, with heavy patrolling between. All vehicles being searched and all personnel required identity. Comment: Possibility of Israel retaliation on large scale must not be overlooked. High state excitement and anger exhibited by public. IDF seething over bold attack on Camp Tserefin. Ben Gurion stated to be in extremely grim mood.

New Subject: Military spokesman just announced four Egypt Vampires invaded Israel territory about noon today Ne Nitzana One shot down by Israel aircraft near Sde Boker, others fled no Israel casualties. Signed Query.

Date: AB/8

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PRIORITY

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APR 12 1956
674.840/4-1256

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy, Tel Aviv
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
REF :

634
DESP. NO.

COPY NO. 1 SERIES A
X2 6840.86
April 12, 1956
DATE

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
17 4/12	NA	Rmk ch IO R P C. CS2

SUBJECT: Report on Fedayeen Personnel, Materiel, and Activities by IDF Intelligence

There is attached a memorandum prepared for the Ambassador by the Army Attache, Col. Leo J. Query, on a briefing the latter obtained from the Israel Defense Force at the height of the outbreak of Fedayeen activity in Israel during the first two weeks of April. Embassy telegram no. 1061 was a digest of the information contained in this memorandum.

For the Ambassador:

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy.

674.84A/4-1256

Enclosure:

Memorandum dated
April 10, 1956.

1956 APR 20 AM 10 12

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WLHamilton:jd
REPORTER

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(Classification)

10 April 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: The American Ambassador

SUBJECT: Fedayeen Activity

1. At my request the Senior Foreign Liaison Officer, Lt. Col. AMINIDAV PERLIN, today gave me a briefing on Fedayeen activities. He based this briefing on interrogation of captured Fedayeen and general IDF intelligence concerning Fedayeen activities.

2. Colonel Perlin stated the Fedayeen are recruited strictly for the purpose, and given military status, possibly as a section of the National Guard, and are assigned under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Gaza Area, specifically reporting to the Chief of Fedayeen activities with station at the Gaza Police Station. The Fedayeen are low, uneducated types, generally speaking the equivalent of Fellahin. In the past it had been noted that recruitment very often was from civil prisoners. The Fedayeen receive very sketchy training and are uniformed in a cotton battle dress type uniform of an approximate olive green color with a peaked cap and rubber soled shoes. They are equipped with hand grenades, Karl Gustav sub-machine guns, TNT blocks, and detonators, most of which are of Soviet manufacture. Interestingly enough most of the captured Fedayeen have had Russian safety matches. The TNT is not of Soviet manufacture. At no time has any captured Fedayeen had any foodstuff in his possession. Colonel Perlin suggests one of three alternatives:

- a. That they live off the land;
- b. That food supplies are pre-cached for their use; or
- c. That they receive assistance from the local Arabs; although there has not been the slightest evidence of such assistance. He, personally, is inclined to believe that foodstuffs are pre-cached for their use by Egyptian Intelligence School personnel during practice infiltration (see below).

3. Colonel Perlin stated that there are two types of infiltrator groups: those who operate on a nightly basis; and those in long-range groups. No Fedayeen group larger than seven or smaller than three has been known. Each group will have at least one ex-Palestinian Arab who knows the roads and landmarks in Israel, and, depending upon the area from which operating, the remainder will be of Egyptians, Jordanians, or Syrians. Their missions are briefly described to them by the Chief of Fedayeen in the area from which they operate and they are sent out by pre-determined routes. Those individuals who are to operate in a radius of approximately 30 kilometres from Deir el Baleh enter Israel territory through the border in the vicinity of Deir el Baleh. Those operating in a radius of 30 kilometres from Gaza north of the road Gaza-Beersheba enter Israel territory between this road and the northeastern border

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(Classification)

of the Gaza Strip. Those engaged in long-range missions in Israel territory enter through the northwestern border of Gaza, continuing up the dunes to the northward, cutting eastward approximately opposite the point where their activities are to commence. Other overnight groups are operating from Jordan opposite the Lachish area, and still another group is operating in the Southern Galilee area on an overnight basis, crossing the Jordanian border south of Affula. All are instructed to return to their base of operations if possible, otherwise to continue to the nearest safe Arab territory. It is noteworthy that present Fedayeen operations have been confined completely to night hours, and the majority of cases to the hours preceding 0230.

4. Colonel Perlin stated that interrogation of captured Fedayeen has established that they are of a poor degree of intelligence and poorly trained. Only a small proportion of them are "dedicated" in their mission--the rest will talk freely upon capture. IDF Intelligence has established that the Commander of Fedayeen, Gaza, is Captain Mustapha GAMISH.

5. Colonel Perlin stated that Fedayeen should not be confused with ordinary Egyptian Intelligence Agents. IDF Intelligence constantly is catching substantial numbers of Egyptian Intelligence Agents who enter Israel on various missions, most of which are troop and vehicle counts. Often the individuals caught are students in the Intelligence School who have been sent out on a practice mission as part of their training. These individuals are never uniformed and often are not armed.

6. Colonel Perlin states that IDF Intelligence estimates, on the basis of information gained, that the initial incursion on 7 April was by 200 Fedayeen in groups varying from three to seven in each. At the present time he estimates that approximately 100 Fedayeen per day are operating, of which possibly one quarter or more are on long-range missions. Most of these, he feels, are in hiding during the day within Israel. Some of them have not even yet commenced operations.

LEO J. QUERY
Colonel, GS
Army Attache

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Control: 7208

Rec'd: APRIL 13, 1956

Info

1:20 PM

RMR

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2059, APRIL 13, 4 P.M.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2059, REPEATED INFORMATION JERUSALEM 139, TEL AVIV 250, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, LONDON, PARIS UNNUMBERED, USUN 73.

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AIR

AL AHAM HEADLINES TODAY: "ISRAEL WITHDRAWS HER MILITARY PATROLS FROM BORDERS. U.N. ANNOUNCES ISRAEL AND EGYPT AGREE TO RESPECT ARMISTICE." AL GUMHOURIYA DOWNGRADES SUBJECT WITH LEAD HEADLINE "LIQUIDATION OF OCCUPATION-ONLY 500 BRITISH TROOPS REMAIN IN CANAL. FINAL NASSER-HAMMARSKJOLD MEETING NOON TOMORROW." AL AKHBAR SAYS "ISRAELI PLANES, ARMY AND POLICE SEARCH FOR COMMANDOS IN CITRUS GROVES." ALL PAPERS FRONT PAGE REPORT OF "KBR BATTLE" BETWEEN EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI PLANES (TELAVIV'S 1082). EGYPTIAN MILITARY SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED "EGYPTIAN VAMPIRE "MADE FORCED LANDING" NORTHEAST ALAUJA. SPOKESMAN STATED EGYPTIAN AIRCRAFT WERE ON PATROL AND HAD ENCOUNTERED ISRAELI PLANES OVER EGYPTIAN TERRITORY. SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED PATROL LEADER HAD REPORTED ISRAELI OURAGAN FIGHTER HAD ALSO BEEN SHOT DOWN.

AL AHAM REPORTS WHITE HOUSE SECRETARY CONFIRMED PRESIDENT SENT MESSAGES NASSER AND BENGURION APRIL 9 APPEALING FOR FULL COOPERATION WITH HAMMARSKJOLD.

PRESS REPORTED ISRAELI PATROL WHICH ATTEMPTED CROSS D/L AT TEL EL-GUBN MORNING APRIL 12 "FORCED FLEE AFTER SUFFERING HEAVY LOSSES".

PAPERS REPORTED 3 ISRAELI JETS PURSUED AIRCRAFT CAIRO BOUND FROM AMMAN OVER JORDAN TERRITORY APRIL 12. ACCORDING CAIRO,

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-2- 2059, APRIL 13, 4 PM FROM CAIRO

BASED AMERICAN COURIER WHO WAS PASSENGER, ARAB AIRWAYS PLANE TRAVELING AT ABOUT 6,000 FEET APPROXIMATELY 10 MILES EAST OF DEAD SEA AND ABOUT 20 MINUTES OUT OF AMMAN, WAS PURSUED BY 2 ISRAELI P-51S. PASSENGERS REPORT PLANE WHICH APPROACHED ON STARBOARD SIDE FIRED ONE OR TWO BURSTS BUT THIS NOT OBSERVED BY COURIER. PLANE RADIOED AMMAN FOR INSTRUCTIONS AND SINCE ISRAELIS HAD GONE WAS INSTRUCTED CONTINUE CAIRO.

ONLY ONE EDITORIAL ON CURRENT TENSION. REFERRING RECENT SPEECH BY DAYAN ALLEGEDLY TO EFFECT JEWS WOULD FIGHT ARABS IN THEIR OWN LANDS AND SUBJUGATE THEM TO ISRAEL'S WILL, GUMHOURIYA REPLIED THAT PERHAPS SUCCESS OF COMMANDOS WILL AWAKEN JEWS TO DANGERS ZIONIST POLICIES. JEWS, SAYS GUMHOURIYA, ARE "PASSING SAME STATE WHICH GERMAN PEOPLE PREVIOUSLY TRAVERSED UNDER HITLER AND NAZISM".

PRESS CONTINUES PLAY UP HAMMARSKJOLD MISSION AND GENERALLY APPEARS ADOPTING TONE OF CALM. NO SADAT EDITORIAL FOR SECOND SUCCESSIVE DAY.

BYROADE

RNS

NOTE: PASSED USUN 4/13/56, 1:45 PM

APR 23 1956

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46-41

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2060, APRIL 13, 5 PM

Control: 7418

Rec'd: APRIL 13, 1956
9:30 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 2060, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 257, JERUSALEM 140, AMMAN 185, BEIRUT 259, DAMASCUS 188, NEW YORK 74, JIDDA, BAGHDAD, LONDON, PARIS, PORT SAID, ALEXANDRIA UNNUMBERED.

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STRONG ISRAELI REACTION EGYPTIAN COMMANDO RAIDS AS NATURAL AS EGYPTIAN REACTION SHELLING OF CIVILIAN POPULATION GAZA BUT ALACRITY WITH WHICH ISRAELIS ESTABLISHED POSITION FROM WHICH THEY COULD REJECT NASSER'S AGREEMENT WITH HAMMARSKJOLD REGARDING ART 11, PARA 2 OF GAA GAVE ADDED CURRENCY TO SPECULATION RE THEIR ULTIMATE POSITION VIS-A-VIS HAMMARSKJOLD MISSION AND BASIC POSITION OF ISRAEL RE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE UNDER EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. ISRAELIS HAVE HAD ENOUGH EXPERIENCE IN CEASE-FIRES TO REALIZE THEY NEVER BECOME EFFECTIVE WITH SPLIT SECOND PRECISION AND KNOW FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES COMMANDOS FREQUENTLY WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS THEIR BASES FOR PERIODS RUNNING UP TO SEVERAL DAYS.

AS SEEN FROM HERE, SHELLING CIVILIAN CENTERS (JERUSALEM'S 416) AND SHARETT'S REPLY TO HAMMARSKJOLD (TEL AVIV'S 1075) SO DEMONSTRABLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE FROM POINT OF VIEW OF ISRAEL'S POSITION BEFORE UN THAT IT WOULD APPEAR THEY EITHER

- 1) REFLECT A TENDENCY TO PANIC NOT THERETOFORE APPARENT IN ISRAELIS OR CONSTITUTE DESPERATE MOVES TO BRING ABOUT RAPID DETERIORATION OF SITUATION IN HOPE
- (2) THAT EITHER WEST WILL BE COMPELLED INTERVENE AND EVENTUALLY DICTATE SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL BE GUARANTEED AND WHICH WILL THUS PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH PROSPECT OF SECURITY WHICH IT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE OBTAIN DURING PAST 7 YEARS OR
- (3) THAT THEY CAN INFLICT DEFEAT EGYPTIAN ARMY WHICH WILL DISCREDIT NASSER AND THUS AFFORD ISRAELIS MORE TIME TO ADJUST TO

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-2- 2060, APRIL 13, 5 PM FROM CAIRO

SITUATION ARISING FROM REVITALIZATION ARAB ARMED FORCES, IF
(2) IF FACT ISRAEL'S OBJECTIVE WE ARE FACED WITH PROSPECT
THAT EVEN IF HAMMARSKJOLDS VISIT IS SUCCESSFUL IN EASING BORDER
SITUATION WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE FACED WITH DISMAL OUTLOOK
THAT TENUOUS PEACE MIGHT AT ANY TIME BE DESTROYED AT ISRAEL'S
OPTION. THIS CONNECTION TIME WILL SOON COME FOR ISRAEL DECIDE
WHETHER OR NOT TO DIVERT JORDAN RIVER. IN THIS CASE ISRAEL
MIGHT PERHAPS BE COUNTING ON PROBABILITY AND THAT ANY CONFLICT
OR THREAT TO PEACE WHICH RESULTED FROM DIVERSION OF ONLY REASONABLE
AMOUNT OF WATER WOULD FIND ISRAEL ENJOYING ADVANTAGE OVER
ARABS VIS-A-VIS WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. IN THIS CONNECTION I
THINK THAT IT IMPORTANT WE REALIZE THAT ARAB-ISRAELI TENSIONS ALONG
BORDER ARE ONLY ONE OF SEVERAL SITUATIONS WHICH THREATEN PEACE
IN MIDDLE EAST.

IF LINE OF REASONING ABOVE AND OTHER MESSAGES FROM THIS
EMBASSY GIVE IMPRESSION WE FEEL GREATEST IMMEDIATE DANGER LIES
IN WHAT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT MAY CHOOSE TO DO IT IS NOT
BECAUSE WE BELIEVE EGYPT OR OTHER ARAB STATES WITHOUT
THEIR SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TENSE SITUATION WHICH EXISTS
BUT FACT OF MATTER IS THAT ARAB NATIONS FEEL NO COMPULSION
BRING THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH ISRAELIS TO HEAD. THEY CAN FIND
NECESSARY CONTINUE HARASS ISRAEL DECADE AFTER DECADE UNTIL ISRAELIS,
JUST AS BRITISH AND FRENCH, FORCED RELINQUISH POSITIONS IN
ARAB WORLD, ARABS THUS HAVE ADVANTAGE THAT IN ANY GIVEN
CRISIS-EXCEPTING ONE WHICH MIGHT ARISE FROM JORDAN RIVER
DIVERSION-THEY ARE FREE PURSUE LINES OF ACTION WHICH DEMONSTRATE
ARAB WILLINGNESS TAKE MEASURES AVOID OUTBREAK HOSTILITIES.
UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEY REACH SOME SORT OF MODUS VIVENDI
WITH ARAB NEIGHBORS, ISRAELIS WILL BE UNDER CONTINUOUS
PRESSURE OF IRRITATING BORDER ACTIVITIES, ECONOMIC BLOCKADE
ETC. WHICH FROM TIME TO TIME WILL BRING TO SURFACE ISSUE OF
WHETHER DECISIVE WAR NOT PREFERABLE TO ENDLESS TENSION.
THIS LINE REASONING SUGGESTS ISRAEL ALTERNATIVES MAY BE TRY
FOR SETTLEMENT, ADJUSTING THEIR POSITION TO REALITIES OF ARAB
POSITIONS; ADAPT TO THIS TENSION; TRAP ARABS INTO STRIKING FIRST

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-3- 2060, APRIL 13, 5 PM FROM CAIRO

BY BAN AT YACUB DIVERSION OR RESORT OTHER MEANS BRING ABOUT CONFLICT. THERE IS NO LONGER ANY GROUND FOR ISRAELIS TO HOPE THAT BY RETALIATIONS IN FORCE SUCH AS RECENT BOMBARDMENT OF GAZA TOWNS OF KHAN YOUNES INCIDENT OF 1955 THEY WILL CAUSE EGYPTIANS IN TIME TO WELCOME SETTLEMENT. EXACTLY CONTRARY IS TRUE UNDER NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. THESE INCIDENTS ONLY SERVE STRENGTHEN MORALE OF EGYPTIAN ARMY, ENHANCE EGYPT'S LEADERSHIP IN ARAB WORLD AND INCREASE ADVANTAGE OF SOVIET POSITION IN MIDDLE EAST.

BYROADE

JMD

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NAVY

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1087, APRIL 13, 3 P.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1087, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 365.

NO (REPEAT NO) INCIDENTS REPORTED NIGHT APRIL 12/13.
HOWEVER, VERY HEAVY GUARDING, PATROLLING AND ROAD
CONTROLS CONTINUING IN TEL AVIV AREA.

LAWSON

VMM

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1954 APR 13 PM 3 27

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Control: 7327

Rec'd: April 13, 1956
5:19 p.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1088, April 13, 1 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1088, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 366,
PRIORITY JERUSALEM 92.

Reference: Cairo's 2051 to Department.

We likewise emphasized to Israel Government that Sharett's reply failed to take into account time factor. We have difficulty however in utilizing same argument re reported deep incursion four Egyptian planes yesterday afternoon one of which shot down 30 kilometers within Israel territory (EMBTLS 1080 and 1082).

Believe Ben Gurion's official reply yesterday afternoon to Hammarskjold (released here to press yesterday evening) represents more considered opinion GOI. This response unlike Sharett's informal reaction was prepared some hours after school boy/synagogue murders which had shocked entire nation.

According to IDF there were no Fedayeen incidents reported last night and tension here appears to have lessened. Maintenance of this improved situation here appears possible unless Nasser sends in new murder squad over weekend.

LAWSON

AB-WDR/1

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Date 4/30/56

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Date 4/30/56

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1089, April 13, 1 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT NIACT JERUSALEM 91, REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 1089
PRIORITY CAIRO 367.

Believe would be most useful if you could obtain from UNTSO and
telegraph to Department, repeating Cairo and here, all available
information bearing on statements made numbered paragraph 1 and
2 Cairo's 2052 to Department repeated Jerusalem as 138.

LAWSON

SW:CRH:7

Control: 6972

Rec'd: April 13, 1956
7:31 a.m.

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AIR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 419, April 13, 4 p.m.

Control: 7743

Rec'd: April 14, 1956
10:38 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 419, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 197, BAGHDAD 21, BEIRUT 115, CAIRO 238, DAMASCUS 116, LONDON 132, PARIS 125, TEL AVIV 215.

Colonel Hommel of UNTSO told me April 13 that with most recent exchange of messages between Hammarskjold and Ben Gurion, as released by UNHQ, he now considered situation has definitely eased. He saw no special reason anticipate renewed incidents between Israeli and Egyptian forces, at least for immediate future. UNTSO had received no new complaints from either party. He added that results observers finding in course investigations "not yet collated" (CONGENTEL 411).

COLE

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2065, APRIL 14, 3 P.M.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2065, REPEATED INFORMATION JERUSALEM 141,
TEL AVIV 253, AMMAN 186, USUN 75, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, LONDON,
PARIS UNNUMBERED.

COURIER CHRISTOPHERSON ON REPORTS FOLLOWING DETAILS REGARDING
INCIDENT INVOLVING ARAB AIRWAYS PLANE (EMBASSY TELEGRAM
2059).

(1) INCIDENT OCCURRED 1/2 (NOT TEN) MILE EAST DEAD SEA AT
1740 HOURS APRIL 12, ABOUT 20 MINUTES OUT OF JERUSALEM (NOT
AMMAN).

(2) TWO ISRAELI P-51 MUSTANG FIGHTERS MADE SEVERAL PASSES
AT PLANE IN CLOSE FORMATION, 2 OF WHICH HE PERSONALLY
OBSERVED. 1 FIGHTER PASSED OVER DC-3 NOT MORE THAN 10 FEET
AWAY.

(3) "BURSTS ORANGE FLAME COMING FROM EACH WING CLOSE TO
NOSE" OBSERVED BY 2 AMERICANS SEATED ON STARBOARD SIDE.
FIRING APPEARED DIRECTED BELOW AIRCRAFT.

(4) FIGHTERS DISAPPEARED AFTER APPROXIMATELY 5 MINUTES FLYING
VERY LOW OVER DEAD SEA.

BYROADE

WDR

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1092, April 14, 11 a.m.

PRIORITY

SENT CAIRO NIACT 368; REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT PRIORITY 1092

Have appointment with Ben Gurion at 12:30 p.m. local time today to deliver Secretary General's message transmitted Cairo's 249 to Tel Aviv.

Control: 7632

Rec'd: April 14, 1956
5:17 a.m.

LAWSON

EOC:MAA

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Control: 7681

Rec'd:

April 14, 1956
7:48 a.m.

NEA
Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1093, April 14, 2 p.m.

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SENT NIACT CAIRO 370, REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 1093.

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I gave Ben Gurion the Secretary General's message (Cairo 249 to Tel Aviv), at 12:30 p.m. After reading it he returned it with the statement that he rejected it.

LAWSON

BB:CRH:7

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NEAControl: 7847
Rec'd: April 14,
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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1095, April 14, 8 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1095, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 371

When I called on Ben Gurion today and gave him Hammarskjold's message, transmitted Cairo's 249 to Tel Aviv repeated Department 2054, Ben Gurion read it through twice before commenting but with his face becoming progressively more flushed and his manner more agitated. He then put down paper, turned to me and in a voice so agitated that at times he was almost incoherent, said "I think this is an impertinence. This is a mission of bad will. This is not his (Hammarskjold's) mission. This is untrue. It is a calumny. Why place this thing on our shoulders? Is he Ambassador of Nasser? I cannot receive this message. Is he agent of Nasser or of UN?" (At this point Ben Gurion was so upset and his speech becoming so incoherent that I feared he would have a stroke. Apparently his wife shared my apprehensions as she was watching him anxiously from next room). Ben Gurion continued "it (the message) is an insult to our government". Ben Gurion then calmed a little and in effort to explain his reaction said that Secretary General was entitled his own opinion regarding question of whether Nasser wanted war. He made it clear that his objections were to last two sentences of message; one placing responsibility for developments on Israel and other regarding propaganda which Ben Gurion interpreted as being directed at Israel. He queried "is it propaganda that our children are killed in a synagogue?"

Comment: While it was obvious to me that Hammarskjold's message would in circumstances be received with displeasure I was shocked at violence of Ben Gurion's reaction. Aside from upsetting character of message, it appeared to me a portion of violence Ben Gurion's reaction was due to heavy strain which he has shouldered during past week's Fedayeen activities; the reports that Fedayeen terrorists have not been withdrawn by Nasser and are still within Israel; and information which he received during interview that an IDF command car had hit mine near Nirim this morning with 5 soldiers wounded. Furthermore

in course

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-2- 1095, April 14, 8 p.m., from Tel Aviv

in course of conversation Ben Gurion referred to his disappointment at a recent message from Hammarskjold that he was not competent to deal with question of freedom of passage for Israel vessels at Suez and Aqaba.

Finally Ben Gurion had previously heard a UP report from Cairo quoting Hammarskjold as saying that Thursday's air incident had taken place over DZ where planes of military aircraft from both sides violated armistice. Ben Gurion said, "I must accept report with some reservation until confirmed but if Secretary General has been accurately reported by press, how was he in position to know facts of case to support statement of this kind?" In fact, he pointed out Egyptian plane and pilot had been found 8 kilometers south of Sde Boker (well outside DZ). I replied he should reserve judgment in this matter, that SYG had made point of cautious talking with press, and referred to fact he would be seeing Hammarskjold shortly and would have opportunity to discuss all these matters. In giving message to Ben Gurion, I had pointed out to him I was merely transmitting agent and message had been sent through United States channels for reasons unknown to me. At close of conversation on this question, I again reminded him the United States Government was merely acting as transmitting agent.

LAWSON

MGG:LJ/12

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Department of State

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Control: 7844
Rec'd: April 14, 1956
4:04 p.m.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1096. April 14. 8 p.m.

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1096 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO PRIORITY 372

After my conversation with Ben Gurion regarding Hammarskhold's message (EMBTEL 1095) Ben Gurion referred to our previous two conversations (EMBTELS 1063 and 1078) and information Israel had obtained of a special Fedayeen squad which was to strike at Tel Aviv. He said they now had information Nasser had not recalled gangs and these people were still in Israel that they had been instructed to stay here and await orders. Furthermore, it had been learned their targets included, in addition to Tel Aviv, some objective in Acre, in Haifa, and some installations near Lydda.

Comment: All entrances to Tel Aviv continue to be heavily guarded with patrolling rural areas between checkpoints.

LAWSON

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Control: 7717

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Rec'd: April 14, 1956

9:17 a.m.

Info

FROM: Jerusalem

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 420, April 14, Noon

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 420, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY AMMAN 193, PRIORITY CAIRO 239, TEL AVIV 216, BEIRUT 116, DAMASCUS 117.

British Consul General Wikeley gave me following account April 13 which he had just obtained from Captain Arabian Airways airplane "buzzed" previous day by three Israeli fighter planes

OCB

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CIA

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AIR

Arabian Airways plane departed Kalandia Airport on scheduled passenger flight to Cairo at 1700 local time April 12. About 25 minutes later it reached vicinity Kerak at 8,000 feet altitude. At that time, three fighter planes approached from the East and made several passes toward Arabian Airways plane. Star of David insignia observed on wings. Airplane Captain lowered undercarriage and turned northward. He reported to Amman and asked for instructions. Since Israeli planes soon disappeared, he was instructed resume normal course. He arrived Cairo without further incident.

Arabian Airways plane carried one American and several British passengers, as well as local travellers. American told aircraft Captain that he saw Israeli plane fire bursts from its guns. He thought planes were "Mustangs." Understand HKY-India MAC meeting shortly consider emergency complaint incident.

Assume Israeli actions connected in some way with rumors Fedayeen flown back to Cairo from Kalandia (CONGENTEL 415). Wikeley had no confirmation, but thought such rumors probably true. His local employee reports having seen group men obviously not local pass through Jerusalem in bus. They were wearing fatigue type military clothes. Bystanders described group as "Egyptian commandos." In addition, Colonel Itzak Jordan MAC delegate told Wikeley, in response his question, that rumored travel Fedayeen "quite possible." Local informants profess to believe they proceeded Cairo in Egyptian Airlines passenger plane.

Danger

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-2- 420, April 14, Noon, from Jerusalem

Danger civil air traffic arising through any use Kalandia for Fedayeen shuttle service now only too obvious.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 7965
Rec'd: April 15, 1956
3:27 p. m.

Info
RMR

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2068, April 15, 6 p. m.

PRIORITY

Have repeated to Beirut Tel Aviv's EMBTEL 1096 April 14
but not Tel Aviv's 1095.

BYROADE

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1956 APR 16 AM 7 27

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Control: 8093

Rec'd:

April 16, 1956
6:53 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1098, April 15, 6 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1098; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO 373.

In conversation with Embassy counselor late last night, Herzog, who had just come from Ben Gurion's home, said that Prime Minister had calmed a bit regarding Hammarskjold's message but was still highly incensed at the "highly arbitrary placement responsibility" on Israel for future developments. Ben Gurion however had decided to wait until SYG's arrival there Tuesday before engaging in further exchanges. Herzog said Ben Gurion's overwrought manner yesterday reflected both the pressures which Prime Minister had been under from some quarters since September to take preventive action, plus "tremendous pressures from all quarters to retaliate" for past weeks Fedayeen activities. He remarked that Friday's special Cabinet meeting (to consider security matters) had been stormy one. Herzog added that Ben Gurion still withstanding these pressures but next few days would tell the story.

Embassy counselor commented Hammarskjold was being tough with both sides; that this was necessary if results were to be obtained; and it would be a serious mistake for Israel to undertake retaliation at time when SYG was engaged in active negotiations and before enough time had elapsed to give Nasser opportunity to demonstrate whether he was adhering to his commitments.

Comment: Embassy hopes Hammarskjold's activities and Eban's April 11 conversation with Secretary, which is interpreted here as reopening possibilities for arms procurement, may have arrested or retarded Israel reprisal or more serious military action. The situation remains potentially critical however and we believe there are several possible developments which could cause resurge of desperation here and which should receive Department's closest attention.

Firstly, there is question of special Fedayeen squad or squads reportedly within Israel awaiting further instructions from Nasser

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-2- 1098, April 15, 6 p.m.. from Tel Aviv.

Nasser which apparently weighs so much on Ben Gurion's mind that he has discussed it with me three times within past week. Similar reports have been received by USARMA. Embassy is convinced that GOI places credence in these reports. Tel Aviv for three days and nights has been ringed with thousands of police and troops closely checking all possible entries into city. In view of terrific impact of this operation on their own citizens, it is hardly likely that it constitutes demonstration merely for foreign consumption.

Secondly, we are concerned about possibility of substitutive Fedayeen activities originating from Jordan, Lebanon and possibly Syria (Amman's 553 and London's 4609 to Department). GOI has already received reports that Fedayeen are entering from Jordan and Friday night's incident near Meron lends credence to British Foreign Office report of intercepted messages. While Nasser might have some success before world opinion in disclaiming responsibility for such activities, GOI is, as Department knows, convinced for many months Egypt has established and maintained Fedayeen training activities in both Jordan and Syria.

Finally yesterday's incident near Nirim in which an Israel command car was blown up by mine, with injury reported to total of seven soldiers, points to possibility resumption mining activities from Gaza. Department will recall long period mining activities and casualties April May 1955 which, along with other incidents, served as prelude to small Israeli retaliation.

LAWSON

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APR 20 1956

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Department of State

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Control: 8449
Rec'd: April 16, 1956
4:47 p.m.53-H
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RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 1099, April 15, 6 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1099, REPEATED INFORMATION OTTAWA 2, LONDON 319,
PARIS 239, ROME 60.

PRIORITY

FOR THE SECRETARY

After delivery Hammarskjold's message and ensuing discussions reported EMBTEL 1095, I gave Ben Gurion a short oral summary DEPTTEL 765.

Ben Gurion thanked me for the information; said your April 11 talk with Eban represented "some advance"; but you "must realize the position of those countries".

In elaboration, and based on conversations in which GOI representatives had already engaged with western countries, Prime Minister cited following:

1. Canada in best position because no colonies or other special Middle East interests. Nevertheless, Canadians sensitive to sovereignty and independence from US and it would be extremely difficult for Cabinet to go to Parliament and explain arms sales on grounds that GOE preferred that Canada rather than US act as supplier.

2. Position France and England even more difficult because of their critical position in Arab world-France in Algeria and Britain in Aden, Jordan and Buraimi. Difficulties for them this matter increased by fact that Arabs know USG supply arms to Israel.

3. Therefore, they (western countries) say with some reason that if United States would be willing to release a portion of arms needed, they would supply rest. Although they are being told by United States to go ahead, they do not dare.

4. "France and Canada have goodwill toward Israel, perhaps does Italy. Britain may be changing its attitude. They are giving a few night fighters." USG with no colonies, already supplying arms to

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-2- 1099, April 15, 6 p.m., from Tel Aviv

to Baghdad pact members, and as friends of both sides, is in better position than France or Britain to help Israel. I interposed that France had been able to provide Mysteres to Israel without the violent reaction from Arabs which might have occurred from a similar US transaction. Ben Gurion replied Nasser had protested to Pineau but that latter was an honorable man and had stood by promises he had made to Israel.

5. Ben Gurion concluded his remarks by saying "Mister Ambassador, America is not what it was a hundred years ago when it was a provincial state. You are now in position of having replaced Britain as world leader. They (western countries) want at least a token shipment of arms from US. Then they are in better position to go ahead"

When I reminded Ben Gurion of your April 11 conversation with Eban, he replied, "yes, it marks a little advance".

LAWSON

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Control: 8077
Rec'd: April 16, 1956
6:19 a.m.NEA
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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1100, April 15, 8 p.m.

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CSENT DEPARTMENT 1100, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 374, AMMAN 152
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PFollowing incidents not included EMBTEL 1091 reported by Foreign
Ministry:UOP
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OLISeven soldiers wounded at 11:00 a.m. April 14, when their army
vehicle hit two mines "inside Israel territory" near Nir Yitzua,
MR 088072. (Ben-Gurion, in conversation reported EMBTEL 1095
located incident at Nirim and reported only five wounded.)IOP
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in day uncovered two additional anti-vehicle mines.R. Solomon 25-year-old Kibbutz Beit She'an shepherd, suffered
hand wound when ambushed at 10 a.m. April 14. Two of his sheep
killed.Egyptian position opened fire on Israeli post at Gaza near Erez
Friday night, Israelis not responding. No casualties.Same Egyptian unit opened fire against 1:30 p.m. April 14,
starting exchange which continued 50 minutes.Comment: Foreign Minister continues efforts to establish
initiative these incidents has been post-Nasser's adherence
to cease-fire. They insist they will be able to establish that
vehicles earlier April 14 traversed without incident same
stretch of road on which army vehicle later set off mines.

LAWSON

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Correction made
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Department of State

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CORRECTION ISSUED
4/19/56 12:35 a.m.

Action

Control: 8077

NEA

Rec'd: April 16, 1956
6:19 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv - CORRECTED COPY

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1100, April 15, 8 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1100, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 374, AMMAN 152, BEIRUT 249.

Following incidents not included EMBTEL 1091 reported by Foreign Ministry:

Seven soldiers wounded at 11:25 a.m. April 14, when their army vehicle hit two mines "inside Israel territory" near Nir Yitzuak, MR 088072. (Ben-Gurion, in conversation reported EMBTEL 1095 located incident at Nirim and reported only five wounded.) According to Foreign Minister investigation of same area later in day uncovered two additional anti-vehicle mines.

R. Solomon 25-year-old Kibbutz Beit Govrin shepherd, suffered hand wound when ambushed at 10 a.m. April 14. Two of his sheep killed.

Egyptian position opened fire on Israeli post at Gaza near Erez Friday night, Israelis not responding. No casualties.

Same Egyptian unit opened fire against 1:30 p.m. April 14, starting exchange which continued 50 minutes.

Comment: Foreign Minister continues efforts to establish initiative these incidents was after Nasser's adherence to cease-fire. They insist they will be able to establish that vehicles earlier April 14 traversed without incident same stretch of road on which army vehicle later set off mines.

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Control: 7947
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FROM: JERUSALEM

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 422, APRIL 15, 11 AM

SENT TEL AVIV PRIORITY 218; REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
422, CAIRO 241.

REFERENCE TEL AVIV'S TELEGRAM 91.

HEREWITH UNTSO COMMENTS NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS CAIRO'S 2052.

BODIES TEN FEDAYEEN WERE RETURNED TO EGYPTIANS ON APRIL 11. NINE WERE IDENTIFIED BY VILLAGE HEADMEN OR RELATIVES UPON RETURN. REMAINING BODY WAS SO RIDDLED WITH BULLETS IDENTIFICATION IMPOSSIBLE. THOSE IDENTIFIED WERE PALESTINIANS, ALL ABOUT 19 TO 20 YEARS OLD. THEY WORE RUDIMENTARY UNIFORM CONSISTING KAKHI FATIGUE-TYPE CLOTHES AND TENNIS SHOES. OBSERVERS REPORTS INDICATE IN ADDITION FOREGOING THREE OR POSSIBLY FOUR FEDAYEEN WERE WOUNDED AND CAPTURED. OF THOSE OBSERVERS HAVE NAMES OF TWO: (1) SALMAN HAMDAN MOHAMMED HAMADLE AND (2) SAID SALMAN EL MILAI.

UNTOS NOT ABLE COMMENT ESPECIALLY ON NASSER'S PROFESSED "BELIEF" THAT PERSONS ATTACKING CHILDREN'S SCHOOL NOT EGYPTIAN. OBSERVERS WERE ABLE VERIFY THAT ATTACKS OF WHICH ISRAELIS COMPLAINED DID IN FACT OCCUR. HOWEVER, ATTACKERS LEFT NO CLUES AS TO THEIR IDENTITY AND ISRAEL AUTHORITIES PROVIDED OBSERVERS NO TRACKING FACILITIES BY WHICH CULPRITS MIGHT HAVE BEEN TRACED. TO QUOTE UNTSO SOURCE, "THEY DID NOT PERMIT OBSERVERS DO ANY TRACKING." ISRAELIS APPARENTLY FEEL THEY HAVE STRONGER CASE WITH NO TRACKING THAN IF TRACKING EFFORTS SHOULD PROVE INCONCLUSIVE. SIMILARLY, ISRAELIS DID NOT ENCOURAGE INTERROGATION CAPTURED FEDAYEEN BY OBSERVERS, ALLOWING LATTER ESTABLISH ONLY RUDIMENTARY INFORMATION SUCH AS GIVEN CONGENTEL 411. SINCE OBSERVERS IN QUESTION DO NOT SPEAK ARABIC THEY WOULD HAVE NEEDED ASSISTANCE INTERPRETER, ETC.

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-2- 422, APRIL 15, 11 AM FROM JERUSALEM

UNTSO HAS DEVELOPED NO INFORMATION WHICH WOULD LEAD TO CONCLUSION THAT ATTACKS AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN WERE WORK OF ISRAELI ARABS IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ATTACKS IN LYDDA-AMLE AREA WERE WORK INFILTRATORS FROM JORDAN BUT UNTSO HAS NOTHING SUPPORT SUCH A HYPOTHESIS.

COLE

CWD:CRH

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APR 20 1956

AIR POUCH

PRIORITY

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

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XK 674.75

FROM : AMEMBASSY, Cairo

1054
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

April 16, 1956

DATE

REF : Tel Aviv's Despatch 612, April 5, 1956

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SUBJECT: Alleged Israeli Commando Activity in Eritrea

Shortly before receiving a copy of Tel Aviv's despatch referred to above the Embassy was queried by journalists as to whether it had information to the effect that Israeli commandos were being trained in Eritrea. The Embassy concludes that the report is known to Egyptian governmental officials but is inclined to agree with Embassy Tel Aviv that the likelihood of such an operation seems to be farfetched. It is no secret, however, that relations between Egypt and Ethiopia are not particularly cordial and we therefore believe that the Egyptian Government may ascribe more importance to the report than it would seem to merit. So far as we are aware no mention of the report has appeared in the local press.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

Alexander Schnee

Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

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Tel Aviv
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Addis Ababa
Alexandria
Port Said

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APR 18 1956

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Control: 9591
Rec'd: April 18, 1956
9:05 a.m.

NEA FROM: Tel Aviv

Info RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 1105, April 17, 3 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1105, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 375.

NOFORN

When Sharett and I chatted at President's Memorial Day reception, he repeated some of Ben Gurion's views on Hammarskjold's message which Prime Minister rejected (Cairo's 2054 to Department, repeated Tel Aviv 249, Embassy telegram 1095).

His reaction was not emotional as contrasted with Ben Gurion's, but he vigorously attacked Hammarskjold's ethics in employing US transmission channels. Proprieties demanded that with communication of this character, US should have been apprised only as member of Security Council or United Nations. By his use of US channels he was putting US in possession of substance of "very sharply worded message to Israel from Secretary General" which could prejudice US attitude in matter in advance of orderly examination of all facts and findings. I interrupted to say that I was certain Hammarskjold had no such intention, Sharett reply that nevertheless net result was to prejudice US.

Gideon Rafael, Foreign Ministry advisor on UN political affairs, took up subject at same party in obvious efforts to determine whether Washington, in fact, had substance Hammarskjold's message. He asked circuitously whether we had channels of communication with Cairo except via Washington. I pointed out that it was possible to communicate with Cairo without going through Washington.

He wanted to know if I could not have rejected message. I dismissed this peremptorily, stating I could not have contemplated such decision for single moment in view of obvious urgency with which Hammarskjold considered message and importance to Israel of being apprised his viewpoint with least possible delay. At any rate, message had already been accepted for US transmission by Embassy. Cairo do that we were merely a relay point in a communication system already established.

Comment: From subsequent reports I gathered Hammarskjold able to mollify GOI officials somewhat in his meeting with them at airport

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-2- 1105, April 17, 3 p.m. From Tel Aviv

Sunday enroute Beirut. Embassy has been informed he told them he had selected US channel to "preserve personal and confidential character of message (sic)".

LAWSON

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JUN 18 1964

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 9466

NEA

Rec'd: April 18, 1956
6:25 a.m.

Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1107, April 17, 2 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1107, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 153, CAIRO 376
DEPARTMENT PASS ARMY

Only incident reported since EMBTEL 1100 was bombing and burning on April 16 of worker's dining hall at Nesher cement quarries near Mishmar Ayhlon. No injuries. Police also discovered eight unexploded sticks of dynamite and according JERUSALEM POST "tracks of three men, one of whom wore tennis shoes found leading towards Latrun." Relaxation of public tension has not diminished maintenance strong security measures. Jerusalem Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv-Beersheba Roads now open to night traffic, but they and all approaches Tel Aviv still covered by road block controls.

IDF FLO advised USARMA that GOI believes six groups of Fedayeen still in Israel.

LAWSON

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Control: 9656
Rec'd: APRIL 18, 1956
10:33 A.M.

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2084, APRIL 18, 1 P.M.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2084, USUN PRIORITY 78, REPEATED INFORMATION
JERUSALEM PRIORITY 144, TELAVIV PRIORITY 259, AMMAN, BEIRUT,
DAMASCUS, LONDON, PARIS UNNUMBERED.

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COLONEL ELY IS INFORMED NASSER HAS ISSUED CATEGORIC ORDERS TO
MILITARY COMMANDERS NOT (RPT NOT) TO FIRE ACROSS D/L EVEN
IF FIRED UPON UNLESS THERE IS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF PROSPECTIVE
ISRAELI ATTACK. VIOLATION THESE ORDERS WILL LEAD TO
"SERIOUS COURT MARTIAL CHARGE".

ELY STATES ABOVE FROM EGYPTIAN ARMY SOURCE WHO WAS CLEARLY
IMPRESSED BY "SEVERITY" ORDERS. AS CONFIRMATION ELY SAYS
UNTSO GAZA REPORTS ISRAELIS YESTERDAY MORNING DIRECTED
AUTOMATIC FIRE AGAINST EGYPTIANS BUT LATTER DID NOT (RPT NOT)
REPLY.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

Info
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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1109, April 18, Noon

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Control: 9650

Rec'd: April 18, 1956

10:49 a.m.



SENT DEPARTMENT 1109, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CINO 378.

At Hammarskjold's request I joined him and Burns at Government House last night for an informal chat. It obvious that sole purpose of this conversation was to acquaint me with fact that unhappy controversy between him and Ben Gurion (EMBTTEL 1095) had now been resolved amicably. He discussed in few general terms reason for firm type of message which he sent to Ben Gurion which in essence was that he was afraid Israel would upset situation and completely wreck his mission by some injudicious and violent action. This he felt after he had obtained definite assurances from Nasser of no desire for war seemed to receive a sharp message firmly placing burden of responsibility on Israel. There were undoubtedly other factors involved and I am of opinion that Hammarskjold's action not only prompted by his fear of precipitous action by Ben Gurion but that he also inspired by certain anger over what he believed was Israel's unfair and unjustified exploitation of propaganda situation. It is relevant specifically to his belief Ben Gurion had permitted his letter to Hammarskjold to be published before latter had in fact received text. Hammarskjold also wished to clear up any misunderstanding with regards to his use of our channels of communication with Ben Gurion and to express regret over position I has been placed of receiving "dramatic reaction" by Ben Gurion. He explained in general terms to effect that channels used appeared to him at that time to be most direct and effective one. He not prepared for long delay in delivery of message and had he anticipated this he would never have dispatched it. He also regretted unfavorable reaction of Israeli Government to his use of Embassy channels and divulging of information to one member of staff but he saw no great damage done along this line.

In this connection it seemed about me that whole controversy was not firmly based on any substantive position of either Ben Gurion or Hammarskjold. It seemed to me that the controversy was more a matter of personal feeling and that Hammarskjold to be fair to Ben Gurion should have been more explicit in his communication to the latter.

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-2- 1109, April 18, Noon, Tel Aviv

this has been completely adjusted in conversations here in Israel. At this point he went out of his way, I thought to praise Ben Gurion in his realistic discussion of subject and his willingness to discuss hard and firm opinions.

Hammaraskjold in reply to my direct question said this controversy had in no way prejudiced talks which he holding with Ben Gurion and Sharett. He also remarked to me at that time and later as I leaving that matter seemed have been completely adjusted and he was in fact very much pleased with atmosphere of two meetings he had held with Israelis that day. He remarked that in general it little too early to predict how his mission would develop but on whole he quite encouraged.

Also in reply to my direct question he stated he had now obtained sufficient assurances from both Egypt and Israel that there would be no more firing across line or movement of regular or irregular troops across line. His job now was to "interlock" these two assurances and he at that time endeavoring to get firm written statement (this later confirmed by Sharett when I met with him and Ben Gurion at latter's home.) I left Hammaraskjold with impression he optimistic with regard to obtaining some part of his program for this area but it clear that he aware of possibilities of changes and breakdowns in arrangements even after they had been completed.

He expected to be in Israel for about three days more after which he would move on to Beirut, Damascus, Amman and again Cairo. He would return to Rome which he would make his headquarters and complete his report of recommendations although he thought it quite possible he might have to make at least one trip back to New York before completing his mission.

I had advantage of an intimate informal meal with Hammaraskjold and Burns and had a few words with some of Hammaraskjold's staff who engaged in preparation of their telegram on day's conversations with Israelis. General air seemed to be one of restrained optimism.

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Control: 10109
Rec'd: April 19, 1956
5:47 a.m.

NEA
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FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1110, April 18, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1110, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 379.

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When Ben Gurion and Sharett were informed of my proposed departure for US they immediately set up a meeting in Ben Gurion's home at 9 p.m. last night. This meeting was somewhat dramatized by the assignment of a 5-man police escort to accompany me from Tel Aviv through the Jerusalem Corridor, although the Fedayeen situation no longer appears acute.

Purpose of this meeting was obviously to: (1) Inform me that unfortunate controversy between Hammarskjold and Ben Gurion had been completely and amicably resolved. They wished to clear books completely of this episode in order that there might be absolutely no prejudice on part of US Government with regard to situation.

Sharett did most of talking but everything he said was attended to by Ben Gurion who seemed somewhat tired from their 2 conferences with Hammarskjold during day lasting a total of 5 hours.

Sharett made it clear that this unfortunate controversy had been cleared up; that both sides had agreed to forget incident; that there had been a further clarification of Hammarskjold's miscalculation regarding the publication of Ben Gurion's letter; that the "decks had been cleared for action" for the talks; that limited progress had been made during the talks; and that atmosphere was an entirely congenial one.

At this point, Sharett addressed his remarks to Ben Gurion and related some of his conversation with Hammarskjold in the car en route from Lydda to Jerusalem. Sharett's line with Hammarskjold followed his discussion with me (EMBTEL 1105). He said he had very firmly made four points of objection to

Hammarskjold's action

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-2- 1110, April 18, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

Hammarskjold's action. They were: (1) Hammarskjold had by reason of his message to Ben Gurion cleared Nasser of any responsibility in event of war.

(2) He had fastened firmly the responsibility of war on Israel.

(3) He had used an improper channel of communication which permitted one member of Security Council to have advance knowledge of an Exchange of communications thus giving the opportunity for US prejudice in the situation.

(4) Unfair reference to exploitation of a propaganda situation by Israel.

He said he thought Hammarskjold received this line of talk with some depression.

Sharett also asked Hammarskjold why he took it upon himself to assure that Nasser does not want war. Hammarskjold replied that he was prompted to this conclusion because Nasser had resisted very strong pressures from other Arab states to take military action after latest Gaza incident. Hammarskjold said he concluded Nasser does not want war now...perhaps later he may wish it and after few months he could not say what situation would be. For moment however he convinced Nasser had no war intention.

Hammarskjold said therefore, he had reasoned that getting public commitment from Nasser that he did not want war would create position from which Nasser would be unlikely to move. He thought this would help stabilize situation.

Sharett said Hammarskjold had asked Ben Gurion for letter undertaking that Israel would engage in no shooting and no crossing of lines by regular or irregulars (he had included irregulars to meet Nasser situation although we do not have any in this country). He said Hammarskjold was at moment engaged in trying to secure similar letter from Nasser. I understand Ben Gurion has agreed to supply such letter. In both instances undertaking will become effective from 6 p.m. Israel time Wednesday night. Although Hammarskjold has Ben Gurion's assurance of letter he is not publishing it until he gets Nasser's reply. He hopes this firm and public undertaking on both sides will assure complete quiet while his negotiations are continuing.

LAWSON

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Control: 10255

Rec'd: April 19, 1956
9:06 a.m.

NEA FROM: Tel Aviv

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RMR TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1110, April 18, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

SENT DEPARTMENT 1110 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 379.

2. To comment on Dulles press conference Sharett referred to radio comment on Secretary's press conference in Washington. He said Dulles was asked about arms from Canada. The report of Secretary's reply was interpreted by both him and Ben Burion to mean Dulles had merely said he not imposing world embargo on Israel. At this point Sharett turned to Ben Gurion and related to him substance his conversation with me Independence Day (EMBTel 1106) ending up with his proposal re F84s. Ben Gurion nodded complete assent.

3. To comment on new Soviet policy Sharett and Ben Gurion both referred to new Soviet policy statement issued April 11. Sharett referred particularly to Soviets willingness recognize demarcation lines. When I inquired whether this might not displease Arabs, Ben Gurion not sure that it would have any material effect on Arab-Soviet relations, but Sharett convinced there would be what he termed "Ripple in Arab press." They considered this completely new development with regard to middle eastern conditions and interpreted good word said for France and Britain as a "sop" ... a sop to British prior to up-coming visit of Bulganin and Krushchev and a sop to French before Mollet's proposed visit to Moscow. Sharett is of opinion Soviets giving much more consideration to friendship recently and as they realize there is present favorable attitude of French toward Israel they are a little careful not to upset French in Middle East area. He also referred to UP dispatch from Moscow theme of which was that, despite this new statement of Mollet's regarding demarcation lines, Soviets would retain Arab friendship.

In discussing changes in Soviet Union later and especially the anti-Stalin line now Sharett referred to visit to Russia recently of Syrian Communist who returned to Syria and publicly expressed great bitterness toward Moscow because he feared Soviets not willing to go all out against Israel. Near close

of conversation

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-2- 1110, April 18, 4 p.m., from Tel Aviv (SECTION TWO OF TWO)
of conversation both Sharett and Ben Gurion asked me to convey
their most respectful greetings to Secretary.

Sharett concluded conversation by saying "in light of your
numerous conversations with Prime Minister and myself we
confident you will know what to tell Secretary". I remarked
that I should be pleased to give him fair and objective report
on exact situation and attitudes which existed here.

Sharett then referred again to his conversations about F84s
and other items which United States Government might find
"manageable" and thus influence French and Canadian Governments
to move in direction of supplying arms to Israel. Ben Gurion
made one remark in this connection saying "if you could bring
72 planes to Israel you would find peace in this area".

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674.34A/4-1356

This Document is Returned to

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1113, APRIL 18

EARLY PRESS REACTION TO SOVIETS ANNOUNCEMENT OF READINESS TO ASSIST IN EFFORTS TOWARD ARAB-ISRAEL PEACE, BANNERLINED BY MOST PAPERS, WAS MIXED. THERE WAS SOME GUARDED HOPE THAT DEVELOPMENT REPRESENTED BREAK IN RECENT SOVIET SUPPORT OF ARABES BUT MOST SAID THEY WOULD RESERVE JUDGMENT PENDING OTHER EVIDENCES OF USSR GOOD FAITH.

MOST SKEPTICAL WAS JERUSALEM POST (MAPAI) WHICH SAID THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER CHANGES IN SOVIET POSTURE STATEMENT MUST BE CONSIDERED "ATTEMPT TO STAKE CLAIM TO EQUAL VOICE WITH WEST IN ME AND ESSAY DRIVING DEEP WEDGE BETWEEN U S ON ONE HAND AND BRITIAN AND FRANCE ON THE OTHER AT MOMENT WHEN MARSHALL BULGANIN AND KHRUSHCHEV ARE VISITING BRITIAN."

AL HAMISHMAR (MAPAM) SAW HOPE SOVIETS BEGINNING TO CHANGE "SURPRISING AND PAINFUL POLICY WHICH SHE HAD EMPLOYED IN ALL RECENT APPEARANCES. ONE MUST STILL WAIT FOR TRANSLATION OF THEORY IN TO PRACTICE AT ANY RATE, IT LOOKS AS IF INSTEAD OF ONE - SIDE SUPPORT OF ARAB COUNTRIES, THERE WILL NOW BE BALANCED APPROACH WHICH WILL TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION "JUSTIFIED NATIONAL INTERESTS" OF BOTH SIDES. ACID TEST IS DISCONTINUATION OF DISPATCH OF ARMS SUPPLIES TO ANY COUNTRY IN ME WHICH IS NOT WILLING TO NEGOTIATE FOR PEACE WITH ISRAEL, AND AS FAR AS THIS IS CONCERNED, SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT HAS NOT YET GIVEN ISRAEL "ALL CLEAR".

DAVAR (SISTADRUT): "ANNOUNCEMENT DOES NOT REVEAL EXACT APPROACH OF USSR TO PROBLEMS AT ISSUE NOR DOES IT REVEAL WAYS AND MEANS IN WHICH SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS PLANNING TO CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHERING PEACE; HOWEVER, POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE FOUNDATIONS OF STATEMENT MUST BE APPRECIATED."

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-2- 1113, APRIL 18, FROM TEL AVIV

HATSOFE (MIZRAHI): "SOVIET ATTEMPT AT PEACE WILL BE WELCOMED BY ALL PEACE-SEEKING ELEMENTS IN ME, SUCH AS ISRAEL, TO EXTENT THIS ATTEMPT WILL BE TRANSLATED INTO REAL ACTION. REASON FOR TENSION IN THE REGION IS FACT THAT FIELD OF RACE BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD POWERS WAS TRANSFERRED TO IT. ARMS SUPPLIED BY USSR TO NASSER ARE INTENDED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE EAGHDAD TREATY, BUT IT IS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT NASSER WILL USE THESE ARMS AGAINST ISRAEL AT PROPER MOMENT. FIRST REQUIREMENT THEREFORE FOR PEACE IS TO BALANCE THE POWER OF ISRAEL AND ARABS. ISRAEL WILL WELCOME ANY DIRECT ATTEMPT MADE TO REMOVE THE REGION FROM AREA OF COMPETITION BETWEEN THE WORLD POWERS. IN THAT WAY NASSER WILL BE DEPRIVED OF THE ABILITY OF BLACKMAILING BOTH THE EAST AND THE WEST WHICH IS HIS MAIN SOURCE OF POWER AND POSITION AND CONSTITUTE THE THREAT TO THE REGION."

LAMERCHAV (ACHDUTAVODA) SAW ETMIET MOVE AS EFFORT TO COUNTER HAMMARSKJOLD MISSION WHICH SOVIETS SEEM TO REGARD AS "PART OF A FIRST PHASE OF U S PLAN TO BLOCK SOVIET PENETRATION OF REGION THROUGH "PAX AMERICANA" BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARAB STATES. PRESUMABLY THE REPORTS SENT BACK BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO CAIRO FOLLOWING THE NASSER - HAMMARSKJOLD TALKS WERE ONE OF MOTIVES FOR STATEMENT WHICH COMES TO REMIND WORLD THAT USSR HAS VITAL INTERESTS IN ME AND CONSIDERS HERSELF PARTY TO ANY NEGOTIATIONS FOR SETTLEMENT STATEMENT IS COUCHED IN MODERATE TERMS IN ITS REFERENCE TO BRITIAN AND FRANCE, THUS SEEMINGLY ACKNOWLEDGING THOSE TWO COUNTRIES INTERESTS IN REGION. AT SAME TIME AND SURELY NOT BY ACCIDENT, NO MENTION IS MADE OF THE U S."

HABOKER (GENERAL ZIONIST) REPORTED CABINET WOULD CONSIDER SOVIET STATEMENTS TOMORROW AND GOI WAS EXPECTING DETAILED REPORTS FROM ITS MOSCOW EMBASSY.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1120, April 19, 6 p.m.

PRIORITY.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1120 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 380, LONDON 321, PARIS 242, AMMAN 154, DAMASCUS 176, BEIRUT 250, JERUSALEM 94.

Evidence available points to conclusion that GOI believes crisis with Egypt is at an end for time being. Roadblocks into Tel Aviv have been discontinued, home guard brigade demobilized; and portion of reservists have been returned to inactive status.

In our judgment most recent crisis reached much more critical point than any of its predecessors since signing of armistice agreements. There were a larger number of troops on active service and positioned for actual warfare than heretofore. Opinion of both public and IDF was highly inflamed during period Fedayeen activities; judgments of both Ben Gurion and Sharett at times appeared to be subject more to emotional than intellectual influences; and finally repeated failures Egyptian Government to respond to General Burn's entreaties, firstly, to adhere cease fire and, secondly, to refrain sending in Fedayeen, placed Israel Cabinet in position of believing onus would be on Egypt in case outbreak general hostilities. Information reaching Embassy from several Israel military sources points to probability that initial decision had been made for a large-scale military counteraction night of April 19-20 and that this was called off at last moment. Department will recall that news of Hammarskjold's success in obtaining commitment from Nasser to conform Article II, GAA, reached Israelis 1 a.m. April 19 and it appears retrospectively that this was factor which resulted change of program by IDF. Influence of Hammarskjold's xgruittus* presence in area at that moment was greatly strengthened by White House statement and President's personal messages.

We believe that experience past several weeks points to two conclusions. Firstly, we believe underlying situation is such that Security Council can no longer afford to ignore a chronic source of friction between Israel and one or more of the Arab States even if at any given moment such friction appears of small magnitude. Although for a period of several months Nasser's unwillingness to adhere to a cease fire and periodic firing

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by his soldiers,

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-2- 1120, April 19, 6 p.m. from Tel Aviv.

by his soldiers, largely Palestinians, along Gaza strip did not appear serious, time arrived when such a course of action caused Israel fatalities and reprisal tactic of shelling Gaza towns was prompt and disastrous. With Israel approaching point desperation and Arabs with new-found confidence (or possibly over-confidence) in their military power, possibilities in similar circumstances of retaliation and counter-retaliation will be greatly enhanced. Furthermore, situation will remain hazardous as long as the two parties have unusually large military forces in close proximity to each other. The conclusion reached is that on any given issues and after General Burns had had first try at solution and failed, the problem should immediately be seized at higher level.

Secondly, experience in past fortnight has brought out certain weaknesses in UNTSO structure which obviously need correction. There has been serious time lag between occurrences and reports of UNTSO investigations; so much so in fact that had general hostilities broken out at any given moment the decisive battles would probably have been waged and terminated before Washington or UN would have had clear picture of circumstances precipitating them or have been able accurately to place responsibility. In addition to need for freedom of movement of UN observers which Hammarskjold is attempting to obtain, it is also apparent that UNTSO badly needs additional personnel and improved facilities such as tracking equipment and its own staff of interpreters if it is going to be able to investigate, analyze and report with reasonable promptness.

Finally, recent experience reinforces Embassy's judgment that no time should be lost by USG in dealing actively with water problem with a view to providing formula which will either solve matter or postpone development of an explosive situation at Banat Yaacov.

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* As received. Verification upon request.

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FROM: Jerusalem

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 424, April 19, 11 a.m.

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SENT PRIORITY TEL AVIV 219 REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
424, AMMAN 199, BEIRUT 117, CAIRO 243, DAMASCUS 118.

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UNTSO officers have informed CONGEN that they not aware
any basis for press report appearing under New York date-
line in JERUSALEM POST April 19 and other Israeli papers
that UNHQ is momentarily expecting announcement of cease-
fire agreement between Egypt and Israel. According report
"announcement will be made first in Jerusalem by Hammarskjold."

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Colonel Hommel of UNTSO has stated that negotiations being
conducted in secrecy so far as UNSYG concerned. Hommel added
that he personally was unaware any impending announcements,
any basis at present for such action. UNSYG meeting again
with Israelis this afternoon and intends departing for
Beirut Friday. Hommel observed that it is of course conceiv-
able that progress will be achieved and announcement made
some time soon.

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Control: 11671
Rec'd: April 21, 1956
10:43 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1122, April 20, 10 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1122; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 381, BEIRUT 322, LONDON 322, PARIS 243, DAMASCUS 177, JERUSALEM 95.

Rafael, Foreign Ministry advisor on UN affairs, who has been participating with Ben-Gurion and Sharett in talks with Hammarskjold past three days, gave me orally this afternoon following summary progress made these meetings (Department will want to analyze this report in light of UNTSO's version which I assume Consulate General Jerusalem is obtaining).

(1) Implementation Article II, paragraph 2, GAA. Ben-Gurion agreed to following measures:

A. Israel patrols would not (repeat not) operate within several hundred meters Gaza border except in special cases where security required it. Example given of exception was case of actual infiltrator stealing within Israel territory.

B. Israel agrees to maintenance by UN of observation posts along border.

C. Israel agrees to UN observer patrols operating along border as long as accompanied by IDF personnel. Rafael said that he understood Egypt has made similar undertakings and that Article III matters are virtually completed. He said that on all matters connected with his article, Ben-Gurion was most cooperative and made "surprising concessions" relative to his previous adamant position of "complete sovereignty".

(2) Proposals under Article I. Israelis took position that in view of fact that SC resolution directed Hammarskjold to survey the GAA's he had an obligation to obtain from Egypt commitments re implementation of Article I, including free passage Suez and Strait of Tiran, no massing of troops in Sinai, no propaganda or threats against Israel, discontinuance state of belligerency, and other warlike acts. Israelis indicated to Hammarskjold that they would be satisfied with de facto rather than de jure arrangements on Suez and Strait of Tiran. Hammarskjold maintained his position that these

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-2- 1122, April 20, 10 p.m., (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Tel Aviv.

that these matters were outside his SC directive but that he was prepared to discuss them with Nasser in his capacity as SYG.

(3) Implementation of Article VIII. Israel position was that they were prepared to trade withdrawal of troops from DZ against Article 1 but could not (repeat not) do so as long as Egypt was engaging in the "aggressive actions" prohibited by paragraph 2 Article I. When I asked Rafael whether GOI prepared comply Article VIII against Egyptian compliance Article VII and VIII, he replied that he was not (repeat not) prepared to comment on that question.

(4) Israel-Syria GAA. Rafael said this morning's discussion centered on relationships with Syria and that GOI had agreed as follows:

A. Will undertake not (repeat not) to send police boats closer than 250 meters to shore, except when required to rescue Israel fishing vessel which may have grounded and would undertake such operation only after notification Syria.

B. Agreed to permit Syrian use Tiberias for water purposes.

C. Reiterated willingness permit Syrians to fish, but only under individual licenses granted by Israel authorities, a condition with which Rafael said Hammarskjold agreed.

D. Told Hammarskjold that he might inform Syrian Government that crew of Syrian vessel and vessel itself would be released from Haifa within next few days.

E. In return requested Hammarskjold to investigate Israelis allegedly detained by Syria.

Rafael said that General Burns had affirmed that he already had undertaking from Syrians not (repeat not) to shoot at Israel fishing vessels any place on lake and not (repeat not) at Israel police vessels beyond the 250 meter line.

(5) Banat Yaacov. Israelis took attitude that Syrians were obligated under Article 1, Israel-Syria GAA, to refrain from firing across line, including any firing into DZ. Rafael quoted Hammarskjold as agreeing with this theory and as saying that he would request of Syrian Government reaffirmation of its compliance with article 1.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1122, April 20, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1122, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 381,
BEIRUT 251, LONDON 322, PARIS 243, DAMASCUS 177, JERUSALEM

Israelis then raised with SYG question "right of Israel to proceed with Panat Yaacov Canal". Israelis argued that urgent period referred to in SC resolution had long since passed and that they were free to proceed with work. Sharett was quoted as making categorical statement that Israel would not permit this, third work season, to pass without completing the canal work. Hammarskjold took position that this was a matter outside his jurisdiction and was in first instance a decision for General Burns or, if it so desired, for SC.

(6) At close of this morning's final regular session, Hammarskjold requested secret meeting this afternoon with Ben-Gurion and Sharett to explain "why he was so optimistic about Nasser". Rafael said that he did not know what this meant. It is possible, however, that this conference may be related to a matter which Nahum Goldmann discussed with me briefly this morning. He said he had two-hour conversation with Hammarskjold yesterday afternoon. The latter said that he believed some prospects for settlement had grown out of his conversation with Nasser. Goldmann noted Hammarskjold as saying that much to his surprise Nasser did not appear to be primarily interested in any questions of territory, but felt that disposition of refugees was important problem. Hammarskjold reportedly said that he believed Nasser would be receptive to a formula under which principle would be established that refugees would have option of returning to Israel or being settled otherwise but Israel would be protected by condition in formula setting forth specified criteria for eligibility which would in fact limit the number of refugees which Israel would have to receive to a reasonable total.

Note: Passed USUN 4/22/56 11 a.m. JK
LMS:CES/12

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Control: 10859

Rec'd: April 20, 1956
6:27 a. m.

FROM: Jerusalem

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 425, April 20.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 425, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 200, BEIRUT 118, CAIRO 244, DAMASCUS 119, TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED.

Following is text of UNSYG announcement April 19 as released at UNTSO headquarters and UN Information Center Cairo at 4:45 p. m. local time.

"At the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Governments of Israel and Egypt have notified him that as of 6:00 p. m., 18 April, and from that time on, orders are in force to the effect that in implementation of assurances to observe Article II, paragraph 2 of the Armistice Agreement, no military or para-military forces, including non-regular forces, may shoot across the demarcation line or pass over that line for any purpose whatsoever."

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VH:TTK/12

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Control: 11600

Rec'd: APRIL 21, 1956
8:24 AM

NEA FROM: JERUSALEM

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 428, APRIL 21, NOON

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SENT DEPARTMENT 428, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 202, BEIRUT
119 CAIRO 245, DAMASCUS 120 TEL AVIV 221.

COLONEL HOMMEL OF UNTSO TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD RAISED
WITH BURNS QUESTION OF PROVIDING BRITISH COLLEAGUE AND MYSELF
DETAILS PROGRESS HAMMARSKJOLD TALKS. BURNS REPLIED TO EFFECT
THAT UNSYG NOT WILLING RELEASE INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. HE
EVIDENTLY WISHES PROCEED WITH COMPLETE SECRECY. CONSULATE
GENERAL REPORTING UNSYG ACTIVITIES IN AREA THEREFORE
NECESSARILY LIMITED TO OCCASIONAL PRESS RELEASES ET CETERA
AS AVAILABLE FROM UNTSO.

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NOTE: PASSED USUN 4/21/56.

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Action
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Control: 12116
Rec'd: April 23, 1956
10:02 a.m.

FROM: Cairo

Into
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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2116, April 23, Noon

SENT DEPARTMENT 2116, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 263,
LONDON 321, PARIS 184, AMMAN 190, BEIRUT 268, JERUSALEM 147.

Reference: Tel Aviv telegram 1120.

Embassy agrees conclusions Embassy Tel Aviv regarding steps
to reduce danger future incidents, and considers Tel Aviv
recommendations situation Banat Yacub particularly important
and perhaps even urgent.

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NEA

FROM: Jerusalem

Control: 11996

Rec'd: April 23, 1956
6:12 a.m.

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 429, April 23, 11 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 429, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 222

General Burns spent week-end in Jerusalem, returning Beirut April 23. During social call at Consulate General April 22, he said he could not at this time provide Consuls (CONGEN 428) with any information for reporting purposes, since Hammarskjold insisted preserving secrecy avoid possibility of information "leaking out" prematurely. In any case, there were no firm commitments yet beyond acceptance "cease fire" in implementation Article II paragraph 2 GAA. With agreement on that point Burns said things appeared take turn for better. Progress on other points now appeared quite possible. In circumstances I am, of course, still not able provide UNTSO version negotiations, but so far as I could gather, they have proceeded along lines described Tel Aviv telegram 1122 to Department.

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Control: 13112

Rec'd: APRIL 24, 1956

8:05 PM

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 884, APRIL 23, 7 PM

RE PALESTINE

CORDIER INFORMED WADSWORTH TODAY SYG EXPECTED ANNOUNCE NEXT THURSDAY OR FRIDAY, APRIL 26 OR 27, THAT OBSERVER ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN CONCLUDED WITH EGYPT AND ISRAEL. HE SAID ORIGINAL AGREEMENT APPROVED BY EGYPT HAD BEEN SLIGHTLY MODIFIED BY ISRAEL AND HE WAS RETURNING IT TO EGYPT FOR FINAL APPROVAL.

ARRANGEMENTS PROVIDED FOR GREATER FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND PATROLLING. HE SAID THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN ARRANGEMENTS, MERELY RESTORATION OF RIGHTS.

SYG WILL ASK FOR 20 MORE OBSERVERS TO BE PROVIDED FROM SWEDEN, NORWAY, CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. (CORDIER HAS ALREADY INFORMED UN DELEGATES OF THESE COUNTRIES.) SYG SUGGESTED NON-BIG-POWER COUNTRIES, FEARING APPROACH TO US MIGHT PROMPT USSR OFFER OBSERVERS.

CORDIER ALSO SAID IN VIEW STRONG FEELING OF ISRAELIS SYG PLANNING ASK EGYPT NEXT TUESDAY, MAY 1, DISCUSS SUEZ CANAL RESTRICTIONS ON "PERSONAL BASIS". BELIEVING EGYPT WILL REQUEST ADVISORY OPINION FROM US GOVERNMENT ON RIGHT OF SYG DISCUSS THIS, POSSIBLY FOR DELAYING PURPOSES, SYG REQUESTS FOLLOWING BE CABLED BYROADE FROM DEPARTMENT AS BASIS FOR ANSWER TO EGYPTIANS SHOULD THEY APPROACH HIM:

"THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AS AGENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO MY KNOWLEDGE SEEMS TO HAVE REMAINED WITHIN THE LIMIT OF HIS MANDATE, BUT AS TO WHAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MIGHT DO ON THE BASIS OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS SECRETARY-GENERAL, I NEITHER HAVE REASON TO EXPRESS OPINIONS NOR ANY CAUSE NOW TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE TO MY GOVERNMENT WHICH, IN DUE TIME, MAY HAVE TO EXPRESS

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-2- 884, APRIL 23, 7 PM, FROM NEW YORK

TO EXPRESS ITS VIEW ON THE PERSONAL POLICY OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL."

IDENTICAL MESSAGE AND REQUEST BEING PASSED BY CORDIER TO USSR,
UK AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS FOR REMITTANCE THEIR AMBASSADORS
CAIRO.

SYG BELIEVES THIS WILL AVOID "TIME DELAY" DETRIMENTAL TO
SUCCESS THIS PHASE HIS MISSION. HE ALSO URGED THAT THIS MESSAGE
BE CONVEYED IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1136, April 25, 2 p.m.

Control: 13653

Rec'd: April 25, 1956
2:20 p.m.SENT DEPARTMENT 1136, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 386, BEIRUT 356,
LONDON 325, PARIS 245, DAMASCUS 181.

Inquired of Foreign Ministry last night re substance Friday after-
noon meeting Ben Gurion and Sharett with Hammarskjold reported
EMBTEL 1122 paragraph 6. Informed that Secretary General said he
had drawn enough encouragement from his Cairo visit to decide
explore possibilities Arab-Israel settlement. In view Hammarskjold,
territorial problem relatively unimportant and his position refugees
was vital question. He arrived at this conclusion by thesis that
cession of territory something which Nasser had conceived and it
was, therefore, demand which he could unilaterally waive. On other
hand repatriation and compensation of refugees were demands to which
all Arab Governments committed and issues which had firm foundation
among refugees in all Arab countries.

Hammarskjold concluded that key to solution was to give refugees
option of returning to Israel and inquired whether Israel Govern-
ment prepared to cooperate adding that all of this within context
of peace (settlement). Sharett replied that GOI prepared to cooper-
ate in this approach subject to three conditions:

1. That approach was within framework of peace;
2. That repatriation formula would not (repeat not) result in flood
of refugees but would on face be limited to reasonable number, and
3. That Nasser and Arabs would abandon territorial claims.

Ministry official in commenting on above indicated skepticism
that Hammarskjold's presentation reflected Nasser's thinking add-
ing that "some people" in Israel Government thought it more likely
that Labouisse, who totally preoccupied with refugee problem had
provided basis for Hammarskjold's approach.

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Control: 13497
Rec'd: April 25, 1956
10:07 a.m.

NEA FROM: Damascus

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 994, April 25, Noon.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 994, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 243, BEIRUT 307,
CAIRO 305, JERUSALEM 76, LONDON 242, PARIS 160, TEL AVIV 190.

Last paragraph Tel Aviv EMBTEL 1120 to Department.

That delay may cause explosion is danger from Israel side only.
Syrians, Embassy believes, can face with equanimity indefinite
postponement work at Jisrbanat Yacub and solution water problem.

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CWD: JHF/16

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FROM: NEW YORK

Control:

13719

Rec'd:

APRIL 25, 1956

3:57 P.M.

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 887, APRIL 25, 3 P.M.

PRIORITY

VERBATIM TEXT

RE: PALESTINE



LETTER FROM S.G. TO SC PRES, SIGNED IN JERUSALEM ON APRIL 18, TRANSMITTED BY CORDIER TODAY (COPIES BEING POUCHED). AFTER REFERRING TO UNCONDITIONAL ASSURANCES EGYPT AND ISRAEL RE COMPLIANCE ARTICLE 11, PARA 2 OF GAA, LETTER STATES:

"IN SUPPORT OF THE MEASURES ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 11, PARA 2, OF WHICH I HAVE THUS BEEN NOTIFIED, I HAVE PUT BEFORE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS PROPOSALS FOR A STRENGTHENING OF THE OBSERVER ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUMBER OF FIXED UN OBSERVATION POSTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE DEMARCATION LINE IN THE GAZA AREA AND OCCASIONAL UN MOBILE PATROLS ALONG THE DEMARCATION LINE. I HOPE, WITHIN A FEW DAYS TO BE ABLE TO INFORM YOU ABOUT THE ARRANGEMENTS TO BE ESTABLISHED. IN PRINCIPLE, THE PROPOSALS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED."

LODGE

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No. 20

25 April 1956

Dear Mr. Lodge,

..... I enclose herewith a letter received from the Secretary-General addressed to you in your capacity as President of the Security Council. I will be in touch with you later regarding the timing of the circulation of the letter as a document of the Security Council.

Very sincerely yours,

Andrew W. Cordier
Executive Assistant
to the Secretary-General

His Excellency
Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
President of the Security Council
2 Park Avenue
New York 16, N.Y.

614. 84A / 4-2556

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At Jerusalem, 18 April 1956

Dear Mr. President,

You have already, on 12 April 1956, circulated for information of the members of the Security Council the text of certain communications, including a declaration by the Government of Israel, dated 9 April, and a declaration of the Government of Egypt, dated 11 April, both giving unconditional assurance of compliance with para. 2 of Article II of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement.

I have the honour to inform you that, at my request, the Governments of Egypt and Israel have now notified me that as of 6:00 p.m. today, and from this time on, orders are in force to the effect that in implementation of the assurances to observe Article II, para. 2 of the Armistice Agreement between the two countries, military or para-military forces, including non-regular forces, may not shoot across the Demarcation Line or pass over that Line, for any purpose whatsoever.

In support of the measures ensuring compliance with Article II, para. 2, of which I have thus been notified, I have put before the two Governments proposals for a strengthening of the Observer

Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge
President, Security Council
United Nations
New York

activities, including the establishment of a number of fixed U.N. observation posts on both sides of the Demarcation Line in the Gaza area and occasional U.N. mobile patrols along the Demarcation Line. I hope, within a few days to be able to inform you about the arrangements to be established. In principle, the proposals have already been accepted by the two Governments concerned.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

Dag Hammarskjold
Secretary-General

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Control: 16004

NEA

Rec'd: APRIL 30, 1956
7:31 AM

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FROM: JERUSALEM

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 438, APRIL 30, 11 AM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 438, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY CAIRO,
247, PRIORITY TEL AVIV 227.

JERUSALEM POST APRIL 30 REPORTS MEMBER KIBBUTZ NAHAL OZ
KILLED WHEN ENDEAVORING CHASE AWAY INFILTRATORS HARVESTING
CROPS WITH THE AID OF "EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS" SOME 300 METERS
INSIDE ISRAEL.

UNTSO HAS RECEIVED REPORT FROM MAC CHAIRMAN TO EFFECT THAT
KIBBUTZ MEMBER DRAGGED OFF HORSE WHEN ONLY ABOUT 3 METERS
FROM D/L AND KILLED. REPORT DOES NOT (REPEAT NOT) MENTION
"MUTILATION" AS ALLEGED IN POST STORY, NOR PRESENCE OF
EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS. MAC REPORTS EGYPTIAN POLICEMAN WOUNDED
IN CONNECTION THIS INCIDENT, BUT FURTHER DETAILS LACKING.
ISRAEL HAS CALLED FOR EMERGENCY MAC MEETING ON BASIS COMPLAINT
WHICH INCLUDES ALLEGATION OF INFILTRATION AND ILLEGAL HARVESTING.
MAC MEETINGS CONTINUE IN ABEYANCE, HOWEVER, OWING REFUSAL
ISRAELIS PERMIT EGYPTIAN DELEGATE PROCEED EL AUJA VIA ISMAIL
ROAD AND DELEGATES INSISTENCE USE THAT ROUTE. IT THEREFORE
UNLIKELY MAC WILL BE ABLE CONSIDER SUCH COMPLAINTS IN FORE-
SEEABLE FUTURE.

ACCORDING UNTSO OBSERVERS INVESTIGATION HAS VERIFIED MINING
ISRAELI VEHICLE APRIL 29 WITH KILLING ONE SOLDIER AND WOUNDING
TWO AT POINT BETWEEN TWO AND THREE KILOMETERS EAST OF D/L.
NO (REPEAT NO) TRACKS WERE FOUND WHICH MIGHT INDICATE WHETHER
MINE WAS PLANTED RECENTLY.

COLE

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FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1159, MAY 1,

USIS TELEGRAPHING USINFO TEXT GOI PRESS STATEMENT RE AGREEMENT
ON UN OBSERVATION POSTS GAZA STRIP.

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Control: 742

Rec'd: MAY 2, 1956
8:12 AM

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2191, MAY 2, 2 P.M.

Control: 972

Rec'd: MAY 2, 1956
1:23 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 2191, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 268, AMMAN 195,
JERUSALEM 149, THE HAGUE 2.

KLM PLANE INTERCEPTION (TELAVIV'S 1154) REPORTED BRIEFLY IN
LOCAL PRESS WHICH SAID PLANE HAD BEEN FORCED LAND LYDDA UNDER
UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES.

KLM HAS CONTRACT WITH EAF FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEY SINAI AND
WE PRESUME PLANE WAS ON ROUTINE FLIGHT FOR THIS PURPOSE.

KLM REPRESENTATIVE HERE HAS NOT YET RECEIVED REPORT FROM HEAD
OFFICE BUT UNDERSTANDS PLANE WAS INTERCEPTED OVER EGYPTIAN
TERRITORY.

RNS

BYROADE

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2193, MAY 2, 7 PM

P R I O R I T Y

SENT DEPARTMENT 2193, REPEATED INFORMATION JERUSALEM 150, BEIRUT 278, AMMAN 197, TEL AVIV 270, DAMASCUS 198.

NEITHER UNRWA REPRESENTATIVE SQUADRILLI NOR UNTSO REPRESENTATIVE AWARE ANY EVIDENCE "THREATENED MASS MARCH BY REFUGEES". HOWEVER BOTH ARE QUERYING THEIR GAZA REPRESENTATIVES. U.P. REPRESENTATIVE UNAVAILABLE. NO SUCH REPORT CARRIED LOCAL PRESS. ELY POINTS OUT REFUGEES HAVE DEMANDED ARMS AND REQUESTED EGYPTIANS PERMIT THEM "RETURN TO THEIR HOMES" ON MANY OCCASIONS. THESE DEMANDS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN DENIED BY EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES AND HE SEES NO REASON FOR GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT CHANGE ITS POSITION. SQUADRILLI VERY SKEPTICAL REPORT WHICH HE BELIEVES WAS PROBABLY BLOWN UP BY REPORTER OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO ITS SIGNIFICANCE IF INDEED IT WAS MADE AT ALL.

BYROADE

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Control: 944
Rec'd: May 2, 1956
12:10 p.m.

NEA FROM: Tel Aviv

Info RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 1160, May 2, 1 p.m.

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All papers prominently featured Chief of Staff Moshe Dagan's melodramatic and bellicose funeral eulogy for Roy Rothberg, Kibbutznik killed at Nahal Oz Sunday (EMETEL 1148).

Representative remarks:

(1) "Let us not pour our invective on his murderers today. Who are we to complain about their fierce hatred of us? For eight years now they have been sitting in their refugee camps in Gaza and watching us taking root in their and their fathers' land and villages right before their eyes."

(2) "It is not against Arabs of Gaza that Roy's blood cries out for vengeance but against us. Beyond this furrow of border there swells sea of hatred and lust for revenge which awaits day that peace and quiet shall have blunted our sense of tense readiness."

(3) "It is to us that Roy's blood cries out from his mutilated body for we have sworn a thousand times that blood shall not be spilled in vain and yesterday we were again taken unawares again we trusted and believed. Let us examine our own consciences today." (See Embassy comment below.)

(4) "How could we fail to comprehend our destiny to recognize mission of our generation in all its cruelty? Have we forgotten that this group of youngsters sitting in Nahal Oz carries on its shoulders heavy gates of Gaza?"

(5) "We are younger generation and without steel Helmet and cannon we can plant no tree build no house...this is fate of our age choice of our life...to stand prepared and armed, strong and valiant."

(6) "Roy, boy who left Tel Aviv to make his home within sight of Gaza to defend us, light in his heart blinded him to glitter of blade, yearning for peace deafened his ears, so that he did not hear sound of lurking murderer. He crushed and overcome

by gates

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-2- 1160, May 2, 1 p.m., from Tel Aviv

by gates of Gaza."

Comment: Dayan's reference to again being "taken unawares" appears to be oblique criticism of concession made to Hammarskjold upon his arrival in area when GOI informally agreed to discontinue temporarily IDF patrolling close to Gaza border. Department will recall that Burns requests in past, which had received same Foreign Ministry support, that patrols be withheld from border were vigorously opposed by IDF on grounds such action would make it impossible protect settlers from infiltration. While Dayan's remarks might appear too inflammatory to have GOI sanction Embassy has learned in past they usually have Ben Gurion's blessings.

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Department of State

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Control: 880

Rec'd: MAY 2, 1956
10:52 AM

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FROM: TEL AVIV

Info
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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1,61, MAY 2

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1:01, NEW YORK 3

PRESS REACTION TO HAMMARSKJOLD'S MISSION CONTINUED UNIFORMLY SKEPTICAL. ALL PAPERS PROMINENTLY REPORTED ARIAS REFUSAL TO ACCEPT UNO TENTIAL CEASE-FIRE IN ABSENCE ISRAELI UNDER-TAKING NOT TO RESUME WORK AT JERUSALEM.

OTHER NEW DEVELOPMENTS, AGREEMENT ON NEW UN OBSERVATION POSTS ALONG GAZA BORDER (EMBTEL 1-91, WAS DISMISSED AS "PALLIATIVE" OR WITHOUT FORCE IN FACE OF ARAB PUBLICITY.

LAMERCHAV (AC BUT AVODA) SAID THAT ARAB PROMISES SHOULD BE WEIGHTED AGAINST FACT "THAT EVEN DURING HAMMARSKJOLD'S STAY IN ARAB CAPITALS FIRING ON ISRAEL BORDERS DID NOT STOP. IF ARAB RULERS PERSIST IN CARRYING OUT ACTS OF HOSTILITY ON ISRAEL BORDERS AND VIOLENT ARMISTICE AND CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS, THEN HAMMARSKJOLD'S MISSION IS AS IF IT DID NOT TAKE PLACE AT ALL. WHAT WILL HE RECOMMEND TO SECURITY COUNCIL QUERY WILL HE HAVE MORAL COURAGE TO FLING TRUTH AT ARAB RULERS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF WESTERN POWERS OR WOULD HIS "COMMON SENSE" STATE EVASION TO HIM OR EVEN SOME THING WORSE QUERY "(REFERENCE TO WESTERN POWERS ABOVE RELATES TO LAMERCHAV'S CHARGE THAT HAMMARSKJOLD MISSION "WAS MADE, UPON AGREEMENT OF ALL POWERS PARTICIPATING IN IT," TO PREVENT ARMED INTERVENTION IN MIDDLE EAST. MILITARY INTERVENTION OF POWERS STILL CONTINUES AS LONG AS SUPPLY OF ARMS ARE BEING SENT TO EGYPT FROM SOVIET BLOC AND TO BAGHDAD TREATY FROM WEST. SO LONG AS ARMS ARE BEING WITH HELD FROM ISRAEL, MILITARY INTERVENTION IS NOT AGAINST AGGRESSOR AS SPECIFIED IN UN CHARTER BUT AGAINST DEFENDER.)"

AL HAMISHMAR (MAPAM) SAID THAT AGREEMENT ON OBSERVATION POSTS MUST BE VIEWED AGAINST BACKGROUND OF EGYPTIAN "VIOLATION

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-2- MAY 2

JOE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS BY ARAB LEADERS MUST BE RECEIVED WITHIN 24 HOURS. IF CERTAIN HAVE NOT YET PROVIDED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO CEASE-FIRE.

HEBBI SAID "OBSERVATION 1 WHICH WILL NOT BE EGYPTIANS HANDS IN THEIR OWN HANDS. A CEASE-FIRE WILL BE A DAMAGING BLOW TO ISRAEL'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE. THEY WILL ALSO TIE ISRAEL'S HANDS AND THEY WILL PREVENT HER FROM EMPLOYING DEFENSE MEASURES IN REPLY TO ENEMY ATTACK."

ACCORDING TO JERUSALEM POST "THE HAMMARSKJOLDS MISSION IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE ARAB LEADERS WORDS AND DECLARATIONS TO THE ADVANCE AND ACTION THEY MAY FEEL FORCED TO TAKE. HERE ARE THE MAIN AND NEEDS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: 2 SYRIAN REFUSE TO AGREE TO CEASE-FIRE UNLESS ISRAEL AGREES TO RESUME WORK ON JORDAN RIVER; 3 EGYPTIAN TRANSGRESSIONS SINCE APRIL 18 CEASE-FIRE; 4 SYRIAN ANNOUNCEMENTS "THAT EVEN WHILE THEY ARE DISCUSSING CEASE-FIRE WITH SECRETARY GENERAL, THEY ARE ALSO TRAINING FEDAYEEN UNITS IN THEIR ARMY."

"IN FACE OF ALL THIS IT DOES NOT SEEM PROFITABLE TO DISCUSS PALLIATIVES. LATEST AGREEMENT TO STRENGTHEN NUMBERS OF UN OBSERVERS AND FACILITIES TO BE GIVEN THEM, INsofar AS THEY ARE DESIGNED TO HELP THOSE GENUINELY STRIVING TO PRESERVE PEACE, WILL HAVE BLESSING OF GOD WHICH SINCERELY PURSUES THAT BLESSED END. BUT AS WHOLE GRIM PICTURE BECOMES CLEAR, IT INDICATES THAT ARAB AGGRESSIVENESS IS ON INCREASE ONLY BECAUSE OF PERSISTENT DENIAL OF ARMS TO ISRAEL. CONSTANT BUILD-UP OF ARAB STRENGTH IS GIVING THEM MOUNTING CONFIDENCE THAT OPEN AGGRESSION WILL SUCCEED. TO THIS FACTOR THERE IS ONLY ONE ANSWER -- TO GIVE ISRAEL MEANS TO DEFEND HERSELF. IF THIS REALIZATION EMERGES FROM HAMMARSKJOLDS VISIT, HIS JOURNEY MAY PROVE OF POSITIVE BENEFIT."

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NOTE: PASSED NEW YORK 5/2/56 11 AM

JUN 18 1956

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10:47 AM

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ICAH

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1162, MAY 2, 3 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 1162, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 393, BEIRUT 26

RE DÉPTEL 1951 TO BEIRUT REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 819.

UPON INQUIRY IDF INFORMED USARMA IT UNWORRIED BY THREATENED
"MASS MARCH" INTO ISRAEL OF GAZA REFUGEES. IT REPORTED IT
HAD HEARD RUMORS BUT INCLINED TO GIVE THEM NO (REPEAT NO)
WEIGHT BECAUSE GAZA ARABS UNORGANIZED, UNCOORDINATED, AND
LACKING LEADERSHIP CAPABLE INSPIRING SUCH ACTION.

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2195 MAY 3, 1 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 2195 REPEATED INFORMATION JERUSALEM 151,
BEIRUT 279, AMMAN 198, TEL AVIV 271, DAMASCUS 199.

REFERENCE: EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2193.

SQUADRILLI TELLS US HE TALKED TO UP CORRESPONDENT PETER WEBB
WHO WROTE STORY IN QUESTION. HE SAYS WEBB DENIES ATTRIBUTING
REPORT REFERENCE "MASS MARCH" TO UNRWA REPRESENTATIVE. WEBB
SAID STORY HE SUBMITTED REFERRED TO RUMORS CURRENT IN
REFUGEE CAMPS ABOUT "MASS MARCH" AND QUOTED "UNITED NATION
OFFICIALS" AS REPORTING REFUGEES "CONFIDENT THEIR PROBLEM WOULD
BE SOLVED IN 3 OR 4 MONTHS".

COMMENT WE CONCUR ISRAELI EVALUATION REPORTED TEL AVIV'S
1162.

BYROADE

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Control: 1684

Rec'd: MAY 3, 1956
2:33 PM

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2201, MAY 3, 7 P.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2201, REPEATED INFORMATION TELAVIV 272,
JERUSALEM 152, THE HAGUE 1.

AKHBAR REPORTED BRIEFLY PAGE FOUR ISRAELI RELEASE KLM PLANE
AND DETENTION "EGYPTIAN PHOTOGRAPHER". NO EDITORIAL COMMENT
OR OTHER COVERAGE.

Control: 1929
Rec'd: MAY 3, 1956
8:12 P.M.

BYROADE

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54-51
Action
NEAControl: 2993
Rec'd: May 5, 1956
7:32 a.m.Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1164, May 3, 2 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1164; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 394, BEIRUT 201,
LONDON 329, PARIS 247, DAMASCUS 185, JERUSALEM 98.

Reference: EMBTELS 1122 and 1136.

GOI official who was present at meetings has given me following
summary Hammarskjold talks May 1 and 2 with Ben Gurion and
Sharett (have requested Consul General Jerusalem to obtain
General Burns' appraisal when possible).

1. Israel - Egyptian GAA. GOI discussed at length recent inci-
dents Gaza strip and said that unless they were stopped they
would "jeopardize the pledge of reciprocity" which Israel had
made to conform to Article 2 paragraph 2. Hammarskjold reportedly
said he was convinced Nasser had issued orders to his military
groups to conform to said article but that some gap might exist
in implementation. Upon his return to Cairo May 3 he would
endeavor to get a commitment to private crossings by civilians.
Regarding previous discussions Articles 7 and 8, Hammarskjold
said he had some hope of getting Nasser informally and unob-
trusively to lift (de facto) Suez and Tiran blockades. After
discussion and pursuance of this effort, Israel has given SYG
a written declaration that as soon as Egypt gives evidence it
has lifted the blockade Israel will "implement its compliance
with Articles 7 and 8."

2. Syrian - Israel GAA. Hammarskjold reported on his discussions
in Damascus and said that GOS had remained adamant on unconditional
undertaking compliance Article 3 paragraph 2, maintaining its
insistence on statement that compliance would be non-operative in
case Israel resumption work DZ. Hammarskjold requested Israelis
to give him an intimation that wisdom would prevail and that GOI
would not be resuming work in DZ. Such an intimation would
enable him to return to Damascus and persuade the Syrians to
abandon their attempt to link cease-fire with Banat Yaacov, tell-
ing them that they did not have to worry about work resumption.
Ben Gurion replied that Israelis were entitled to resume work;
that they could if they so desired begin work "when we leave this
room;" and that he could not therefore give SYG any pledge.

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-2- 1164, May 3, 2 p.m., from Tel Aviv.

(Source said that Israel's made no reference to discussions water problem now going on in Washington.) After going to Damascus yesterday afternoon for a final effort to persuade Syrians, Hammarskjold is holding another meeting this morning with GOI before proceeding Cairo.

3. Jordan - Israel GAA. Hammarskjold reported that he had obtained letter of cease-fire compliance from HKJ; that while letter contained strong statement re Israel resumption work Banat Yaacov, this did not constitute a condition to acceptance. SYG reported he had made no progress on question of compliance Article 8 GAA (Mt. Scopus), whereupon Israeli delegates requested him to record that fact in his report to Security Council. Hammarskjold indicated he was reluctant to do this because he did not want to evoke any discussions about past performance but rather to concentrate on making practical proposals for progress in future.

In discussion with SYG on local commanders agreements, Ben Gurion made concessions, which he had previously refused to make to General Burns, including agreement for UN observer at meetings whenever higher party so desired. Source said these concessions should now make it possible to go ahead with local commanders agreements covering critical border areas similar to program already in effect for Jerusalem.

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NOTE: Delayed in transmission.

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47
ActionControl: 2467
Rec'd: May 4, 1956
12:49 p.m.NEA
Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: ~~1167~~ 1168, May 4, 3 p.m.SENT DEPARTMENT ~~1167~~ 1168, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 395,
BEIRUT 263, LONDON 332, PARIS 248, DAMASCUS 286 JERUSALEM 99.

Reference: EMBTEL 1164.

Foreign Ministry advises that this morning it received communication from Hammarskjold saying he had been successful in obtaining from Egyptian Government statement that it would take effective measures to prevent border crossing and misdeeds of all persons (including civilians) and would punish culprits.

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Hammarskjold's message also reportedly said he had obtained "satisfactory reply" from GOE on question informal lifting Suez and Tiran blockades and was forwarding details.

Comment: Israelis for first time are permitting themselves measure restrained optimism re concrete results of Hammarskjold's negotiations. Statement re control civilians precisely what GOI regarded as necessary to provide basis border stabilization. While reserving judgment on SYG's message re blockade until details received, Israelis appear hopeful that minimum way may have been opened for transitting Suez with their petroleum imports.

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CORRECTION

Control: 2467
Rec'd: May 4, 1956
12:49 p.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1168, May 4, 3 pm

The first paragraph of this Secret message should be corrected to read:

SENT DEPARTMENT 1168; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 395, BEIRUT 263, LONDON 332, PARIS 248, DAMASCUS 286, JERUSALEM 99.

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(Date)

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- ☐ AGM. # _____
- ☒ LTR
- ☐ NOTE

FROM Date _____

TO Date _____

(a) File No. from 674.84a/5-456

to 774.00/5-456

(b) Additional information _____

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☐ All papers have been changed or corrected, etc.

☐ SCS ACTION papers.

53
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(OLD FILE NUMBER)

674.84a/5-456

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Department of State

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33

Action

Control: 3558

Rec'd: May 7, 1956
9:02 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 1171, May 7, 11 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1171 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 396, BEIRUT 264,
LONDON 333, PARIS 249, DAMASCUS 187, JERUSALEM 100.

Reference: EMBTEL 1168.

Foreign Ministry reports it has received communication from
Kidron, Israel UN representative who saw Hammarskjold in Rome,
quoting latter as saying Nasser had "backed out" of agreeing
formula under which GOE would lift blockade in return Israel
compliance Articles 7 and 8 GAA.

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1956 MAY 7 PM 2 29

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AIR

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1173, MAY 8, 1 PM

Control: 4972

Rec'd: MAY 9, 1956

9:41 AM

MESSAGE CENTER

SENT DEPARTMENT 1173: REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 397

THROUGH DEVICE OF "FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN" GOI TOOK FORMAL COGNIZANCE FOLLOWING MINOR INCIDENTS YESTERDAY ON GAZA STRIP WHICH IT DESCRIBED AS EGYPTIAN VIOLATIONS CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT. NO CASUALTIES IN ANY OF INCIDENTS.

TWO ARMY VEHICLES SEVERAL HOURS APART STRUCK MINES "PLANTED BY EGYPTIAN" NEAR NIR YITZHAK.

WHEN SETTLERS AT K FAR AZA ATTEMPTED TO CHASE OUT ARAB INFILTRATORS HARVESTING CROPS, FIRE OPENED FROM EGYPTIAN TERRITORY TO COVER INFILTRATORS FLIGHT BACK TO GAZA STRIP.

EGYPTIANS OPENED FIRE FROM GAZA STRIP ON GROUP OF WORKERS NEAR NIRIM. HOUR LATER TDLYD# OF EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS PENETRATED 300 METERS INTO ISRAEL TERRITORY BUT FLED TO GAZA STRIP WHEN ISRAEL PATROL APPROACHED.

FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN COMMENTED AS FOLLOWS: "MOST SERIOUS VIEW MUST BE TAKEN OF THESE INCIDENTS. THEY NOT FIRST TO HAVE OCCURRED SINCE EGYPT UNDERTOOK EXPLICIT ASSURANCES TO SECRETARY-GENERAL OF UN TO OBSERVE FULL CEASE-FIRE.

"PARTICULAR CONVERN AROUSED BY TACTICS USED BY EGYPTIANS IN VIOLATION OF CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT.

"PLACING OF MINES ON ROADS IN ISRAEL TERRITORY HAS BEEN FAVORITE EGYPTIAN TRICK FOR LONG TIME, IT IS CAUSE OF ANXIETY THAT TODAY'S INSTANCE IN NIR YITZHAK AREA IS SECOND OF TYPE TO HAVE OCCURRED SINCE EGYPTIAN CEASE-FIRE UNDERTAKING. IN SECOND OF TODAY'S INCIDENTS INFANTRY CAME

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-2- 1173, MAY 8, 1 PM FROM TEL AVIV

ACROSS BORDER INTO ISRAEL TO REAP OUR CROPS UNDER PRO-
TECTIVE FIRE OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS. THIS SAME TECHNIQUE WHICH
EMPLOYED WITH SUCH GRUESOME EFFECT LAST WEEK AT NAHAL OX
WHEN ROTHBERG KILLED (EMBTel 1160). MOST SERIOUS OF TODAY'S
INCIDENTS WAS CROSSING OF BORDER BY GROUP OF EGYPTIAN
SOLDIERS IN NIRIM AREA (LAST WEEK REFERRING TO ACTUAL
EGYPTIAN AGGRESSION IN NAHAL OX AND NIR YITZHAK WE HAD
OCCASION TO ASK WHAT EXTENT RELIANCE COULD BE PLACED ON
EGYPTIAN ASSURANCE OF CEASE-FIRE. TODAY'S INCIDENTS REIN-
FORCED QUESTION".

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CWD:VMM

AS RECEIVED. VERIFICATION UPON REQUEST.

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JUN 18 1966

THE REPORTER

*Repey drafted
NE-Berger
5/10/56*

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36 EAST 57th STREET
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.
Murray Hill 8-4033

May 8, 1956

The Honorable George V. Allen
Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Allen:

I am enclosing an advance copy of THE REPORTER which contains
a first-hand report from Jerusalem on Israeli-Egyptian relations,
"Israel: The Moment of Decision Goes By" by Claire Sterling.

Mrs. Sterling says "The Israelis will not invade Egypt, now or
a year from now."

The editors would be most interested in any comments you might
care to make after reading this article.

Sincerely yours,

Ruth M. Davis

Ruth M. Davis
Public Relations Department

enc.

674.84A/5-856

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674.84A/5-856

MAY 22 1956

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May 11 1956

Dear Miss Davis:

Your letter of May 8, 1956 enclosing an advance copy of the May 17 issue of The Reporter was received after Mr. George Allen's departure on a tour of Africa. The magazine will be circulated among officers of the Department who are immediately interested in problems affecting United States relations with the countries of the Near East. Your courtesy in making this article available to us is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Donald C. Bergus
Officer-in-Charge
Israel-Jordan Affairs
Office of Near Eastern Affairs

Miss Ruth M. Davis,
Public Relations Department,
The Reporter,
136 East 57th Street,
New York 22, New York.

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5/11/56

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MAY 11 1956 P.M.

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Control: 6467

Rec'd: May 11, 1956
2:01 p.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 445, May 11, 12 noon

SENT DEPARTMENT 445 REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 212, CAIRO
TEL AVIV 232.

UNTSO source has informed Consulate General of report sent UN SYG by General Burns respecting certain incidents cited by Sharett in message to UN SYG of May 8. According to POST Sharett "expressed Israel's grave concern . . . over renewed outbreak of violence along Egyptian and Jordanian borders."

Burns report dated May 10 refers Israeli complaints of two incidents Nirim area. First allegation states Egyptian military position opened fire May 7 across D/L at group workers in Israel territory. Second states Egyptian soldiers crossed D/L same date but withdrew when Israeli patrol approached. When observer began investigation he was asked postpone it pending decision senior Israeli MAC delegate as to "future" those complaints. He was later told that in view evidence Egyptian complaints same incidents Israeli delegate might wish withdraw Israel's complaints. According Egyptian complaints Israelis harvesting south of Hill 86 near Khan Yunis crossed D/L with tractor, and officer proceeding investigate was fired on from Israeli position. Fire also directed against Egyptian post in area. Upon investigating Egyptian complaint observer found marks of tracked vehicle across D/L into Egyptian territory some 15 meters. He found tracks two wheeled vehicles across D/L some 20 meters further south, and indications they proceeded some 200 meters southward and were about 600 meters inside Egyptian territory. Tracks then recrossed D/L. Report next refers incident involving two Israeli vehicles striking anti personnel mines near MRO865-0637. Little damage no (repeat no) casualties. Next incident mentioned consisted Israeli allegation illegal harvesting May 5 and firing across D/L. Observer shown grain/stubble but no (repeat no) evidence shooting.

Regarding Jordan border, report covers three incidents cited by Sharett consisting cross border and firing across border. There were no (repeat no) casualties nor (repeat no) requests for investigations. Two

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-2- 445, May 11, 12 noon, from Jerusalem

for investigations. Two additional incidents cited were reported CONGEN telegram 443.

With reference above and deserted house blown up at Kfar Yavetz May 6 UNTSO source indicated opinion Israelis doing best either fabricate or exaggerate incidents in hope influencing Security Council and "world opinion."

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MAY 15 1956

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PRIORITY

(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMEMBASSY, CAIRO

1164

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

May 15, 1956

REF : Embtel 2191, 2201

67 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	5/21	RMR-7, EUR-5, L-2, ID-4, USIA-10, Army-4, Navy-3 CIA-5, USIA-10, Army-4, Navy-3 AIR-3

SUBJECT: Israeli Interception of KIM plane.

On May 13 the reporting officer asked a local KIM representative as to the status of the KIM plane which had recently been intercepted by Israeli fighters and had been forced to land at Lydda. The KIM representative replied that the Egyptian Government still refused to permit the plane to return to Cairo unless the Egyptian sergeant, who had been on board, returned with it. Since the Israelis still refused to release the sergeant, the operation was becoming extremely expensive to KIM (or more properly to its wholly owned subsidiary "Air Cartas" (Sp?) which had contracted with the Egyptian Government to do the survey work). The Company, in addition to being deprived of the use of its plane, was having to pay for the accommodations in Israeli hotels for the Dutch crew members including the wife of the pilot, who had been transported at company expense to remain with her husband. Furthermore, the Egyptian Government was refusing to pay the Company for the substantial number of photographs which had already been taken and turned over to the Egyptians on the grounds that payment could only be made when the contract was completed. Since the contract apparently includes a penalty clause, the Company's chance of realizing a profit on the job is becoming remote and it increasingly runs a risk of facing a substantial loss.

The KIM representative could make no guess as to when the problem would be resolved. He indicated that perhaps a MAC meeting would be necessary but the chances of such a meeting's taking place in the near future seemed very doubtful in view of the Israeli occupation of Al Auja. In response to the reporting officer's query, the KIM representative explained that the Egyptian sergeant was not a photographer but had accompanied the flight as a representative of the Egyptian War Department. He commented that KIM had been able to obtain the survey contract in preference to BOAC, Air France or TWA because of Egyptian unwillingness to entrust aerial surveys to companies associated with the "Big Powers". However, the Government did not fully trust even KIM and therefore had insisted on a representative's being present on each flight. The KIM representative added that the incident had not improved Dutch-Egyptian relations, the Egyptians having pointed out to the Dutch that the Dutch press continued to be full of articles hostile to Egypt and to Nasser but had made no criticism of the Israeli interception of the KIM plane. There have been no references to the incident in the local press since

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Page 2 of
Desp. No. 1164
From Cairo


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(Classification)

Page _____ of
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

those reported in the reference telegrams.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:


Alexander Schnee
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

Copies to:

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TELEGRAM

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Department of State

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57-H

Action

Control: 10516

Rec'd: May 18, 1956

4:10 p.m.

NE

FROM: Jerusalem

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 450, May 18, 5 p.m.

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Have discussed matters reported CONF 46 with Vigier and Hommel of UNTSO who have provided details outlined herewith.

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Deadlock respecting meetings EIMAC continues with no indication that it may be broken at an early date, and formal adoption in MAC of arrangement covering establishment observer posts on both sides Gaza D/L thus is being frustrated. Israelis have continued to maintain that if MAC were to meet at El Auja Egyptian delegate must proceed there by road from Rafiah. Egyptians have insisted their delegates entitled proceed by any road they wish and stated willingness use only road from Ismailiya. Israelis have resisted this evidently because they have military positions along that road which they do not wish Egyptians to observe. On the other hand, Hommel reports that Egyptians have mined the Rafiah road and presumably do not wish remove mines to permit travel over it.

Vigier stated that Israelis have recently broadened the character of their objections to MAC meeting at El Auja, regardless Egyptians route of travel there, by advancing new argument to effect that MAC should not meet there "now that articles 7 and 8 of the GAA may be regarded as in a state of suspense." Israelis have, however, asserted that they would agree readily to MAC meetings at K-95 elsewhere that vicinity, where meetings were held in past owing convenience that location. Egyptians unwilling accede latter suggestion, wishing as matter of principle maintain rights with respect El Auja D/Z which not already lost through establishment of Kibbutz in D/Z stationing of Israeli troops in D/Z, and Burns concession allowing 30 Israeli "police" there. Egyptians would perhaps be willing meet elsewhere later, but feel they must initially maintain in principle right to meet at El Auja as established by GAA.

According

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-2- 450, May 18, 5 p.m., from Jerusalem.

According Vigier, Ben Gurion has departed to spend week-end at Sde Boker. Since latter has taken charge of questions arising agreement with UNSYG respecting establishment of UN observer posts each side Gaza strip D/L, such matters appear likely remain in abeyance at least for next few days, although Tekoah assured UNTSO today "he is doing his best" make progress toward reactivating MAC. Since when negotiating on subject with UNSYG Ben Gurion gave no indication that Israelis would place any obstacles in way of MAC meeting to adopt arrangements re Gaza D/L, Vigier pointed out their tactic now raising difficulties this point might well appear as breach of understanding with UNSYG. Vigier added that, anticipating line now being followed by Israelis, Egyptians had proposed that arrangements should be adopted by MAC chairman, rather than by MAC itself. Israelis would not accept this.

In commenting on above, Vigier expressed view that Israelis attitude toward UNTSO and observers has not changed. Although Israelis were not in a position to refuse UNSYG's proposals while here, he expects they will seize upon various subterfuges to avoid "implementing" them. Placing obstacles in way of MAC meeting thus appears ideally suited their purpose. Vigier pointed out similarity this present situation and treatment accorded by Israelis to UNSYG proposals of November 4 relative El Auja. In latter case, initial acceptance "in principle" was followed by evasiveness and equivocation about "implementing" them, and same pattern appears emerging again with regard agreement for observers posts.

Comment: While Vigier frequently takes pessimistic view UNTSO affairs and may show bias against Israelis at times, his presentation of facts as related above is doubtless generally correct and his conclusions do not seem unreasonable in light past experience. Perhaps Department and Embassies would wish consider feasibility some initiative with parties overcome deadlock concerning MAC meeting. Burns expects depart for New York May 22.

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FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2318, May 23, 11 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2318, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 218, BEIRUT 304, BAGHDAD 175, DAMASCUS 215, JIDDA 166, TEL AVIV 285, LONDON 351, PARIS 209.

Saw Hussein briefly right after his initial meeting with Nasser. Hussein had following points of interest on this first encounter.

(1) He personally felt completely reassured that Nasser had no intention of attacking Israel.

(2) Nasser's feeling on question of arms for Israel was intense. He obviously operating under some type of intelligence unknown to us which indicates that definite decision was made to try to keep Israel as strong as Arab States. He feels blame must be shared but mentioned Eden particularly. He apparently wonders whether things have reached point in Britain where British would even spur Israeli aggressions against Egypt. He felt that real motivation behind rumored arms blockade again lay with Eden and that Eden envisaged type of blockade which Israelis could circumvent as in past hostilities. I told Hussein to pass to Nasser that I absolutely convinced he operating under false information. Truth was almost entirely to contrary as Eden had been annoyed at Russian suggestion of arms embargo to Middle East which he saw as move on their part to wreck Baghdad Pact.

(3) Secretary should not feel that motive behind recognition Red China was slap at US. Timing of this act had been related solely to establishing new source of arms because of Nasser's feelings as above on question arms for Israel. Hussein said Nasser asked that I be told this officially and that he regretted apparent misinterpretation in United States.

BYROADE

CWD:PLH

Note: Message delayed in transmission.
NEA message center notified 5/26/10:32 a.m. EMB

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Control: 12895
Rec'd: May 23, 1956
1:24 p.m.

Action

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FROM: Jerusalem

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 453, May 23, 11 a.m. (SECTION 1 OF 2)

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SENT DEPARTMENT 453 REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 217, BEIRUT 126, CAIRO 253, DAMASCUS 126, LONDON 137, PARIS 131, TEL AVIV 237.

General Burns has postponed his departure for New York owing difficulties obtaining adoption arrangement covering UNTSO observation posts each side of Gaza D/L. According Burns, position as described COMTEL 450 has however evolved to some extent. It is now substantially as follows:

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(1) Gohar has sent Burns letter stating that Egypt willing consider arrangement as in effect without its being "formally adopted in MAC".

(2) While maintaining their position that MAC should not meet at El Auja now that "articles VII and VIII of GAA are in suspense" Israelis have agreed to one meeting at El Auja for purpose formally adopting arrangement, provided MAC representatives agree in advance adopt resolution to effect that pending compliance by the parties with articles VII and VIII subsequent meetings of MAC will be held elsewhere. If Egyptians agree foregoing Israelis have indicated they will allow Egyptian MAC delegate proceed El Auja by any road he wishes.

(3) Burns expects reply about May 24 from Egyptians as to whether they are willing have their MAC delegate attend meeting at El Auja in circumstances just mentioned. He would proceed New York thereafter.

(4) Hammarskjold takes "dim view" of Israelis idea of holding MAC meeting only on condition of prior commitment as above. If Egyptians unwilling give such commitment Hammarskjold would consider Israelis responsible for obstructing adoption arrangement.

With respect Israeli motives for taking above position, Burns said he assumed Israelis do not consider it advisable at this time to block progress entirely on adoption arrangement

establishing

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-2- 453, May 23, 11 a.m. (SECTION 1 OF 2), from Jerusalem

establishing observation posts, especially in light publicity attaching UNSYG visit and SC meeting. However, they presumably still wish limit activities observers as much as they can and take any expedient steps maintain habitual

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Action

Control: 13075

Rec'd: May 23, 1956

6:50 p.m.

NEA FROM: Jerusalem

Info

RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 453, May 23, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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SENT DEPARTMENT 453, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 217, BEIRUT 126, CAIRO 253, DAMASCUS 126, LONDON 137, PARIS 131, TEL AVIV 237

Thesis re their "sovereignty" in the D/Z.

They also continued relate compliance article VII and VIII to Egyptian attitude toward article I of GAA, including freedom transit Suez. In this connection Israelis likewise have in mind Egyptian actions such as increase number military units in Sinai and anti-Israeli propaganda.

With respect Gaza D/L which now relatively quiet, Burns opined that Egyptians are making genuine effort control troops and avoid firing incidents, while Israelis likewise keeping patrols back from immediate vicinity D/L. Situation indicative of what parties can achieve in this direction when they wish.

Turning to other matters, Burns said he thought suggestions for improving Lake Tiberias situation (SC resolution January 19, 1956) are all being observed by parties at this time with exception permission Syrians fish in Lake, which remains as described COMFEL 441. With regard Jordans-Israel local commanders agreements covering border outside Jerusalem area, Burns said both sides considering proposals for agreement in terms generally similar that of June 8, 1953, which lapsed following Scorpion Pass bus incident. Israelis had just returned proposed draft agreement with their comments, but progress on Jordan side might be delayed by change of government. Burns hopes new agreement will provide that both low level officers near frontiers and high level commanders of military districts concerned should have direct means communication with opposite numbers.

Burns said his opinion was that Jerusalem area commanders arrangement had proven obliterated significance at least partly owing to fact Jordanians had named chief of Jerusalem police force as "area commander" for purposes of the arrangement. ~~They did not (repeat not) name officer in charge military area,~~ who would be logical choice since he commands Arab Legion troops in Jerusalem, because when arrangement concluded that

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-2- 453, May 23, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Jerusalem

post was occupied by British Brigadier. Jordanians did not repeat not wish British officer have direct contacts with Israeli opposite number. As result "area commander" on Jordan side was in fact police officer with but little force of character and no (repeat no) control troops in Jerusalem. Burns hopeful that with departure British from Arab Legion, Jordanians will feel free give their ranking military officers proper role any such local arrangements in future.

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2:11 p.m.

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NEA
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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 457, May 25, 10 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 457, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 219, BEIRUT 13
CAIRO 254, DAMASCUS 127, LONDON 138, PARIS 132, TEL AVIV 238.

Burns told me at social gathering last night Israelis have
agreed implement arrangement UNTSO observation posts along
Gazza D/L without its formal adoption in MAC (CONTEL 453).
Plans contemplate establishment 6 posts each side D/L. Burns
proceeding New York May 25.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy, Tel Aviv

764
DESP. NO.

June 1, 1956
DATE

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,

REF :

Amman - Beirut - Cairo - Damascus - GE-1

2 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
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4/1-6 P-1 4/01-1 IO-4
Cia 7 L51a-10 ARMY-4 NAVY-3

SUBJECT: Yedioth Hayom Comments on Rumored Establishment of a "Palestinian State" in Gaza

The above-named independent newspaper carried an editorial on May 30, 1956, in which it discussed "remarkable rumors from over the border" to the effect that Egypt plans to set up a "Palestinian State" in the Gaza Strip. According to the paper, establishment of such a state may follow activation of the Palestinian Army recently announced by Prime Minister Nasser. In review the paper noted that such a government was proclaimed in Gaza in 1948, but departed the town in "autumn, 1948" with the first shelling, only to proceed to Cairo where it is allegedly still maintaining a shadowy and unsuccessful existence. The paper claims that Egyptian indifference to such a government since 1948 was due to Jordanian sensitivity, which apparently now could be ignored, "since King Hussein, under the control of Ali Abu Nuwar, is now in Nasser's pocket."

As speculated upon in the editorial, the purpose of the prospective "State" would be to serve as a core for a future Arab Palestine, with a geographical location which would promote Egyptian hegemony over Palestinian developments.

The article concludes:

"For Israel the creation of such a Palestinian State would present a grave challenge since it is obvious that it would conduct itself purely as a front-line army against Israel. As far as Israel is concerned such a State simply would not exist, since we have concluded a General Armistice Agreement only with Egypt, and it is quite clear that we would continue to hold Egypt solely responsible for observance of the Armistice provisions. In any event, however, the setting up of such a state would certainly add to the tension in the Middle East, and give us some very serious problems to cope with."

No other newspapers have referred to these "rumors."

For the Ambassador:

cc: Jerusalem, Haifa.

DEPT PLS PASS AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS.

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

RDDavis:mf/jd
REPORTER

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy, Tel Aviv

798

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

June 11, 1956

DATE

REF :

DC/L-1 AMMAN-1 BEKUT-1 CAIRO-1

ACTION	DEPT.
For Dept. NEA-4	IN RM/R-2 CLIC IO 4 EUR SPIE 4 DAMASCUS
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SUBJECT: The Fortified Jewish Settlements of the Gaza Strip

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In the company of a lieutenant of the Israel Defense Force from which permission for the trip had to be obtained, and an officer of the United States Division of the Foreign Ministry, the reporting officer visited four border settlements along the Gaza demarcation line June 5 and 6. His interests in the trip, among others, included the following:

1) In a recent upwelling of nationalist and religious fervor, widely publicized here and abroad, urban Israel is reported to have contributed more than 1,000,000 man hours of labor to the construction of defenses for the border settlements or kibbutzim (Embdesp 685). The practical contribution this effort made to the defense of the settlements, as apart from the psychological lift it gave both recipients and donors of the labor, was a matter of interest.

2) The names of the settlements visited are among those most frequently seen in accounts of border violence and a first-hand impression of their situation was desired.

3) It has been suggested that the settlements in the most exposed position are not primarily agricultural villages at all but little fortresses, disguised as farm communities, which will provide prepared points of strength for the IDF in the event of large scale hostilities originating on the Gaza Strip.

The reporting officer concluded that the settlers regard themselves primarily as farmer-settlers but accept the responsibility of providing a first-line defense against invasion as a critically important but secondary community function. For, in fact, the settlements produce bountifully - whether economically is another question.

The settlers assume the burden of the defense of their compound; the IDF defending the general area - that is, the settlements strung a few kilometers apart all along the demarcation line.

Both defense preparations and agricultural practices fall into a general pattern.

WJHamilton:jd
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Agricultural activity. Each of the four kibbutzim visited farms more than 2,000 acres. They practice diversified farming with large livestock responsibilities requiring attention when they are not planting, cultivating, or harvesting, so that there is a heavy work load the year around. They have large acreages of wheat and barley rotated either with pasture or legumes; small tracts of fresh vegetables; either beef or dairy cattle herds or both; and large poultry flocks. They have been "tied in" to the Yarkon water line this year, and are now preparing to put from a tenth to a fifth of their land under irrigation.

Defense Preparations and Responsibilities. All settlements visited reported that they had had volunteer help during the recent campaign mentioned above from their metropolitan countrymen but on this sector of Israel's frontier their contribution is not apparent. The trenches are machine-dug; the barbed wire strung from trucks, by contrast with the volunteer efforts of city notables, shown in news photos laboriously unrolling and stringing the wire by hand. But the real efforts of the volunteers may have been expended more logically in helping construct defenses, amateurish but probably sufficient in the circumstances, in less exposed communities.

The IDF which, incidentally, controls and escorts the movement of outsiders to and from the border settlements on the Gaza Strip, furnished the blueprints for the defenses of the compound. They were virtually indistinguishable in the four settlements visited.

A zig-zag trench parallels the arc of the compound perimeter which faces south and west. At every third or fourth point of intersection, heavy sand-bagging provides a firing bay for machine gun or mortar. The trenches are lined with corrugated iron. Just outside the trenches and paralleling the perimeter is a line of 30-foot light poles spaced fifty feet apart and mounting conventional but heavy candle-power bulbs with reflectors. These are lighted from sunset to sunrise, not for assistance against military forces but to discourage the thieving and sabotage of Gaza Arabs. At less frequent intervals, perhaps in three or four places along the perimeter, are watch towers, also thirty feet in height, equipped with a machine gun mount and searchlight that throws a beam three kilometers.

Just outside the trenches is a 5-foot barbed wire fence. In addition to the strands strung in the conventional manner on the vertical, steel fence posts, wires are strung at a 45 degree angle outward and inward from the top of the posts to parallel lines of steel cleats, like tent stakes. These angling strands are heavily interwoven so that anyone trying to scale the fence would have to ascend and descend an ugly bed spring of barbed wire.

The compound itself is criss-crossed with communication trenches between such points of importance as living quarters, schoolrooms, nursery, and workshops. There are three or four air raid shelters - one each for school and nursery, and one or more near the points of heaviest population concentration.

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From _____

One enters them by a 3-foot wide, concrete-covered ramp which descends steeply 25 feet below ground to a concrete tube eight feet in height and five or six in width. All tubes have emergency water tanks, food and first aid lockers, and telephones. In the shelter for nursery age children there are bunk beds and playthings. All are electrically lighted.

In each family living-unit there is a weapon - usually rifle or sten gun - which one member of the family is expected to man in case of hostilities. Each kibbutznik does all-night sentry duty one week in a month. In comparatively peaceful times, six persons are posted at strategic points along the perimeter trench from darkness to dawn.

In addition to the rifle or sten gun which is each family's individual responsibility, there is a central armory. On inquiry, the reporting officer was informed that its contents were a military secret. He thereupon said that all he had been permitted to learn would not indicate that the settlements were equipped for resistance against anything other than infantry attack. The IDF escort replied that along the Strip there were points which more obviously than others called for antitank weapons, but gave no hint as to whether kibbutzniks at those points would have been trained in the use and maintenance of antitank weapons or would look to the IDF for this responsibility.

Of the four kibbutzim visited, the perimeter defenses of three are manned by inhabitants of the kibbutz. The fourth, Nahal Oz, is manned by the IDF who apparently never leave the place.

The circumstance of the settlements which struck the reporting officer most forcibly, was the thoroughness with which the kibbutzim are being prepared, both psychologically and in the character of their defenses, to stand fast in case of invasion. The possibility of evacuation is in no way suggested to them, although escape routes to north or east could be mapped on lines which offer no topographical barrier, the fields rolling levelly all the way east and north to heavily settled, less exposed areas.

The settlers are being conditioned to believe that safety for them and their children lies in taking to the bunkers and air raid shelters.

The reporting officer is tempted to conclude that the Government's objective is to see that these people instinctively stand fast if invasion comes. Their protection thus becomes a military commitment of the IDF, and the plight of the beleaguered little garrisons provides the foundation for a moving appeal not only to the Diaspora Jew everywhere but to the rest of the non-Muslim world as well.

And the longer the border kibbutzim survive without serious loss, the easier it will be to persuade other groups to form similar units, gradually filling in all the gaps in the line of the frontier settlements, and then building new settlements in increasing density between the Gaza Strip and the Jordan border, spreading south as far as water permits and thus establishing a Jewish hold more deeply and firmly on the land.

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Desp. No. _____
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The four Kibbutzim visited are Nirim, which, save for one other, is the southernmost settlement along the demarcation line (MR 062/083): Ein Hashelosha (well of the three), two kilometers north of Nirim; Nahal Oz, some three kilometers still further north; and Sa'ad, a similar distance north of Nahal Oz but four kilometers east of the Strip and separated from it by the fields of another kibbutz and a major north-south road firmly under Israel control.

The four perform very similar functions in buttressing Israel's claim to the northern Negev by settlement and defense, but their ideological affinities are somewhat different. Nirim is a Mapam kibbutz with its allegiance to Marxist principles diluted only by a stronger adherence to Zionism. Hashelosha has its roots in the Diaspora; it is made up of young Zionists from half a dozen Latin American capitals who moved here from an idealistic desire to return to the sources of their religion, race, and nation. Nahal Oz is the fruit of the Hagshama movement which takes volunteer urban high school students, both sexes, and forms them into units indoctrinated with the idea that settlement of the land and defense of the land is an end to itself. This is almost pure Jewish nationalism, the religious impulse is not apparent if it exists at all.

The last is a settlement founded under the auspices of Hapoel Mizrachi, the orthodox politico-religious party which has a youth land settlement movement of redemptionist qualities but motivated in the main by a desire to match other political party's efforts on behalf of their youth.

Nahal Oz is especially interesting for a variety of reasons: it is the nearest to the border almost directly facing Gaza city; it is the first fruits of a movement which expresses Ben Gurion's goal of the return of Jewish youth to the land and the defense of the Jewish homeland; it is a foster son of the IDF.

Its perimeter defenses were the only ones of the four settlements visited that the reporting officer was not permitted to inspect at will, leading him to the conclusion that along it were probably located heavier weapons than such a settlement is expected to employ in peace times. Through binoculars his party, however, was able to watch IDF regulars moving about in the trenches from salient to salient.

Climbing the steel ladder of a 60-foot grain silo, it was possible to see all the way to the Mediterranean. To the south of Gaza City, a series of low promontories are the sites of Egyptian artillery positions, according to our IDF escort. In front of them a huge barn-like structure was described as an UNWRA medical supply and drug warehouse. From Gaza City coming eastward towards our vantage point were: first, Arab fields in which large bands of Arabs were harvesting wheat with sickles by contrast with the tractor drawn combines at work in Jewish fields; then, the demarcation line, which is a deep, ploughed furrough; third, the road on which the IDF patrolled the line until they recently acquiesced in the request of Hammarskjold to end such

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close patrol; fourth, the Jewish fields, already harvested; fifth, the new patrol road established since Hammarskjold's visit; and finally the perimeter defenses of Nahal Oz, immediately below us.

A kibbutznik guide told the party that while an absence of Arabs in the fields between Nahal Oz and the coast did not necessarily mean trouble, they had learned that they had nothing to fear if Arabs were going about their normal activities.

The eighteen married couples who form the nucleus of Nahal Oz started the experiences that culminated in their present situation about six years ago when as high school students they voluntarily joined Hagshama in which they devoted a large part of their leisure time to paramilitary training, camping, hiking, and studying elementary land settlement courses under the direction of kibbitzniks assigned as Hagshama trainers by their political parties. When they reached the age of military conscription, they exercised the choice of entering as a unit into the Nahal, a part of the IDF training program in which conscripts divide their training between agriculture and soldiering. Their shoulder patch is a combination of sickle and sword. Upon completing the Nahal training, they elected to man a border settlement as a unit. Somewhere along the way, they formed into married couples. Their political affiliations Mapai, the party of Ben Gurion.

Now having achieved the average age of 21, they are the fire-hardened veterans of three and a half years of living in closest proximity to the Gaza Strip with all its tensions and flare-ups. Two of their members have been slain; the most recent Roy Rothberg was dragged from a horse by Arab infiltrators while he was patrolling Nahal Oz fields (Embtel 1148). They have six children.

Augmenting their slim ranks are some volunteers and a contingent of new Nahal who, on the basis of their experiences here, will decide on the completion of their military service whether to volunteer for border settlement or return to purely civilian occupations.

Small IDF units move in and out of Nahal Oz at will. While we were there, a female sergeant drove up in a land rover and about seven new conscripts, North African immigrants, tumbled out of the vehicle and waited while the sergeant tacked a map against one of the buildings and proceeded to give a lecture in Gaza Strip geography.

Nahal Oz compound is a collection of one-story wooden shed-like buildings, one room in depth, several in length. Only amenity is an extremely well-furnished and appointed recreation room which their parents contributed. Its comfortable chairs, tables, magazine racks, chess tables, rugs, floor and table lamps provide a marked contrast to the rough hewn, unpainted benches, tables, naked light bulbs and bare floors of the community dining hall and other central buildings. The farm is thoroughly mechanized with a fleet of tractors to draw many implements.

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Nahal Oz has become a principal port of call for visitors whom the Israel Government wishes to impress. Observing the hard way these young couples live, the little improvement in their lot that the future holds for them, it is easy to believe the stories of Jewish dedication and selfless determination to secure their land. Ed Murrow visited Nahal Oz for his television study of Israel. One of the boys who guided his party there apparently appeared so personable on American television screens that the Jewish Agency engaged his services, and he is now touring the United States under the auspices of the United Jewish appeal to whom it is cynically said he will be worth several million dollars in contributions.

Despite their youth, the Nahal Oz settler is more securely attached to this life than any of his counterparts in the other three settlements visited. Their loss from defection has been one or two a year. Even the widows have chosen to remain with the community rather in spite of their youth to return to the urban homes of their parents. Their long years of indoctrination at a formative period has "taken." Their sense of community identification is very strong.

Most numerous defections were at Ein Hashelosha, where 50 per cent of the Latin American Jews, drawn from urban homes and with no conception of frontier life, fled to the city after the first year. The hard core that remains has become adjusted and its losses are only five to ten per cent per year defecting, not from the original settlers but mostly from the new recruits who have since joined them.

The Mapamnicks suffer five to ten per cent as does the Mizrachi, Sa'ad. The turnover of the latter is continuous, however, because it serves as a Mizrachi youth training center. A constant stream of Mizrachi youth pour into Sa'ad, the reporting officer was informed, some to remain and settle there permanently, others to volunteer for new settlements on other borders.

Between Nahal Oz and Sa'ad lies Kfar Aza. This settlement was established by North African immigrants who found the life too difficult and left it by twos and threes until the Gaza artillery fire of April 5, after which so many vacated that the remainder could not cope with its more than 2,000 acres. Nahal units were moved in to carry on until a new settlement nucleus can be selected.

While it is generally believed that the kibbutz movement is no more than holding its own while the moshav settlements, individual holdings with co-operative use of certain facilities, are growing in strength, informants along the route of the trip described herein insisted that it was expanding steadily. As evidence, they said that volunteers having completed Nahal training and electing to man the settlements had been registered in sufficient numbers to fill all the manpower deficiencies in existing border settlements. New units emerging from the Nahal would from this time onward be placed on new settlements. This may be an artificial stimulus, but once units are as well indoctrinated as these at Nahal Oz, Sa'ad and Nirim are established on

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the land, pressures of one kind or another - patriotism, personal "face," responsibilities of Nahal wife and child, etc. - will probably suffice to keep them there. Of course as their position, both militarily and economically speaking, becomes more secure they may gradually metamorphose to moshavims. In the meantime, the kibbutzim type communal organization is probably better suited to the requirements of combined military-agricultural responsibilities.

The life is hard and the compensations few. It was many times remarked to the reporting officer that these kibbutzniks were like the American pioneer on the western frontier. This is a comparison of dubious validity. The American pioneer left an environment in which he had little prospect of improving his lot and took his chances, not primarily to develop the country, but to improve his and his children's prospects. The Israeli settler leaves possibly rather better prospects in the city for the sake of securing the land to his nation.

The settlers are indifferent or innured to atrocious food - unnecessarily grim to judge from bursting barns, fat livestock and poultry.

Lunch, the big meal of the day, at Nirim was typical. Heavily seasoned fish, boiled whole and then cut in half, head in one portion, body and tail in the other and served in a gelatinous sauce; boiled potatoes without gravy or butter; unbuttered coarse brown bread, cold water to drink, pickled beets, raw turnips and cucumbers which one peels at the table, tomatoes, and uncongealed jello or gelatin for dessert. Supper at Sa'ad was brown bread, PL 480 butter (the most palatable part of the meal), boiled potatoes, raw vegetables as above, and fruit-flavored water as a beverage. Breakfast, also at Sa'ad, was coarse sardines, bread, butter, and whole cream spread on bread; fried egg, and lukewarm tea sweetened before it was poured from the pot.

The inducements are few. The individual is relieved of duty with the military reserve but inasmuch as he is looking over a rampart every night one week in each month, the advantage is not apparent. As a community the border settlements are permitted unlimited water for irrigation which assures them of a much larger income than dry farming in this area would yield. Amortization of their debt is on most generous terms. A government could contemplate neither subsidy probably except by charging off a part of the concessions to National Security Requirements.

For the Ambassador:

William L. Hamilton, Jr.

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy, Tel Aviv

816

DESP. NO.

674.84a/6-1956

NR 674 85

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

June 19, 1956

DATE

REF : Embassy Despatch 540, March 1, 1956

For Dept.	ACTION	DEPT.
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SUBJECT: Jerusalem Post Summaries of Border Incidents - March, April and May,

As indicated in referenced despatch, a monthly recapitulation of alleged border incidents has become a regular feature of the Jerusalem Post. Summaries for the months of March, April and May are enclosed as a matter of interest.

For the Ambassador:

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

1956 JUN 22 AM 11 04

CURRENT RECORDS
BRANCH

✓ Enclosures:

Clippings from Jerusalem Post:

1. April 4, 1956.
2. May 2, 1956.
3. June 3, 1956.

WLHamilton:jd

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IS THIS AN ARMISTICE?

As reported in The Jerusalem Post during the month of March

THURSDAY, March 1.—Army patrol opens fire on group of infiltrators in Israel territory... Egyptian post opens fire on patrol, which replies and proceeds without suffering casualties... Egyptian positions open fire on Israel posts in Nirim, Kisuifim, Be'eri sectors... Egyptian infiltrators, reaping grain in Kibbutz Kisuifim fields, driven off by patrol.

FRIDAY, March 2.— Egyptian positions open fire on Israel posts near Kibbutz Be'eri and Kisuifim... Israel and Egyptian positions exchange fire for extended period in Dir El Balah area, Gaza Strip.

SUNDAY, March 4.— Egyptian position opens automatic fire on Israel patrol in vicinity of Nitzana... Israel position in Be'eri region shot at by Egyptian post... Israel patrol coming upon flock of Egyptian sheep grazing in vicinity of Nir Yitzhak fires over shepherds' heads. Shepherds and animals make for border... Two instances of Egyptian attack in Erez and Be'eri areas. No casualties... Two flocks of sheep cross border from Gaza Strip to graze on Kisuifim lands. Chased back by Israel patrol... Israel patrol finds Jordan infiltrator in Israel territory south of Megiddo who escapes across border.

MONDAY, March 5.— Syrian troops shoot and kill two Israel policemen, wound two others, on northern shore of Lake Galilee despite fact they had been informed through UNTSO that constables would be arriving to fetch boat abandoned there earlier. Bodies of two dead returned in evening, two more found later.

TUESDAY, March 6.— Fire from anti-aircraft and machine guns opened on Israel scout plane flying near Kibbutz Dafna, Upper Galilee, from Syrian positions across border. Plane hit, makes forced landing in open field near kibbutz. One of two-man crew slightly wounded by shrapnel... Egyptian position opens fire on Israel post in Kisuifim area. Fire returned and position starts to rain mortar fire on post... Group of four in-

filtrators wearing rubber boots break into Moshav Ta'ashur and steal six white goats and irrigation pipes... Young Lebanese infiltrator sentenced to eight months in jail by military Court in Acre.

WEDNESDAY, March 7.— Israel soldier dies after having been severely wounded when vehicle hits Egyptian mine planted in Israel territory south of Nir Yitzhak... Israel army patrol encounters squad of armed Egyptian scouts in Haderim area. One killed, two captured, in ensuing exchange of fire... Infiltrators perpetrate thefts at Kibbutz Dorot; two mules and horses from Moshav Beit Hagai.

THURSDAY, March 8.— Group of infiltrators enter Kibbutz Hazerim members' rooms and rifle closets. Gilpsee caught of thieves when members leave cinema performance. Settlers give chase but marauders make getaway... Infiltrators steal horse and mule from Shuval IV... Egyptian position opens fire on Israel post in Be'eri area.

FRIDAY, March 9.— Egyptian position opens fire on Israel post in vicinity of Kisuifim.

SUNDAY, March 11.— Jordan infiltrators kill member of Moshav Noham, Hartuv area. One infiltrator killed by border police in chase... Egyptian positions open fire at Israel posts in Kisuifim area. Sporadic firing continues all morning; renewed in evening... Israel patrol vehicle strikes Egyptian laid land mine in Nir Yitzhak sector. Two members of patrol slightly wounded... Another mine found in ensuing search... Israel patrol discovers group of Egyptian infiltrators reaping fields in Be'eri sector, opens fire and drives them across Armistice line.

MONDAY, March 12.— Israel demands UNTSO investigate menacing Egyptian troop concentration along Israel border; protests refusal of Jordan MAO chairman to call emergency meeting on killing of Noham farmer... Gunfire from Syrian side of Lake Kinneret on Israel fishing boat... Israel patrol spots four armed Jordan infiltrators in Lachish area, capturing three after exchange of fire... Second group enters territory, fires upon patrol; patrol returns fire and infiltrators flee... Egyptian patrols twice open fire on Israel post in Kisuifim area.

TUESDAY, March 13.— Tax officials visiting Barta'a village on Jordan border in Hadera area attacked by rifle and automatic fire from across border. One Israeli killed, one wounded... Jordanians open fire on vehicle travelling on road near Kibbutz Migdal, Emek Hefer. One passenger slightly wounded... Four incidents on Egyptian border...

...penetrate with flocks into Israel territory in Kisuifim area. Driven off by Israel patrol... Shot infiltrator identified by Israel border police as Mustafa Hassan Abud, Middle East's most notorious hired killer.

THURSDAY, March 15.— Egyptian infiltrators penetrate into Israel territory in Nir Yitzhak sector; driven back... Three Egyptian soldiers cross into Israel in Kisuifim sector, shot at by Israel position and driven back across line... Egyptian shepherds drive flocks into Israel territory same sector, but driven back by patrol... Shot fired from Jordan territory slightly wounds Israel policeman on Israel side of Barta'a village.

FRIDAY, March 16.— Large number of Egyptian infiltrators penetrate into Kisuifim sector. On approach of Israel patrol, Egyptian emplacements open machine-gun fire. Fire returned and infiltrators flee... Egyptian squad crosses into Israel territory and begins firing at patrol. Driven back to join fleeing infiltrators... Egyptian post opens fire on Israel infantry patrol in region of Nirim... Israel position near Kisuifim also machine-gunned.

SUNDAY, March 18.— Egyptian infiltrators enter Israel territory in Kisuifim and Be'eri area. Driven back by fire from Israel posts... Egyptian positions open fire on Israel posts in Kisuifim area... Fire on Israel po-

sitions in Kisuifim and Be'eri areas... Groups of infiltrators penetrate into Israel territory in Nirim-Kisuifim area... Doses shots fired from Old City on Tannous Building in Jerusalem's Commercial Centre... Squad of Egyptian soldiers enter Israel territory in Nitzana area...

Egyptian positions open fire on Israel post at Kisuifim... Abdul Nasser says that any attempt to divert Jordan River would inevitably mean Arab-Israel war.

MONDAY, March 19.— UNTSO will investigate Israel's charge that Egyptian troops are massing on the border... Egyptian infiltrators cross Armistice lines at several points... Egyptian post opens fire on Israel position in Kisuifim area... Three Egyptians attempt to steal flock of sheep from Moshav Tidhar, Beit Re'im area.

TUESDAY, March 20.— Number of shots fired by members of Arab Legion and Jordan National Guard at Israel guard position near Line not far from Beercheba-Hebron road.

WEDNESDAY, March 21.— Two Egyptian spies sentenced to 20 years in prison by Military Court.

THURSDAY, March 22.— Eleven persons slightly wounded when tractor hits mine near Kibbutz Gvulot Western Negev... Infiltrators break into Gvulot and escape after stealing cash and clothing... Infiltrators harvest some 300 dunams of barley in fields belonging to Kibbutz Nahal Oz.

FRIDAY, March 23.— Member of *Jedayeen* tried in Lydda by full military Court. Sentences postponed *sine die*.

SUNDAY, March 25.— Israel Army vehicle damaged by Egyptian mine southwest of Gvulot... Jordanians fire shot at Israel post on Mount Zion, Jerusalem... Infiltrators penetrate Kibbutz Urim, Western Negev, but escape guards.

MONDAY, March 26.— Lebanese infiltrators shoot and wound Arab from Irbibin village, north of Kibbutz Eilon.

WEDNESDAY, March 28.— Arab Legion sniper's bullet wounds man and boy in Mamilla Road, Jerusalem... Egyptian forces open fire on Israel position in vicinity of Nitzana... Fire opened from Jordan positions on Israel post north-east of Ben Shimon... Squad of Arab Legionnaires crosses into Israel territory and attacks same post.

THURSDAY, March 29.— Egyptian forces open fire on Israel position in vicinity of Nitzana.

FRIDAY, March 30.— One Egyptian killed, two wounded, when group of 10 Egyptians drive large herd of cattle onto Israel fields in vicinity of Kisuifim... Egyptians penetrate into Israel territory in region of Nir Yitzhak to graze cattle. Flee, leaving behind Arab boy... Recently laid mine discovered near Nir Yitzhak.

IS THIS AN ARMISTICE?

(Border Incidents Reported in The Jerusalem Post in the Month of April)

SUNDAY, April 1. Police car ambushed on way through Wadi Ara... Shortly after, civilian car attacked at same spot... Egyptian infiltrators cross border to harvest lands in vicinity of Nahal Oz. Israel forces approaching spot attacked by machinegun fire from Egyptian positions.

WEDNESDAY, April 4. Three-man infantry patrol attacked by ambush at dusk in vicinity of Kibbutz Nitzan, Gaza Strip. Squad of soldiers coming up to relieve them subjected to heavy fire. Two members of patrol, including one wounded, succeed in making way back to base. Third soldier, more seriously wounded, left in field. Reinforcement coming area finds soldier dead, killed by burst of bullets fired at close range. Weapons stolen.

THURSDAY, April 5. Three Israel soldiers killed when infantry patrol moving in vicinity of Kibbutz Nitzan attacked from Egyptian positions. In order to extricate patrol, artillery fire opened on Egyptian positions... Stones thrown from Old City (Jerusalem) Wall smashed window in Rehov Mamillah apartment.

FRIDAY, April 6. Come-fire bridge used to artillery and mortar battle flaring up along west of Gaza Strip border after incessant fire from Egyptian positions attacks Israel patrols up and down the line, penetrating five Negev settlements. Four Israel soldiers and two civilians wounded. Forty Egyptians killed and more than 100 wounded... Last shot fired from Old City wall tears through clothing of Jerusalem teacher, wounding him on chest... Arab Legion forces stones at houses in Jewish Jerusalem. One coffee apartment in Musara Quarter.

SUNDAY, April 8. Egypt breaks cease-fire, 12 hours after accepting it, and renews fire along Gaza Strip... Demonstrations reported in Gaza against Nasser regime and U.N. during mass funeral of civilians killed in Thursday's shelling... Woman killed and two injured when hand grenade thrown in Ashkelon. Pipeline nearby blown up... Number of vehicles attacked ten kilometres south of Fajaja-Yotv-Moss crossroads.

Hand grenades thrown into Kibbutz Nitzan; into tractor depot near Nitzan; shots fired into settlement itself... Two civilian vehicles attacked on Iraq-Suweid Road. Several persons injured... Automatic fire directed at civilian truck travelling on Beerseba-Fajaja Road near Ahuzam. Two persons injured. Water pumping station near Migdal turn-off sabotaged and shot fired at persons nearby... Civilian tanker attacked with automatic fire north of Shoval; one person killed, one injured... Civilian vehicle fired at on Beerseba Road near Ahuzam: Three occupants wounded; car bursts into flames...

Jordan Legionnaires fire at group of Gezer farmers at work in banana plantation who leave tractor and take shelter. One man wounded. Jordanians fire at Technion students... Legionnaires shoot at watchmen of Nahariya Dam... Syrians train flash-light on two fishing boats on Kinneret and open fire. Fishermen forced to abandon nets... Arab Legionnaires posted behind the Old City Wall hurl stones at passers-by near Hotel Fiat. One man hit.

MONDAY, April 8. Syrian forces manœuvring near border: shell explosions and automatic gunfire heard all day long... Marauders penetrate into Moshav Shafir, 10 km. north of Ashkelon, and throw grenades into house, wounding eight-year old boy... Also enter Moshav Shitufi Mawot Yitzhak on main road between Ashkelon and Eshel, throwing hand grenade into village... Motorcyclist wounded near Kibbutz Ein Hasehbi, Nafta area... Legionnaires continue throwing stones from Old City wall.

TUESDAY, April 10. Egyptian murder gangs kill Israeli when attacking Mekorot work camp at Ktziot, Nitzana Demilitarized Zone. Three other workers wounded... Five Egyptians killed in vicinity of Nir Galim, near Yavne... Israel patrol kills two Egyptians, wounds two others, in Lachish area action... Egyptians blow up well near Kibbutz Gevur Am and lamp-post at Kibbutz Zikim, near Yad Mordechai...

Car travelling on Be'eri road ambushed: one passenger killed, another wounded... Fire opened at jeep on Masarya road, between Be'er Tuva and Gezer... Police car travelling south of Beerseba ambushed: one officer wounded... Water line supplying Kibbutz Beit Re'im near Gaza Strip blown up... Egyptian position opens fire on tractor operating in Nahal Oz fields: tractorist wounded... Egyptian murder bandit sentenced to death by military court... Egyptian infiltrator handing blow up two houses in Shafir settlement, 10 km. north of Ashkelon: father and two sons wounded.

WEDNESDAY, April 11. Israel patrol contacts gang of infiltrators northwest of Beerseba: kills one, wounds and captures another... Army patrol kills infiltrator in Lachish area... Three soldiers injured when vehicle driven two miles in vicinity of Kibbutz... Command of car driven into near Kibbutz Hagev; three casualties... Water towers and pipes sabotaged at Kibbutz Gezer, Tzema, Tzema-Naan and Kibbutz Magen-Givon Negev... Electric pylon blown up at Gevur Am... Tel Aviv-Beerseba railway line damaged at two points... Shots fired at Elim... Watchman at Shitufim Mahadsha fired on... Palestinian wounded when answering urgent call from Ofakim to take woman to Beerseba hospital... Doctor narrowly escapes death when jeep runs into hail of machinegun bullets near Kibbutz Kfar Hasehbi.

THURSDAY, April 12. Three boys killed and five others and instructor wounded when marauders enter grounds of Shafir Agricultural School, open door of synagogue and turn automatic weapons onto praying congregation... Husband and wife and year-old child injured by grenade thrown into house in Moshav Ahisemekh... Policeman wounded by automatic fire on road leading to Lydda... Two workmen escape injury when grenade is thrown at them from Gezer... Large forces of soldiers and police scour area for gang thought to have

fired at two Eshed buses travelling from Tel Aviv to Ramle... Fire opened on Israel patrol in vicinity of Kibbutz Beit Govrin and on workman at reservoir near Kfar Silver... Members of Kibbutz Sde Eliyahu working near settlement's fish ponds under fire.

FRIDAY, April 13. Egyptian Vampire jet shot down over Israel territory when two Israel planes intercept four Egyptian aircraft. Seriously injured pilot taken prisoner. Remaining three planes flee across border... Rifle and machinegun fire directed at Israel position in Erez sector... Cache of explosives found in ground near railway tracks adjoining Moshav Shalva, northern Negev... Mine discovered near well in Moshav Azrikan, west of Beer Tuva... another found near pumping station of Moshav Shafir, same area.

SUNDAY, April 15. Fifteen-year old Jerusalem boy injured by shots fired from Old City wall... Seven soldiers wounded when vehicles hit two mines near vicinity of Nir Yitzhak... Another two mines discovered in same area later... Exchange of fire in Kibbutz Erez area after Egyptian post starts shooting at Israel position. Egyptians put out decoy in order to provoke Israel fire, begin sniping when ruse fails...

Kibbutz Beit Govrin shepherd ambushed near settlement... Arab Legion forces shoot from across Armistice Line at Israel patrol near Nir Eliyahu...

Mine found in Matzliah settlement, in vicinity of Ramle... Fire opened on police vehicle travelling near Meron... Mekorot watchman wounded in clash between group of watchmen and marauders outside Mekorot water installations near Ashkelon.

TUESDAY, April 17. Workers' dining room at Nesher Quarries in Ayalon Valley, Jerusalem Corridor, set on fire and damaged by explosives. Police find tracks of three men, leading to Latrun.

THURSDAY, April 19. Three-inch water pipeline connecting Kibbutz Lahav to Kibbutz Dvir blown up in two places. Marauders make getaway.

FRIDAY, April 20. Jordan forces attack Israel patrol in Israel territory in Lachish area. One member of patrol killed.

SUNDAY, April 22. Infiltrators fire at Army vehicle in northern Negev... Infiltrators from Gaza Strip harvest 50 dunams of barley from fields belonging to Kibbutz Mfalim... Violent explosion at Moshav Goren, Lebanese border, shatters water pipe leading to village reservoir.

TUESDAY, April 24. Israel fishing boats on Lake Kinneret fired on from across Syrian border... Israel patrol fired on from across Jordan border in Lachish area.

WEDNESDAY, April 25. Killers from Jordan territory ambush and murder four Tahal employees travelling in command car from Ein Yahav to Be'er Menuha Tahal Camp. Murderers rob victims and set fire to vehicle.

SUNDAY, April 29. Israel patrol discovers group of marauders reaping grain in Kibbutz Kfar Aza area. Thieves flee... Infiltrators steal 100 metres of water pipes from Zikim... Five countries asked by U.N. to provide four officers each for an expanded T.S.O. Observer corps.

MONDAY, April 30. Infiltrators from Gaza Strip, aided by Egyptian soldiers, kidnap Kibbutz Nahal Oz member who goes out to investigate harvesting on kibbutz land 300 metres from demarcation line. His body returned in afternoon, eyes gouged out and hands mutilated, in presence of U.N. Observers... One soldier killed and two gravely wounded when vehicle is destroyed by mine planted during preceding 24 hours along patrol route deep in Israel territory south of Nir Yitzhak.

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IS THIS AN ARMISTICE?

Border Incidents Reported in *The Jerusalem Post* in the Month of May

THURSDAY, May 3. Automatic fire opened from Syrian territory on Israel patrol in vicinity of Eln Gev.

FRIDAY, May 4. Gaza Strip marauders harvest ten dunams of ripening barley valued at IL500 from Nahal Oz.

SUNDAY, May 6. Marauder from Jordan killed in clash between band and Army patrol in vicinity of Mount Gliboa.... Infiltrators penetrate Eilat, steal goods from Kibbutz Meuhad fishing co-operative.

MONDAY, May 7. Egyptian spy caught in Israel police trap as he emerges from shop with map in his hands... Building on fringe of Netzer Issakhar blown up by infiltrators from Jordan... Fire opened from direction of Kalkilya on police vehicle travelling in area of Kfar Saba.

TUESDAY, May 8. Army vehicle strikes mine planted by Egyptians in vicinity of Nir Yitzhak... Second vehicle strikes another mine in same vicinity... Group of Arab infiltrators found harvesting fields of Kfar Aza... Egyptians open fire on group of Israel workers in fields of Nirim. Shooting starts fire in fields... Squad of Egyptian soldiers penetrate some three hundred metres into Israel territory but flee on approach of Israel patrol.

THURSDAY, May 10. Israel patrol in Nablat sector encounters marauder from Jordan who fires when ordered to halt. Fire returned and trespasser killed... Israel patrol in Israel territory south of Nitzanel Oz, opposite Tulkerem, fired upon from Jordan... Group of Egyptian infiltrators enters Israel territory and begins to reap fields belonging to Nahal Oz. Thieves chased across border by Kibbutz members.

FRIDAY, May 11. Arabs open automatic fire on civilian car travelling on Kfar Saba-Ramat Hakovesh Road, Sharon Plain... Infiltrators who try to break into Kibbutz Urim sheep pen driven off by watchmen... Egyptian infiltrator from Gaza Strip wounded by Israel patrol in vicinity of Nahal Oz; finds way back across lines... Shot fired from Syrian territory at Israel fishing boats on Lake Kinneret.

SUNDAY, May 13. Fire opened from Gaza Strip at Israel position in vicinity of Nahal Oz...

Rifleshots from Syrian territory aimed at Israel fishing boat on Lake Kinneret... Stones thrown from Old City (Jerusalem) at Church of Notre Dame.

MONDAY, May 14. Egyptian position fires at army vehicle moving in Israel territory near Eln Hashlosa, Western Negev.

TUESDAY, May 15. Two workers wounded when Syrian soldiers enter Israel territory near Kibbutz Gonen and fire at group of men at work.

THURSDAY, May 17. Two Circassians of Kfar Kama escape with lives when hearing explosion of bomb thrown at them, and after being shot at by marauders on Wadi Ara highroad... Infiltrators from Jordan enter Eilat and steal equipment and field telephones from Mekorot... Moshav Lachish watchmen shoot it out in the dark with marauders after hearing suspicious sounds in neighbourhood.

FRIDAY, May 18. First passenger train to make regular Tel Aviv-Beersheba run arrives five minutes behind schedule, due to sabotage by infiltrators who blow up section of track 20 kms. north of Negev capital... Syrian position fires shell into Israel territory near Eln Gev... Five tons of barley stolen from Kibbutz Beit Kama, northeast of Beersheba.

MONDAY, May 21. Infiltrators open fire on guards at Amatzia, Lachish area... Irrigation pipes and sprinklers valued at IL735 stolen from Beit Govrin.

TUESDAY, May 22. Lebanese infiltrators open fire on Israel patrol wounding constable.

THURSDAY, May 24. Israel policemen wounded near Hadassah Compound, Mount Scopus, when Jordan forces open fire on police patrol... Syrian boat discovered fishing in Kinneret some 200 metres offshore while group of about 50 Syrians cross into strip of Israel territory along lake's shore.

FRIDAY, May 25. Band of five infiltrators from Gaza Strip steal irrigation fittings worth IL100 from Kibbutz Nir Oz, Western Negev... Infiltrators harvesting barley from fields of Kibbutz Lahav, Eastern Negev, chased off by watchmen... Two Egyptian anti-vehicle mines found close to Be'erotayim, Nitzana area.

SUNDAY, May 27. Tractor driver working in Lachish area ambushed and shot to death; ammunition stolen... Party of surveyors working in area east of Beersheba-Hebron road fired upon from Jordan territory... Infiltrators steal water pipes from Nir Oz... 40-dunam crop of barley stolen from Kibbutz Lahav.

TUESDAY, May 29. Egyptian position opens fire on Israel troops in Nitzana area.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action
NEAControl: 12182
Rec'd: June 20, 1956
1:16 p.m.Info
SMR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

SS
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NO: 462, June 20, 10 a.m.

UOP
OLISENT DEPARTMENT 462; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY TEL AVIV
242, AMMAN 226, CAIRO 255, DAMASCUS 129.

Reference: DEPTTEL 234.

OCB
USTIA
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

Did not (#) Hommel Chairman ISMAC has reported as follows respecting UNTSO inspection. He visited Kibbutz Havogrim on June 13 and found shelters, trenches, 22 concrete pill-boxes. As effort had been made conceal latter, UNTSO has requested permission reinvestigate. Request now in negotiation stage. Construction pill-boxes appear as violation GAA, but status other work dependent on US interpretation.

Elaborating on foregoing Hommel said UNTSO personnel found 2 or 3 shelters suitable for personnel or materials within area of Kibbutz dug into ground and covered with cement roofs. Outside Kibbutz area were firing and connecting trenches, surrounded by tactical barbed wire, plus two concrete pill-boxes tactically sited and equipped with firing ports. Latter were covered with earth in apparent attempt at concealment from observers. Chairman has expressed opinion that (except for pill-boxes) other construction may be allowed to stand. Message from UNHQ takes position that trenches plus single strand-type barbed-wire fence would not violate GAA, but any construction in excess this cvitdrinn* would represent violation Annex II paragraph 4.

Assume Burns, who returned Jerusalem June 19, will make decision on question violation and ordering destruction after further investigation.

COLE

BB:JHF/16

* As received. Correction to follow.
(#) Omission. Correction to follow.

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CORRECTION ISSUED:

6/22/56 8:30 a.m.

Control: 12182

Rec'd: June 20, 1956
1:16 p.m.

FROM: Jerusalem - CORRECTED COPY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 462, June 20, 10 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 462 REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY TEL AVIV
242, AMMAN 226, CAIRO 255, DAMASCUS 129.

Reference: DEFTel 234.

Did not receive Tel Aviv's 1259.

According Hommel Chairman ISMAC has reported as follows respecting
UNTSO inspection. He visited Kibbutz Havogrim on June 13 and
found shelters, trenches, 22 concrete pill-boxes. As effort had
been made conceal latter, UNTSO has requested permission reinves-
tigate. Request now in negotiation stage. Construction pill-
boxes appear as violation GAA, but status other work dependent
on its interpretation.

Elaborating on foregoing Hommel said UNTSO personnel found
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area of Kibbutz dug into ground and covered with cement roofs.
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surrounded by tactical barbed wire, plus two concrete pill-
boxes tactically sited and equipped with firing ports. Latter
were covered with earth in apparent attempt at concealment from
observers. Chairman has expressed opinion that (except for
pill-boxes) other construction may be allowed to stand.
Message from UNHQ takes position that trenches plus single
strand-type barbed-wire fence would not violate GAA, but
any construction in excess this criterion would represent
violation Annex II paragraph 4.

Assume Burns, who returned Jerusalem June 19, will make
decision on question violation and ordering destruction after
further investigation.

COLE

SW:PVB/7

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JUN 21 1956

Correction made
by RM/R

AIR POUCH

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674.846/62556

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TEL AVIV

837

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

June 25, 1956

DATE

REF :

17 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	IN F OTHER
7/2	NEA 4	Rm/32 of 6 P-1 4/6 P-1 Is-4 USUN-1 EUP-5 Cia 7 US 720 OCB-1 OSD-4 Army 4 Navy 3

SUBJECT: Embassy Military Attaché's Conversation with Col. Bayard, UNTSO

There is enclosed as of possible interest to the Department a memorandum prepared by the Embassy's Military Attaché in regard to his conversation with Colonel Bayard of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization. In a conversation yesterday with representatives of the Israel Prime Minister's Office and the Finance Ministry, the reporting officer obtained confirmation of the extension of the water pipeline into the Nitzana area of the Demilitarized Zone and of its intended utilization by Israel troops in that area. It is the Embassy's understanding that in view of Egypt's disregard of the provisions of Article I of the C.A., the Israel Government takes the view that it is under no obligation to conform to Article VIII of the same agreement. There is, therefore no special effort being made to disguise Israel's activities in the Demilitarized Zone.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

Ivan B. White
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure:

Memorandum.

IBWhite/eb

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674.846/6-2556

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JAN 20 1957

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674.846/6-2556

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MEMORANDUM

Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Israel
22 June 1956

1. Colonel Bayard of the EIMAC, Gaza, visited me today. In the discussion he made the following points:

a. Despite their verbal agreement with Mr. Hammarskjold to permit demarcation of the border line of the DMZ, the Israelis this week refused to permit Colonel Bayard to start such demarcation, claiming that Mr. Hammarskjold had misunderstood their agreement in principle to be an agreement to execute. He is now negotiating with the Israeli Representative, whom Bayard describes as a very difficult, deceitful individual.

b. Colonel Bayard describes the new kibbutz overlooking the Nitzana road at the road bend close to the Egyptian Border within the DZ as being a veritable fortress manned by Nahal. He says extensive minefields surround it within the DZ.

c. A new kibbutz is being built at Bir Ein southeast of El Auja into which the water line has been extended. This area is also heavily mined.

d. A new kibbutz is being built at the Revivim turnoff on route 84.

e. A new kibbutz is being built in the extreme corner of Israel near the intersection of the DMZ line and the Gaza Strip at MR 081062.

f. A water pipe line has now been extended from Nirim in a practically straight line overland to Revivim, thence to route 84, thence to the new kibbutz above described, thence to Bir Ein. There are signs that a branch of this pipeline is to be extended from route 84 southwestward toward Har Boqer.

g. Colonel Bayard and his observers have noted large numbers of IDF troops and equipment in the Negev Area. There are substantial numbers in the area south of the DZ.

2. Colonel Bayard further stated as follows:

a. The Egyptian EIMAC Representative told him that under no circumstances would the Egyptians conduct further Fedayeen operations in Israel. The next time there was a serious Israeli

breach

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Page _____ of _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

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Page 2 of 2
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 837
From Tel Aviv

breach the Egyptian Army would move.

b. Colonel Bayard said that about 6,000 Egyptian National Guardsmen in the Gaza Area are receiving intensive training and are being developed into a fairly decent troops. Only Palestinian Home Guards are in the area north of Gaza.

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☒ CHARGE TO

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RPTD INFO: AmEmbassy TEL AVIV 921
AmEmbassy CAIRO 3108
AmEmbassy DAMASCUS (via pouch) *WEB*

Origin

Info

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According Army Attaché Tel Aviv two new kibbutsim established
El Auja DZ and Israelis refusing permit UN marking of DL. Inquire Burns
when new kibbutsim established and if UN Observers able visit settlements.
Also desire know whether Israelis expected agree marking DL near future.

*Dulles
(WEB)*

DC/R

2

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CS/T

Drafted by: **NEA:NE:SCB:Kiston:hm**
6/29/56

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: **NE - William C. Burdett**

Clearances:
UNP-Mr. Ladlow (in draft)

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Classification

JUN 29 1956 P.M.

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46
Action
NEAControl: 1366
Rec'd: July 3, 1956
4:09 p.m.Info
RMR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

SS
G

NO: 2, July 3, 2 p.m.

SP
CSENT DEPARTMENT 2; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 2, DAMASCUS
TEL AVIV 2.L
TO

Re Department telegram 237.

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In absence Burns in Amman and Cairo, have consulted Homme
Vigier, and Bayard on Kibbutzim el Auja DZ and marking
DL.

OCB

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NAVY

AIR

No new Kibbutzim established in DZ. One new Kibbutz built immediately north of DZ on Beersheba Road, two others in planning stage further north on road. Bayard thinks all three military installations. June 30 UN observer reported partial erection three barrack-type buildings in tent camp at Birein in DZ. Camp in existence since February, water pipeline recently completed, tested once but not in use. This site probably part of projected Negev settlements reported Congress telegram 421. Camp is strategically located, strongly fortified with extensive mine fields. Though permanent Kibbutz not yet established, Hommel says prefab buildings could go up over night, and recent construction may indicate imminence establishment Kibbutz.

UN observers do not have right visit settlements or military positions in DZ. They are confined to "main roads" in DZ, have been fired at several times as warning not approach certain areas. However, Hommel and Vigier say observers can see all they need from distance.

On marking DL, Israelis refuse permit UNTSO personnel do marking. They insist joint marking be done through agreement selves and Egyptians, or will allow Egyptians erect markers their side DL. According Hommel, Burns pointed out Israelis agreed to UN marking with UNSYG. Israelis replied many subjects discussed with SYG but not (repeat not) agreed on. When asked for copy verbatim report of SYG's negotiations, Israelis replied it "being edited". Bayard believes Israelis desire Egyptians mark DL to impress refugees, Israelis holding that marking primarily designed stop infiltration. UN holds marking primarily

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-2- C. July 3, 2 p.m., from Jerusalem

marking primarily necessary to enable military positions
both sides determine if crossing DL by civilians or
military patrols has actually occurred. Bayard says even
UN observers have mistakenly alleged crossings, as present
Israeli ditch invisible from many positions. Higher sees
no early prospect Israeli agreement to marking by UN.

SALIN

END

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy TEL AVIV
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
REF : Embassy Despatch 816, June 19, 1956

9
DESP. NO.

July 5, 1956

DATE

67 Dept. Use Only	ACTION REC'D 7/10	DEPT. IN OTHER CIA-7* USIA-10*
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SUBJECT: Jerusalem Post Summary of Border Incidents - June, 1956

As indicated in referenced despatch, a recapitulation of alleged border incidents during the preceding month has become a regular feature of the Jerusalem Post. This summary for the month of June is enclosed as a matter of interest.

For the Ambassador:

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

✓ Clipping from Jerusalem Post,
July 2, 1956.

WLHamilton:jd

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : American Embassy, Cairo, Egypt
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
REF :

14

DESP. NO.

July 6, 1956

DATE

71 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION NETA-4 REC'D 7/24	DEPT. IN F O Rn/R-2 021-6 P-1 IO-4 CIA-7 USIA-10 ARMY-4 NAVY-3
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SUBJECT: Conversation with Colonel Ely re Syrian-Israeli D/Z and other UNTSO

Lt. Colonel Ely, UNTSO Liaison Officer in Cairo, called on June 30 to discuss UNTSO matters. He said the situation along the Egyptian-Israeli border was quiet although there had been "a bit of mortaring" four days ago. He understood that the Egyptians had filed a complaint to the effect that the Israelis in Al Auja had directed mortar fire at an Egyptian patrol in the vicinity of Sabha. The complaint had been investigated on the Egyptian side but he had not heard the result nor had he heard whether the Israelis had filed a counter complaint. He was inclined to believe that they had not since he considered that otherwise he would have heard of it. In any case, in the absence of a resolution of the Al Auja situation, it would appear unlikely that there would be a MAC meeting.

In answer to the reporting officer's query, Ely said progress was being made in strengthening the observer system in the Gaza area. Colonel Bayard, the head of the E-I MAC, had been given a complement of 28 of which he proceeded to station 11 observers on the Israeli side (2 in Al Auja, 1 in Beersheeba, and 8 in observation posts - 4 on duty and 4 as reserve). He had not heard whether the observation posts on the Israeli side had been manned as yet. He volunteered that Bayard was somewhat disappointed as to the sites which the Israelis had picked for the posts on their side of the D/L. The posts on the Egyptian side had been picked freely by the observers in the spring of 1955 and were spread out from the northern end of the Gaza strip to the south. Colonel Bayard had hoped that the posts on the Israeli side could be staggered so as to provide more coverage along the D/L. The Israelis, however, had insisted that the posts on their side of the D/L be located either directly opposite or flanking the observation posts on the Egyptian side. Consequently, Bayard felt that there would be little increase in observed area.

Colonel Ely volunteered that when recently in Jerusalem he had talked at some length with Colonel Hommel and Mr. Lucas (Assistant Political Adviser to General Burns) regarding the problem of Israeli construction in the region of Banat Yacob. Colonel Ely said he had pointed out that according to the Israeli-Syrian Armistice Agreement the Demarcation Line runs to the west of the Demilitarized Zone and that therefore under Article Five of the Israeli-Syrian Armistice Agreement not only no military forces (Art. 5 a, b, c) but by implication no persons not originally resident in the zone could legally

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Page 2 of
Desp. No. 14
From Cairo

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Page of
Encl. No.
Desp. No.
From

cross the D/L and enter the D/Z (Art. 5e). He found that both Hommel and Lucas were quite surprised when he pointed this out to them. Lucas, in particular, he said, had been using an Israeli map which shows the Demarcation Line as running along the international frontier on the eastern side of the Demilitarized Zone. (According to Israeli maps available to this Embassy, the Israelis would appear to have assimilated the demilitarized zones along the Syrian border to the status of that of Al Auja where the D/L runs along the international frontier. However the US map of the Syrian demilitarized zones available to this Embassy - Serial No. 11954 which was recently received from the Department - would seem to indicate that Colonel Ely's contention may be correct.)

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:



Alexander Schnee
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

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Action
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Control: 5023
Rec'd: JULY 10, 1956
12:14 P.M.

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FROM: JERUSALEM

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 12, JULY 10, 11 A.M.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 12, AMMAN 10, BEIRUT 6, DAMASCUS 8, CAIRO 10, TEL AVI

HOMMEL YESTERDAY SUPPLIED FOLLOWING FILL-IN RECENT UNTSO MATTERS.

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CIA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

UNSYG ARRIVING JERUSALEM JULY 19, HAS APPOINTMENT FAWZI JULY 21. HE PLANS DISCUSS WITH BEN GURION LATTER THEORY "RECIPROCAL NON-COMPLIANCE" GAA AND CEASE-FIRE, RETALIATION THREATS, ISRAELI ACTIVITIES IN DE-MILITARIZED ZONES, AND RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENTS UN OBSERVERS. BURNS HAS ASKED PERMISSION MAKE OFFICIAL DEMARCHE TO GOI STATING RETALIATION PROHIBITED BY CEASE-FIRE. SYG HAS INSTRUCTED HIM WAIT HJS ARRIVAL.

BURNS HAS WRITTEN GOI REQUESTING THEM CEASE AND DEMOLISH FORTIFICATIONS NORTHERN DE-MILITARIZED ZONE. ON CONTRARY, ISRAELIS APPEAR TO BE ERECTING MORE.

NUMBER BUILDINGS AT BIREIN IN EL AUJA DE-MILITARIZED ZONE IS NOW 6, NOT PRE-FABS BUT MORE PERMANENT TYPE. BOTH MEN AND WOMEN IN CAMP, ~~ALTHOUGH~~ ^{ALTHOUGH} HOMMEL UNAWARE POPULATION FIGURE OR IF NUMBERS RECENTLY INCREASED. MILITARY POSITION DETECTED 3 KILOMETERS FROM CAMP. SINCE RESTRICTIONS, BIREIN NO LONGER SUSCEPTIBLE UN OBSERVATION.

HOMMEL STATES IT HIS PERSONAL OPINION RESTRICTING OBSERVERS PRELIMINARY TO ISRAELI ACTION IN AREA, POSSIBLY MILITARY.

SABINI

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Control: 8034
Rec'd: July 14, 1956
10:05 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info
RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 38, July 13.

G
SP
C SENT DEPARTMENT 38; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 19, CAIRO 19,
L BEIRUT 20, DAMASCUS 15.

IO
P All papers bannered or prominently front-paged report of killing
TOP by mine in Gaza Wednesday of Col. Mustafa Hafez, whose name is
OLI household word in Israel as Chief of Egyptian Fedayeen.

OCB All papers apparently relied on same unidentified source to
USIA report in terms similar to those used by HAARETZ that it is
CIA known on "good authority relatives of those refugees sent by
OSD Hafez into Israel and killed have been threatening to take
ARMY his life. It is known that Hafez had lately been going about
NAVY with heavy bodyguard. It is therefore not impossible that he
AIR was assassinated by those refugees".

Reports of death were variously attributed to Ramallah and
Cairo Radio's and Gaza City correspondent of Agency France Press.

Hafez last made Israel headlines on April 11, 1956, when
Egyptian infiltrators, wounded during their capture by IDF,
told captors in Israeli hospital that they had been recruited
and dispatched to Israel on sabotage mission by Hafez. Their
interrogation was also local news reel feature.

LAWSON

AB: JHF/16

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Cairo 107
London 285

Following should be discussed orally (rpt orally) with Cordier:

QUOTE We believe that the British have already informed Hammerskjold of the informal proposals which the Egyptian Foreign Minister has made to them and to us of steps that might be taken toward a Palestine settlement. Subsequent conversations which our Ambassador has had with Fawzi leave some question as to the firmness of the suggestions. Nevertheless, Fawzi has informed us that he intends to discuss the matter with Hammerskjold when he is in Cairo. In view of the fact that Fawzi has broached the proposals to us, Hammerskjold may wish to have our reactions to them.

The United States would welcome any exploratory talks with the parties to the dispute such as Fawzi suggested as a first phase. In particular, it would seem to us useful if the Egyptians and the Israelis were to indicate their general thinking on the terms of a possible settlement. The mere fact of discussions looking toward a settlement would seem to be all to the good.

With respect to Fawzi's proposal for a group to be composed of the UK, Pakistan, US, USSR, India and ~~Japan~~ to make recommendations resolving the gap in the positions of the two sides, it is our belief that such a group would be unwise. Experience to date has shown that a multi-lateral group of this

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674.842/7-1356

S/Russell/amb 7/13/56

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

NEA - Mr. Allen
C - Mr. MacArthur

10 - Mr. Wilcox

52704

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kind has not proven to be suitable for this purpose. Moreover, it is our belief that discussions among major powers on questions relating to the Palestine problem should take place within the framework of the Security Council which is presently seized of this problem.

Hammerskjold will, of course, have our support in any effort that he may find it possible to make in bringing the two sides toward a settlement of their dispute. UNQUOTE

Dallas

52705

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Department of State

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56-51
Action

Control: 8840

Rec'd: JULY 16, 1956

7:59 P.M.

SS

FROM: NEW YORK

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 52, JULY 16, 7 P.M.

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RE PALESTINE (DEPTEL 13)

CROSTHWAITE (UK) INFORMED US UK DELEGATION HEARD TODAY FROM UK EMBASSY WASHINGTON THAT WE INTENDED INFORM SYG HAMMARSKJOLD THRU CORDIER OF EGYPTIAN DEMARCHE AND OUR REACTIONS. HE URGED IN INTEREST OF SECURITY THAT WE RECONSIDER USING THIS CHANNEL TO SYG. WE LATER INFORMED CROSTHWAITE OF DEPARTMENT'S CONTINUING DESIRE WE ACT IN ACCORDANCE REFTEL. CROSTHWAITE SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO PROTEST.

FAWZI HADMADE IT CLEAR THEY WOULD REPUDIATE THEIR POSITION IN EVENT OF LEAK AND UK FELT THAT WHILE EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE MIGHT NOT BE PRODUCTIVE IT WAS IMPORTANT ENOUGH NOT TO JEOPARDIZE IT. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT CONSIDER INFORMING SYG VIA GENEVA. WE UNDERSTAND SYG LEAVES GENEVA 7 P.M. ON 18TH.

LODGE

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LONDON 285

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(F.H.Q.)*

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Drafted by:

NEA:NE:LHoffacker *mr*

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S - Francis Russell

Clearances:

UN/P - Mr. Ludlow *W*

S/S/CRM

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R

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 97, JULY 17, 2 P.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 97, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 11,
USUN 1.

REFERENCE NEXT TO LAST SENTENCE DEPTTEL 107.

IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT FAWZI CONSIDERS THAT DISCUSSIONS
AMONG MAJOR POWERS ON QUESTIONS RELATING TO PALESTINE PROBLEM
SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF UNITED NATIONS. DO
NOT BELIEVE HE WAS THINKING OF CONFERENCE OF GROUP MEN-
TIONED IN ANY OTHER FRAMEWORK. AS REPORTED BEFORE, HE EN-
VISAGES EVENTUAL UNITED NATIONS ACTION THROUGH GENERAL
ASSEMBLY RATHER THAN SECURITY COUNCIL.

BYROADE

CFP

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

674.84A/7-1956

FROM: Amembassy TEL AVIV

39

COPY NO. 1 SERIES A

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

DESP. NO.

July 19, 1956

DATE

REF:

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.				
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	7-26	CIA*	USIA*	ARMY	NAVY	CCB

SUBJECT: Israeli Comment on Bombings of Col. Hafez and Egyptian Military Attache in Amman

SUMMARY

Israeli public opinion received with considerable satisfaction the news that Col. Mustafa HAFEZ, Commander of the Fedayeen in Gaza, and the Egyptian Military Attache in Amman, Lt. Col. Salah MUSTAFA, had become victims of postal bombs. The events have set off a wave of speculation and "interpretations," some of which are recapitulated herewith.

The Israel press on July 13 prominently carried the news, reported initially from Radio Ramallah, that Col. Hafez had been killed July 11 by a bomb in Gaza. On July 15 the story was headlined that the Egyptian Military Attache in Amman, Lt. Col. Salah Mustafa, had been seriously wounded July 14 by a postal bomb. All details of the two incidents were accredited to Arab sources, and are thus presumably identical with versions current in other countries.

From the start the Israel press has tended to limit itself to one interpretation of the Hafez killing, namely that he was murdered by disgruntled Gaza Strip relatives of Palestinian youngsters whom he had impressed into Fedayeen activity. The fullest version of this story (attached as an enclosure) was written on July 16 by Gideon WEIGERT, Arab expert of the JERUSALEM POST (Mapai). Weigert's account elaborates the alleged pressure methods by which Hafez recruited young Palestinians. They were tricked into criticism against Egyptian rule in Gaza, denounced, imprisoned, and after suitable "softening" in jail, tempted into espionage and/or Fedayeen missions into Israel as a price of freedom. Resentment developed against this practice and became organized as early as February, 1956, in a protest by the Mukhtars of Rafah, Khan Yunis and Gaza. This resentment sharpened into grave disaffection as a result of other raids "in the early spring" of 1956 after an increasing number of the raiders failed to return to Gaza, and Hafez was recalled to Cairo after he had received anonymous letters threatening his life. When things had calmed somewhat, he was returned to Gaza, "less than three months ago." The Palestinians, however, had not forgotten him, and he was killed by them to redeem their pledge "Death to Mustafa Hafez." Basically, the same explanation for the killing appeared in HAARETZ, DAVAR, HERUT, HABOKER, YEDIOTH CHADASHOTH, and YEDIOTH HAYOM.

RBDavis:jd

REPORTER

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There has been no explanation for the attempt on Lt. Col. Salah Mustafa, although the local papers have freely reported the accounts of the Egyptian Information Service attributing both the assassination of Hafez and the bombing of Mustafa to the Israelis. The Old City (Jerusalem) AL JIHAD was quoted in the July 17 press that "A foreign brain, or rather a Jewish criminal brain, thought up the idea, for Jews are used to employing such means to get rid of their enemies." An ADIFFA (Old City) comment was also quoted to the effect that "Political circles in Amman tend to think that Israel may have had a hand in sending the explosives, while Radio Beirut said the explosive material was local Jordanian work."

Not all Israelis subscribe to the JERUSALEM POST theory about Palestinian refugee guilt.

Major Daniel ("Danny") GOV, the Israel Army spokesman, told the drafting officer he did not believe the death was attributable to the refugees. He explained that an Egyptian arriving July 16 in Cyprus had said that it was generally accepted in the Gaza Strip that Hafez had been killed while experimenting with new explosive devices. He was inclined to believe this version. He said there was "probably no substance" to the Egyptian Information Service report that Hafez had been killed by a postal bomb, and noted that this detail had been "released" after a several day silence, following the attempt on Lt. Col. Mustafa. He thought ascribing it to a postal bomb had been an inspired afterthought, designed to facilitate ascription of both killings to one source, Israel. He did not advance any theories about the Mustafa affair.

Eliav SIMON, local U.P. representative, also told the drafting officer he now considered it likely that Hafez had been killed while testing some of his own explosives. However, a day previously he had said that the two attacks probably were connected with the present intense struggle for power going on inside Jordan. He explained that the coming few months were critical for Jordan in the sense that the present government must restore firm control within a short period, or face complete subversion, loss of power and probably division of the country. He hinted the two bombings may have been Iraqi inspired. When asked to comment on Arab reports the Jews had been responsible he laughed, said it was not true, and that spreading this report was a natural but serious blunder for the Arabs to have committed. This report would have two very bad effects among the Arabs, first in that it would stimulate admiration for Jewish technical genius necessary to "kill by mail" and secondly because it would spread an unreasoning fear of Israelis among Arabs which would damage morale.

Still another theory, this time blaming the Moslem Brotherhood, was advanced to an Embassy officer by Moshe BEJARANO, of a wealthy General Zionist Tel Aviv industrialist family. Mr. Bejarano thought the attacks were designed to undermine Nasser's prestige whom the Moslem Brotherhood "hated more than they hate the Israelis." He belittled the suggestion of Israeli execution, since such action could not accomplish anything. "Why kill two low ranking men? They can be replaced by hundreds of others, and no lasting advantage would be achieved."

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Some of the most interesting comments were made to an Embassy officer, Mr. Koczak, by Mr. Francis OFNER, Israeli stringer for the Christian Science Monitor. Mr. Ofner, a number of months ago, had remarked to Mr. Koczak that Israel's best conceivable weapon against bellicose Arab leaders, particularly those responsible for hostile actions against Israel, would be to assassinate them. On July 17 Mr. Koczak met Mr. Ofner, and reminding him of this earlier opinion, inquired whether he thought the Israelis were conforming to this advice and had been responsible for the two bombings. Mr. Ofner, taken somewhat aback, replied that he did not know whether the Israelis were responsible, but that he did not think so. He said that he still thought, however, that such assassinations would be the best answer to Fedayeen activity. They were preferable to retaliation as a policy for two reasons: (1) If aimed at persons responsible for Fedayeen murders they would have an effective deterrent value and (2) They were morally preferable to retaliation, since they would only hit at guilty persons whereas retaliations usually killed innocent persons. However, such a policy would be "terribly risky" for Israel to adopt, since "no Israel leaders thereafter would be safe." (N.B. This point on reciprocal dangers to GOI leaders of such a policy was also emphasized by Teddy KOLLECK, Director General of the Prime Minister's Office, in a conversation with the Embassy Counselor - Cf. Embtel 42, July 15, 1956. This identity of comment may derive from a known close connection with Ben Gurion's office on the part of Ofner.)

Several Israelis have remarked to Embassy personnel they believe it likely that the GOI carried out the bombings, but this possibility is discounted by individuals who are habitually in contact with foreign diplomats and therefore at pains to express views not derogatory to Israel.

It may be of interest to note that Mr. Peter WESTLAKE, British Charge d'Affaires in Tel Aviv, considers that the Israelis carried out the bombings. He told the drafting officer that he thought they had planned and worked on the action since "last April," as recompense for their not having retaliated adequately against the April 7-12 Fedayeen raids. He added that under the circumstances it was probably the most effective reaction they could adopt against Fedayeen tactics, since broad retaliation was now becoming dangerous.

COMMENT

It is a tempting hypothesis to view the twin actions as the work of the GOI, possibly as retaliation against current killings in Israel and as a reaction to recent reports that Jordan is now building up a Fedayeen apparatus. There is, however, not any evidence whatever available in Israel that this is the case, and such statements as are heard to that effect are admittedly no more than speculation.

Enclosure:

✓ As stated. *CH*

For the Ambassador:

Department send copies to Amman,
Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo,
Damascus (without enclosure).

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

SECRET

VEA

Mustafa Hafez' Assassination Redeems Gaza Refugees Pledge

By GIDEON WEIGERT

In February of this year, a number of Palestine Arab makhtars from the Gaza Strip towns of Gaza, Khan Yunis and Rafah appealed to the Egyptian military authorities in the Strip to "put an end to the practice of sending our sons across the border on suicide and espionage missions from which they never return."

This move closely followed months of agitation against the man who was behind the training of Palestine Arab *fedayeen* and their dispatch into Israel: Major Mustafa Hafez. This Egyptian officer was hissed often when he passed through the narrow streets of the Gaza bazaar, where relatives of *fedayeen*, killed during raids inside Israel, openly uttered threats against his life. Who was Mustafa Hafez, and why did he arouse the hatred of Palestine Arab refugees in the Gaza Strip?

Supplies Spies

It all dates back to less than a year ago, in November, 1955, when small, stout, black-moustached Major Hafez, Chief Egyptian Intelligence Officer in the Strip, took over the job of supplying fresh waves of "spies" from his office in the Gaza Sarayah, the seat of the local government.

He first set up a team of agents whose job it was to seek out young Palestine Arabs and provoke them into making critical remarks about the Egyptian military regime in the Strip. They were then denounced and pushed by the dozens into the town's filthy fortress, once the mandatory police building.

Once sufficiently softened up, an easy task with young people who are administratively detained and are given to understand that they will never be brought up for trial, these young men were ready for any desperate action which would get them out of prison.

One after another, with intervals of days of solitary confinement, they were called into the private office of the Egyptian Major. He told each of them that this meeting should be regarded as a "special favor" for which he alone had been singled out. "Walk in Israel!"

Then the revolution came; for a "little service," nothing of great importance, the prison gates would be opened for him. Over a cup of sweet Turkish coffee, and a couple of excellent cigarettes the prisoner was asked what he thought about a little walk into Israel, just a night jaunt across the lines armed with a notebook and pencil — nothing dangerous, just to mark down the numbers of Israeli military traffic on certain roads, or, purchase some maps and magazines. The desperate men generally agreed to the bargain.

All went smoothly as long as the young men returned safely and were released after two or three successful trips. But at the beginning of spring another took a turn for the worse. Israeli security patrols killed or detained an ever-growing number of these boys. Soon Gaza became a hotbed of discontent. Anonymous threatening letters were sent daily to the little Egyptian Major, openly charging him with responsibility for the death of dozens of young men who never returned home.

Soon after, the news broke

that the Egyptian Army Command, fearful for the life of Major Hafez, had recalled him to Cairo. At the same time, some 7,000 Palestine Arab refugees from the Gaza Strip were detained and transferred to the notorious desert camp, Liman Tora, near Cairo.

In spite of the Egyptian authorities' severity, discontent in the Gaza Strip increased and eventually bubbled over into public discussion in Gaza cafes.

To counteract this movement, the Egyptians stepped up the recruiting of young local Palestinians into regular army units instead of using them as irregular *fedayeen*. When Col. Abdul Nasser visited Gaza in April, he inspected the first unit of the newly created "Palestine Army," which, he declared, would soon be brought up to battalion strength. Matters seemed to calm down, and Major Mustafa Hafez, who had been died down promoted to the rank of Lt.-Colonel, came back to the police fortress overlooking Gaza and nearby Nahal Oz.

Resentment Smoulders

Yet Palestinian resentment still smouldered beneath the surface. Whenever Egyptian scouts or *fedayeen* were caught or sentenced to heavy prison terms in Israel, it immediately became known in Gaza through Kol Yisrael's Arabic transmissions.

Less than three months had passed since Mustafa Hafez returned to his Gaza post when, last Wednesday night, a time bomb, mailed in a nightly packed parcel, exploded in his hands.

The Arab refugees in Gaza had redeemed their pledge of "Death to Mustafa Hafez."

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 143, JULY 26, 4 P. M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 143 REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 23, 25 AUG. 8.

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FROM HART.

BRITISH EMBASSY HAS TOLD US THAT IN COURSE CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT FAWZI TOLD BRITISH AMBASSADOR THAT HE HAD AGREED WITH HAMMARSKJOLD TO LEAVE TIMING AND METHOD OF FIRST STAGE UP TO LATTER. FAWZI SAID HE HOPED HAMMARSKJOLD WOULD BEGIN SOON RATHER THAN WAITING FOR CONDITIONS ALONG THE BORDERS TO IMPROVE. AFTER ALL IF FIRST STAGE REALLY GOT UNDERWAY IMPROVEMENT BORDER CONDITIONS MIGHT LOGICALLY ENSUE.

FAWZI TOLD TREVELY AN EGYPTIAN GOVT BELIEVED PROGRESS THIS MATTER WAS DESIRABLE OF ITSELF; MOREOVER PROGRESS SHOULD ALSO HELP IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND WEST. BUT IMPROVEMENT RELATIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT UNLESS THERE WAS AT LEAST MINIMUM OF MUTUAL COOPERATION. TREVELYAN INTERPRETS CAVEAT AS REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS WESTERN WITHDRAWAL FROM FINANCING HIGH DAM.

FAWZI SAID HAMMARSKJOLD HAD AGREED NOT TO REPORT ON HIS DISCUSSIONS TO UN SO THAT IF LEAKS SHOULD TAKE PLACE EGYPT WOULD BE ABLE TO DENY ANY CONVERSATIONS HAD TAKEN PLACE.

FAWZI TOLD TREVELYAN NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON AL AUJA. EGYPTIANS HELD TO THEIR DEMAND FOR MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL WHERE AS ISRAEL IS INSISTED ON LINKING THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM D/Z TO SUEZ CANAL QUESTION WHICH GOE VIEW NOT ONLY UNRELATED IMPLEMENTATION ON ARTICLES SEVEN AND EIGHT BUT EXTRANEOUS GAA AS WHOLE. FAWZI NOTED SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON STATIONING

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-2- 143, JULY 26, 4 P. M., FROM CAIRO.

STATIONING OF OBSERVERS IN GAZA AREA BUT APPEARED CONCERNED
OVER SITUATION ALONG JORDANIAN BORDER.

BYROADE

JHF

SECRET

52582

Aug 1 1966

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Department of State

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Control: 17725
Rec'd: JULY 30, 1956
10:17 P.M.

FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 550, JULY 31, 2 A.M.

1 copy for Mr. Kelso
NAC 11-20-69
Spanner

NIACT

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TODAY AND THIS EVENING BARBOUR AND I HAVE HAD PRIVATE SEPARATE AND LENGTHY TALKS WITH EDEN AND MACMILLAN. THESE WILL BE RECOUNTED IN GREATER DETAIL IN OTHER MESSAGES BUT I WANT TO SEGREGATE ONE URGENT NOTE BOTH MEN STRUCK WHICH THEY REQUESTED BE COMMUNICATED IN UTTER SECRECY TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT. THEY SAID BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO DRIVE NASSER OUT OF EGYPT. THE DECISION THEY DECLARED IS FIRM. THEY EXPRESSED SIMPLE CONVICTION MILITARY ACTION IS NECESSARY AND INEVITABLE. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS EACH SAID IN SUBSTANCE THEY ARDENTLY HOPED US WOULD BE WITH THEM IN THIS DETERMINATION, BUT IF WE COULD NOT THEY WOULD UNDERSTAND AND OUR FRIENDSHIP WOULD BE UNIMPAIRED. IF WE WERE WITH THEM FROM BEGINNING CHANCES OF WORLD WAR III WOULD BE FAR LESS THAN IF WE DELAYED. THEY SEEM CONVINCED USSR WILL NOT INTERVENE BUT THEY ASSERT THAT RISK MUST BE TAKEN. MACMILLAN REPEATED OVER AND OVER IN LANGUAGE SIMILAR TO THAT EMPLOYED BY EDEN THAT GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN THE DECISION AND THAT PARLIAMENT AND BRITISH PEOPLE ARE WITH THEM. THEY BOTH REPEATED WISH THAT THE PRESIDENT CLEARLY UNDERSTAND DECISION IS FIRM AND HAS BEEN ARRIVED AT CALMLY WITHOUT EMOTION. THEY SEE NO ALTERNATIVE. MACMILLAN IN REFERRING TO OUR CLOSE WARTIME ASSOCIATION IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA EMPHASIZED SEVERAL TIMES HIS BELIEF THAT AS A FORMER ADVISER AND MEMBER OF PRESIDENT'S WARTIME STAFF HE

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974.7301/7-3156

(2)

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-2- 550, JULY 31, 2 A.M., FROM LONDON

FELT HE COULD ASSURE THE PRESIDENT THAT BRITAIN HAD NO INTENTION OF SUBMITTING TO NASSER'S DICTATION, THAT BRITISH STAKE IN ME IS VITAL, THAT A DEMONSTRATION OF FORCE PROVIDED ONLY SOLUTION. MACMILLAN DESCRIBED SOME OF THE MILITARY PLANNING WHICH CONTEMPLATES HE SAID THE LANDING OF THREE BRITISH DIVISIONS IN EGYPT IN AN OPERATION WHICH WOULD TAKE SIX WEEKS TO MOUNT. THE BRITISH ESTIMATE OF IMPORTANCE OF EGYPTIAN RESISTANCE IS LOW. MACMILLAN TALKED ABOUT COSTS. HE SAID THIS OPERATION WOULD COST FOUR TO FIVE HUNDRED MILLION POUNDS WHICH THEY COULDN'T AFFORD BUT THEY WOULD PAY. ALL BRITISH SHIPPING WOULD BE ALLOCATED TO IT EXCEPT THE TWO QUEENS.

DURING THESE CONVERSATIONS I ADVANCED I BELIEVE ALL OF THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH YOU AND THE PRESIDENT AS WELL AS THE UNDER SECRETARY HAVE RAISED. EDEN, MACMILLAN AND LLOYD SHOWED THROUGHOUT UNEXPECTED CALM AND NO HYSTERIA. THEY ACT AS THOUGH THEY REALLY HAVE TAKEN A DECISION AFTER PROFOUND REFLECTION. THEY ARE FLEXIBLE ON PROCEDURES LEADING UP TO SHOWDOWN BUT INSIST OVER AND OVER AGAIN THAT WHATEVER CONFERENCES, ARRANGEMENTS, PUBLIC POSTURES AND MANEUVERS MIGHT BE NECESSARY, AT THE END THEY ARE DETERMINED TO USE FORCE. THEY HOPE WE WILL BE WITH THEM AND BELIEVE FRENCH ARE WITH THEM.

MACMILLAN INDULGED IN MUCH GRAPHIC DISSERTATION ON BRITISH PAST HISTORY AND STRESSED THAT IF THEY HAD TO GO DOWN NOW THE GOVERNMENT AND HE BELIEVED BRITISH PEOPLE WOULD RATHER DO SO ON THIS ISSUE AND BECOME PERHAPS ANOTHER NETHERLANDS. TO DO ANOTHER MUNICH LEADING TO PROGRESSIVE DETERIORATION OF ME POSITION AND IN END THE INEVITABLE DISASTER IS HE SAID SOMETHING HE EDEN AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN GOVERNMENT ARE SIMPLY NOT PREPARED TO DO. AT DINNER MACMILLAN AND FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER (HAROLD CACCIA ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT) URGED REPEATEDLY THAT PRESIDENT AS THEIR FORMER C IN C (RPT C IN C) FULLY APPRECIATE FINALITY OF BRITISH

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-3- 550, JULY 31, 2 A.M., FROM LONDON

DECISION. MACMILLAN SEVERAL TIMES EXPRESSED WISH HE
COULD EXPLAIN ALL THIS ORALLY TO PRESIDENT.

I APOLOGIZE FOR LENGTH OF THIS MESSAGE. BUT I AM PERSUADED
THAT FLAVOR OF THESE CALM AND VERY SERIOUS STATEMENTS
SHOULD BE CONVEYED URGENTLY AS THEY REQUEST TO THE
PRESIDENT.

BARBOUR

CFP


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674.842/7-3156

Your EMTEL 550 will be discussed at White House Meeting
9:30 a.m. today. In view overriding import of information
contained therein, it will not be possible to answer questions
on correlative problems, such as communique and timetable of
meetings, until basic issue resolved.

Dulles

WOM

5 DULLES

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Drafted by:

H. H. Humes Jr.
JF Dulles:jm

7/31/56

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S/S - Mr. Sturgill

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OUTGOING TELEGRAMS

July 1956

7/2/56 - 3 to Moscow, Control 187
 7/2/56 - 6 to Manila, Control 168
 7/3/56 - 22 to Paris, Control 914
 7/6/56 - 2 to Pretoria, Control 2297 (Eyes Only envelope - Mr. Howe)
 7/6/56 - 28 to Tehran, Control 2310 (Eyes Only envelope - Mr. Howe)
 7/6/56 - 3 to Pretoria, Control 2298 (Eyes Only envelope - Mr. Howe)
 7/6/56 - 75 to Paris, Control 02879 (Noform Eyes Only Ridgeway Knight)
 7/7/56 - 108 to London, Control 3138
 7/9/56 - 76 to Ankara, Control 3354
 7/9/56 - 80 to Ankara, Control 3442
 7/9/56 - 82 to Ankara, Control 3633
 7/11/56 - 123 to Athens, Control 4571 (Special file)
 7/11/56 - 64 to Cairo, Control 4572 (Special file)
 7/11/56 - 11 to Pretoria, Control 4704 (Special file)
 7/11/56 - 187 to London, Control 4871
 7/12/56 - 213 to London, Control 5528
 7/13/56 - 14 to Pretoria, Control 6023 (special file)
 7/13/56 - 39 to Geneva, Control 6267
 7/17/56 - 228 to Paris, Control 8152
 7/18/56 - 57 to Geneva, Control 8560
 7/18/56 - 243 to Paris, Control 8899
 7/19/56 - 105 to Paris, Control 9492
 7/20/56 - 33 to Ottawa, Control 10395
 7/20/56 - 34 to Ottawa, Control 10396
 7/21/56 - 81 to Madrid, Control 10509
 7/21/56 - 82 to Madrid, Control 10510
 7/24/56 - 196 to New Delhi, Control 11446
 7/24/56 - 37 to Ottawa, Control 11434
 7/24/56 - TEDUL 6 to Bogota, Control 11444
 7/24/56 - 16 to Wellington, Control 11447
 7/25/56 - TEDUL 10 to Quito, Control 12260
 7/25/56 - 38 to Ottawa, Control 12142
 7/25/56 - TEDUL 12 to Lima, Control 12482
 7/27/56 - to Paris 382, Control 14047
 7/27/56 - to London 547, Control 13757
 7/27/56 - to Ottawa 42, Control 14057
 7/27/56 - To London 545, Control 13755
 7/27/56 - to London 546, Control 13756
 7/28/56 - to Lima 20, Control 14073
 7/28/56 - to
 7/28/56 - to London 564, Control 14217
 7/28/56 - to Rome 370, Control 14181

Autgins

- 7/30/56 - 571 to London, control 14314
- 7/30/56 - 389 to Paris, control 14371
- 7/30/56 - 49 to Ottawa, control 14468
- 7/31/56 - TEDUL 2 to London, control 15542
- 7/31/56 - TEDUL 3 to London, control 15559
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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

674.84A/8-156

FROM : Amembassy TEL AVIV

61

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

August 1, 1956

DATE

REF : Embassy Despatch No. 9, July 5, 1956

ACTION For Dept. Use Only	NEA-4	DEPT.	IN F O	Rm/R-2 ONI-6 P-1 IC-4
	REC'D 8-7	OTHER CIA-7 USA-10		

SUBJECT: JERUSALEM POST Summary of Border Incidents - July, 1956

As indicated in referenced despatch, a recapitulation of alleged border incidents during the preceding month has become a regular feature of the JERUSALEM POST. This summary for the month of July is enclosed as a matter of interest.

For the Ambassador:

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

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Enclosure:

Clipping from JERUSALEM POST,
August 1, 1956.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1956 AUG 7 PM 2 18

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1956 AUG 10 PM 3 24

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IS THIS AN ARMISTICE?

(Incidents reported in The Jerusalem Post during the month of July).

SUNDAY, July 1.—Infiltrators steal all removable parts of P.W.D. steamroller parked 12 kilometres north of Eilat. Blow roller up... Infiltrators from Gaza Strip try to steal irrigation pipes from Kibbutz Kissufim... Flock of sheep from Egypt enters Israel territory near Kibbutz Magen, Gaza Strip. Returns after guards fire a few shots.

TUESDAY, July 3.—Egyptians fire upon Israel patrol north of Kissufim.

WEDNESDAY, July 4.—Cow and calf stolen from Moshav Brosh, northern Negev... Twenty 3"-irrigation pipes stolen from Kibbutz Kissufim.

THURSDAY, July 5.—Infiltrators steal 450 metres of aluminium irrigation pipes; also various small items from Kibbutz Yad Mordechai, near Ashkelon... Infiltrators steal goat from Moshav Beit Hagedi, Western Negev... Rifle and machinegun fire from Gaza Strip on tractorist working in fields west of Kibbutz M'falsim.

FRIDAY, July 6.—Four goats valued at IL350 stolen from Moshav Bitha; another of equal value stolen from Moshav Beit Hagedi... Jordan infiltrator enters Israel territory near Kfar Sa'im north of Umm el Fahm; opens fire on Mata'el Haooma Co. guard, killing donkey.

SUNDAY, July 8.—Jordanians open machinegun and rifle fire at Israel patrol moving inside Israel territory near Kastel, Jerusalem Corridor... 11-year old boy abducted from home in Arab village of Beit Safata by three or four armed Jordanians... Infiltrators from Jordan steal 35 sheep from Abu Rukel'ik tribe... Two calves valued at IL1,200 stolen from Moshav Maslul, Western Negev... Infiltrators try to steal mule from Paltish settlement... Fire opened on members of Kibbutz M'falsim working 200 metres from Egyptian position in Gaza Strip.

MONDAY, July 9.—Egyptian post in Gaza Strip opens fire on Israel position in vicinity of Kibbutz Nirim.

TUESDAY, July 10.—Two civilian employees of the Israel Mining Corporation killed in ambush five kilometres north of Hatzeva (Ela Husub) on Sdom-Eilat Road. Place of attack well inside Israel territory, nearly 10 kilometres from Jordan border... Machinegun fire from Jordan opened on group of civilian visitors to Kibbutz Ramat Rahel, south of Jerusalem... Driver of border police vehicle shot in leg while travelling along Wadi Ara Road... Israel Army patrol car passes over mine on road to Moshav Tanakhim, eight kilometres southwest of Afula... Egyptian positions open machinegun fire at Israel post in Magen area.

SUNDAY, July 15.—Arie Grobak of Rehovot murdered in the presence of his girl friend by a gang of infiltrators on the Yahuda-Wilhelma road... Eight armed Egyptians penetrate into Israel territory in Kissufim sector, engage Israel patrol in exchange of fire, and then withdraw into Gaza Strip area.

MONDAY, July 16.—Worker injured by explosion of hand-grenade hidden under heap of stones he was removing at Kastel Housing Project in Jerusalem Corridor. At the moment of the explosion, several shots fired at him from Arab Legion outposts across border.

TUESDAY, July 17.—Fire opened on workers at M'vaseret Yerushalayim near Kastel from Arab Legion posts...

Egyptian posts open fire on Israelis... Near Kissufim, Egyptian post shoots at Israel position on three occasions... Infiltrators from Gaza Strip steal 120 metres of pipe valued at IL480 from Kibbutz M'falsim.

WEDNESDAY, July 18.—Thirty metres of pipe stolen from Kibbutz Zikim... Infiltrators from Jordan steal 20 animals valued at IL2,100 from member of el Finish beduin tribe.

SUNDAY, July 22.—Fire opened on four Tiberias boats from considerable distance inland. Fishermen state five Syrian soldiers seen crossing border into Israel near outlet of Jordan River at northeastern end of Lake... Infiltrators seen in vicinity of Moshav Amtziya well, Lakhish area... Infiltrators from Lebanon fire at Moshav Ya'ara, near Hanita.

MONDAY, July 23.—Jordanian Legionnaires open fire on group of workers at M'vaseret Yerushalayim, near Kastel... Fire opened on group of labourers on Mount Kastel... Israel police car, on way to rescue workers nailed down by Jordan fire, narrowly escapes exploding concealed mine.

TUESDAY, July 24.—Twelve sleeping boys miraculously escape injury when pair of infiltrators hurl hand-grenade into children's house at Kibbutz Maale Hahamisha, Jerusalem Corridor. Grenade explodes in hallway, fragments rip into walls, floor, ceiling; window panes blown out... Rifle and automatic fire opened from Syrian territory on group of men working north of Lake Hula... Infiltrators from Gaza Strip steal 120 metres of irrigation pipe and ten sprinklers from Kibbutz Eln Hashlosha, Western Negev.

WEDNESDAY, July 25.—Two U.N. Observers injured on stepping on an old anti-personnel mine while investigating entry of Jordanian soldiers into house in Israel zone on Mount Scopus. Member of Jordan delegation to MAC also hurt... Rifle fire opened from Egyptian position on Kibbutz Kerem Avshalom, near southern end of Gaza Strip... Two infiltrators spotted in same neighbourhood. Withdrawn on being challenged... Infiltrators from Gaza Strip steal pipes and fittings valued at IL1,500 from fields of Kibbutz Kissufim.

THURSDAY, July 26.—U.N. Observer team travelling through Jordan territory to examine alleged Jordan casualties of fire exchange fired on by villagers; U.N. Observer seriously injured... Israel patrol comes under fire from Jordan position... Another attack directed at U.N. team... U.N. vehicle damaged, passengers unhurt... Automatic fire opened from Egyptian positions at Israel patrol moving north of Kissufim... Later, another patrol shot at in same area... Egyptian positions open fire at patrol in vicinity of Kibbutz Be'eri... Israel patrol moving in vicinity of Kerem Avshalom, opposite southern end of Gaza Strip, shot at from Egyptian position... Syrian fire directed at members of Kibbutz On, on south east shore of Lake Kinneret.

FRIDAY, July 27.—Jordanians open fire on Israel aircraft flying over Israel territory in Upper Motza area, near Jerusalem, at

ting it and forcing it down... Infiltrators wound Druse watchman at Kibbutz Zikim, near Gaza Strip.

SUNDAY, July 29.—United Nations radio officer killed by explosion of anti-vehicle mine laid by Egyptians on path used only by the U.N. within Israel territory near Nir-Oz... Two men wounded when car strikes mine... Anti-tank mine which had failed to explode also found at the site... Truck travelling in same sector (Nitzana), south of Ktziot, undamaged after being attacked with a hand-grenade and automatic fire... Jordanian infiltrators fire at and slightly wound one of two cowherds tending cattle on Moshav Amatzya, Lakhish area... Arab Legion soldiers fire over border at group of workers in olive grove near Yad Hanna, Tulkarm area... Two watchmen of Kibbutz

Shelah slightly wounded in three-minute exchange of fire with Egyptian infiltrators... Fire opened on weapons carrier escorting convoy carrying workmen employed by Prof. Nelson Glueck near Sde Boker... Egyptian positions open fire on Kerem Avshalom... Jordan marauders remove stone marking the border in vicinity of M'vaseret Yerushalayim... Concealed hand grenade found under barrel by workers of same settlement: had not been there day before

MONDAY, July 30.—Fifteen aluminium irrigation pipes stolen by infiltrators from Kibbutz Zikim fields, north of Gaza Strip.

TUESDAY, July 31.—Fire opened from Egyptian positions on Kerem Avshalom, near Gaza Strip... Egyptian position opens fire with automatic weapons at Israel post in same area.

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AFTER HAVING DELIVERED PRESIDNET'S REPLY TO BULGANIN'S LETTER JUNE 6 TO BULGANIN, I TOLD BULGANIN THAT I HAD ANOTHER COMMUNICATION RECEIVED ONLY THIS MORNING FROM THE PRESIDENT. I THEN GAVE HIM LETTER (DEPTEL 141) WHICH WAS TRANSLATED INTO RUSSIAN. BULGANIN LISTENED VERY ATTENTIVELY AND SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED VERY MUCH THE PRESIDENT WRITING HIM ON THIS SUBJECT. I THEN SAID, AS INDICATED IN THE LETTER, I HAD A NUMBER OF OTHER COMMENTS TO MAKE ON THE SUBJECT.

I SAID I THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER IN ITSELF SHOWED THE DEEP CONCERN WITH WHICH HE AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT VIEW THE SITUATION CREATED IN REGARD TO THE SUEZ CANAL BY THE ACTION OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT; THAT THE U.S. HAD STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT THIS SITUATION SHOULD BE SETTLED BY NEGOTIATION AND ON A BASIS THAT WOULD BE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TO ALL CONCERNED; THAT AT THE LONDON CONFERENCE, AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, OTHER AND MORE DIRECT MEASURES OF DEALING WITH THIS SITUATION HAD BEEN CONSIDERED BUT IN LARGE MEASURE DUE TO U.S. POSITION THESE MORE DIRECT COURSES OF ACTION HAD NOT BEEN ADOPTED AND THAT THE THREE WESTERN POWERS HAD AGREED ON AN ATTEMPT TO SETTLE THIS QUESTION FAIRLY THROUGH PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION, AND TO THIS END HAD PROPOSED A CONFERENCE TO WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED AN INVITATION LAST WEEK. I SAID THAT THE U.S.,

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HAVING MADE EVERY EFFORT, AND SUCCESSFULLY, TO OBTAIN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SOLUTION THIS PROBLEM FELT THAT IT WAS OF THE MOST VITAL IMPORTANCE THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION SHOULD NOT FAIL AND, IN PARTICULAR, SHOULD NOT BE REJECTED BY THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT. IN SUCH AN EVENT THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE EGYPTIAN ACTION WOULD REVERT TO A MOST DANGEROUS STAGE AND THAT MORE DIRECT MEASURES WHICH HAD BEEN CONSIDERED AND REJECTED BY LONDON CONFERENCE MIGHT WELL BECOME INEVITABLE.

I ADDED THAT AS A PERSONAL OPINION, BUT ONE BASED ON INFORMATION I HAD RECEIVED, THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE U.S. TO ARGUE IN FAVOR OF SOLUTION BY NEGOTIATION IF THIS PROPOSAL MET WITH NO SATISFACTORY RESPONSE.

I ADDED THAT HAVING HEARD MANY TIMES SINCE I HAD BEEN HERE STATEMENTS FROM SOVIET LEADERS THAT ALL INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE SETTLED BY NEGOTIATION, WE HAD EVERY RIGHT TO EXPECT SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE PRINCIPLE WHICH HAD BEEN ADOPTED IN REGARD TO THE SUEZ CANAL BY THE THREE WESTERN POWERS AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE WOULD BE USED TO THAT END WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

BULGANIN LISTENED VERY CAREFULLY TO MY STATEMENT AND SAID THAT IN GENERAL THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN SET FORTH IN KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH AT THE LENIN STADIUM, THAT THEY HAD NOT YET REACHED A FINAL DECISION AS TO THE REPLY TO THE BRITISH INVITATION, BUT HE EXPECTED THE REPLY TO BE GIVEN EITHER TODAY OR TOMORROW. HE SAID, HOWEVER, SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN GIVING CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE MATTER AND HE WOULD LIKE FIRST OF ALL TO SAY THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION A COMMON POSITION IN THAT BOTH FELT THIS MATTER MUST BE SETTLED BY PEACEFUL MEANS. AS TO THE CONFERENCE ITSELF, AFTER REPEATING THAT NO FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE, HE SAID NEVERTHELESS THAT THEY HAD DOUBTS 1) AS TO THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE

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AND 2) AS TO COMPOSITION. IN REGARD TO THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD ALREADY SEEN THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION WHICH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAD GIVEN THAT MORNING TO SHEPILOV, AND FROM THIS IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY WAS TO UNDO THE ACT OF NATIONALIZATION OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, THAT THE VIEW OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON THIS POINT HAD BEEN CLEARLY STATED BY KHRUSHCHEV AND THEY FELT THAT EGYPT WAS ENTIRELY WITHIN HER RIGHTS IN SO DOING AND THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO UNDO THIS LEGITIMATE ACT WOULD IN EFFECT BE INTERFERENCE IN EGYPT'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. AS A RESULT, HE SAID, THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE HAD AROUSED "DOUBTS" AND EVEN INVOKED A "NEGATIVE" REACTION FROM SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

HE FELT THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE CONFERENCE WAS "TENDENTIOUS", A WORD WHICH HE WAS NOT USING IDLY, SINCE HE FELT THAT THE LIST HAD BEEN CAREFULLY DRAWN UP IN ORDER TO INCLUDE NATIONS FAVORABLE TO WESTERN POWERS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID, EVEN THE CRITERIA FOR PARTICIPANTS HAD NOT BEEN OBSERVED SINCE NEITHER AUSTRIA NOR OTHER SUCCESSOR STATES OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY WHO WAS ORIGINAL SIGNATORIES, FOR EXAMPLE CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, YUGOSLAVIA WERE NOT INVITED. AS TO OTHER CRITERION OF INTEREST IN NAVIGATION WHY, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD ETHIOPIA BEEN INCLUDED WHILE POLAND AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES, TO SAY NOTHING OF CHINA, WHO HAD GREAT INTEREST IN NAVIGATION SUEZ CANAL, HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED. ANOTHER QUESTION THAT HAD ARISEN WAS WHY HAD LONDON AND NOT CAIRO BEEN SELECTED. HE CONCLUDED BY REPEATING THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT FULLY SHARED VIEWS U.S. GOVERNMENT AS TO NECESSITY PEACEFUL SOLUTION BUT FELT THAT ACTUAL CONFERENCE PROPOSED RAISED DOUBTS HE HAD REFERRED TO.

WITH REFERENCE TO HIS COMMENTS ON NATIONALIZATION, WHICH OF COURSE FOLLOW STANDARD SOVIET LINE, I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT IF HE READ CAREFULLY DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS HE WOULD SEE NATIONALIZATION WAS NOT CHIEF ISSUE, BUT RATHER WHETHER

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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS? SUCH AS THE CONVENTION OF 1888, COULD BE VIOLATED WITH IMPUNITY ONE COUNTRY UNDER THE PRETEXT OF NATIONALIZATION AND THAT NAVIGATION SUEZ CANAL, WHICH WAS INTERNATIONAL QUESTION COULD NOT BE LEFT TO THE UNILATERAL CONTROL AND ARBITRARY WILL OF ANY ONE COUNTRY. I THEN SAID I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED PRINCIPLE OF UNILATERAL ABROGATION INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, WHICH WE HAD ALREADY SEEN IN PRE-WAR PERIOD WHEN HITLER'S ACTION PRODUCED DANGEROUS ANARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. BULGANIN, AT MY REFERENCE TO HITLER, FIRST AND ONLY TIME DURING CONVERSATION SHOWED SIGNS OF IRRITATION AND SAID THAT COMPARISON BETWEEN "LEGITIMATE" ACTION OF NASSER AND EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT BE COMPARED TO HITLER AND HE FELT THIS COMPARISON WAS INAPPROPRIATE AND COULD NOT ACCEPT IT. I REPLIED THAT IT WAS HE AND NOT I WHO MENTIONED EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT AND NASSER, I WAS MERELY CITING FACT OF HISTORY AND A PRINCIPLE WHICH U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTS. BULGANIN THEN REPEATED THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SOLUTION THIS MATTER THROUGH NEGOTIATION BUT IN ANY ATTEMPT TO UNDO LEGITIMATE ACTION EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH HE FELT PROPOSAL FOR INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY WAS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE, WOULD BE INTERFERENCE IN EGYPT'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS WHICH SOVIET UNION COULD NOT SUPPORT.

I THEN SAID TO BULGANIN THAT I WISHED TO GET THE ATTITUDE OF HIS GOVERNMENT AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE SO I COULD REPORT ACCURATELY TO THE PRESIDENT. WAS I CORRECT IN INTERPRETING HIS STATEMENT THAT ANY INTERNATIONAL ACTION IN REGARD TO THE SUEZ CANAL WOULD CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN EGYPTIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, TO WHICH HE INITIALLY SAID YES THAT WAS THE SOVIET POSITION. I THEN SAID FROM THAT IT WOULD APPEAR THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS TAKING POSITION THAT NAVIGATION SUEZ CANAL WAS SOLELY MATTER FOR EGYPT TO DECIDE, THAT OTHER COUNTRIES HAD NO RIGHTS IN THIS CONNECTION AND THAT ENTIRE MATTER, THEREFORE, WAS NOT ONE FOR ANY FORM OF INTERNATIONAL ACTION OR DISCUSSION. I SAID I WISHED TO BE ENTIRELY CLEAR ON THAT POINT BECAUSE IT WAS CARDINAL TO THE WHOLE SUBJECT. BULGANIN (WHO IS NOT AS FAST ON HIS FEET AS MOLOTOV) SAW THE AWKWARDNESS OF THIS POSITION AND BACKED AWAY FROM HIS ORIGINAL

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STATEMENT, SAYING THAT OTHER COUNTRIES HAD AN INTEREST, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE FREE NAVIGATION THROUGH THE CANAL AND THAT, THEREFORE, THAT ASPECT WAS LEGITIMATELY A SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION; AND EVEN SAID THAT HE "DID NOT SEE WHY UN WAS BEING BYPASSED IN THIS MATTER." I ASKED HIM UNDER WHAT ARTICLE OF THE CHARTER AND TO WHAT BODY HE FELT A QUESTION OF THIS KIND COULD BE SUBMITTED, TO WHICH HE HAD NO CLEAR REPLY. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT IN 1954 SECURITY COUNCIL (DEPTEL 145) VISHINSKY HAD TAKEN LINE THAT MATTERS OF SUEZ CANAL WERE NO CONCERN OF UN BUT ONLY FOR SIGNATORIES 1888 CONVENTION. BULGANIN MERELY SAID HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THIS STATEMENT "FORMER COMRADE VISHINSKY."

AT LEAST FIVE TIMES I EMPHASIZED TO HIM THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION WHICH WOULD BE CREATED IF THE ATTEMPT AT PEACEFUL SOLUTION WHICH THE U.S. HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN HAVING ACCEPTED WAS REBUFFED BY EGYPT OR OTHER INTERESTED POWERS, AND LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT, WITHOUT STATING EXPLICITLY, AS TO WHAT U.S. POSITION MIGHT WELL BE IN THAT EVENT. BULGANIN AT ONE POINT CRITICIZED BRITAIN AND FRANCE FOR USE OF THREATS, PRESSURES AND MILITARY MEASURES SUCH AS MOVEMENT OF SHIPS, WHICH HE SAID HARDLY CREATES ATMOSPHERE FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION. I TOLD HIM THAT THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH WAS THAT SET FORTH IN THE PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE AND THE MEASURES HE COMPLAINED ABOUT WERE MERELY ELEMENTARY PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES IN FACE OF A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION BROUGHT ON BY ACTION EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, AND THAT ONLY WAY TO MAKE SURE MORE SERIOUS DEVELOPMENTS DID NOT OCCUR IN REGARD TO THIS QUESTION WOULD BE TO SUPPORT PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION PROPOSED BY THREE POWERS.

IN CONCLUSION, BULGANIN REPEATED HIS APPRECIATION PRESIDENT'S LETTER WHICH WOULD BE GIVEN "MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION" BY SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

COMMENT: ALTHOUGH AS CAN BE SEEN CONVERSATION WITH BULGANIN WAS NOT SATISFACTORY, AND HE STUCK TO SOVIET LINE SUPPORTING

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EGYPT IN NATIONALIZATION ACTION AND RESISTANCE TO ANY INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY OVER CANAL, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FROM CONVERSATION ALONE TO JUDGE EFFECT OF PRESIDENT'S LETTERS AND MY COMMENTS SOVIET POSITION. I DID, HOWEVER, HAVE IMPRESSION THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT ALONG GENERAL LINES HAS REACHED ITS DECISION CONCERNING REPLY TO CONFERENCE INVITATION WHICH, AS ANTICIPATED (EMBTel 272), WILL PROBABLY SUPPORT PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATION BUT REJECT TERMS OF REFERENCE, COMPOSITION AND PROBABLY DATE AND PLACE OF CONFERENCE. BULGANIN'S REFERENCE TO IT MAY HAVE BEEN FORTUITOUS, ON THE OTHER HAND MAY BE INDICATION LINE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL. WHATEVER EFFECT TODAY'S DISCUSSION MAY HAVE ON SOVIET POSITION IT HAS CERTAINLY LEFT THEM NO DOUBT AS TO SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH US WOULD VIEW COMPLETE REJECTION BY EGYPT OR SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONFERENCE.

SINCE I HAD NO INFORMATION AS TO HOW ABSOLUTE TERMS OF REFERENCE AND MEMBERSHIP WERE I DID NOT ATTEMPT TO DISCUSS THESE ASPECTS WITH BULGANIN.

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The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Egypt

I Problem

If economic sanctions were to be invoked against Egypt, what forms could they take and what impact might they have on the Egyptian economy?

II Assumptions

A. The economic sanctions would not be accompanied by military action against Egypt.

B. The sanctions would be directed against the Egyptian economy as a whole and not attempt to affect adversely only the economic policies of the Egyptian Government.

C. The sanctions would be invoked primarily by NATO countries. Other countries firmly committed to the West, such as some members of the British Commonwealth or some countries of Latin America, might also invoke sanctions against Egypt.

D. The objective of invoking economic sanctions would be to force Egypt to accept international control of the Suez Canal.

III Kinds of economic sanctions which might be invoked against Egypt

A. Trade

1. Embargo exports to and imports from Egypt.
2. Compete with Egyptian products in third markets, if necessary on a subsidized basis.

B. Finance

1. Freeze Egyptian assets in foreign countries.
2. Suspend the U.K.-Egyptian sterling agreement of 1955.

C. Shipping

1. Refuse to allow Egyptian vessels to bunker in ports of countries invoking sanctions.
2. Refuse to allow vessels of countries invoking sanctions to carry goods to or from Egypt.

D. Technical and Development Assistance

1. Terminate all governmental technical and developmental assistance operations in Egypt by withdrawing personnel and funds.
2. Withdraw foreign personnel from various positions in the Egyptian economy, including the Canal.

IV Effectiveness of economic sanctions

A. Trade

1. Background. The Egyptian economy is dependent to a considerable

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considerable extent on foreign trade. Exports in 1955 totaled EL 138.4 million,^{a/} of which raw cotton represented 78 percent of the total. About 85 percent of Egypt's dollar earnings came from cotton in that year. Other exports were rice (5 percent), cotton yarn (3 percent), and vegetables (2.5 percent).

Imports in 1955 totaled EL 182.9 million, of which machinery, other than electrical, represented 12 percent of the total; petroleum 9 percent; iron and steel 9 percent; electrical machinery 6 percent; wood and wood products 5.5 percent; automobiles and parts 5 percent; chemicals and medicinals 5 percent; and fertilizers 5 percent.

Egypt is a net importer from Western Europe and North America while it is a net exporter in its trade with the Soviet Bloc. The bulk of Egypt's trade is with Western Europe, with 30 percent of Egypt's exports going to European NATO countries in 1955 and 46 percent of Egypt's imports coming from these countries. The Soviet Bloc took 21 percent of Egypt's exports in 1955 and supplied 7 percent of Egypt's imports. The U. S. and Canada took 7 percent of Egypt's exports and supplied 12 percent of its imports.

During the cotton marketing year ending July 31, 1956, 40 percent of Egypt's raw cotton exports went to the Soviet Bloc, a sizeable increase over previous years. Thirty percent went to NATO countries.

The large bulk of Egypt's imports of machinery of various types, automobiles and parts, iron and steel products, chemicals, and fertilizers comes from NATO countries. Petroleum products are imported largely from Saudi Arabia and the U. S. Wood and wood products come largely from Scandinavia and Czechoslovakia. The latter is also somewhat important as a source of cotton textiles for Egypt. Except for these products from Czechoslovakia, Egyptian trade statistics do not show the Soviet Bloc as a major supplier of any particular item in the Egyptian market.

2. Possible action against Egyptian cotton There are several possibilities whereby the U. S. alone or together with other NATO countries could take action against Egyptian cotton. It does not seem probable, however, that action with regard to cotton could be effective in the short term without adversely affecting friendly cotton producing countries.

The possibilities are:

a. The U. S. with its carryover of 14.7 million bales of cotton could sell the bulk of these stocks on the world market at a price that would depress the price of Egyptian cotton. However, this would also reduce the price of Mexican, Brazilian, Peruvian, Turkish and Pakistan cotton. Even if the U. S. were to sell 50,000 bales of long staple cotton which it holds in competition with Egyptian cotton, such action might adversely affect Peru and the Sudan.

b. The U. S. and other NATO countries could refuse to buy Egyptian cotton. This would cost Egypt the bulk of its convertible currency earnings. However, Egypt's dependence on NATO countries as

a market

a/ There are 2.87 U. S. dollars per 1 Egyptian pound

a market for its cotton is declining while its exports to the Bloc are increasing. Furthermore, this action would cause some hardship to textile industries in Western Europe, particularly the U. K. and France, which use considerable quantities of Egyptian long staple cotton, until Egypt's competitors in this kind of cotton - the Sudan, Peru, and the U. S. - could increase their production. This would take at least two years.

c. The U. S. could develop its P.L. 480 programs on cotton with a view to replacing in third country markets the shorter staples of Egyptian cotton which compete with much of our output. This would involve commitments from countries receiving P.L. 480 cotton that U. S. cotton would, in fact, be used to replace Egyptian rather than other countries' cottons. Time is required to develop and negotiate P.L. 480 agreements. Furthermore, such commitments are very difficult to obtain and to enforce, unless the countries involved in the P.L. 480 agreements were cooperating with the U. S. in economic sanctions against Egypt.

3. Embargoing of exports to Egypt

Egypt is dependent upon NATO countries for a wide variety of manufactured products, particularly machinery of all types, automobiles, replacement parts, iron and steel, chemicals and fertilizers. If NATO countries were to embargo shipments of such items to Egypt, the latter would in time be forced to seek alternative sources.

It is possible that a country like Japan, unless it cooperated in the economic sanctions against Egypt, could provide a large part of the manufactured products referred to above. The Soviet Bloc might also be a source of supply for such items. Re-exports by countries such as Lebanon or Spain of embargoed items shipped from Western Europe might provide some items unless export controls by the embargoing countries were rigidly enforced.

Such an embargo might well create hardships for European manufacturing industries. Although Egypt does not loom large in the overall market for European industries it nevertheless represents a traditional market particularly for the United Kingdom and France. Machinery and equipment in manufacturing industries, in electric power plants, and in the railroad system, for example, are of British, French, Belgian, Swiss and Swedish origin.

B. Finance

Financial measures against Egypt, which have already been taken in part by the U.K., the U. S. and France, might be the most effective of the various kinds of economic sanctions.

1. Freezing of Egyptian assets in foreign countries Egypt's foreign assets in May 1956 were reported to be £L 221 million. Freezing Egypt's foreign assets would prevent banks in countries invoking sanctions from paying out funds on orders from Egypt or by Egyptian nationals or by Egyptian companies. It would prevent the export to Egypt of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency, or securities.

Such action would make it impossible for Egypt to buy goods from or to sell goods to countries taking such action except on a direct barter basis. The latter assumes, of course, that trade sanctions would not also be invoked.

If Egypt's assets abroad were frozen, it would have to

consider

consider using its gold and foreign exchange holdings, reported to total £174 million and £420 million, respectively, in February, 1956, to pay for needed imports, and to develop barter transactions using cotton primarily to pay for such imports.

The gold and foreign exchange holdings in the aggregate represent about three times the level of imports in 1955, but these assets particularly the gold, could not be drawn down substantially without affecting the stability of the Egyptian economy. On the other hand Egypt might be able to develop barter transactions to a greater extent than presently employed to secure needed imports.

2. Suspension of the U.K.-Egyptian Sterling Agreement of 1955

This agreement, which the British have already suspended, provides for the annual release through 1963 of Egypt's sterling balances totaling about £100 million held by the United Kingdom. This amount represents about 45 percent of Egypt's total foreign assets.

Egypt has used these balances in the past, and had counted on using them in the future, to pay for part of its imports not covered by exports. The alternatives available to Egypt described above would obtain as a result of this action as well.

C. Shipping

1. Refusal to allow Egyptian vessels to bunker in certain ports

One type of economic sanction against Egypt could involve a refusal to allow Egyptian vessels to bunker in the ports of countries invoking the sanctions. The objective of this action would be to make it difficult for Egyptian vessels to sail to certain areas.

This action cannot be expected to have much effect on Egypt in itself. The Egyptian merchant marine consists of only 25 vessels (with a gross tonnage of 1,000 and over) having a total gross tonnage of 115,000. The bulk of Egypt's foreign trade is carried by non-Egyptian flag vessels.

2. Refusal to allow vessels of countries invoking sanctions to carry goods to and from Egypt Of greater possible significance than a sanction against bunkering Egyptian-flag vessels would be a refusal by governments of countries invoking sanctions to permit vessels registered in their country to carry goods to and from Egypt.

Vessels registered in NATO countries total 10,000 with a total gross tonnage of 67.3 million. These are the vessels handling the bulk of Egypt's foreign trade.

This type of sanction could be effective only if all NATO countries were to cooperate in its application. Even then, Japanese, Liberian, Panamanian, Spanish, Swedish, or Soviet Bloc flag vessels, with an aggregate tonnage of 14 million gross tons, could replace NATO shipping in Egyptian foreign trade.

D. Technical and Development Assistance

1. Terminate governmental technical and developmental assistance operations in Egypt

Point Four assistance is being provided Egypt in a wide number of fields. Approximately \$10 million remains in unliquidated

funds

funds for Egyptian technical assistance. A development assistance program is currently in effect with approximately \$26 million currently unliquidated. The development assistance program is ~~in operating~~ operating in such fields as the railroads, highways, canals and irrigation.

These operations could be terminated by the U. S. by withdrawing personnel and funds. By itself this action would probably have little effect on the Egyptian economy other than to postpone improvements in various phases of the economy and in the standard of living of the Egyptian people.

2. Withdraw foreign personnel from various positions in the Egyptian economy, including the Canal NATO countries could direct their nationals now engaged in various parts of the Egyptian economy to return home. This direction could presumably be enforced through passport controls.

Foreign nationals hold many important positions in private business and in technical jobs. Pilots in the Suez Canal are largely of foreign nationality. Trained Egyptians are not now presently available to take the place of foreign nationals who might leave, but in time this problem could presumably be overcome by the Egyptians possibly with help from the Soviet Bloc.

To offset the difficulties to the economy which might result from the wholesale departure of foreign nationals, the Egyptian Government might prevent them from leaving. There is a precedent for this kind of action in the case of foreign nationals employed by the Suez Canal Company.

V. Conclusions.

Economic sanctions against Egypt could not be expected to be effective within any relatively short period of time, up to 6 months, without adversely affecting the economies of countries friendly to the United States.

Even in the long term the extent to which economic sanctions against Egypt might actually be effective is limited to a few types of action, and their effectiveness is based upon the assumption that NATO countries would take joint action in invoking and enforcing economic sanctions against Egypt.

On this assumption there are two basic actions which might be most effective in the long run:

1. An embargo on the importation of Egyptian cotton by NATO countries. The achievement of this point could be helped by the use of P.L. 480 agreements with NATO countries to replace Egyptian cotton.

2. The continued blocking of Egyptian foreign assets, particularly sterling held by the United Kingdom.

AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

UNCLASSIFIED
(Security Classification)

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TEL AVIV

79
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

August 9, 1956

REF : Embtel 1059, April 10, 1956

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D 8/17	IN F O
	WEA-4	Rm/r-2 oliv 4/10-1 P-1 EUR-5 L-2
		Cia 7 usi 410 DCB1 OSD-4 Army-4 Am-1

SUBJECT: Second Captured Fedayeen Member Sentenced to Death Beirut

Cum-1 Baghdad-1 Damascus-1 Jerusalem-1

The Israel press announced on August 7 the sentencing to death by a military tribunal of Abdul Razek Mustafa Abu AARAF, member of a Fedayeen group. Aarafa entered Israel from the Gaza Strip on April 9, and was captured in the early hours of April 10 in an unspecified location near the Gaza Strip line. His trial lasted two days. He pleaded guilty to several counts which included belonging to the Fedayeen, entering Israel illegally, and engaging in combat with an Israel army patrol on Israel soil. His Israel defense counsel asked clemency in the absence of proof that he had wounded any Israelis, and due to his having already suffered severely in being wounded at capture. In throwing himself upon the mercy of the court, the prisoner expressed regret for his actions and gratitude that his life had been spared at capture. He also protested that he had been told in Gaza by his recruiter, the late Colonel HAFEZ, that there was no death penalty in Israel.

He was sentenced to death by hanging, the sentence subject to confirmation by the IDF Chief of Staff. An ultimate right of clemency is of course vested in the Israel president.

The first death sentence for a Fedayi occurred on April 9, 1956 (Cf. reftel). He had been captured in January, 1956, and probably was engaged in nothing more than espionage. He was tried in February or March, 1956, and apparently had been found guilty at that time, although newspaper accounts were vague and the general impression gained was that the court had recessed to arrive at a verdict. On April 9 it was announced that the court had passed the death sentence. The announcement of the sentence at that particular juncture was doubtless designed to frighten Egyptian Fedayeen then engaged in the largest of all their operations against Israel.

Commenting editorially on the "tragedy of Abu Aarafa," the August 8 JERUSALEM POST said that the Fedayeen could not "claim the protection normally afforded to regular soldiers under the Geneva

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674.84A/8-956

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Page 2 of 2
Desp. No. 79
From Tel Aviv

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Page _____ of _____
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

Convention engaged in the battle with an enemy. They came in the guise of peasants and did not choose military targets, human or otherwise. Their objective was men, women and children going about their peaceful lives." The editorial acknowledged the disquiet felt by many Israelis at the sentence, since the death penalty for murder had been abolished in Israel for some years, but claimed the death penalty was the only suitable deterrent to Fedayeen recruitment.

Neither death sentence has yet been confirmed by the Chief of Staff. Several Hebrew papers pointed out that execution of the sentences would be difficult, since "there is no hangman in Israel."

For the Ambassador:



William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

Department pass copies to Amman, Beirut,
Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Jerusalem.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TEL AVIV
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
REF :

84
DESP. NO.

August 1, 1956

17 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION RECEIVED #17	DEPT. IN F O OTHER	Rmbr - 06 10-4 P-1 400-1 USUN-1 Cia - 7 USIA-10 OCB, OSD-4 Army-1 Ammat-1
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SUBJECT: Press Report of 78 Egyptian POWs in Israel Custody

Beirut - Lebanon - Cairo - Jeddah - Baghdad -

YEDIOTH HAYOM for August 10 carries a report on the condition of 78 Egyptian prisoners of war now in Israel custody. The paper stated that Israeli journalists had been allowed to interview the prisoners recently.

The article states that the prisoners are in good health and lead a well-ordered if somewhat boring existence. They are treated strictly according to the provisions of the Geneva Convention, and the reporter says that "even the most obstreperous of the prisoners do not deny this." The officer in charge of the Egyptians is Captain Mahmud LUTAIEF, pilot of the Egyptian jet plane shot down near Sde Boker on April 12. The paper quoted Captain Lutaief as saying "It appears to us that we have been deserted and that no one is interesting himself in our fate. The last visit of a representative of the International Red Cross occurred a long time ago, even before the release of the Syrian prisoners. Since that time we have also not been visited by any representatives of UNTSO. Our only connection with home is in the form of packages and letters which we receive through UNTSO." Otherwise the Captain had no complaints. Lt. Samir AZAM complained, however, that the food was insufficient and that the cuisine was "Polish". He also said that a short while ago the meat issued them had not been good. In this connection the journalist emphasizes that the food given to the Egyptian prisoners is the same as is issued to the Israeli Army. The difference in cuisine, however, had led to many complaints on the part of the Egyptian prisoners. Specifically, they objected to the prominence of fish on the menu, and it appears that a few weeks ago the rumor was circulated in the camp that the prisoners were being given "donkey meat".

Lt. Ibrahim ISSA, described as officer of a mortar unit captured in the Nitzana battle, was alleged to have used the word "scandalous", when he was told that the Egyptian authorities had displayed indifference over the status of the Egyptian prisoners and persistently had refused to exchange them for the three Israeli prisoners in the hands of the Egyptians.

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
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(Classification)

A fourth officer, Artillery Lt. Abdel Monam ABDALLA, also taken at Nitzana, is in a tuberculosis hospital in Israel. His tuberculosis is described as acute. Apparently the Lieutenant first blamed his illness upon his Israeli detention, but the reporter asserts that this claim was belied by the subsequent receipt from Cairo of medicines from his family and records of earlier treatment carried out by Egyptian physicians.

In order somewhat to relieve the boredom, Israeli prison authorities have permitted the men to make certain purchases each month to the amount of four Israeli pounds per soldier and five Israeli pounds per officer, as well as with extra money which they receive from home. The camp commandant is also endeavoring to obtain a small special allotment to permit establishment of cooking facilities so that the prisoners can prepare their own oriental dishes. One radio was available for a time but it appears that this is now out of order. The prisoners are allowed to read the Mapai Arab newspaper EL YOM, and it is related that they are greatly amused at its format and quality. The prison Administration has also set up a special fund to purchase books for the prisoners, and it is said they receive from Egypt a number of books including "detective novels and propaganda brochures concerning the successes of the Nasser regime."

For the Ambassador:



William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

Department send copies to Amman, Beirut,
Damascus, Cairo, Jidda, Baghdad.

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38-B
Action

NEA

FROM: Jerusalem

Control: 11237
Rec'd: August 17, 1956
10:26 a.m.

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 43, August 17, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 43; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 31, CAIRO 18, TEL AVIV 28.

UNTSO reports receipt Egyptian complaints of two Israeli attacks in Gaza strip last night, with total nine Egyptian dead. First complaint alleges Israeli patrol crossed DL 21301. Eir El Balah, attacked Egyptian position, three Egyptian military dead. Second complaint alleges Egyptian medical car ambushed 2330 on main road north of Rafah, six passengers killed.

Israel has requested emergency meeting Jordan MAC on Eilat road ambush of bus and two jeeps morning August 17 (complaint reported from Tel Aviv). UN investigation continuing this morning.

Hammarskjold's statement on Sde Boker and Eilat road incidents released locally this morning. Last sentence appears imply possible Security Council action.

SABINI

SW:ECM/1

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1956 AUG 17 PM 3 25

NOTE: Mr. Bergus' office (NE) notified 8/17/2 p.m. E.M.B. (CWC)

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 172, August 20, 4 p.m.

Control: 12860

Rec'd: August 21, 1956
5:01 a.m.

Although GOI maintained silence on Egyptian charges Israel responsible for 2 Gaza incidents of August 16 in which 9 Egyptians killed and IDF disclaims any knowledge there is tacit assumption in leading newspapers actions constituted an Israeli retaliation.

Press rejects Hammarskjold's condemnation two Gaza incidents August 16 and attacks his accompanying comment which denied that retaliation is "necessary act of permissible self-defense". All papers point out Israel's past restraint in observing Hammarskjold's cease-fire and conclude GOI responsibility defend security its citizens means "self defense" has to be resorted to as counter to repeated Arab violations. JERUSALEM POST (Mapai) says effect his formulation is "that nation which takes steps to create conditions which will make unprovoked acts of violence unprohibitable is equally guilty with initiator of original crime". This is failure "to call spade a spade" and such assumptions paralyze UN's capacity solve Middle East problems. Same line taken YEDIOTH HAYON (Independent) HABOKER (General Zionist) and LAMER CHAV (Achdutavoda). Latter also proceeds to attack inadequacy of protection offered by present convoy system south of Beersheba. HERUT characterizes retaliation as inadequate demands "Palestinian territory" be "freed from Arab murder gangs".

LAWSON

BB:VMM/2

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

674.84A/8-2156

FROM : AMCONGENERAL, JERUSALEM

30

DESP. NO.

August 21, 1956

DATE

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF : Contel 43, August 17, 1956

4 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	NEA-4	RM/R-2 041-6 IC-4 USUN-1 P-1
	9-3	CIA-7 USIA-10 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3

SUBJECT: Gaza Incidents of August 16 and 17

Transmitted is the text of a UNTSO press release giving the result of the UN Military Observer's investigation of the two incidents that occurred in the Gaza Strip on August 16 and 17. The issuance of such a press release is an unusual step by UNTSO, but according to Graham LUCAS, acting press officer, General BURNS was incensed over the incidents, which appeared to be retaliation by the Israelis, and knowing that the Egyptian complaint would never come to a Meeting by the Israeli-Egyptian MAC, he ordered the release. The following day, because of unofficial Israeli criticism of the release, another was issued by UNTSO on the Eilat Road bus incident of August 16.

The U.N. Secretary General's statement on these incidents, released in New York and Jerusalem August 17, states that the Gaza incidents, along with the Eilat Road and Sde Boker incidents, will be presented to the Security Council.

John A. Sabini
American Consul

Enclosure

Copy of Text of UNTSO (UNCLASSIFIED)
Press Release, August 17, 1956

Copies sent Cairo, Tel Aviv

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1956 AUG 5 AM 11 32

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From _____

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Page 1 of
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 30
From Jerusalem

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

Jerusalem, 17. August 1956

Two serious incidents occurred on the 16th and 17th August 1956 near the Demarcation Line in the Gaza area in Egyptian-controlled territory.

The first incident took place on 16 August about 1830Z near Wadi Gaza. There was an exchange of fire between Egyptian and Israeli patrols at approximately MR 0957 0944 in Egyptian-controlled territory. As a result three Egyptian soldiers were killed. United Nations Military Observers found the three bodies near the scene of the incident together with ammunition magazines, hand grenades and other explosives which were scattered over the nearby area. Tracks led from the scene of the incident to within one hundred metres of the Demarcation Line at MR 0963 0940 in Egyptian-controlled territory.

The second incident occurred before midnight on 16-17 August when an Egyptian jeep was fired upon at MR 0835 0762 on the Rafah road in Egyptian-controlled territory. All six occupants of the jeep were killed. United Nations Military Observers found extensive bloodstains at the scene of the incident. The six bodies which had been removed to a hospital, bore multiple gunshot wounds. Incoming and outgoing tracks of approximately six men led from the scene of the incident to the Demarcation Line at approximately MR 0853 0739.

The above findings have been reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

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53

Action

Control: 14052

Rec'd: August 22, 1956
2:42 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 179, August 22, 3 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 179, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 56, AMMAN 53, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

Israel press and public accept two Gaza incidents August 16 as IDF reprisal for Negev bus ambush and recent mine laying around Sde Boker. GOI, however, abstains from any comment. Veteran Israeli journalist told Embassy officer Foreign Ministry and Ministry Defense refused give him any information. Embassy officer broached matter to Tekoah of Foreign Ministry pointing out press tendency to call actions retaliatory and questioning if this true why GOI remained silent. Tekoah declined to discuss question saying "press more vociferous on this than GOI wishes to be".

Harkavi IDF intelligence chief making only official admission known to Embassy reportedly advised British Military Attache actions constituted reprisals not (repeat not) for bus massacre but rather for minelaying.

Comment: Embassy surmised retaliation against Sde Boker minings. Great GOI sensitivity can be assumed in reference any Arab tampering in neighborhood Gen-Gurion's Sde Boker residence where he frequently weekends.

LAWSON

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1956 AUG 23 AM 7 38

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Control: 15371
Rec'd: August 24, 1956
10:46 a.m.

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Returned to

NEA FROM: Jerusalem
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TO: Secretary of State

RMR NO: 49, August 24, Noon

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EUR SENT DEPARTMENT 49, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 38, CAIRO 21,
L TEL AVIV 35.

IO
USUN UNTSO notified by chairman Egyptian MAC that fire fight between
P Israeli and Egyptian patrols in Wadi Gaza area involving auto-
UOP matic weapons and mortars began 0830 zone time today. Chairman
OLI trying arrange cease-fire.

OCB Israel condemned by Jordan MAC August 22 on tank near DL (CONTEL
USIA 45 and 47).

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BB:CRH:6

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Control: 16398
Rec'd: August 27, 1956
9:32 a.m.

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 52, August 27, Noon

PRIORITY.

SENT DEPARTMENT 52 REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 39, CAIRO 22,
TEL AVIV 36.

Re CONTEL 49.

UNTSO sources report quiet on Gaza DL since Friday morning,
though last week marked by general shift from relative quiet
to series of minor incidents involving exchanges of fire and
"provocative patrols". UN military observer was under fire
Friday but not hit.

SABINI

BB:PVB/1

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 Control: 19333
 Rec'd: August 31, 1956
 9:13 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 202, August 31, 1 p.m.

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 SENT DEPARTMENT 202; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 55, BEIRUT 61,
 CAIRO 59, DAMASCUS 40.

 Foreign Ministry and IDF FLO report 2 soldiers killed 3 wounded,
 1 critically, when patrol car hit 3 mines north of Ketsiot
 in Nitzana area (MR 096034) at 1330 hours Thursday.

 According to early press reports unofficial investigation reveal-
 ed that 10 Egyptians took part in laying mines in Israel territory
 about 5 kilometers from Egyptian border in Nitzana-Rafia road".
 Reports added many vehicles passed over same spot early in day
 indicating mines planted shortly before incident.

 It believed 3 anti-vehicular mines detonated simultaneously by
 device of placing board over them which then covered with sand.

 Israelis claim tracks of 3 men wearing rubber-soled shoes found
 near spot and tracks of others 300 meters away some of whom had
 worn army boots and others crepe soles. Tracks led towards
 Egyptian border.

 Foreign Ministry reported UNTSO and Israel MAC members began
 investigation at dawn today.

LAWSON

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 1956 AUG 31 PM 2:04
 D:ECM/12

674.84A/8-3156

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Action

Control:

19650

Rec'd:

September 8, 1956

7:02 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 204, August 31

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SENT DEPARTMENT 204 REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 56, BEIRUT 62, DAMASCUS 41.

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PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIRFORCE.

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Both IDF and Foreign Ministry are disclaiming knowledge reported Israel patrol actions Gaza Strip and Nitzana area last night (being reported Consulate General Jerusalem).

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

It appears probable that actions were IDF reprisal for latest Egyptian minelaying incident reported EMBTEL 202. Coupled with IDF response mining incident August 16 (EMBTELS 163, 165 and 179), pattern appears to be that GOI had decided for time being to cope with Egyptian minelaying program by response to specific incidents through immediate unpublicized reprisals without awaiting UNTSO findings.

LAWSON

TT:PVB/1

Note: Passed Army, Navy and Air 9-8-56 11:40 a.m. RMW.

Message delayed in transmission.

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1956 SEP 10 AM 7 40

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FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 57, August 31.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 57; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 43, CAIRO 24, TEL AVIV 39.

UN has received Israeli complaint and Egyptian complaint on separate incidents both resulting in deaths military personnel within last twenty-four hours. Israeli complaint alleges IDF patrol car hit by mines on Nitzana-Rafiah road 1345 zone time August 30, killing one, wounding four (Jerusalem POST says two dead) Egyptian complaint alleges Israeli patrol crossed Gaza DL near Dier El Balah 2330 August 30, opened fire killing two wounding two. UN investigating.

SABINI

ECM 12

Control: 19408

Rec'd: August 31, 1956
11:08 a.m.

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AIR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 58, August 31

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 58 REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 44, CAIRO 25,
TLE AVIV 40

RECONTEL 57

UNTSO reports 2 more Egyptian complaints received alleging further Israeli attacks last night and this morning, bringing total Egyptian dead to 13. First complaint (CONTEL 57) confirmed by United Nation investigation. Second alleged attack occurred in Egyptian territory outside El Auja D.Z., killing 6. Third occurred near Rafah in Gaza strip with 5 Egyptian military reported killed.

SABINI

VMM/14

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1956 AUG 31 PM 3 21

Control: 19512
Rec'd: August 31, 1956
1:58 a.m.

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

674.84a/9-456

FROM : Amembassy TEL AVIV

132
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

September 4, 1956

REF : Embassy Despatch 61, August 1, 1956

15 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION *	DEPT.
	REC'D	F OTHER
	NEA-4	RM/R-2 OLI-6 P-1 IO-4
	9/7	CIA-7 USIA-10

SUBJECT: JERUSALEM POST Summary of Border Incidents - August, 1956

11-1
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674.84a/9-456
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As indicated in referenced despatch, a recapitulation of alleged border incidents during the preceding month has become a regular feature of the JERUSALEM POST. This summary for the month of August is enclosed as a matter of interest.

For the Ambassador:

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

1956 SEP 11 PM 2 46

MESSAGE CENTER

Enclosure: ✓ 117

Clipping from JERUSALEM POST,
September 2, 1956.

WLHamilton:jd
REPORTER

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67484a/9-456

IS THIS AN ARMISTICE?

INCIDENTS REPORTED DURING AUGUST

THURSDAY, August 2. — Four Egyptian soldiers fire lands belonging to Kibbutz M'falsim, near Gaza Strip. Damage estimated at IL350.

SUNDAY, August 5. — Number of shots fired by Egyptians at Kfar Asa from across Gaza Strip border... Infiltrators make off with quantity of irrigation pipes belonging to Kibbutz Ein Hashlosha.

MONDAY, August 6. — Number of shots fired from Jordan at Israel police vehicle moving on road in vicinity of Taibeh village, Little Triangle.

TUESDAY, August 7. — Sentence of death imposed on 20-year-old Arab from Gaza Strip wounded and captured after being involved in running fight with Israel patrol four months before... Two armed Egyptian soldiers penetrate Israel territory north of Kibbutz Kissufim, retreating to Strip after exchange of fire... Egyptians open automatic fire on Israel position in Ein Hashlosha sector.

WEDNESDAY, August 8. — Rifle and machinegun fire directed from Jordan territory at members of Kibbutz Nir David, Beisan Valley.

THURSDAY, August 9. — Group of ten Arabs from Gaza Strip set fire to crops in Kibbutz Kissufim fields. Second case in two weeks.

FRIDAY, August 10. — Egyptians open fire on Israel frontier post near Kissufim... Jordan shepherd with flock crosses border west of Kibbutz Ein Geddi; ignores patrol's challenge; flees when fired on leaving flock behind... Number of Jordanians approach border at Mt. Zion and fire shots at Israel patrol.

SUNDAY, August 11. — Infiltrators from Jordan open automatic fire on Israel patrol in Lachish area. Search of area reveals prepared ambush... Kibbutz Erez is target of Egyptian

rifle fire. Truck parked in kibbutz hit by bullet.

MONDAY, August 13. — Egyptians fire from across demarcation line at Erez... Two Egyptians approach demarcation line and fire with automatic weapons at tractors working in fields in same area... Group of Jordanians infiltrate in Kibbutz Beit Govrin area and shoot at Israel patrol. Retreat following exchange of shots... Wounded infiltrator picked up by Israel patrol in fields between kibbutzim of Nirim and Ein Hashlosha, near Gaza Strip.

TUESDAY, August 14. — Rifle shots fired from Gaza Strip at Kerem Avshalom settlement.

WEDNESDAY, August 15. — Stones thrown by Arab Legionnaires hit young woman standing near Fast Hotel Building in Jaffa Road, Jerusalem.

THURSDAY, August 16. — Civilian truck hits mine north of Sde Boker.

FRIDAY, August 17. — Passenger bus and two security escort vehicles attacked from ambush on way to Eilat north of Be'er Menuha; attackers first kill three of those in escort and woman passenger. Seven of passengers and two of escort wounded... First of two vehicles carrying merchandise and group of hikers hits mine one kilometre south of Sde Boker. Several injured.

SUNDAY, August 19. — Israel patrol jeep near Taibeh village burnt out after being hit by automatic and rifle fire from Jordan territory... Exchange of fire takes place between Negev Beduin and group of three suspected infiltrators.

WEDNESDAY, August 23. — Four-man Israel patrol moving along Israel-Jordan Armistice Lines southwest of

Umm el Fahm attacked at close range by Jordanian rifle and machinegun fire. Member of patrol killed by fire.

THURSDAY, August 23. — Israel patrol moving within Israel territory on road north of Taibeh, fired on from across demarcation line.

FRIDAY, August 24. — Three Egyptian positions open mortar and machinegun fire at Israel patrol moving along Gaza Strip border near Kissufim... Infiltrators steal tools from Ein Geddi.

SUNDAY, August 26. — Group of armed Egyptian soldiers cross border in vicinity of Kissufim and open fire on Israel patrol and Israel position in area. Covering automatic and mortar fire directed from Egyptian positions... U.N. Observer subjected to volley from Egyptian side of border, forced to jump from jeep and take cover.

THURSDAY, August 30. — Bat Galim, Israel ship detained by Egypt two years ago, commissioned in Egyptian navy.

FRIDAY, August 31. — Two soldiers killed and three wounded when army patrol car hits three mines laid together to detonate simultaneously on road north of Ktziot in Nitzana area, five kilometres inside Israel territory. Tracks of ten men, some in army boots, led toward Egyptian border.

AIR POUCH

PRIORITY

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(Security Classification)

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMCONGENERAL, JERUSALEM

38

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

September 6, 1956

REF : Contels 57 and 58

67 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION REC'D 9/13	DEPT OTHER 10	NEA-4, AMR-2, OH-1-6, P-1, ID-4, E-1, CUA-6, USIA-10, ARMY-4, NAVY-3
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SUBJECT: Four Incidents Involving Egyptian and Israeli Forces August 30-31.

AIR-3

Transmitted is a UNISO press release giving details of the four incidents involving Egyptian and Israeli units in and near the El Auja DZ and the Gaza Strip within a twelve-hour period on August 30-31, to wit:

1. the mining of an Israeli command car near Nitsana (contel 57);
2. the attack on an Egyptian position near Deir El Balah (contel 57);
3. the attack on an Egyptian position near Rafah (contel 58); and
4. the attack on an Egyptian position near El Auja (contel 58).

The UN investigation revealed the facts of the first two incidents to coincide with the statements in the Israeli and Egyptian complaints. The investigation of the third and fourth incidents, which was not completed at the time of the press release, showed that extensive fire-fights had taken place at the sites mentioned and that tracks led from the sites to the DL. However, the bodies of the eleven alleged Egyptian dead were not seen by the UN Observers, the Egyptian authorities claiming that they had been removed to Cairo for burial. UN interrogation of the wounded tended to confirm the killings, however. The Egyptian newspaper reports reaching UNISO make no mention of Egyptian casualties, though claims are made of heavy casualties inflicted on the Israelis.

The three almost simultaneous attacks on Egyptian positions occurring about ten hours after the mining of an Israeli vehicle seem clear indication that the Israeli policy of retaliation is active, or even automatic, at least regarding the Egyptian border. UNISO officials here were worried about possible further Egyptian retaliation, but the Egyptian playing down of the incidents makes it appear that Egypt is not at present prepared to continue the chain of incidents.

John A. Sabini
American Consul

Enclosure

Copy of Press Release of UNISO, 31 August 1956

Copies sent Cairo, Tel Aviv

JASabini/hlm

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HEADQUARTERS
TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

Jerusalem, 31 August 1956

On 30 August 1956 in the early afternoon, an Israeli command car was blown up by mines buried under the surface of the Rafah road at a point in the Demilitarized Zone about three kilometres north of El Auja (Nitzana). Two Israeli soldiers were killed and four wounded as a result of the explosion.

United Nations Military Observers saw three mine craters, mine fragments and the completely wrecked vehicle.

During the night of 30/31 August 1956, three serious incidents took place in Egyptian-controlled territory; two near the Demarcation Line in the Gaza area and one near the International Frontier, facing the area of the El Auja Demilitarized Zone.

The first incident occurred on 30 August 1956 at about 2130 GMT when there was an exchange of fire between Egyptian and Israeli patrols, approximately midway between DEIR AL BALAH village and Gaza town, about 1200 metres within Egyptian-controlled territory.

United Nations Military Observers found the bodies of two Egyptian soldiers at the scene of the incident as well as a number of empty cartridges, two unexploded hand grenades, five sub-machine gun magazines, exploded hand grenade fragments and a bloodstained box for first aid dressings. Incoming and outgoing tracks of approximately fifteen men led directly southeast from the scene of the incident to a point on the Demarcation Line where they crossed into Israeli-controlled territory.

The second incident also occurred on 30 August 1956, at about 2130 GMT, in the Rafah area in Egyptian-controlled territory, when there was an exchange of fire between Egyptian and Israeli forces. Egyptian authorities report the killing of five Egyptian soldiers as a result of the exchange of fire.

The third incident took place on 30 August 1956 shortly before midnight GMT at a point about two kilometres west of the International Frontier, in Egyptian territory, facing the El Auja Demilitarized Zone. Egyptian authorities report the killing of six Egyptian soldiers as a result of an exchange of fire between Egyptian and Israeli forces.

Investigation by United Nations Military Observers of the second and third incidents is proceeding.

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38

Action

Control:

5484

Rec'd:

September 11, 1956
12:27 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 229, September 11.

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AIR

SENT DEPARTMENT 229, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 61, AMMAN 61.

Text follows of press statement released by Foreign Ministry September 10 responsive to dynamiting of railway line north of Beersheba same date:

Egypt has again committed unprovoked act of aggression, Foreign Ministry spokesman stated today. This accusation was made following blowing up of railroad to Beersheba early this morning.

Sabotage act was carried out at distance of approximately 30 KMs from Gaza Strip and 10 KMs from Jordan border. Egyptian murder squads have been known in past to enter Israel from Gaza Strip and leave by way of Jordan border, spokesman observed.

This morning's attack was of nature similar to other acts of mining carried out recently by Egyptian units, and resulting in Israeli casualties in killed and wounded.

Latest assault and current reports of increased Fedayeen activities indicate Egypt is persisting in her acts of unprovoked aggression against Israel.

Israel delegation lodged complaint of attack with Israel Egyptian MAC.

LAWSON

GEM/7

674.84A/9-1156

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1:04 p.m.

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RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 64, September 11.

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C PRIORITY

L
IO SENT DEPARTMENT 64, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 47, CAIRO 27,
USUN TEL AVIV 43.

P
UOP UNTSO reports Egyptian complaint received that Israeli patrol
OLI crossed into Egyptian territory near El Auja early this morning,
penetrated 16 kilometers northwest El Qusaima, engaged in fire
fight result of which five Egyptian soldiers killed, one wounded.
OCB United Nations investigating.

USIA
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1956 SEP 11 AM 3 23

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SUBJECT:

DATE

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

William Hamilton

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

[Redacted]

24

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To SecState

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FROM : AMEMBASSY CAIRO

241
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

September 25, 1956
DATE

REF :

13 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION NEA 4	DEPT. RM/R-2 CL-1-6 IC 4 LSON-1 P-1 L-2 S/S-2 G-1 S/P.
	REC'D 10-2	OTHER CIA-12 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3 CSD-4 LSIA-10

SUBJECT: General Burns Visits Cairo

General Burns called at the Embassy on the afternoon of September 19 in order to meet Ambassador Hare. During the course of the conversation he reviewed in general terms the situation along the Egyptian-Israeli border which, in his opinion, had become somewhat quieter. General Burns thought that the Egyptian Government had taken measures to keep it that way. The Israelis on the other hand, he said, continued their "provocative" patrolling techniques.

General Burns remarked that no progress whatever had been made in persuading the Israelis to contribute toward the solution of the problems of the Al Buja demilitarized zone and the defensive areas. Ben Gurion had declared flatly to General Burns that he could not discuss an Israeli withdrawal while Egypt maintained toward Israel what Ben Gurion considered was a generally hostile attitude in violation of Article I of the General Armistice Agreement. In this connection the Israelis continued to be particularly exercised over the question of transits through the Canal. Nor had any progress been made in collateral matters such as border marking. As a matter of fact there had been some retrogression. The Israelis had further restricted the movements of UN observers in the Al Buja demilitarized zone and General Burns thought it highly probable that the Israelis would refuse to renew their agreement to the manning of UN observation posts on the Israeli side of the Gaza demarcation line when the time limit of October 31 which Ben Gurion had imposed for the operation of these posts would expire. General Burns said that Ben Gurion had told him that the observation posts had in no way reduced incidents of infiltration. He explained to Ambassador Hare that the posts were of course not intended for this purpose but to prevent clashes between the regular forces of both sides. However, the observation posts had had limited success because of the requirement that manning schedules be submitted in advance to the military authorities. UNTSO had observed that the Israelis tended to divert patrol activity to sectors not covered by the schedule for that day.

General Burns saw Foreign Minister Fawzi on the morning of September 20. He had told the Embassy that he had nothing in particular to discuss but merely intended to have a general review of the current situation. Lt. Colonel David Ely, UNTSO Liaison Officer in Cairo, reviewed this conversation with the reporting officer on September 22. According to Colonel Ely Fawzi did most of the talking which revolved essentially around the status of the Secretary General's proposals to the Security Council in his report of May 9. Ely noted that both Egypt and Israel during the Security Council debate on the Secretary General's report had accepted these

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proposals but as a matter of fact no progress whatever had been made in carrying them out. Fawzi had reiterated to General Burns Egypt's preparedness to implement the proposals simultaneously with Israel. The status of the proposals as described by Ely is as follows:

Setting up of observation posts along the Gaza demarcation line.

Observation posts had been instituted on the Egyptian side at the request of Egypt in the spring of 1955. The Israelis had agreed in the spring of 1956 to the setting up of observation posts on their side of the line for a six months' period. Egypt had no objection to the indefinite continuation of the posts but Israel would probably not renew its consent after October 31.

Marking of the demarcation line in the Gaza area. Egypt has no objection to the marking of the line if done by UNTSO. Israel refuses to have it done by UNTSO but wants to mark the line itself.

Withdrawal of patrols and fixed positions. Israeli patrols were initially withdrawn following the Secretary General's visit to the area. Israel reserved the right, however, to resume close patrolling if considered necessary to protect its citizens. Such close patrolling has now been resumed. In consequence no withdrawal of Egyptian fixed positions has been carried out.

Physical barrier (fence) along the Gaza demarcation line. Egypt continues to oppose this measure on grounds that erection of a physical barrier would give the line the character of an international boundary. Egypt has never objected to the erection by Israel of a fence in Israeli-controlled territory but the Israelis have no interest in this suggestion.

Local commanders' agreement. Egypt and UNTSO are in agreement that a UN observer must listen to and record any conversations between local commanders. Israel disagrees.

Joint patrols. Egypt and UNTSO have lost interest in this proposal. Israel had always opposed it. UNTSO feels that it is impractical at the present time because the success of joint-patrolling depends on a more amicable relationship than exists between the two parties at present.

Al Auja and the defensive areas. Egypt holds to its commitment to the Secretary General to carry out a simultaneous withdrawal with Israel. Israel on the other hand has refused to agree to simultaneous withdrawal so long as Egypt maintains restrictions on Israeli shipping through the Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. The position of UNTSO on this matter is that Israel should abide by its original commitments to the Security Council and in any case the transit of vessels is not a subject for the UNTSO, being outside the purview of the General Armistice Agreement.

Colonel Ely commented that Fawzi in reviewing the Egyptian position made clear that Egypt attached primary consideration to the question of mutual withdrawal from Al Auja and the defensive areas. In Fawzi's opinion the "big things" necessarily had to be solved before the "little things". As long as the forces of the two countries faced each other in the strategic Al Auja area it was idle

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to talk of minor matters in the region of the Gaza strip. Colonel Ely gave the impression that UNRSC agreed with this point of view.

The reporting officer reviewed with Colonel Ely the series of minings and retaliatory raids which had taken place across the Egyptian-Israeli border a few weeks ago, and suggested that perhaps the minings and particularly that in the region of Sde Boker had been intended as a retaliation for the assassination by means of "book parcels" of the Egyptian commander of fedayeen in Gaza and the Egyptian Military Attache in Amman. The reporting officer mentioned in this connection that President Nasser in his speech of July 26 had gone out of his way to refer to the cases of these two men in passionate terms. Colonel Ely agreed that the mining of Sde Boker because of its distance from Gaza strongly suggested that it had been carried out with official authorization and confirmed that the Israeli raids which followed that and a subsequent mining incident were certainly of a retaliatory nature. He thought, however, that the Egyptian Government had since these episodes taken necessary measures to call a halt to such activities since continued tension with Israel was not at present in Egypt's interest.

In the course of General Burns's conversation with Ambassador Hare he had given the impression that although reasonably satisfied with the position of the Arabs he was greatly concerned by that of Israel. General Burns made clear to the Ambassador that he felt the Israelis were generally assuming a state of readiness from which they could readily take advantage of the preoccupation of the tripartite powers with the Suez problem to advance their own interests, particularly vis-a-vis Jordan. General Burns thought that the Israelis might in particular be preparing to intervene to "assert some of their claims" in the event disorders should take place in Jordan either as a result of developments connected with Suez or the October elections. While General Burns had noted that the Israeli press had speculated on the situation which might arise if Iraqi troops entered Jordan, apart from any internal breakdown, he said that their point had not been raised with him by Israeli officials.

Since it appeared that General Burns had undergone something of a change in his thinking vis-a-vis Israel (in the past on visits to Cairo he has often shown impatience with the Arab position which he has described as "quibbling" and to be somewhat more tolerant of Israel's theses), the reporting officer asked Lt. Col. Ely whether he had noticed any change. Ely said that both he and Colonel Gohar had found the change remarkable. Ely thought it might be due at least in part to the position taken by the Israeli authorities with regard to the recent retaliatory raids against Jordan. Although the Israeli press left in the minds of its readers no doubt that these raids were retaliatory and their nature was such as to make it perfectly evident that they had been carried out under government sponsorship, the Israeli officials had blandly informed General Burns that they knew nothing about them. Ely also noted that the views of General Burns were now much closer to those of Secretary General Hammarskjold. Hammarskjold's communications with the Egyptian Government, Ely alleged, were much more friendly than those he had sent to the Israelis. Ely said that Hammarskjold had a warm personal regard for Foreign Minister Fawzi. However, he felt that the Secretary General's attitude towards the parties was primarily

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Page 4 of
Desp. No. 241
From Cairo


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influenced by the feeling that the Israelis had not only come close to deliberately sabotaging his mission in the spring of this year but had obstinately and unjustifiably refused to carry out their commitments to him and the Security Council, particularly with reference to the Al Auja problem.

As evidence of the current trend of General Burns's thinking, Colonel Ely mentioned on a strictly confidential basis that following the first police post raid in Jordan General Burns had sent an urgent message to Fawzi asking Egypt to exercise such influence as was available to it to persuade Abu Nuwwar not to retaliate. Burns had found Abu Nuwwar in a more subdued frame of mind when he discussed the incident with him than Burns had expected. He did not know whether Egyptian influence had been responsible for the restraint exercised by the Jordanians but he assumed it had played some part.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:



Alexander Schnee
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

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FROM: Paris (VIA POUCH)

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1484, September 27.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1484, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV, LONDON
UNNUMBERED.LE MONDE for September 27 carried interview with Menahem Begin.
Following is substance Begin's reply to questions posed by
LE MONDE correspondent:

Begin was in France on goodwill mission since his party had always supported close French-Israel alliance similar to British-French entente cordiale. French parliamentarians, high functionaries, and political figures had evinced warm friendship for Israel.

Begin strongly denied he had favored cession of military bases in Israel to France, since he was opposed to such policy as matter principle. Only exception might be if high military commands between Israel and allied countries might dictate such tactical measures in conflict against common enemy.

Fact that "two Occidental powers" had taken spectacular military measures over Suez question but had refrained from action constituted rude blow to their prestige. Economic sanctions would not seriously hurt Egypt since fellahs already had very low standard of living and ruling class could easily obtain requirements elsewhere. Nasser and Khrushchev were, at least for moment, victors in Suez dispute, latter having obtained sympathy of Arab masses without raising even little finger to aid Egypt and Arabs. Russia in process erecting stronghold in Middle East.

Nationalization of Suez had not affected Israel position since Israel had been prevented in past from transiting canal. An Israel ship should attempt to pass through canal under protection Users Association. What, Begin asked, would Users Association do if Egyptian dictator broke his promise of freedom of navigation? Would Association defend Israel's right to transit canal?

Cairo's Hebrew broadcast commending Israel on its moderation on Suez question and accusing Begin as "imperialist agent" who continued foster frontier incidents to maintain Israel-Arab

tension

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-2- 1484, September 27, from Paris

tension was characteristic of Egyptian hypocrisy since Cairo had continually promised wipe Israel off map.

Begin could not be accused of desiring preventive war against Arab states since Nasser insisted state of war already existed and refused respect armistice signed between Israel and Arab states. Nasser's repeated promises to suppress Israel was declaration of war a priori.

It was Israel's duty to liberate all regions within its natural frontiers and now occupied by Arab armies. Israel must reoccupy Gaza zone, source of bloody offensive of fedayin where lived 80,000 Arab refugees armed by Egypt. Similarly Israelis had same right to Jerusalem as to Nazareth. Once the entirety of Israel state had been assured, Israel had no objections receiving all Arab Palestinian refugees as Israeli citizens. Military operations which Begin had described, he added, were not dictated by spirit of expansion but simply a restoration of Israeli rights and reunification state Israel.

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(a) File No. from 6842.74 9-2756

to 674.842 9-2756

(b) Additional information _____

- ☐ All cards (other than "name" cards) in the Card Indices have been changed or corrected as indicated above.
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- ☐ SCS ACTION papers.

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57-51
Action
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Control: 12282
Rec'd: October 21, 1956
11:02 a.m.

Info

RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 390, October 21

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SENT DEPARTMENT 390, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 82

IDF FLO informed USARMA of serious incident near Orinitzanadz. Two IDF vehicles blown up at dawn today on road four KMS north-west Kibbutz Ketsiot in DZ. Three soldiers killed, twenty-one wounded.

OCB

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CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

According noon press six soldiers severely wounded. Mines laid 100 meters apart, and second vehicle destroyed on return trip after loading up casualties of first accident. GOI has protested to Israel/Egypt MAC, but did not request meeting.

No further details available.

LAWSON

JCK/8

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9:37 a.m.

674.84A/10-2156

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NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 391, October 21, 2 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 391, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 83.

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AIR

Incident in DZ, which undoubtedly will be discussed today's Cabinet meeting, will permit GOI to shift focus its military attention to Egypt. Although retaliation likely it may not be predictable terms of time and place because IDF casualties at Qalquilya and Husan were attributed largely to loss of surprise factor.

Should be recalled Ben Gurion reaffirmed Egypt to be main threat of Israel in October 15 Knesset speech.

Last mine incident in Negev was September 10 mining Beersheba Railway, last mining attack involving casualties was August 30 near Nitzana, killing two and wounding three soldiers.

Pass Army, Navy, Air.

LAWSON

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1956 OCT 22 AM 7 47

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FROM: Jerusalem

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TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 120, October 22, 10 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 120, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 33, TEL AVIV 7.

JERUSALEM POST October 22 carries statement by Foreign Ministry spokesman regarding mining incident. Statement accuses Egypt of act of aggression through mining of road in El Auja demilitarized zone. As result 3 Israeli soldiers reportedly killed and 27 wounded in explosion involving two vehicles.

OCB

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AIR

Burns told me last night that Israelis had not informed UNTSO of incident. However, chairman EIMAC had proposed UNTSO investigation be made but Israelis refused allow this. Burns instructing chairman again raise subject with Israeli MAC representative, pointing out it will doubtless be of interest to Security Council at this time.

COLE

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FROM : Amembassy TEL AVIV

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TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

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SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation

NOFORN

There is enclosed a memorandum prepared by a member of the Embassy staff reporting comments made to him by the Director General of the Prime Minister's Office concerning possible developments in Israel's security policy. It is requested that care be exercised to protect the source of this information.

With reference to the last two paragraphs of the memorandum, the Department is referred for background to the Embassy's despatch no. 829, of June 22, 1955, titled: "Israel's Access to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Port of Eilat."

In recent days it has become apparent to the Embassy that there has been unusual diplomatic activity between Israel and France. Firstly, the French Military Attache here was suddenly called to Paris, presumably for consultation. Secondly, this week the IDF Deputy Chief of Intelligence left Israel for Paris. Finally, there have been veiled allusions recently in press and official circles here to the community of interest between France and Israel vis-a-vis Nasser and the Egyptian Government. While these movements and presumed discussions may not in fact result in anything tangible, it is believed that in some manner they may be related to the subject matter discussed in the closing paragraphs of the attached memorandum.

Mr. Kollek's report of the Prime Minister's fear of British military intervention in support of Jordan is consistent with the position Ben Gurion has taken in Knesset debates. It does not answer, however, the question of the line of action which Israel would follow should developments reach the point where the United Kingdom decided its position in Jordan was irretrievably lost.

For the Ambassador:

Ivan B. White

Ivan B. White

Counselor of Embassy

IBWhite:jd

REPORTER

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OCT 26 1956

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October 25, 1956

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(Classification)

Page 1 of

Encl. No. 1

Desp. No. 229

From Tel Aviv

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TO: The Ambassador

FROM: Ivan B. White

When I heard through a mutual friend that Teddy Kollek, Director General of the Prime Minister's Office, was going from Jerusalem to Haifa on October 13, I asked him to stop in for a few minutes en route. He called at the Embassy Saturday morning for an hour. I told him we would be very interested in any changes in thinking by the GOI regarding modifications in the policy of retaliation which might grow out of the Qalqilya action. Kollek said there were several points which had been debated in the Cabinet since the Husan action which, although it did not result in as many Israeli deaths as did Qalqilya, had caused heavy enough casualties to lead the Cabinet to explore the possibilities of some modification. On the first point, urged by some, that Israeli troops remain in occupation of portions of Jordan territory taken in a retaliatory action, Kollek said that this proposal envisaged holding on to the territory taken as a basis for forcing the Jordanians into direct negotiations. He said that up to now Ben Gurion had opposed this approach because of his conviction that Great Britain would intervene militarily under the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. When I asked him whether the Prime Minister had arrived at this conclusion from what the British had told him, he said no, that rather it was based on Ben Gurion's own analysis which led him to the conclusion that the British would use such a situation to retrieve their position in the Middle East.

The second question was whether the Israelis should modify their military operations to avoid civilian casualties. It was clear from recent reprisals that some Israeli casualties had accrued because of the precautions taken to avoid civilian deaths. Kollek was inclined to believe that the Cabinet would continue to use this approach for the time being in spite of the criticism which it had evoked. Kollek indicated that two possible modifications were: (1) Abandonment of the principle that retaliation should be in the same area where the original incident occurred. The present practice had the disadvantage of eliminating the element of surprise. (2) The IDF claims that the short period of, say, twelve hours between a Cabinet decision to retaliate and the commencement of such an operation did not give the Army enough time to prepare adequately for the action. The IDF desired more time.

Kollek then said that the locus of activity might very shortly shift from the Jordanian border to Egypt. He ventured

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(Classification)

Page 2 of
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 229
From Tel Aviv

that if Nasser won out shortly on the Suez issue Israel might then take military action to free the Straits of Tiran. Such an action would, of course, take some time for preparations. When I asked Kollek why he thought such an action would be in the Tiran rather than the Suez area, he replied it was entirely a matter of logistics. The IDF believed that the former action could be successfully executed but did not hold the same opinion in the case of a Suez operation. When I asked Kollek whether the IDF was confident that having taken the Straits of Tiran it could continue to hold its position there indefinitely, he replied in the affirmative.

At this point Kollek said that, while I might not be aware of it, discussions between the Israelis and the French on a pipeline from Eilat to a northern Israel port had made real progress. He added that he thought the French would be interested in "having a blow struck at Nasser from this side".

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NEA

Control: 15622

Rec'd: October 26, 1956
9:57 a.m.

Info

RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 415, October 26, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 415, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON PRIORITY
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Beginning yesterday morning and continuing until now (repeated now) (12 noon local time) there has been IDF call up on considerable scale of reservists and civilian vehicles in Tel Aviv and adjacent areas as far south as Rehovoth. To this moment operation has closely resembled in techniques and mobilization points expansion in Israel's arms strength which occurred at time of Nitzana action November last and Fedayeen operations this April.

Present movement has become widely known among local press people and public and there is good deal of speculation that "something big may happen". Report of special interest has been advice by family controller road transport to Embassy officer that week end trips should be cancelled and food supplies stocked. Reference was made to community of interests with French, a relationship which is being increasingly mentioned here in both public and private circles, with some references to Eilat and Strait of Tiran as possible scenes of actions (reference Embassy despatch 829, June 22, 1955 and 229, October 24, 1956).

While impossible to know at this time whether present movement will shift from partial to complete mobilization or area of possible action, Embassy will attempt to check other important population centers with view to keeping Department informed.

LAWSON

SW:JS/1

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**OUTGOING
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☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

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SENT TO: Amembassy LONDON / ~~EXHIBIT~~ ~~REBOX~~ PRIORITY 3039
Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY 1533

DC/T

Origin

Info

By separate telegram Department has sent you text of President's statement regarding Middle East which White House released afternoon October 28. Department is discussing ^{matter} this afternoon ~~questions~~ with British and French representatives Washington along lines indicated in press statement.

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6714-2856

Drafted by:

NEA:FWilkins;WMRountree:jm

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/S - Robert Spurgill

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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57-51

SECRET

Action

Control: 17274

NEA

FROM: Paris

Rec'd: October 29, 1956

Info

1:51 p.m.

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2027, October 29, 7 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2027, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 348, TEL AVIV 22.

CIA

Re DEPTTEL to London 3039, Paris 1533.

We discussed briefly with Daridan this afternoon tripartite conversations in Washington on Middle East. He said instructions not (repeat not) yet dispatched to Alphand but indicated line would be that French unwilling to discuss Israeli dispositions in isolation but happy to discuss grave situation throughout whole area. He then catalogued series of attacks on French institutions in several Arab countries during past few days and apprehension what is to follow. On other hand, he continued profess ignorance extent Israeli preparations and supposition they are defensive in intent.

Comment. It seems probable to us that French are making no (repeat no) effort restrain Israelis and that, whether or not (repeat not) they are privy to Israeli intentions, they would not (repeat not) be loath to see Israeli dispositions which might divert Arab attention from France, or perhaps even military action which would weaken Egypt and its allies. French are bound at this moment to look at developments in Middle East through spectacles increasingly bitter Franco-Arab hostility.

For this reason, despite probability French may not (repeat not) cooperate as we would wish in implementation 1950 declaration, we would consider it of greatest importance to remain in close consultation with them on this matter in order that their policy not (repeat not) diverge from ours any more than unavoidable minimum.

DILLON

SW:CAB

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VERBATUM TEXT

SENT TO: **Ambassy LONDON** **NIAC**
 Ambassy PARIS **NIAC**
 RPTD INFO: **USUN, NEW YORK** **NIAC**

Origin

Info

There follows telegraphic text working group draft proposed SC resolution calling for cessation hostilities:

QUOTE Security Council

Noting report on outbreak hostilities between Israel and state concerned);

Expressing its grave concern regarding effect this renewal of fighting upon maintenance international peace and security in area;

1. Determines that breach of peace has occurred; (If possible, this paragraph would also identify aggressor.)
2. Calls for immediate cessation hostilities;
3. Calls upon Israel immediately withdraw its armed forces behind established armistice lines;

4. Calls upon all Members render prompt assistance to United Nations in execution this resolution and refrain from giving any military, economic or financial assistance to Israel.

5. Requests Chief of Staff of United Nations Truce Supervision
Organisation to keep Security Council informed on compliance given this
resolution and make whatever recommendations he deems appropriate respecting
further action by United Nations to assist in implementation this resolution.
UNQUOTE.

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:FWilkins:crc 10/29/56

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - William M. Rountree

10

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INFORMAL RECORD OF MEETING

Secretary's Office, October 29, 1956, 3:15 p.m.

Attendance: The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Allen Dulles (*later*)
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. McCardle
Mr. Phleger
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Wilcox
Mr. Hill (*later*)
Mr. Rountree
Mr. Armstrong
Mr. Kalijarvi
Mr. Wilkins
Mr. Burdett
Mr. Jones (WE)
Mr. Lister (BNA)
Mr. Richards (U/OP)
Mr. Macomber
Mr. Greene
Mr. Sohm

Subject: Israeli Aggression

The meeting heard news reports of the Israeli attack on Egypt and a subsequent report from Mr. Allen Dulles on the extent of Israeli penetration into Egypt.

In a consideration of the OCB Working Group draft of February 17 on "Political and Economic Measures to be Taken Against an Aggressor in the Arab-Israeli Controversy", The Secretary noted that it was important to find out where the British and French will stand ~~and~~ any approach to the Security Council. It is also important to have the latest and best information, particularly from General Burns, about developments.

The Secretary decided to call in the British and French Chargés d' Affaires to tell them that we are disposed to go to the UN and to give them the text of ~~the~~ draft resolution, adapted from that at Annex A in the OCB paper. (A copy of the paper prepared for the British and French is attached.)

It was agreed to tell the Egyptians here and in Cairo of our ideas
There was general agreement that any action the United States might take, such as blocking Israeli funds, should be taken under a UN resolution.

It was /

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It was also agreed that our Embassies in London and Paris would be instructed to approach the Foreign Offices there, paralleling the Secretary's demarche.

The Secretary spoke to Ambassador Lodge on the telephone and was told that two reports from General Burns about the situation immediately prior to the Israeli attack had been sent on to the Department. Mr. Wilkins subsequently gave an oral summary of these reports as received from USUN.

omitting The Secretary received through Mr. Howe a message from Colonel Goodpaster discussing the desirability of the President's ~~making his plane to~~ stop at Richmond. After some discussion he sent word back to Goodpaster suggesting that the President stop briefly and say that there is disturbing news from the Middle East tending to confirm the fears that he had expressed yesterday. Although there is as yet no definitive information, he (the President) wishes to return promptly to Washington to confer with the Secretary of State.


Joseph N. Greene, Jr.

S/S:JNG:cph
10/29/56

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 453, October 30, 2 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 453, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 89, LONDON 100, CAIRO 90, AMMAN 110, DAMASCUS 65, BEIRUT 86, BAGHDAD 44.

PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR

PARIS PASS CINCUSAFE

Foreign Ministry and IDF/FLO broke news blackout which had been virtually complete for ten hours shortly before noon today to report that Egyptians with "Migs and Meteors" were bombing Israel territory near Eilat and IDF columns deep in Sinai.

Foreign Ministry official told Embassy that IDF put problem of how to respond to air action in government hands.

GOI also reported.

1. Egyptian Forces have been observed crossing canal in substantial numbers apparently to meet Israeli columns now (repeat now) 30 kilometers from Suez.
2. IDF had taken Quesima (MR 060/090).
3. IDF had had "few" casualties these items were almost first GOI has reported since announcement of 9 p.m. October 29 (EMBTel 443), and in intervening hours have said only that Israel columns were moving west across difficult terrain toward canal encountering little opposition.

Sound of anti-aircraft batteries clearly audible to Tel Avivians for short interval this morning but it appears to have been firing practice.

Comment: Egyptian air activity may be excuse Israelis had been looking for to introduce their own aerial arm. Embassy officials as usual skeptical.

Control: 18126

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11:15 a.m.

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-2- 453, October 30, 2 p.m., from Tel Aviv

at Lydda airport in connection evacuation dependents saw upwards of 20 fighter jets being armed with two half-ton bombs each.

LAWSON

SW:JLN/2

NOTE: Passed OSD, ARMY, NAVY and AIR 10/30/56, 2 p.m. JAK

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Action
NEAControl: 18234
Rec'd: OCTOBER 30,
2:03 PMInfo
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FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2357, OCTOBER 30

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2357, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 386

PRIMIN EDEN MADE FOLLOWING STATEMENT RE ISRAEL-EGYPT
SITUATION IN HOUSE OF COMMONS AT 4:30 THIS AFTERNOON:

"AS THE HOUSE WILL KNOW, FOR SOME TIME PAST TENSION ON
FRONTIER OF ISRAEL HAS BEEN INCREASING. THE GROWING MILITARY
STRENGTH OF EGYPT HAS GIVEN RISE TO RENEWED APPREHENSION
WHICH STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS OF EGYPTIAN GOVT HAVE FURTHER
AGGRAVATED.

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AIR

ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT MILITARY COMMAND BETWEEN EGYPT,
JORDAN, AND SYRIA, RENEWED RAIDS BY GUERILLAS, CULMINATING
IN INCURSION OF EGYPTIAN COMMANDOS ON SUNDAY NIGHT HAD ALL
PRODUCED VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION.

FIVE DAYS AGO NEWS WAS RECEIVED THAT ISRAELI GOVT WERE TAKING
CERTAIN MEASURES OF MOBILIZATION. HMG AT ONCE INSTRUCTED
BRIT AMB TEL AVIV TO MAKE INQUIRIES OF ISRAELI MIN FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND TO URGE RESTRAINT.

MEANWHILE, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE TRIPARTITE
DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF UK, FRANCE AND US.

MEETING WAS HELD ON OCTOBER 28 IN WASH AND SECOND MEETING TOOK
PLACE OCTOBER 29. WHILE THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE PROCEEDING NEWS
WAS RECEIVED LAST NIGHT THAT ISRAELI FORCES HAD CROSSED FRONTIER
AND HAD PENETRATED DEEP INTO EGYPTIAN TERRITORY.

LATER, FURTHER REPORTS WERE RECEIVED INDICATING PARATROOPS
HAD BEEN DROPPED.

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-2- 2357, OCTOBER 30, FROM LONDON

IT APPEARED THAT ISRAEL SPEARHEAD WAS NOT FAR FROM BANKS OF SUEZ CANAL. FROM RECENT REPORTS IT ALSO APPEARED THAT AIR FORCES ARE IN ACTION IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF CANAL. DURING LAST FEW WEEKS HMG HAVE THOUGHT IT THEIR DUTY, HAVING REGARD TO THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANGLO-JORDAN TREATY, TO GIVE ASSURANCES BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OF THEIR INTENTION TO HONOR THESE OBLIGATIONS. HM AMB IN TEL AVIV LATE LAST NIGHT RECEIVED AN ASSURANCE THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ATTACK JORDAN.

FOREIGN SECRETARY DISCUSSED SITUATION WITH US AMB EARLY THIS MORNING. FRENCH PRIMIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER HAVE COME OVER TO LONDON AT SHORT NOTICE AT INVITATION OF HMG TO DELIBERATE WITH US ON THESE EVENTS. I MUST TELL HOUSE THAT VERY GRAVE ISSUES ARE AT STAKE AND UNLESS HOSTILITIES CAN QUICKLY BE STOPPED, FREE PASSAGE THROUGH CANAL WILL BE JEOPARDIZED. MOREOVER, ANY FIGHTING ON BANKS OF CANAL WOULD ENDANGER SHIPS ACTUALLY ON PASSAGE.

NUMBER OF CREWS AND PASSENGERS INVOLVED TOTALS MANY HUNDREDS AND VALUE OF SHIPS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO BE ON PASSAGE IS ABOUT 150 MILLION, EXCLUDING VALUE OF CARGOES.

HMG AND FRENCH GOVT HAVE ACCORDINGLY AGREED THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DONE TO BRING HOSTILITIES TO AN END AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK HAVE THEREFORE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO JOIN US REP IN SEEKING AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL.

IN MEANTIME, AS A RESULT OF CONSULTATIONS HELD IN LONDON TODAY, UK AND FRENCH GOVTS HAVE NOW ADDRESSED URGENT COMMUNICATIONS TO GOVTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL. IN THESE WE HAVE CALLED UPON BOTH SIDES TO STOP ALL WARLIKE ACTION BY LAND, SEA AND AIR, FORTHWITH, AND TO WITHDRAW THEIR MILITARY FORCES TO DISTANCE OF TEN MILES CANAL.

FURTHER, IN ORDER TO SEPARATE BELLIGERENTS AND TO GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH CANAL BY SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS, WE HAVE ASKED EGYPTIAN GOVT TO AGREE THAT ANGLO-FRENCH FORCES SHOULD MOVE, TEMPORARILY--I REPEAT TEMPORARILY--INTO KEY POSITIONS AT PORT SAID, ISMAILIA, AND SUEZ.

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-3- 2357, OCTOBER 30, FROM LONDON

GOVTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAVE BEEN ASKED TO ANSWER THIS COMMUNICATION WITHIN TWELVE HOURS.

IT HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR TO THEM THAT, IF AT THE EXPIRATION OF THAT TIME, ONE OR BOTH HAVE NOT UNDERTAKEN TO COMPLY WITH THESE REQUIREMENTS, BRIT AND FRENCH FORCES WILL INTERVENE IN WHATEVER STRENGTH MAY BE NECESSARY TO SECURE COMPLIANCE. I WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP HOUSE INFORMED "OF SITUATION."

ALDRICH.

VMM

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Control: 18232
Rec'd: OCTOBER 30, 1956
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FROM: LONDON

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2359, OCTOBER 30, 6 PM

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FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF UK-FRENCH DECLARATION DELIVERED TO
ISRAELI AMBASSADOR AT 1630 GMT BY FONOFF AND GIVEN US AMBASSADOR
1645 GMT

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT.

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE HAVE
TAKEN NOTE OF THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ISRAEL
AND EGYPT. THIS EVENT THREATENS TO DISRUPT THE FREEDOM
OF NAVIGATION THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL ON WHICH THE ECONOMIC
LIFE OF MANY NATIONS DEPENDS.

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE ARE RESOLVED
TO DO ALL IN THEIR POWER TO BRING ABOUT THE EARLY CESSATION
OF HOSTILITIES AND TO SAFEGUARD THE FREE PASSAGE OF THE
CANAL.

THEY ACCORDINGLY REQUEST THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL:

- (A) TO STOP ALL WARLIKE ACTION ON LAND, SEA AND AIR FORTHWITH
- (B) TO WITHDRAW ALL ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES TO A DISTANCE
10 MILES EAST OF THE CANAL.

A COMMUNICATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE GOVERNMENT
OF EGYPT, REQUESTING THEM TO CEASE HOSTILITIES AND TO
WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE CANAL,
AND TO ACCEPT THE TEMPORARY OCCUPATION BY ANGLO-FRENCH
FORCES OF KEY POSITIONS AT PORT SAID, ISMAILIA AND SUEZ.

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-2- 2359, OCTOBER 30, 6 PM FROM LONDON

THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS REQUEST AN ANSWER TO THIS COMMUNICATION WITHIN 12 HOURS. IF AT THE EXPIRATION OF THAT TIME ONE OR BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOT UNDERTAKEN TO COMPLY WITH THE ABOVE REQUIREMENTS, UNITED KINGDOM AND FRENCH FORCES WILL INTERVENT IN WHATEVER STRENGTH MAY BE NECESSARY TO SECURE COMPLIANCE.

END VERBATIM TEXT.

ALDRICH

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Action
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Control: 18233
Rec'd: OCTOBER 30, 1956
2:01 PM

FROM: LONDON

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2360, OCTOBER 30, 6 PM

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FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF UK-FRENCH DECLARATION DELIVERED TO
EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR AT 1630 GMT BY FONOFF AND GIVEN TO
US AMBASSADOR AT 1645 GMT:

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE HAVE
TAKEN NOTE OF THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ISRAEL
AND EGYPT. THIS EVENT THREATENS TO DISRUPT THE FREEDOM
OF NAVIGATION THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL ON WHICH THE
ECONOMIC LIFE OF MANY NATIONS DEPENDS.

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE ARE
RESOLVED TO DO ALL IN THEIR POWER TO BRING ABOUT THE
EARLY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND TO SAFEGUARD THE FREE
PASSAGE OF THE CANAL.

THEY ACCORDINGLY REQUEST THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT:

(A) TO STOP ALL WARLIKE ACTION ON LAND, SEA AND AIR
FORTHWITH;

(B) TO WITHDRAW ALL EGYPTIAN MILITARY FORCES TO A DISTANCE
OF 10 MILES FROM THE CANAL.

(C) IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH
THE CANAL BY THE SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS AND IN ORDER TO
SEPARATE THE BELLIGERENTS, TO ACCEPT THE TEMPORARY OCCU-
PATION BY ANGLO-FRENCH FORCES OF KEY POSITIONS AT PORT
SAID, ISMAILIA AND SUEZ.

THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS REQUEST AN

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1956 OCT 30 4 25 PM

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-2- 2360, OCTOBER 30, 6 PM FROM LONDON

ANSWER TO THIS COMMUNICATION WITHIN 12 HOURS. IF AT THE EXPIRATION OF THAT TIME ONE OR BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOT UNDERTAKEN TO COMPLY WITH THE ABOVE REQUIREMENTS, UNITED KINGDOM AND FRENCH FORCES WILL INTERVENE IN WHATEVER STRENGTH MAY BE NECESSARY TO SECURE COMPLIANCE.

A SIMILAR COMMUNICATION HAS BEEN SENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL.

END VERBATIM TEXT.

ALDRICH

VMM

NOV 1 1956

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OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
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Action
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FROM: PARIS

Control: 17837
Rec'd: OCTOBER 30, 1956
5:52 AM

Info

RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 2046, OCTOBER 30

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WHILE ISRAELI ATTACK DOMINATES HEADLINES THIS MORNING, MAJORITY PRESS HAS NOT HAD TIME FORMULATE COMMENTS. ATTITUDES TAKEN GENERALLY FAVORABLE ISREALIS. FABIANI ON FRONT PAGE COMBAT NOTES TURNING FRENCH CONSULATES AND MOBILIZATION ARAB FORCES, THEN ASKS: " DOES EISENHOWER PREACH MODERATION TO ARABS? NO, HE ADDRESSES HIMSELF TO ISRAEL". CONSIDERS US-UK- FRENCH CONFERENCE AS USELESS, AIMED ONLY AT ABSORBTION OF ARAB BLOC BY US AND AT PROTECTION ARAMCO INTERESTS.

FRANC-TIREUR SAYS THAT IF EGYPT TAKES HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST FRENCH NATIONALS" FRANCE WILL NO LONGER CONTENT ITSELF WITH REPARATIONS AND EXCUSES; SHE WILL REPLY, IF NECESSARY , BY FORCE".

MASSIP IN LEAD STORY IN FIGARO SAYS ATTACK NO SURPRISE; ISRAEL CONSIDERED WASHINGTON ATTITUDE AS ANNOUNCEMENT ABANDONMENT; WEAKNESS WEST ON SUEZ DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE ANY ISRAELI WILLINGNESS ACCEPT ADVICE OR COUNSELS OF PRUDENCE. CONCLUDES DESPITE US DESIRE SEIZE SECUTITY COUNCIL, AT RATE EVENTS MOVING DIPLOMATIC ACTION BEING QUICKLY OUT-STRIPPED.

FIGARO HAS SMALL INNER STORY QUOTING DEFENSE MINISTER BOURGES-MAUNOURY AS SAYING SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT TENSION HAS NOT CEASED MOUNT IN RECENT DAYS. FRANCE KNEW EGYPTIAN TROOPS WERE BEING REINFORCED AT ISRAELI BORDER. GRAVE EVENTS FORESEEN. TO BE PREPARED ALL EVENTUALITIES, FRENCH TROOPS IN CYPRUS PLACED IN STATE" REINFORCED ALERT". THEY READY FACE ANY SITUATION.

DILLON

T-11
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Action

NEA

Control: 18373

Rec'd: October 30, 1956
4:27 p.m.

Info

RMR

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2061, October 30, 4 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2061, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 17, TEL AVIV 37, RABAT, ALGIERS, TUNIS UNNUMBERED

Jordan Ambassador Haikal commenting on Israeli penetration Egyptian territory, said today he believed Israel had three goals in view: to seize and occupy Suez Canal zone, with French complicity; to crush Egyptian government thereby automatically weakening Jordan government and resulting in occupation by Israel of west bank; to enlarge Israeli frontiers and permanently subdue its Arab neighbors.

Haikal was convinced of French complicity, deduction made from French political orientation "since 1952" as well as various items including announcement yesterday's press that Israeli Foreign Minister Meir would visit Paris November 4 to confer French government officials. Haikal not convinced of Britain complicity.

Israeli timing of attack carefully planned, Haikal said, to coincide with Russia's preoccupation Hungary, British and French differences with Egypt over Suez, and forthcoming elections in US.

Although Haikal obviously unaware his government intentions, said Jordan troops were committed as of moment Israel crossed Egyptian frontier. Did not have any views on whether UK would come to Jordan's aid or under what circumstances.

Re Jordan Parliament's decision sever diplomatic relations with France, published French press, Haikal said his government not obligated follow parliamentary decision. He had no indication Jordan government would recall him.

Haikal opened and concluded conversation with impassioned plea for US "to stop war". Spoke with admiration of President's statement and attempts intervene with Ben Gurion. Said that US could win respect and gratitude entire Arab world by putting end to conflict. France, Haikal said, had no appreciation diplomacy, knew only force, and was now in process plunging entire

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-2- 2000 30. 4 p.m. from Paris

entire Middle East (with Communism)
would envelop entire Middle East (whose wife is French)
hoped that US would be able to deal with France in
present crisis, since France would dare continue
support Israel over its interests.

END

MGC:JB-6

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FROM: Bonn

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1666, October 31, 1 p.m.

Control: 19471

Rec'd October 31, 1956
11:10 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1666, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 156, PARIS 247, CAIRO 11, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, ROME UNNUMBERED.

Foreign Office informs us re Suez situation that although as yet no high level determination of Federal Government attitude has been made, Foreign Office press division has been instructed reply to press inquiries concerning Federal Government attitude along following lines:

News of developments in Suez area has been received in government circles with concern. Since basic attitude of the Federal Government is that international conflict should be settled by peaceful means only, Bonn is hopeful that United Nations will be successful in its efforts to preserve peace.

CONANT

LR:JB-6

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Action

Control: 18206
Rec'd: OCTOBER 1:31 PM

NEA

FROM: PARIS

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2069, OCTOBER 30, 6 PM

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2069, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON, CAIRO,
TEL AVIV, TUNIS, RABAT, ALGIERS UNNUMBERED

FROM VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH (#) PRELIMINARY PUBLIC REACTION
ISRAEL INVASION OF EGYPT:

1. AS IN CASE ARREST FIVE ALGERIAN REBELS, THERE IS UN-
QUESTIONED SATISFACTION IN FIRST INSTANCE. DIRECT BLOW AT
NASSER PARTICULARLY WELL-RECEIVED.
2. THERE ARE WIDESPREAD RUMORS IMMINENT FRENCH AND BRITISH
LANDINGS IN EGYPT. PUBLIC OPINION WOULD SUPPORT SUCH MILITARY
OPERATIONS NOW PERHAPS EVEN MORE THAN AT TIME ORIGINAL SUEZ
CRISIS, WE FEEL, BECAUSE OF EXTREME ANNOYANCE NOTHING EFFECTIVE
DONE AGAINST NASSER THEN.
3. ATTITUDE TOWARDS US SEEMS TO BE THAT WE PREVENTED EFFECTIVE
WESTERN POLICY BEFORE SO IT WAS INCUMBENT ON FRANCE AND BRITAIN
GO IT ALONE NOW. THERE IS GENERAL BELIEF US WILL ADOPT
STRONGLY ANTI-ISRAEL POLICY. THERE IS LIKEWISE SOME COMMENT
ALONG LINES US HARDLY IN POSITION ADOPT MORAL JUDGMENT AGAINST
ISRAELI AGGRESSION BECAUSE US HAS ABANDONED ITS MORAL POSITION.
REFUSAL HELP HUNGARIAN PATRIOTS.
4. THERE IS NO RPT NO INTEREST IN WHAT ACTION UN MAY TAKE
THOUGH GENERALLY BELIEVED FRANCE WILL REFUSE ACCEPT ANY ANTI-
ISRAEL MOTION.
5. WE HAVE FOUND SOME SOURCES BELIEVE ENTIRE AFFAIR, PROBABLY

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NEA
1956 OCT 30 PM 4:25

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-2- 2069, OCTOBER 30, 6 PM FROM PARIS

WITH BRITAIN AND FRANCE PARTICIPATION, WILL BE OVER IN FOUR DAYS WITH MILITARY DEFEAT AND DISAPPEARANCE NASSER. OVERTHROW PRESENT EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT IS LEADING FRENCH OBJECTIVE. SEEMS TO BE ACCEPTED THAT FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN ACTIVELY PLANNING AFFAIR WITH ISRAELIS (AND BRITAIN) FOR SOME WEEKS.

6. THERE IS SOME CONCERN OVER REPERCUSSIONS NORTH AFRICA AND UPRISINGS AGAINST FRENCH ARE FEARED ESPECIALLY IN ALGERIA (NOV 1 IS SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF BEGINNING OF REBELLION). THERE SEEMS TO EXIST BELIEF FRANCE SHOULD NOW FOLLOW LIBERAL POLICY WITH MOROCCANS AND TUNISIANS (SENDING SEYDOUX BACK TO TUNIS TENDS BEAR OUT THIS IS GOVT INTENTION). HOWEVER, OTHERS TALK OF MILITARY REOCCUPATION BOTH TUNISIA AND MOROCCO.

7. THERE IS CONCLUSION FRANCE SHOULD MAKE HER OWN DECISIONS AND IN VIEW PROFOUND DISAPPOINTMENT OVER SUEZ UNDER NO RPT NO CIRCUMSTANCES DEFER TO US WISHES.

DILLON

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(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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1961 OCT 30

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OCT 31 AM 7 27

Control: 18318

Rec'd: October 30, 1956
3:23 p.m.

FROM: Stockholm

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 503 October 30, 5 p.m.

Initial Swedish press reaction Israeli invasion of Egypt strongly censures "indefensible bold venture" that might set whole Middle East ablaze. Even normally pro-Israeli papers, while recognizing pressure from Arabs, condemned Israeli action. Liberal DAGENS NYHETER, Jewish owned and pro-Israeli deplored "major systematic retaliation actions against Jordan and Egypt" warned that if war results, "Israel will appear as aggressor", and situation may result whereby "Britain, France, and United States will be called upon intervene against Israel and side by side with Egyptian dictator". Liberal STOCKHOLMS-TIDNINGEN under caption "an act of madness" wrote that Israel had broken armistice and violated treaties and UN Charter. Semi-official Social Democratic MORGON-TIDNINGEN noted that constant Egyptian frontier attacks have cost many Israeli lives and kept Israeli nation in nervous suspense, but questioned whether retaliatory tactics would lead to satisfactory result from either Israeli or world peace viewpoint. Fearing that spark could cause catastrophe it warned that "heavy responsibility" falls on anyone who gives rise to such sparks. Conservative SVENSKA DAGBLADET while trying to understand Israel's apparent desperate decision to employ its present relatively high military might to prevent a deadly threat later on, wrote "its action will stand forth as a challenge to a great section of world opinion," and warned that rather than pursue a successful preventative war Israel may prove that old saying of what happens to him who lives by the sword.

COCHRAN

AAL/HSO/2

674.84M/10-3056

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by RM/R

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FROM: Stockholm

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 503, October 30, 5 p.m.

Control: 18318

Rec'd: October 30, 1956

3:23 p.m.

The serial number of this OFFICIAL USE ONLY message received as 508 should be corrected to read 503.

JAK-16

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 30, 1956

SUBJECT: Israeli Invasion of Egypt.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. F. J. Blakeney, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Australian Embassy
Mr. J. C. Ingram, Second Secretary, Australian Embassy

NEA - Mr. J. Lampton Berry
NE - Mr. Maurice S. Rice

COPIES TO: OLI(2cc); NEA(2cc); NE(3cc); SPA(cc)

Mr. Berry received Mr. Blakeney at 3:00 o'clock instead of Mr. Rountree who was occupied in the Secretary's office.

Mr. Blakeney said he sought information on the latest developments concerning Israel's invasion of Egypt and the British-French ultimatum. Mr. Berry said we have received little information on the hostilities and no official notice of the ultimatum. Further, he said, the US had no previous knowledge of the latter action.

Mr. Blakeney said it appeared to him that today's developments in the SC had been overtaken by the British-French move and that another effort in the SC would have to be taken if Egypt and Israel reject the ultimatum.

Mr. Blakeney then asked for Mr. Berry's views on Israel's purpose in launching its invasion. Mr. Berry replied that there is no hard estimate on this point, but his personal belief is that Israel would not have gone as far as she has for a limited objective. They must want the downfall of Nasser, he said.

Mr. Blakeney said he had read much press speculation that Britain, France and Israel are acting on a coordinated plan. Mr. Berry replied that there was evidence that the French might have known in advance of the Israeli attack. He then referred to a conversation Ambassador Aldrich had had with Selwyn Lloyd Sunday night which indicated that Lloyd might not have had prior knowledge of Israel's plans.

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NOV 30 1956

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- 2 -

Mr. Blakeney asked what Mr. Berry regarded as the main disadvantage of the Israeli attack. Mr. Berry said from the US standpoint we have wanted from the outset a settlement of the Suez question without having the Israeli-Arab issue beclouding the issue. Now, he added, the problem is further complicated.

Mr. Blakeney then said it was most important that he see Mr. Rountree during the next 24 hours. Mr. Berry said he would tell Mr. Rountree of his request.

See
NEA:NE:MSRice:mfr/amb
10/31/56 *WBR*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

October 30, 1956

CATEGORY "B"

To be read only with the permission
of the Director of S/S.

To: G - Mr. Murphy
C - Mr. MacArthur
IO - Mr. Wilcox
NEA - Mr. Rountree
EUR - Mr. Elbrick

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of the Director of S/S.

The following draft message to the President of the Security Council was telephoned to Ambassador Lodge's office on October 30:

Excellency:

The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States have received information to the effect that in violation of the armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt, the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory. This military action commenced October 29 and is continuing in the Sinai area. The situation makes imperative an immediate meeting of the Security Council, charged as it is with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as well as responsibility for the observance of the Armistice Agreement.

We have the honor, therefore, in behalf of our Governments to request you to convene a meeting of the Security Council as soon as possible to consider "The Palestine Question: Steps for the Immediate Cessation of the Military Action of Israel against Egypt".

Accept, etc.

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AUG 14 1963

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Per Bradford S/S-RO

SPECIAL HANDLING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : NEA - Mr. Rountree

DATE: October 30, 1956

FROM : SOA - W. Witman *Witman*

SUBJECT: Call of Pakistan Ambassador at 12:00 noon October 30

*6842.902
780.5*

The Pakistan Ambassador has requested an appointment to see you to obtain the Department's reaction to recent developments in the Middle East, particularly with respect to reported clashes between the Israelis and the Egyptians. Ambassador Ali has no instructions but is anxious to inform his Government of the Department's views on current Middle East developments.

You may wish to take this opportunity to mention to the Pakistan Ambassador our concern at the recent public statements of the Pakistan Foreign Minister naming India as Pakistan's "principal enemy", and justifying Pakistan's membership in the SEATO and Baghdad Pacts on the grounds of Pakistan's need for a "posture of strength" against India (Tab A).

Ambassador Hildreth on the Department's instructions recently spoke along these lines to the Prime Minister of Pakistan (Tabs B and C).

Attachments:

- Tab A - New Delhi telegram 988.
- Tab B - Department's telegram 864 to Karachi.
- Tab C - Karachi telegram 1058.

DC/R
Anal <i>16</i>
Rev <i>[initials]</i>
Cat <i>[initials]</i>

NEA: SOA: GHSoul en: WWitman: mb

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 NOV 20 1956

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674.84A/10-3055

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Control: 18493 ZI

Rec'd: OCTOBER 30, 1956
8:21 PM

FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2372, OCTOBER 31

NIACT

COMMONS TONIGHT DEBATED ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION CALLING ON ISRAEL AND EGYPT WITHDRAW FROM SUEZ CANAL. OPPOSITION ATTACKED GOVTS RECKLESS ACTION IN BYPASSING UN, PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF FAILURE CONSULT US. PARLIAMENT SUPPORTED GOVT. AS EXPECTED IN DIVISION CALLED GAITSKELL, 270-218.

EDEN PROVIDED LITTLE FURTHER INFO RE ANGLO-FRENCH INTENTIONS IN EVENT EGYPTIANS, ISRAELI'S IGNORED CALL TO WITHDRAW FROM CANAL. BASED ARGUMENT MAINLY ON WHAT HE TERMED NECESSITY PROTECT BRITISH INTERESTS AND SHIPPING IN CANAL ZONE. STATED TRIPARTITE PACT OF 1950 NOT RPT NOT MATERIAL SINCE EGYPT HAD NEVER RECOGNIZED AND HAD IN FACT FREQUENTLY ATTACKED. LLOYD, IN ANSWER ROBENS QUESTIONS RE EXTENT CONSULTATION WITH US, STATED HMG IN CLOSE COMMUNICATION WITH USG BUT BOTH BRITISH AND FRENCH RESERVED RIGHT TAKE INDEPENDENT ACTION WHERE THEIR INTERESTS CONCERNED.

OPPOSITION DEMANDED EDEN PROMISE REFRAIN FROM MILITARY ACTION PENDING SC DECISION. WHEN EDEN DECLARED INTENTION MAINTAIN FREEDOM OF ACTION TO TAKE SUCH MEASURES AS SAW FIT, GAITSKELL CALLED FOR DIVISION.

SEVERAL OPPOSITION SPEAKERS EXPRESSED DOUBTS ISRAELI ATTACK IN ANY WAY THREAT TO CANAL, THEREFORE DID NOT RPT NOT JUSTIFY BRITISH-FRENCH OCCUPATION.

CABINET REPORTED MEETING AFTER COMMONS SESSION TO CONSIDER REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL MESSAGE APPEALING FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

ALDRICH

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Note: Mr. Rountree (NEA) notified 10/30 9:10 p.m. RM

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39
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To Sec State

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39

United States
Information Agency

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Control: 19370
Rec'd: OCTOBER 31, 1956
7:09 PM

Action

IPS

FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

Info

I/S

TO: United States Information Agency

I/L

IRI

NO: TOUSI 138, OCTOBER 31

IOP

IOP/LN

IOP/LS

IOP/PA

IBS/NB

JOINT USIA-STATE MESSAGE.

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IBS

IN RIO PRESS ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN SITUATION TODAY TOOK PRECEDENCE OVER EASTERN EUROPEAN EVENTS ALTHOUGH LATTER CONTINUE TO RECEIVE HEAVY NEWS AND EDITORIAL ATTENTION.

CIA

OCB

OSD

SINCE TOO EARLY FOR SIGNIFICANT EDITORIAL REACTION TO NEAR EAST NEWS HEADLINES ARE PRINCIPAL CLUES TO PRESS ATTITUDE. IN SECOND EDITION OF MORNING CORREIO DA MANHA CARRIED TOP 8 COLUMN HEADLINE SAYING "PARACHUTISTS LEAVE TO OCCUPY SUEZ". THIS BASED ON UP ITEM FROM LONDON. AMONG OTHER PAGE ONE ITEMS WERE REPORT THAT FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN HAD VETOED BOTH U.S. AND RUSSIAN RESOLUTIONS IN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THAT EISENHOWER HAD APPEALED TO ENGLAND AND FRANCE NOT TO USE FORCE IN MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

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DIARIO DE NOTICIAS TOP HEADLINE SAID "ENGLAND AND FRANCE AID INVAS BY ISRAEL". FOREIGN NEWS COMMENTATOR SAME PAPER CONCLUDED THAT BEN GURION'S ACTION IN INVADING EGYPT WAS PROTECTED, IF NOT STIMULATED, AND THAT IT WAS NOT A MATTER OF CHANCE. THIS, IT WAS POINTED OUT, IS WHAT ENGLAND AND FRANCE HAVE WANTED. MEANWHILE BEN GURION CAN COUNT ON DELAY OR PARALYSIS OF U.S. ACTION DUE TO INTERNAL FORCES INCLUDING ELECTIONS.

O JORNAL COMMENTATOR TOOK SIMILAR LINE IN ANALYZING POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGY OF SITUATION. WRITER CONCLUDES THAT ISRAEL IS NOT CARRYING OUT A SUICIDAL LONE-WOLF CAMPAIGN AIMED TO CONQUER EGYPT.

DC/R

WHILE O GLOBO PLAYED WAR NEWS PAGE ONE UNDER HEADLINE SAYING "POWERFUL FRANCO-BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN MOTION TO DISSEMBARK AT SUEZ" PAPER GAVE SECOND POSITION TO UP DESPATCH FROM WASHINGTON UNDER HEADLINE "U.S. WILL NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN WAR." PAPER ALSO REPORTED INTERVIEW WITH EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR BRAZIL WHO QUOTED SAYING "IN SPITE OF TALK OF PEACE ISRAEL HAS BEEN PREPARING FOR WAR FOR LONG TIME."

IN PAGE ONE EDITORIAL TRIBUNA DA IMPRENSA SAID THAT WHILE EVENTS HUNGARY AND

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-2- TOUSI 138, OCTOBER 31, FROM RIO DE JANEIRO

HUNGARY AND SUEZ PLUNGE WORLD INTO ATMOSPHERE OF IMMINENT WAR WITH U.S. PARALYZED BY ELECTIONS. IT DOES NOT BELIEVE WAR WILL BECOME GENERAL. PAPER CONCLUDED FRANCO-BRITISH ACTION IN SUEZ CASE MERITS RESPECT SINCE THOSE COUNTRIES FIGHT FOR PRESERVATION OF LEGITIMATE INTERESTS.

EDITORIALS CONTINUE ON HUNGARIAN REVOLT. IN EDITORIAL TITLED "PRICE OF LIBERTY" O GLOBO REFERRED TO MOSCOW'S ATTEMPT TO TAKE OVER GUATEMALA AND POINTED OUT THAT WHAT HAPPENED IN HUNGARY DEMONSTRATES PRICE THAT MUST BE PAID BY CITIZENS WHEN BOLSHEVIKS GAIN FOOTHOLD.

O JORNAL EDITORIAL PRAISED BRAZILIAN FOREIGN OFFICE ACTION IN DEPLORING INTERVENTION OF SOVIET TROOPS IN HUNGARY. PAPER CONCLUDED "AMERICAN REPUBLICS CANNOT BE SILENT IN FACE OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN HUNGARY AND BRAZIL, ALWAYS A PIONEER IN FIGHT AGAINST INTERVENTIONS, MUST ACT AS IT DID, PLACING ITSELF AMONG THE FIRST TO APPLAUD CALLING SECURITY COUNCIL TO MANIFEST AGAINST INVASION OF MAGYAR SOIL BY RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS."

VEBBER

TJI

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Amembassy BRUSSELS 580
Amembassy LUXEMBOURG 43
Amembassy PARIS TOPOL 708
Amembassy THE HAGUE 789
Amembassy ROME 1831

Origin

Info

Elbrick today reviewed Middle East developments with Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg Ambassadors. He acknowledged U.S. and seriousness fact deep differences exist between French-British on this issue. He emphasized desirability attempting to minimize to extent possible any adverse effect this divergence on Western alliance. Stated U.S./~~plans~~ continues place importance on NATO relationship. Commented on most unfortunate fact that Middle East developments limited Western ability exploit situation in Eastern Europe.

In separate conversation Counselor Italian Embassy voiced to Department officer deep concern re possible effect Middle East developments on NATO unity and strength. Department officer commented along foregoing lines to Counselor.

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(QZ)

Draft: EUR:WE:TCCameron:jlc
RA:BELT:monons:mck;EUR:CBElbrick:

Telegraphic transmission and
Classification approved by:

C. Burke Elbrick

Clearances: WE - Mr. Jones

WE - Mr. Eagle

S/S-CR

OCT 31 1956 P.M.

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NOV 1 1956

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Department of State

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Action Assigned to
Control: 373
Rec'd: November 1, 1956
9:50 a.m.

Action

FE FROM: Canberra

Info

RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 218, November 1

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PRIORITY

Australian Labor Party today announced unanimous adoption
resolution summarized as follows:

1. Strongly condemns threats for force to Egypt and Israel and use of force pursuant ultimatum.
2. Opines that object of ultimatum was acquisition Suez.
3. Repudiate Menzies' Suez speech and point of contrary to UN Charter.
4. Agree UD Labor Party attitude in condemning ultimatum.
5. Demand immediate reconsideration by eight GA or SC.
6. Will oppose attempts of government to involve Australia in Suez war.

MESSAGE UNSIGNED

JCK/8

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

73 Department of State

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44
Action

ARA FROM: San Salvador
Info RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 146, November 1, 5 p.m.

G
SP

C Foreign Office spontaneously expressed warm applause US attitude in
EUR United Nations on Israeli-Egyptian issue.

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Control: 843
Rec'd: November 1, 1956
9:34 p.m.

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United States Information Agency

074.742/11-156

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Control 616

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 1, 1956

2:40 PM

FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

TO: United States Information Agency

NO: TOUSI 141, NOVEMBER 1

JOINT USIA STATE MESSAGE

VIN SECOND DAY INTERNATIONAL CRISIS OVER SUEZ RIO PRESS BEGINS WHO ATTITUDE BOTH IN NEWS AND EDITORIALISM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S RADIO-TV ADDRESS RECEIVED GOOD PLAY, BUT SECONDARY TO NEWS COVERING ACTION IN EGYPT. CORREIO DA MANHA PLAYED STORY STRAIGHT WITH LIBERAL QUOTES UNDER HEAD SAYING "U.S. WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN MIDDLE EAST FIGHT".

DIARIO DE NOTICIAS CARRIED ITEM FROM LONDON DESCRIBING OPPOSITION TO EDEN'S POLICY IN HOUSE OF COMMONS UNDER HEAD "EDEN SABOTAGED WORLD PEACE". SAME NEWSPAPER SAID IN INTERNATIONAL NEWS COMMENTARY THAT FRANCO-BRITISH ACTION WAS AMORAL AND MEANT RETURN OF COLONIALISM

COMMENT CONCLUDED: "AGAIN U.S. SHOWS ITSELF IN STATURE OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES BY REPROVING METHODS OF ISRAEL, ENGLAND AND FRANCE."

O JORNAL SAID EDITORIALLY THAT WHILE ACTION OF FRANCE AND ENGLAND IN OCCUPYING SUEZ MAY NOT FIND SUPPORT IN INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND ACCORDS IT HAS ITS LOGIC. PAPER CONCLUDED: "U.S. OCCUPIED WITH ELECTIONS AND RUSSIA GRAVELY DISTURBED BY UPRISING OF SATELLITES, DO NOT HAVE TIME OR TASTE TO GO BEYOND GIVING ADVICE."

TRIBUNA DA IMPRENSA SAID EDITORIALLY THAT FRANCO-BRITISH ACTION MERITS RESPECT SINCE THOSE COUNTRIES FIGHT FOR PRESERVATION OF LEGITIMATE INTERESTS.

VEBBER

PTT

1956

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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CORRECTION ISSUED:
11/6/56 8:30 AM BB
Control: 3204
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 5, 1956
12:28 PM

FROM: MOSCOW - CORRECTED COPY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1074, NOVEMBER 5, 6 PM

NIACT

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

SHEPILOV THIS AFTERNOON HANDED ME A LETTER SIGNED BY BULGANIN ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT, SUGGESTING IN ESSENCE THAT US AND SOVIET UNION SHOULD JOIN ITS FORCES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN TO BRING ABOUT A HALT TO THE AGGRESSION AGAINST EGYPT. SHEPILOV, IN HANDING ME THE COMMUNICATION, FULL TRANSLATION OF WHICH WILL BE IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, STATED THAT ALTHOUGH THE UN HAD SHOWN ACTIVITY THE LAST WEEK, THE WAR STILL WENT ON IN EGYPT AND IF THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION COULD JOIN TOGETHER THEY COULD WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN BRING A HALT TO THIS AGGRESSION AND RESTORE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

I ASKED MR. SHEPILOV WHAT HE MEANT BY "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN", AND HE REPLIED THAT ANY DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN WITHIN ITS FRAMEWORK AND HE HAD SENT, AS INDICATED IN THE LETTER, SIMILAR COMMUNICATIONS TO HAMMARSKJOLD AND THE PRESIDENT SECURITY COUNCIL. I ASKED HIM IF SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS SERIOUSLY SUGGESTING THAT THE US SHOULD USE ARMED FORCE AGAINST ENGLAND AND FRANCE. HE REPLIED THAT WAS NOT BEING PROPOSED AND WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY IF THE US AND USSR WOULD MAKE PLAIN THEIR "DETERMINATION" TO SEE THE FIGHTING COME TO A HALT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I TOLD HIM I COULD NOT COMMENT ON SO SERIOUS A MATTER BUT WOULD SEND THE PROPOSAL IMMEDIATELY TO THE PRESIDENT.

ALTHOUGH I DID NOT RAISE WITH HIM QUESTION PUBLICATION, IN VIEW RECENT BACKGROUND THAT QUESTION, SINCE HE HAS SENT COMMUNICATION TO UN I ASSUME PUBLICATION WILL TAKE PLACE VERY SHORTLY.

SECRET

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674.84a
11-5556

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1074

11/5/56

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4/3/59

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112 X master

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at Goodpastor's
Residence

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Jackson

CIA ✓ #10

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USIA

USUN-Lodge

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OTHER #11 Pres File

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U/OP (Higgs)

(Richards)

(21)
INCOMING TELEGRAM

F770000-0144
Department of State

ACTION COPY

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36
Action
SS
Info

Control: 3283
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 5, 1956
2:03 PM

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1081 NOVEMBER 5, 7 P M

NIACT

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 3/4/77
PER R.D.Vme OFFICE EUR
EADRC FOI CASE NO. 640307
McCauley

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING.

THERE FOLLOWS TEXT BULGANIN LETTER TO PRESIDENT.

BEGIN TEXT.

MOSCOW, KREMLIN, NOV 5, 1956. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT.

IN ALARMING AND RESPONSIBLE MOMENT FOR CAUSE GENERAL PEACE I
APPEAL TO YOU IN NAME SOVIET GOVT.

WEEK HAS ALREADY PASSED SINCE ARMED FORCES ENGLAND, FRANCE
AND ISRAEL, WHICH IS SUBSERVIENT TO WILL EXTERNAL FORCES,
ATTACKED EGYPT WITHOUT ANY CAUSE, CAUSING DEATH AND DESTRUCTION.
INHUMANE BOMBARDMENTS BY ENGLISH AND FRENCH AVIATION OF EGYPTIAN
AERODROMES, PORTS, INSTALLATIONS, CITIES, CENTERS OF POPULATION
ARE TAKING PLACE. ANGLO-FRENCH TROOPS HAVE LANDED ON EGYPTIAN
TERRITORY. FROM FIRE OF OCCUPIERS HAVE PERISHED HUGE TREASURES
CREATED BY WORK OF EGYPTIAN PEOPLE, FROM DAY TO DAY HUMAN
SACRIFICES ARE INCREASING, BEFORE EYES WHOLE WORLD IS UNFOLDING
AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST EGYPT, AGAINST ARAB PEOPLES, WHOSE ONLY
FAULT CONSISTS OF FACT THAT THEY ARE DEFENDING THEIR FREEDOM
AND INDEPENDENCE.

SITUATION IN EGYPT REQUIRES IMMEDIATE AND MOST DECISIVE
ACTIONS ON PART UN. IF SUCH ACTIONS ARE NOT UNDERTAKEN, UN
WILL LOSE IN EYES OF ALL MANKIND ITS PRESTIGE AND WILL COLLAPSE.

SOVIET UNION AND U.S. ARE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL
AND ARE TWO GREAT POWERS POSSESSING ALL CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF

PERMANENT

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1081
Moscow
674-84a/11-556

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-2- 1081, NOVEMBER 5, 7 PM, FROM MOSCOW, CN 3283

ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING ATOM AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS. ON US LIES SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PUT STOP TO WAR AND TO RESTORE PEACE AND TRANQUILLITY TO AREA OF NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IF GOVTS OF USSR AND USA FIRMLY ANNOUNCE THEIR WILL TO GUARANTEE PEACE AND WILL CONDEMN AGGRESSION THEN AGGRESSION WILL BE TERMINATED AND THERE WILL BE NO WAR.

MR PRESIDENT, IN THESE THREATENING HOURS WHEN HIGHEST PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY, BASES AND OBJECTIVES OF UN ARE BEING SUBJECTED TO AN ORDEAL, SOVIET GOVT TURNS TO GOVT OF U.S. WITH PROPOSAL FOR CLOSE COOPERATION TO STOP AGGRESSION AND TERMINATE FURTHER BLOOD-SHED.

U.S. HAS IN AREA OF MEDITERRANEAN SEA A STRONG NAVAL FLEET. SOVIET UNION ALSO HAS STRONG NAVAL FLEET AND POWERFUL AVIATION. UNITED AND URGENT USE OF THESE MEANS ON PART OF U.S. AND SOVIET UNION IN ACCORDANCE WITH DECISION OF UN WOULD BE RELIABLE GUARANTEE OF TERMINATION OF AGGRESSION AGAINST EGYPTIAN PEOPLE, AGAINST COUNTRIES OF ARAB EAST.

SOVIET GOVT APPEALS TO GOVT OF U.S. TO UNITE THEIR EFFORTS IN UN FOR ADOPTING DECISIVE MEASURES TO TERMINATE AGGRESSION.

SOVIET GOVT ALREADY HAS APPEALED TO SECURITY COUNCIL AND EXTRA-ORDINARY SPECIAL SESSION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY WITH APPROPRIATE PROPOSALS.

SUCH JOINT STEPS OF U.S. AND SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT THREATEN INTERESTS OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE. POPULAR MASSES OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE DO NOT WANT WAR, JUST AS MUCH AS OUR PEOPLES, THEY DESIRE PRESERVATION PEACE. ALSO MANY OTHER GOVTS ALONG WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE ARE INTERESTED IN IMMEDIATE PACIFICATION AND RESTORATION OF NORMAL FUNCTIONING SUEZ CANAL DISRUPTED BY MILITARY ACTIONS. AGGRESSION AGAINST EGYPT WAS BY NO MEANS UNDERTAKEN FOR SAKE OF FREEDOM OF SHIPPING THROUGH SUEZ CANAL WHICH WAS GUARANTEED. PIRATICAL WAR WAS UNLEASHED FOR PURPOSE OF RESTORING

UNCLASSIFIED

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-3- 1081, NOVEMBER 5, 7 PM, FROM MOSCOW, CN 3483

COLONIAL ORDER IN EAST WHICH HAD BEEN OVERTHROWN BY PEOPLES.
IF THIS WAR IS NOT STOPPED, IT IS FRAUGHT WITH DANGER AND
CAN GROW INTO THIRD WORLD WAR.

IF SOVIET UNION AND U.S.A. SUPPORT VICTIM OF AGRESSION, THEN
OTHER MEMBER-GOVERNMENTS OF UN WILL UNITE WITH THEM IN THESE
EFFORTS. AT SAME TIME AUTHORITY UN WILL BE INCREASED TO SIGNIFICANT
DEGREE, PEACE WILL BE RESTORED AND STRENGTHENED.

SOVIET GOVT IS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS
WITH GOVT U.S. ON PRACTICAL EXECUTION OF PROPOSALS PRESENTED
ABOVE IN ORDER THAT EFFECTIVE ACTIONS IN INTERESTS PEACE
COULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN NEAREST FUTURE.

IN THIS TENSE MOMENT OF HISTORY WHEN FATE OF ALL ARAB EAST ALONG
WITH THAT FATE OF WORLD IS BEING DECIDED, I AWAIT FAVORABLE ANSWER
FROM YOU.

SINCERELY,

(SIGNED) N. BULGANIN

TO HIS EXCELLENCY
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON.

END TEXT

BOHLEN

AB

UNCLASSIFIED PRESIDENTIAL
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P. Hall

President 2
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1081
11/5/56
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Message
Belgium to
President on
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U/OP (Higgs)
(Richards)

EYES ONLY

18 Names Book
17 Green's Book
5 Hal Shear
3- Poundett

(21)
INCOMING TELEGRAM

F770000-G147

Department of State

ACTION COPY

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Action
S/S

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1083, NOVEMBER 5, 8 PM

Control: 3288

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 5, 1956
2:05 PM

NIACT

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 3/4/77

PER R.D.Vme OFFICE EGR

EADRC EOI CASE NO. 640307 McCauley

IT IS HARDLY LIKELY THAT SOVIET GOVT ANTICIPATES ANY POSSIBILITY THAT THEIR PROPOSAL FOR JOINT ACTION BRING FIGHTING MIDDLE EAST TO HALT WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE U.S. GOVT, AND THEREFORE PURPOSE BEHIND THIS ACTION SHOULD BE SOUGHT ELSEWHERE.

1. IN LARGE PART, IF NOT ENTIRELY, PROPOSAL IS MOTIVATED BY DESIRE THROUGH SPECTACULAR PROPOSAL THIS NATURE TO DIVERT WORLD ATTENTION FROM SOVIET ACTION HUNGARY AND PROVIDE SOVIET PROPAGANDA WITH ADDITIONAL QUESTION TO AGITATE.

2. HOWEVER, IN EXTREMELY TENSE SITUATION BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO DISMISS THIS MERELY AS AN EMPTY PROPAGANDA GESTURE.

3. EGYPTIAN RESISTANCE HAS LASTED NOW OVER A WEEK AND AS INDICATED EMBTEL 1027 POSSIBILITY SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE RELATED IN PART TO DURATION EGYPTIAN RESISTANCE.

4. SOVIET UNION IN ACTION AGAINST HUNGARY HAS CASUT ASIDE ANY PRETENSE TO MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THIS FACT MAY INCREASE WILLINGNESS TO RISK MORE HAZARDOUS ACTION IN MIDDLE EAST THAN WOULD NORMALLY HAVE BEEN CASE.

5. I DO NOT SEE SOVIET UNION DELIBERATELY STARTING WORLD WAR III AND REFERENCE TO ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS IN COMMUNICATION MAY BE MERELY DESIGNED TO ENHANCE DRAMATIC EFFECT OF PROPOSAL, BUT SOME FORM OF ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT APPEARS MORE LIKELY THAN IT DID AT INITIATION BRITISH AND FRENCH ACTION. AS ALREADY

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Moscow

674.84a
11-5-56

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F770228-0148

--2- 1083, NOVEMBER 5, 8 PM FROM MOSCOW

REPORTED EMBTEL 1060, THERE WAS STRONG SMELL OF SOME MILITARY
DEAL IN UYRAIN TALKS HERE, AND THREAT TO IRAN IS ALWAYS PRESENT.

NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF SOVIET PROPOSAL BUT RATHER IN SPITE OF IT EVERY
CONSIDERATION OF WISDOM WOULD INDICATE SPEEDY CEASE FIRE
BY BRITISH AND FRENCH IF THIS COULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT WITHOUT
REFERENCE TO SOVIET PROPOSAL; IF BRITISH AND FRENCH COULD BE
INDUCED TO DECLARE CEASE FIRE IMMEDIATELY THIS WOULD UNDERCUT
EFFECT SOVIET PROPOSAL AND ELIMINATE WHAT ELEMENT OF REAL DANGER
INVOLVED IN SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES.

BOHLEN

VMM

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1083

11/5/56

3288

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P. Hall

President 2
State
Jackson

the message
B. Lyman
President on Suez
Ritzgoy
Murray

CIA ✓ #10- Allen Dulles.

ICA

USIA

USUN-Lodge

SEC DEFENSE

ISA

JCS

OTHER #11 Pres File

✓ 14
✓ 8-

ARA

FE

NEA ✓ 13 picked up by
Mr. Rountree

U/OP (Higgs)

(Richards)

EYES ONLY

NND 897403
BOX 2677

①
11/11

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 674.84A/11-656
Tel 1345
Date 11/6/56
From Cairo
To SecState

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

State
Authority

11/4/89
Date

①

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

32

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

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AIR

FROM: Beirut

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1115, November 6, 6 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1115, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 58, LONDON 127, TEL AVIV 60, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, CAIRO, JIDDA, BAGHDAD UNNUMBERED.

Henry LaBouisse Dirgen UNRWA just returned from trip to Gaza. He said there was no doubt his mind Israeli forces considered themselves as there to stay. Israeli commander has had several arguments with American colonel representing UNTSO in Gaza: Israel said UNTSO had no business in Gaza strip.

HEATH

LR:JLN/12

Control: 4664

Rec'd: November 6, 1956
11:10 p.m.

It is to be returned to
Rm 8
Central
files
674.34A/11-656

HBS

NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

1956 NOV 7 PM 3 16

Confidential File

NOV 1 1956

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F770000-0149

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

November 5, 1956

The Acting Secretary -

Subject: Bulganin Letter to the President

Colonel Goodpaster indicated that the President would probably wish to see you about this upon your return from the Secretary.

The enclosed telegram (1074) was sent to the White House and at Colonel Goodpaster's request to Admiral Radford and Mr. Allen Dulles.

The full text of the letter itself is being processed (if available I will attach) and it will also be sent promptly to the White House, Radford, and Allen Dulles.

Messrs. Murphy, Henderson, Phleger, and Allen Dulles have been working on this matter and may have suggestions for you.

You should know that Colonel Goodpaster remarked on the ~~sending time of Moscow's 1074~~, namely 6 p.m. local time, which would be 10 a.m. our time. The Moscow radio commenced broadcasting the text at 9:30 a.m. our time, which is presumably about when Bohlen received the letter and before he could telegraph it.


Fisher Howe

Attachment

INCOMING TELEGRAM

F770005-0150
Department of State

A/S

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

Control:

Rec'd:

4:07

NOVEMBER 6, 1951

0344 AM

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: NOVEMBER 6, 3 PM

DECLASSIFICATION DATE

3/4/77

PER R.D.Vine

OFFICE EUR

FADRC FOI CASE NO.

640307 McCauley

SENT DEPARTMENT 09 3 PM AED INFORMATION PRIORITY MOSCOW
229. PRIORITY PARIS 204

REF ID: AAL 1091

674.84a/11-556

THE SITUATION IN GERMANY AFTER THE END OF THE SECOND
WORLD WAR HAS BEEN A SUBJECT OF CONTINUING INTEREST
AND CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES. THE FACTS OF THE
CASE ARE WELL KNOWN. THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN
ALONG WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE. THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN
IN EGYPT CONTINUING. THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN
INDICATIONS TO BRITAIN AND FRANCE. THE UNITED STATES
DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO MAINTAIN COMBINED ACTION IN
FIGHTING CONTINUING AND CERTAIN DEVELOPMENT AND
ARE STILL CAPABLE OF RESISTANCE.

THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A SUBJECT OF CONTINUING
INTEREST AND CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES. THE
FACTS OF THE CASE ARE WELL KNOWN. THE SOVIET
UNION HAS BEEN ALONG WITH THE UNITED STATES IN
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE. THE
UNITED STATES HAS BEEN IN EGYPT CONTINUING.
THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN INDICATIONS TO
BRITAIN AND FRANCE. THE UNITED STATES
DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO MAINTAIN COMBINED
ACTION IN FIGHTING CONTINUING AND CERTAIN
DEVELOPMENT AND ARE STILL CAPABLE OF
RESISTANCE.

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Moscow

1091

674.84a/11-656

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091, NOV-MBEP 6, 3 PM FROM MOSCOW

I SHALL BE SENDING MESSAGE LATER THIS MORNING GIVING JOINT UNION SERVICE ATTACHES-HELP AS TO MILITARY POSSIBILITIES OPEN TO SOVIET UNION IN REGARD TO MIDDLE EAST FIGHTING.

KEY FACTOR REMAINS NOW OF COURSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN REGARD TO HOSTILITIES. AND WHILE SOVIETS HAVE OTHER IRONS IN THE FIRE I BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE PRIMARILY AT THIS STAGE INTERESTED IN SEEING CESSATION HOSTILITIES. SOVIET THREAT, I REALIZE, HAS COMPLICATED SITUATION BUT I STILL ADHERE TO VIEWS EXPRESSED LAST PARAGRAPH REFTEL.

IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT TO CONVINCE SOVIETS THAT ANY MILITARY ACTION ON THEIR PART AGAINST BRITAIN AND FRANCE WOULD ENCOUNTER THE ARMED OPPOSITION OF THE U.S. HOWEVER, THIS WARNING WOULD BE VERY MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE IF IT COULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY SOME OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION FROM U. S. GOVERNMENT AS TO WHEN ALL HOSTILITIES WOULD CEASE AGAINST EGYPT.

BOLEN

DT

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Air Pouch

PRIORITY

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(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM Amconsul, Haifa

23
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

November 21, 1956

REF : -----

67 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION REC'D 11/9	DEPT. IN OTHER O	<i>Send copies as requested in para 3 (4)</i> Rm 2. OL-6, EUR-5 TO-4, S/S 2, S/P-1 CIA-12, U.S.I.A.-16, Army-4, Navy-3
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SUBJECT: The Arab Community In Israel Since Outbreak Of Hostilities Between Israel And Egypt.

With the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Egypt on October 30, 1956 relatively few additional security restrictions were placed on the movement or activities of the Arab minority in Galilee. There were some reports of somewhat increased travel restrictions, mainly in the form of increased travel pass controls. However, these were generally minor in nature, and it must be assumed that the Israel Defense Forces were determined to give the Arab minority a benefit of doubt until an overt action might have been taken. Since areas along the borders held heavy troop concentrations security of the interior was considered a relatively minor problem. Some arrests of known communist or other agitators have been reported in Galilee. The morning following Abdul Nasser's call for sabotage of Western oil installations in the Arab States, immediate security measures affecting both the Haifa port itself and all other major oil installations near Haifa were put into effect. There were immediate increases of the guards at the entrances to the port, the Consolidated Refineries Ltd., the IPC tank farm and the Israel fuel depot nearby. An order was issued prohibiting the entry of all "minorities" to these installations. The order has since been relaxed only slightly to admit some trusted Druzes.

Unofficial reports from a usually reliable source have reached the drafting officer that severe disturbances took place on the first day of the reported outbreak of hostilities in villages of the little triangle. These reports indicate that abortive insurrections took place among villagers from Tira, Taiyba and Kafr Qasim. Numbers of Arab inhabitants of these villages are said to have attempted to bar Israel Army units from entering the area and were disbursed only by gunfire. The information, if true, is apparently being kept secret by the Israel authorities.

There seems little doubt that the great majority of Israel Arabs were hopeful that Israel would be defeated by Egyptian

LRCowles:mpm
REPORTER

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forces. Reports reaching the Consulate stress the early jubilation which was followed by profound gloom as the IDF penetrated deeply into the Sinai peninsula. Some Christian Arab elements may have felt a sense of relief at the announcement that British and French forces were attacking the Egyptians at Suez. Nevertheless, it is believed that the overwhelming majority of the Arabs here have viewed Russian statements regarding her possible intervention in the area with renewed anticipation and hope. Abdul Nasser is considered by them still as a hero who only withdrew his forces from Sinai in order more effectively to encounter the British and French. Indeed he has even gained their greater respect and admiration for his apparent success in holding off French and British forces "until they were forced by a Russian ultimatum to ask for a cease-fire."

The Druze community has remained outwardly loyal through-out this period. It has been estimated that some 2000 Druze reservists are under arms, and protestations of loyalty have been made by several among the Druze leadership. In some one or two of the Druze villages, it was learned, schools were closed by the Druzes themselves when school teachers were discovered preaching disloyalty to the State of Israel. More recently there appears to be some evidence that the Israel intelligence service is seeking ways to find a "bridge" between the Druzes of Israel and Syria. The only well-educated Druze leader in Israel, Sheikh ABDULLAH Khair, a graduate of A.U.B., has informed me that he has been approached for his advice by a member of the Israel intelligence service and by the Mayor of Haifa, Mr. Abba KHOUSEY, on this matter as recently as yesterday. Sheikh Abdullah was a former District Commissioner during Mandate times. He holds a British passport and has been considered in the past somewhat suspect by the Israel Government because he has refused to take any part in Israel's Arab politics. In his discussions with the Israeli authorities he reports that they are seeking a way to neutralize the Jebel Druze in Syria. His reported advice is that Israel should take no action by herself since this would only drive the Syrian Druze community into further cooperation with the Syrians against Israel. Instead, he suggested a way must be found in collaboration with Britain or the United States to channel Druze politics away from the pro-communist direction of the present Syrian Government. It is only in this field that there is any opportunity for Israel and the Syrian Druze to find a common front. Sheikh Abdullah was told that his recommendations would be brought to the attention of Mr. DIVON in the Prime Minister's office for further consideration.

COMMENT: It is extremely doubtful that Sheikh Abdullah had

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Page 3 of
Desp. No. 23
From Haifa

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Page _____ of
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

been brought in on the details of any plans which the Israel Government may be considering with respect to intelligence operations. More than likely he has been approached primarily for the purpose of obtaining a barometric reading of the attitudes of his particular small following. Nevertheless, it may be perfectly true that Israel is continuing its efforts to devise ways of encouraging any differences which may exist between the Syrian Druzes and the Government in Damascus.

Leonard R. Cowles
American Consul

Dept. pouch to Damascus, Cairo,
Amman and Beirut

cc: Amembassy, Tel Aviv (2)

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11-2-61

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File Designation

674,84 A/11-756

Tel 482

Date

11/7/56

From

State

To

Tel Aviv

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Security-Classified Information



Otherwise Restricted Information

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CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 7, 1956

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Israel Forces from Egyptian Territory.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Beuven Shiloah, Minister, Israel Charge d'Affaires
Mr. Yohanan Meroz, First Secretary, Israel Embassy
The Acting Secretary *H.N.H.*
NEA - Mr. William M. Rountree
NE - Mr. Donald C. Bergus

x2-Israel

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cc cc cc cc cc cc

*Dist made
in 9/9*

The Acting Secretary received the Israel representatives at 6:15 p.m. The Acting Secretary stated that we had transmitted a message to the Israel Prime Minister from the President. He handed copies of the message to the Israel representatives for their information.

The Acting Secretary said that he looked upon this as the most important meeting which he had had with representatives of Israel. A part of the world with which we were all concerned was in flames. He had discussed this matter with the Secretary, in the hospital, and the Secretary had added emphasis to what the Acting Secretary was about to say. The Acting Secretary wished to underline the gravity of the situation which the Free World faced today.

The Acting Secretary viewed the present situation in the Near East not only as it affected the various countries in the area, but as it affected world peace. There was evidence, of which the Israel representatives must be aware, that the Soviets were exploiting this situation in a manner which might bring major consequences of a disastrous nature particularly to the Near East but which could spread out. We felt that in such a situation Israel would be one of the first countries to be swallowed up. Right at this moment refusal by Israel to withdraw its troops as requested would lay it open to the charge that it was gravely endangering world peace and rendering it difficult or impossible for the United Nations to accomplish its purposes. The United Nations was the greatest hope,

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greatest hope, perhaps the only hope for area and world peace. The United States felt that the only way in which this matter could be approached was through the United Nations.

The Acting Secretary feared that the failure of Israel to comply with the General Assembly resolutions and withdraw forces from Egyptian territory would place Israel in a position, in the eyes of the vast majority of United Nations members, of flouting world opinion. This was particularly so with respect to public opinion in the United States with an inevitable effect upon governmental and private aid so freely given heretofore by the United States. It was possible that in those circumstances a movement would develop for the suspension or expulsion of Israel from the United Nations.

It was virtually inevitable that if Israel should refuse to comply, a resolution would be proposed and adopted calling for strict sanctions against Israel.

In reply, Mr. Shiloah said he would not presume to anticipate his Prime Minister's reaction. He would convey the Acting Secretary's message with great faithfulness. There was no doubt in his mind as to the points made by the Acting Secretary and he was sure that there would be no doubt in his Government's mind.

Mr. Shiloah wished to ask one or two questions. The most important thing was what was intended after a withdrawal. In the Secretary's last talk with Mr. Eban, the Secretary had said that we could not return to the status quo ante. The Acting Secretary pointed out that the United States had introduced into the General Assembly a resolution calling for a commission of a group of people with the authority of the United Nations behind them charged to bring the Palestine problem to a solution. We would not wish to prejudice the studies of that Commission by comment at this time. The Commission might later ask for the views of the United States. We felt that the Palestine problem was inextricably in the United Nations and that we would have to work there.

Mr. Rountree said he wished to underline the Secretary's statement to Mr. Eban that we must find some way to solve these problems. We intended to pursue the two resolutions which we had placed before the United Nations. The first thing was to stop the fighting and bring about a withdrawal to the armistice lines. The peace of the world was endangered. Mr. Shiloah would recall the impression, and Mr. Rountree believed that it was the honest impression, which Mr. Eban and Mr. Shiloah had conveyed to Mr. Rountree on October 29 that Israel forces would not attack. That meeting had

been interrupted

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been interrupted with the news that Israel had moved into Egypt. Mr. Rountree referred to the assurances of the Israel Prime Minister that Israel did not seek territorial gains which had been conveyed to the Secretary on October 30. Therefore the Israel statements that they would not withdraw their forces came as a great shock to the United States. Withdrawal of Israel forces was perhaps the most important single element affecting the outcome of peace or war. Israel should conform with the overwhelming wishes of the United Nations.

Mr. Shiloah said he wished to comment. Mr. Eban had transmitted the message from the Israel Prime Minister to the Secretary with the full authority of the Israel Government. With regard to defensive precautions taken by the Israel forces, Mr. Shiloah thought that he could show the United States Government what it had discovered since its military operations in Sinai. This material proved that without the Israel military operation there would have been another one which would have occurred the same week involving all the Arab countries. Israel had in its possession genuine documents which implicated Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. These had followed the signature of the Syria-Jordan-Egypt defense pact in Amman in October. In this case there would not have been the existing relatively localized crisis but the whole area would be in flames. This was not an excuse or an argument. Mr. Shiloah referred to an earlier request for Mr. Eban to call on the Acting Secretary. The Acting Secretary pointed out that by the time the Israel request was received, plans had already been made to ask the Israel Ambassador to call to receive our expressions of concern.

The Acting Secretary indicated that he had a very pressing schedule in the next few days. He suggested that Mr. Eban make arrangements to call on Mr. Rountree.

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11/8/56

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

November 13, 1956

THE ACTING SECRETARY

Memorandum of Conversation

For approval prior to
distribution.

Your remarks are indicated.


Fisher Howe

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CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 8, 1956

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Israel Troops from Egypt

PARTICIPANTS: The Acting Secretary *H.H.H.*
Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Israel Embassy
NEA - Mr. William M. Rountree
NE - Mr. Donald C. Bergus

COPIES TO: S/S, G, C, L, IO, NEA, EUR

XR - Israel

9/9
W.H.H.

Mr. Eban handed the Acting Secretary copies of Mr. Ben Gurion's reply to the President's message (attached). A similar message had gone forward to the United Nations Secretary General who had expressed satisfaction. The Secretary General wished to discuss arrangements with Mr. Eban on November 9.

The Acting Secretary asked if the Israel Prime Minister were agreeing to withdraw behind the armistice line. Mr. Eban said he was not authorized to interpret the Prime Minister's message but that he could say he was instructed to take up these arrangements with the Secretary General. The Acting Secretary inquired concerning Gaza. Mr. Eban said that Israel did not want vacuums created in the area and for this reason he had been told to begin discussions with the Secretary General on this point as well as other arrangements. Israel's response to the call for withdrawal had been similar to that of the British and French. The Secretary General had said that Israel's response would enable him to act.

Mr. Eban said that the Israel Government had been concerned over reports of Soviet activities in the area, including the concentration of weapons in Syria and Egypt and the inspiration of fedayeen activities. He pointed to the recent upsurge of fedayeen activity from Syria and Jordan. Israel had asked the Secretary General to express to Soviet representatives Israel's fears on this point. The Acting Secretary pointed out that the

United States

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United States had thought for a number of months that these developments might take place.

Mr. Eban said Israel felt that the reassertion of Western unity in the Near East was one of the best things that could happen. The Soviet Union was probably telling the Arabs that the Soviet intervention had had its effect. This would raise Soviet prestige to new heights.

Mr. Eban said that Israel took very seriously the promise of the President's letter that there would be no going back to the status quo ante. This was very urgent with respect to Egypt. The Egypt-Israel armistice agreement was in ruins, the others remained. He would lack statesmanship if we did not seize this opportunity. As for the draft resolutions submitted by the United States, Israel had some suggestions which Mr. Eban would be presenting to Ambassador Lodge. Israel felt that the resolution should put responsibility on the parties to negotiate.

The Acting Secretary pointed out that our draft resolution created a Commission with very broad powers and responsibilities.

Mr. Eban referred to Mr. Ben Gurion's desire to visit the United States. Mr. Ben Gurion felt that Israel and the United States should be drawing closer together. Once the ceasefire and withdrawal had been implemented there would be a great opportunity. Mr. Ben Gurion would still like to come and discuss these matters with President Eisenhower. Mr. Ben Gurion had not been to the United States since the President assumed office.

The Acting Secretary said he did not know the President's plans for the next few weeks and that he was unable to answer for him. Israel's action in withdrawing its forces would be taken with the great feeling that all were gratified that Israel was complying with the General Assembly's request.

Mr. Eban referred to the third paragraph of the Prime Minister's message. While these were not conditions they were very important matters requiring United Nations action. This was Israel's policy.

A discussion was held at the conclusion of the meeting concerning the release of the President's letter and the Prime Minister's reply. Mr. Eban was sure that the full text of both communications would be read by the Prime Minister in a speech which he had probably already started to give in Israel. Accordingly, it was agreed that the White House would release both texts at 7 p.m. on November 8.

Attachment:

W Copy of Ben Gurion's reply to President's message.

NEA:NE:DCBergus:crm

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

11/13/56

S/S-RO:

The attached Memorandum of Conversation is forwarded for the Acting Secretary's approval.

NEA - E.E. Oulashin

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

November 13, 1956

THE ACTING SECRETARY

Memo of Conversation
with Ambassador Eban

For approval prior to distribution. Your comments are indicated.



Fisher Howe

11/9/56

Mr. ~~Greene~~:

Now that the Pres' letter to B-G
has been released to the press,
can not the telegrams in the black
books be removed? -- Substitution
of the release would serve to remind
that the letter had been made public.

ph

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file

NOV 8 1956

not be returned to

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL A. J. COOMASTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Gann Strip and South-Nashville Rivalry

Enclosed are the reports on the Gann strip and the
South-Nashville rivalry requested by the President.

FISHER HOWE
DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Fisher Howe
Director
Executive Secretariat

674.84A/11-855

Enclosures:

1. Report on Gann strip.
2. History of South-Nashville Rivalry.

S/S-RO

1956
A true copy of
signed original.

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The Gaza Strip

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947, which recommended the partition of Palestine into an Arab and Jewish state, awarded the territory presently comprised by the Gaza strip, along with other territory to the north and south of the strip, to the proposed Arab state. (See attached map.)

Upon the termination of the Palestine Mandate and the withdrawal of the British on May 15, 1948, hostilities broke out between Israel and the Arab states, including Egypt. Israel soon effectively occupied the Egypt and had sent forces into the Sinai peninsula around El 'Arish. Egypt remained in control of the Gaza area.

On February 24, 1949, Dr. Ralph Bunche secured Egyptian and Israeli signatures to the General Armistice Agreement. Articles V and VI of that agreement cover the establishment of an armistice line and its application to Gaza. Article V points out that the line should in no sense be construed as a political or territorial boundary and that it was delineated without prejudice to the claims of either party in an ultimate settlement of the Palestine question. Article VI confirms the Egyptian occupation of the territory of the Gaza strip to the West of the armistice line. (See map.)

Egypt has never claimed sovereignty over the strip. Egypt's public position has been that it is in occupation under the terms of the Armistice agreement and is acting as the protector of the Palestinian Arabs there. At one time the Egyptians attempted to set up an All-Arab Palestinian Government in Gaza, but this effort failed, primarily because of the strong opposition of the late King Abdullah of Jordan. Egypt has sought to maintain the form of a local "Palestinian" administration, but effective control of the strip has always been in the hands of the Egyptian military.

Israel has never formally claimed the strip, but Israeli representatives have on several occasions expressed the view to United States representatives that Egypt occupies the Gaza strip solely by virtue of the Armistice Agreement. The Israelis added that since Egypt was in violation of other articles of the Armistice Agreement, the whole agreement was void and the legal basis for Egypt's occupation of the Gaza strip lapsed.

Our impression is that up to about one year ago, Egypt wished to get rid of the Gaza strip but was inhibited from doing so for fear of adverse reaction to such a move by other Arab states who would claim that Egypt was leaving the Palestinian area. Occupation of the strip has been costly to Egypt (which must feed the approximately 250,000 indigenous inhabitants) and adversely affected the equipment of Egypt's military forces against Israel.

Israel also, up to one year ago at least, apparently did not want the Gaza strip because taking it over would raise problems of what to do with the 250,000 - 300,000 Arabs there (indigenous Arabs plus 250,000 Palestinian refugees). If the strip was formally incorporated into Israel, Israel's Arab minority would rise from about 25% of the

population to about 25%. Any "historic" claim of Israel to Gaza might be asserted by the Israelis to be based in part upon Genesis XVI, 13: "In the same day the Lord made a covenant with Abraham, saying 'Unto thy seed have I given this land, from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates'."

Brief History of Rivalry Between Hashimites and Saudis

While dynastic rivalry has existed between the forebears of the present King Saud of Saudi Arabia and King Faisal of Iraq for many decades, the immediate cause of the basic enmity between the two royal houses springs from the conquest by the late Saudi Arabian King Ibn Saud of the province of the Najd, the western province of the present Saudi Arabia, in 1933.

The Najd, important as the site of the holiest cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, was ruled by the present King Faisal's great uncle, Prince Ali, at the time of the conquest. Prince Ali was one of four sons of the Sherif Hussein who founded the Hashemite dynasty and who ruled the Najd throughout World War I when this Ottoman province was a base for British-Arab operations against the Ottoman empire. Ali succeeded his father in 1933.

In recognition of their cooperation during this period, the British placed two of Ali's brothers on thrones in newly formed lands: Abdullah in Transjordan and Faisal in Iraq.

Meanwhile, the Saudi family was consolidating its power in the center of the Arabian Peninsula. Sherif Hussein of the Najd province incurred the opposition of much of the Islamic world by proclaiming himself Caliph (chief prince of Islam) in 1933. Using this in part as a pretext, Saud moved against the Najd and conquered it.

Prince Ali, the eldest son of Hussein, fled, with his son, Abdul Ilah, to Iraq. Although Prince Ali and Abdul Ilah remained bitter against the house of Saud, Ali's brother, King Faisal I of Iraq, tended to recognize the existence and power of the Saudi kingdom and to deal with King Ibn Saud in the settlement of outstanding issues between the two countries. Relations between the Hashimites and the Saudis improved to the point where Faisal and Ibn Saud met for the first time in the Persian Gulf in 1930.

Relations remained without serious friction between the two Kingdoms until 1939 when Prince Abdul Ilah, son of Ali, became Regent of Iraq. In the years since that time relations have been correct, but cool, with Abdul Ilah, until very recently, resisting any efforts at a closer rapprochement.

King Abdullah in Jordan and his son Talal did not display the same enmity toward Saudi Arabia and did, at times, accept financial assistance from the Saudis. The bitterness has been concentrated primarily in Iraq.

During the last year King Faisal II and King Saud, both of whom assumed their respective thrones in 1939, have tended to move toward a rapprochement, in part because of their common over Egyptian opposition. This culminated in a meeting of the two Kings in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on September 20, 1946.

MILTON L. PHILLIPS

Insurance Broker

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NEW YORK 7, N.Y.

U.S. SERVICES DIV.
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JAN 4 1957
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Nov. 3, 1956

The Honorable Dwight D. Eisenhower
President of the United States
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

The State Department has handled things beautifully. They have
maintained a rift with our closest allies, have allowed the Russian Congress to
murder and beat into submission the Hungarian people and other freedom loving
peoples of this world, have condoned the Egyptian provocations against Israel
led by "Madman" Nasser that have led up to the present day crisis in the Middle
East and are now trying to pressure Israel to withdraw from Egypt and return to
the borders set up in the Arab-Israeli armistice of 1949.

Webster's dictionary defines the word "ceasefire" as a brief
suspension of arms, by agreement; a temporary suspension of hostilities, by
agreement; a truce. Has there ever actually been a suspension of hostilities?
There has been a truce, but in reality there never has been an armistice and certainly
not there the fact of armistice. In effect it was a definitely not brief unless
you choose to count seven years as such. Then why pressure the government of
Israel to bid by a pact that was a truce? We would probably like to believe
that this armistice did exist and would like to promulgate further toward a
permanent peace in the Mideast for fear of offending the offender. If we
sustained ourselves to the Arab situation because their "ceasefire" is the
biggest? Has this become a situation where the Arab situation is now a dictate to
the Mideast and they obey, right? It is in a position to offer
the Mideast independence?

Other than a few exceptions, such as in this world, the all other war.
During World War II, I have seen the devastation and horror, the suffering and tragedy that violence
brings. I too should like to see the world live side by side in peace, but I do
think that the world, such as our, these foundations built on freedom by
people such as the people of Israel, should help them in their
struggle for peace and freedom, rather than to hinder them. Remember the price
of a single life is still only about thirty-five dollars. Thirty-five dollars a
month. Don't let this price serve as a price with our help
should be in the making?

Respectfully Yours,

Milton L. Phillips

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FILED

NOV 1956

1956

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

MSR
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47-N
Action

Control: 8023
Rec'd: November 10, 1956
11:31 p.m.

NEA FROM: Cairo
Info
RMR TO: Secretary of State

NEA
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Cairo
Files

SS NO: UNNUMBERED, November 9

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1. Abd Al Rahman Tag, Rector of Al Azhjr addressed a telegram to the Embassy reading as follows:

"Rector of Al Azhar and its lamas request you convey President Eisenhower their sincere thanks for having sided with justice, supported equity, defended principles of international honor freedom of nations and condemned imperialist invasion.

"They pleased with him to take decisive steps to complete withdrawal of the forces of the enemy from Egypt at once and push Israel back behind the armistice lines to prevent bloodshed and strengthen peace."


2. Yesterday Abd Al Rahman Tag sent a telegram to Soviet Ambassador along line first paragraph of message to this Embassy.

HARE

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☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Classification

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SENT TO: Amembassy TEL AVIV 494 PRIORITY

Origin

Info

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

Please deliver following message from the President to
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. Confirm date and time delivery.

QUOTE November 9, 1956

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I appreciate your message of yesterday ~~informing~~ ^{informing} me that
you will withdraw your forces from Egypt. This decision will
be warmly welcomed not only by the United States but by all
of the nations which are striving to restore peace and
security for all nations in the Middle East. It will
contribute greatly to a situation in which a peaceful
solution may be attained. Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower UNQTE

Dist.
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Only)

Hoover
ACTING

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

Drafted by:

S/S

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/S - F. Howe

Clearances:

White House

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November 9, 1956

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President #1

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~~#11~~

~~#11~~ H. H. M. B. Books

10. M. B. B.

6. M. B. B.

#16 M. B. B. (Rgs)

Pres message
to Ben Muvion
on Suez

Category C

Suez

IC

EUR

ARA

FE

NEA

D/OP (Riggs)

(Richards)

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

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Tel 579
Date 11/11/56
From State
To Moscow

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Date

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(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE COUNSELOR

21

November 14, 1956.

MEMORANDUM TO: EUR - Mr. Elbrick

Through: S/S *it*

With reference to your memorandum of November 13, recommending that the President's November 11 message to Bulganin be made available to both Eden and Mollet, I took this matter up with Colonel Goodpaster today and he has now informed me that there is no objection to making copies available to Eden and Mollet. It would, however, be done on what I understand is the usual basis, that there would be no publicity and would be given special handling. *etc*

DW MacA
Douglas MacArthur II

674.84a / 11-1456

Strictly secret & personal info only

11

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**PRESIDENTIAL
HANDLING**

XXXXX

579

11/1/56

2671

2, 3, 4, 7-10 Inc.

12, 14, 15, 17, 19 ~~19~~ #1

destroyed 4/7/59

P. Hall

#2-

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Pres. message

to Bulgarian

on Subj. &

Hungary

Category C

Boy

CIA #11

USIA

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SEC OFFENSE

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OTHER

~~#11~~

20 Presidential Carrier Vehicle

~~#17~~ #18 M.E. Bonds

#14 S/S Pan. File

~~#15~~ ~~15~~ Hungary file

#4 M.E. Bonds (Rys)

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NOV 14 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL A. J. COOPASTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

THIS Document Must Be Returned to
S/R
Central
Files

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's Reply to the
President's Messages of October 27 and
28, 1956

There is enclosed the signed original of Prime Minister
Ben-Gurion's letter of October 29 to the President which re-
plies to the President's messages of October 27 and 28, 1956.

XR
784a:13

ENCLOSURE
1
ENCLOSURE

38
Fisher House
Director
Executive Secretariat

Enclosure:

Prime Minister's reply

S/S-R

NOV 14 1956
A true copy of
signed original

SECRET

8/S-RO:GEMouser:ldac

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63/R
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(11)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Rm/1c
file
ebb
5/5/64

November 16, 1956

MEMORANDUM TO: IO ✓ - Mr. Phillips
- Mr. Walmsley
- Mr. Adams

*hmc
may 9 toled
to discuss with
you
started today*

SUBJECT: The Question of Volunteers

I spoke to some of you earlier this morning about the need to look into the volunteer problem. Last night I noticed in the News an article from New York indicating that the United States Delegation to the General Assembly felt that the November 2 resolution, which calls upon the parties not to send forces into the area, does not go far enough. According to this news item, they believe that a separate special resolution ought to be tabled dealing with the volunteer problem.

In any event, at the Staff Meeting yesterday IO was instructed to consider this matter on a rather urgent basis, and I would hope that some steps could be taken this afternoon in my absence to initiate the proper staff work.

674.842/11-16-56

For
IO - Francis O. Wilcox

IO:FOW:lg

Revised by RIA/H

(1)

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Date: NOV 16 1956

To: ✓ - Mr. Murphy
From: FE - Mr. Robertson *WRR*

Subject: Japanese Mediation between Egypt and Israel.

Bureau of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 19 1956

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
Department of State

Ambassador Tani will call on you at 12:00 noon November 17 to discuss the possibility of Japan's accepting the role of intermediary in peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt. You will recall that on November 2 Ambassador Tani called on you for a briefing on the Hungarian and Suez crises. At that time we had received information from Embassy Tokyo that the Foreign Office had been approached with respect to mediation by Israel in June and by Egypt in October (Tab A). You asked Ambassador Tani whether Japan had been asked to mediate and he indicated no knowledge of the matter (Tab B). The Department on November 2 instructed Embassy Tokyo to inform the Foreign Office, should its views be requested, that the United States looked to the United Nations as the best approach to resolution of the problem (Tab C).

The Japanese Embassy here received a cable from Tokyo on November 15 stating that the Israeli Government has recently made formal representation to the Japanese Government to act as direct intermediary in peace negotiations with Egypt. Ambassador Tani will give you the details. He would also like to get our views on the current situation in Hungary and the Near East. Mr. Martin will be present.

Recommendations:

1. That you inquire whether Egypt has re-expressed its interest in Japanese mediation.

2. That you set forth the United States view that the United Nations is the best medium for restoring peace to the Near East and resolving the basic problems in the region. A United Nations force is now being installed in Egypt to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. The United States has pending before the General Assembly two resolutions indicating how the United States believes the basic Near East problems, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Suez, might be approached through the United Nations.

3. However, the decision on whether to accept the role of mediator between Egypt and Israel is of course one for Japan alone to make.

Concurrence:

NEA - Mr. Rockwell

FE - Mr. Sebald

CONFIDENTIAL

FE:NA:JVMartin Jr:mfh
11/16/56 *S143*

Confidential File

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

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36
Action

SS
Info

Control: 12358
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 17, 1956
8:46 AM

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1231, NOVEMBER 17

**PRESIDENTIAL
HANDLING**

NIACT

SENT NIACT DEPARTMENT 1231, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT LONDON
258 NIACT PARIS 230

GROMYKO ASKED ME TO COME SEE HIM AT 12:30 THIS MORNING AT WHICH TIME HE HANDED ME A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT AND AS AN ENCLOSURE A TEN-PAGE DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT. GROMYKO IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION TOLD ME THAT THIS DECLARATION, AND PRESUMABLY COVERING LETTER, WILL BE PUBLISHED IN PRESS TOMORROW AND WILL BE ON SOVIET RADIO THIS AFTERNOON OR EVENING. HE WAS NOT SURE WHICH. TEXT BULGANIN'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT FOLLOWS HEREWITH:

MOSCOW KREMLIN, NOVEMBER 17, 1956. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: THE MILITARY ATTACK ON EGYPT HAS BROUGHT ON A SERIOUS AGGRAVATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. IN CONSIDERATION OF THIS FACT IT IS THE DUTY OF ALL STATES AND ESPECIALLY THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH BEAR THE BASIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE TO FIND MEANS FOR THE SOLUTION OF QUESTIONS IN DISPUTE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

IN THIS DANGEROUS MOMENT FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL TO APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF ALL COUNTRIES AND IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE GREAT POWERS TO UNITE THEIR EFFORTS FOR THEIR ADOPTION OF URGENT MEASURES DIRECTED TOWARDS THE PREVENTION OF WAR, OHVFVAQNG# OF THE ARMS RACE AND THE SOLUTION OF QUESTIONS IN DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

IN SENDING TO YOU THE DECLARATION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON THE QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT AND REDUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION MY COLLEAGUES AND I EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE USA

PERMANENT

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Moscow

674.84 a/ 11-1756

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-2- 1231, NOVEMBER 17 FROM MOSCOW

AND YOU PERSONALLY, MR. PRESIDENT, WILL EXAMINE WITH ALL ATTENTION THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SET FORTH IN THE DECLARATION. SIGNED BULGANIN."

IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM WILL HIT HIGH POINTS AND OPERATIVE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN DECLARATION, BUT FULL TRANSLATION WHICH IS BEING DONE IMMEDIATELY MAY NOT REACH WASHINGTON BEFORE PUBLICATION.

SIMILAR COMMUNICATIONS I UNDERSTAND ARE BEING GIVEN TO BRITISH, FRENCH AND INDIAN AMBASSADORS.

BOHLEN

CRH

#AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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Moscow

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President #24

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~~#20 Prior File~~

~~#4 Eisenhower~~

~~56 Summit file~~

Copies 3-2-79
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destroyed
4/8/59
R Hauer

EYES ONLY

EMBASSY OF EGYPT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 19, 1956

Sir:

I have the honour to communicate to the Government of the United States of America the following Aide-Memoire, transmitted on the 17th instant by the Government of Egypt to Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations:

Aide Memoire

1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations had on the 16th and the 17th of November, 1956, conversations in Cairo with the Egyptian Government.
2. The Secretary-General's attention was called to the fact that, in spite of the passing of thirteen days since the adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations of its resolution in which it 'calls upon Israel once again to immediately withdraw all its forces behind the armistice lines established by the armistice agreement of February 24, 1949', and 'calls upon the United Kingdom and France once again immediately to withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory consistently with the above-mentioned resolutions.', the armed forces of France, the United Kingdom and Israel had not withdrawn from Egyptian territory, these armed forces, are, on the contrary, consolidating
/their positions/

The Honourable
Herbert Hoover, Jr.
Acting Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

674.842/11-1956
NR 974.7301

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their positions in Egyptian territory in complete disregard for Egypt's sovereign rights and in defiance to the United Nations and to the world and Egyptian public opinion and feelings.

3. The Secretary-General's attention was also called to the fact that these armed forces are at the same time launching upon extremely provocative acts in Port Said and the Suez Canal area, which acts include indiscriminate shooting of the population resulting in many victims killed, maimed or wounded. To this are added the searching and looting of houses and stores, and forcing laborers, under all kinds of threats, to work with the invading forces.

4. The Egyptian Government have expressed to the Secretary-General the earnest desire of the Government of Egypt that these aggressive acts by the invading forces be forthwith put an end to, that the resolutions of the General Assembly on November 2-7 regarding the cease-fire and the withdrawal be fully and immediately put into effect, and that the Secretary-General inform both the Government of Egypt and the General Assembly of the United Nations of this situation, and that, in the meantime he orders this Aide-Memoire to be circulated as a United Nations document.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Ahmed Hussein
Ahmed Hussein
Ambassador of Egypt

"Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free"

THE PALESTINE ARAB REFUGEE OFFICE

801 2nd Avenue, Room 801
New York 17, N. Y.

TELEPHONE: LEXINGTON 2-2272
CABLE: PALOFFICE, NEW YORK

THE WHITE HOUSE November 20, 1956.

Nov 21 9 03 AM '56

RECEIVED

The Honorable Dwight D. Eisenhower
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

I feel it is my duty as a Palestine Arab refugee, at this critical moment in world history, to put before you a few facts about the grave situation now prevailing in the Middle East to which I and a million like me have greatly contributed. Our contribution, Mr. President, to this crisis was not by trespassing on other peoples rights but by being the victims of aggression for a very long time.

The Middle East today is at the crossroad and Providence has decided it, Sir, that your decision in the next few days or weeks will decide its future and its fate. May this decision, Mr. President, be steered by God's guidance for the peace of the world.

It has become evident from the happenings of the past few weeks that the invasion of Egypt by Israel, Great Britain and France on the 29th October, 1956, was premeditated. An alliance between the three parties was organized against the Arab world. The three aggressors became allies in arms.

It is indeed gratifying for the Arab people to see that the United States of America has, very wisely and consistently, opposed this alliance, and was the first country to take action in the United Nations against the treacherous Israeli invasion. The unholy alliance between Israel and the two big western powers, has placed the Middle East in one of the most critical periods of its history. It has actually converted the Arab world into a volcano. It is important to point out at this juncture that two members of this alliance, Great Britain and France, are parties to the Tri-Partite Declaration of 1950. These two powers, together with the United States of America, according to that declaration, pledged themselves to stop any aggression between Israel and the Arab neighbouring states. They also took upon themselves to oppose any violation of the existing armistice lines until a final peaceful settlement is reached. The three big powers assigned to themselves the duty of keeping the peace in the region. However, not only did the Tri-Partite declarors fail to halt repeated Israeli military attacks on the Arab territories, but two of them, in betrayal of their declaration and in violation of their obligation, allied themselves with Israel against their "traditional friends" - the Arabs.

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The news of the Israeli invasion of Egypt was a great shock not only to the Arabs, but to the whole world and especially to the Security Council. Only a few days before this invasion, in defending the criminal attack of the Israeli military forces at Rahwa, Wadi Fukin and Qalqilya of Jordan in the Security Council, Abba Eban, Israeli representative, ended his long evasive (Fedayeen) speech by saying that Israel will not start another attack nor covet other peoples land. Not believing in whatever the Israelis say, it was natural for the Arabs to think that this fresh attack on Egypt was no more than a repetition of these ruthless aggressions. But they soon found out, to their astonishment, that this attack was of a different kind. This time it was an invasion for expansion against which the Arabs have been continuously cautioning. It was war - the "preventive war" - the Israeli Government, Knessett and some parties in Israel have been alternately declaring and denying.

The Israelis would not have gambled on such a war, had they not been promised full participation by the two members of the Tri-Partite Declaration. They would not have risked war against the Arab countries had they not been assured that British and French aeroplanes would be bombing Port Said the next day. It was well planned. The Israelis would occupy the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip and their two allies will be destroying Egyptian opposition. With the three forces attacking simultaneously, they believed, that within a few days, Nasser would be overthrown, the Suez Canal would be seized from end to end and the whole world would be confronted with a "fait accompli", before the United Nations could intervene. As to what will happen to the United Nations after this unilateral military success the new allies cared little. Perhaps the whole scheme was planned to undermine this world organization which has, since its creation, been critical of their imperialistic policy.

The conspiracy of the three aggressors was too obvious to hide and too challenging to world conscience. Never in the history of the United Nations were democratic nations condemned and despised as were these two countries. The whole world gave its judgment and the prestige of two great nations was seriously damaged by the brutal methods of two shortsighted, revengeful Prime Ministers. As for Israel, it had no prestige to lose and the usual condemnation was passed as a matter of routine.

The Arab world, Mr. President, is now facing a new danger. It is no more Israeli aggression that the Arab people have to guard against but a formidable force of an alliance. The Arab people must not deceive themselves again and trust in declarations, promises, pacts and even treaties. The triple alliance, since the 29th October, 1956, has taken the law in its own hands against the United Nations Charter, and although its threat has been temporarily checked by United Nations Resolutions and world opinion, its sword is still drawn for further aggression and bloodshed. So far, we have no proof that this alliance has broken up.

The Arabs well know that for their safety they cannot entirely depend on the United Nations Charter or on United Nations resolutions. The many resolutions that have been adopted by the General Assembly for the return of the Palestine Arab refugees to their homes and for the internationalization of Jerusalem, have not sent one refugee back to his home or removed one military post or 10 metres of barbed wire from the heart of the divided Holy City. It has become abundantly clear to the Arabs that implementation of United Nations

resolutions depends mostly on the military strength of the powers which seek their implementation. This was exactly the position of the League of Nations in Geneva in 1936, which quickly led to its ineffectiveness and finally its extinction.

Under these circumstances, Mr. President, if the Arab people are not able to depend on the United Nations to guarantee their safety against an aggressive alliance, whom are they to turn to? Could they afford to have vacuum behind their back?

Of course, they can turn to the United States of America. The United States of America has great military strength and if they became its ally, it would be able to protect them against this new danger.

The United States of America, has great economic, strategic and cultural interests in the Arab world which it cannot very well overlook. However, in spite of these colossal interests, American-Arab Foreign policy has always been guided in the past by many considerations. These considerations still exist. The United States of America has had to consider its two allies, Great Britain and France, who still maintain considerable imperialistic interests in the Arab world. And although the United States has often condemned colonialism, it has never openly condemned its allies in the full sense of the word. Even this attack by Britain and France on Egypt was only considered by the United States as a "grave error".

The second and more important consideration to the United States has been Israel. While the 1,700,000 Israelis who now occupy Palestine have been giving to the Department of State a lot of trouble, much more serious trouble has been caused by the fanatic Zionist pressure group in the United States who were responsible for the implication of the United States in the Palestine problem. The Zionist organization in the United States has unparalleled propaganda machinery which has, to a great extent, influenced American public opinion to see only the Zionist point of view in the Palestine question and it was not possible for any administration, because of this great Zionist pressure, to remain even neutral in this issue. The Forrestal diaries and later President Truman's diaries clearly demonstrate the tremendous pressure the Zionists exerted on all Government offices who almost invariably obtained what they demanded.

The above two considerations, but especially the second one, have greatly alienated the American people from the Arab people. In 1948, when Israel was created by the United Nations, the Arabs attributed their whole tragedy to the special efforts of President Truman. This had damaging effects on the excellent American-Arab relations existing at the time. Ever since, Zionist propaganda in the United States has been intensified to cover up the blunder, and American reaction remained extremely passive to the great problems (especially the refugee problem) that Israel has introduced into the Middle East. This has slowly but firmly, pushed the whole Arab people to the other camp. The other camp was glad to give a helping hand and Soviet prestige rose as fast as western prestige deteriorated. The persistent American and Western support to Israel, regardless of their great economic interests in the Arab world, notwithstanding the aggressive and uncompromising spirit of the new comers, and unmindful of the great human moral and physical sufferings of the displaced inhabitants of Palestine, drove the whole Arab people to despair.

With these and other considerations in view, the Arabs find themselves today at a loss as to what line the United States will follow at this critical moment. Will the President of the United States, they ask, who has been given a free mandate by the American people, follow the dictates of justice without fear or favour and regardless of all considerations? The United States has a golden opportunity to redeem its name and live up to its traditions. This might be the last chance for America to restore the confidence that the Arab people had in her.

The Arab world today is closely and anxiously watching what the President of the United States will do.. Your decision, Mr. President, will determine the future of the Middle East and world peace.

Yours respectfully,

Izzat Tannous

IZZAT TANNOUS, M.D.

Director

The Palestine Arab Refugee Office.

OC/R
TRANSFER-CATCH
SHEET

12-12-56
(Date)

DEC 18 1956

TO: OC/R Files

Please send the following papers to the Catalogue Section for necessary corrections.

FROM Cairo

TO _____

- ☒ TEL.
☐ INST.
☐ DESP.
☐ AGM. # 1591
☐ LTR
☐ NOTE

FROM Date Nov 21, 1956

TO Date _____

(a) File No. from 674.844/11-2156

to 824.411/11-2156

(b) Additional information _____

- ☒ All cards (other than "name" cards) in the Card Indices have been changed or corrected as indicated above.
☐ All "name" cards have been changed or corrected, etc.
☐ All papers have been changed or corrected, etc.
☐ SCS ACTION papers.

68
(No. of OC/R Analyst)

NOTE: If document is NOT in the subject file, use this form as a "CATCH" by writing the OLD FILE NUMBER on the right margin and filing it in the subject files.

674.844/11-2156
(OLD FILE NUMBER)
CONT. 11-21-56

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 674,84A/11-2156
Tel 1609
Date 11/21/56
From CAIRO
To Sec State

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Authority

1/4/89
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

③

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

November 26, 1956

~~SCD~~
~~AC~~
11/30/56
IN
CEO

NEA - Mr. Oulashin

The attached letter to the Secretary from J.J. Perling offering a solution to the Suez situation is forwarded for reply at a suitable bureau level.

Please send copies (2) of the reply to S/S by the close of business on November 30.

Central
Files

G.E.M.
G.E. Mouser
S/S-RO

Attachment:

Referenced letter
dated 11/23/56

DC/R	6
ADRA	---
347	---
Cat	---

Returned to

J. J. PERLING

*Public Relations*POST OFFICE BOX 326
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE

November 23, 1956

PERSONALHon. John Foster Dulles,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Two weeks ago, on Saturday morning November 10, I wired to Mr James Hagerty requesting that he ~~transmit~~ submit to the President this suggestion as a solution of the Gaza Strip dispute:

THAT THE PRESIDENT URGE ISRAEL TO OFFER, AND EGYPT TO ACCEPT, PAYMENT FOR THE ANNEXATION OF THE GAZA STRIP

I supplemented this telegram with two letters, detailing the reasons for this plan to bring peace in the Middle East.

I now appeal to you to explore, with the President, the logic, the practicability, and the results of this plan. Of course, Ben Gurion and Nasser would have to be "sounded out" diplomatically. The financial factor is not insurmountable: we could underwrite the plan with a long term loan. Here are some reasons for the desirability of the plan:

- 1 It would eliminate the probable attempts of Egypt to regain the territory by armed force, probably bringing in other Arab states and Russian "volunteers"
- 2 It would "save face" for Nasser, and give Egypt funds for initiating the Aswan Dam project
- 3 It would tend to induce Jordan to make peace and to negotiate for the Jordan River projects
- 4 Give Israel room for expansion, and a longer shoreline
- 5 Renounce "outside influence" in the relations between Israel and her neighbors.

I do hope that, unlike others who disdain suggestions for which they themselves cannot reap the credit, you will give this suggestion earnest thought.

Sincerely and respectfully,

J. J. PERLING

JJP/er

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In reply refer to
NEA:NE

November 29 1956

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Dear Mr. Perling:

This is in reply to your letter of November 23rd to the Secretary in which you outline a plan for determining the future of the Gaza strip. The United States is giving strong support to the United Nations effort to bring an end to the crisis in the Near East by establishing and maintaining a cease-fire, by the installation of a UN force in Egypt, and through the withdrawal of all foreign forces. Once this has been accomplished the basic problems in the area must be approached with renewed vigor. One of these is, of course, the Arab-Israel conflict, in which the future status of the Gaza strip is an element. The United States has tabled in the General Assembly a resolution indicating how we believe this issue should be approached. It is our hope that the resolution will be adopted and that it will facilitate the search for a sound and lasting solution of the Palestine conflict. Your suggestion with regard to Gaza is thus made at a good time, and we are grateful for your consideration in sharing it with us.

Sincerely yours,

Stu

Stuart W. Rockwell
Deputy Director
Office of Near Eastern Affairs

Mr. J. J. Perling,
Post Office Box 326,
Wilmington, Delaware.

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WU10 NL PD AR CD NEWYORK NY NOV 25

HON HERBERT HOOVER JR

ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE STATE DEPT WASHDC
I REPRESENT AMERICAN CITIZENS OF EGYPTIAN BIRTH AND
JEWISH FAITH, WITH RELATIVES IN EGYPT, WHO ARE DEEPLY
DISTRESSED BY THE REPORTS PUBLISHED TODAY REGARDING
INTERMENT AND DEPORTATION BY THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT OF
"ENEMY NATIONALS", INCLUDING "ZIONISTS" AND STATELESS
JEWS. IS IT TRUE, AS I AM PRESENTLY INFORMED, THAT THESE
CRUEL MEASURES APPLY EVEN TO NATIVE JEWS OF ANCIENT
EGYPTIAN LINEAGE? I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THE RELEVANT
AVAILABLE INFORMATION INCLUDING INFORMATION REGARDING THE STEPS
CONTEMPLATED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON BEHALF OF THESE NEW
VICTIMS OF ANTI-SEMITIC BARBARITY. I RESPECTIVELY SUGGEST THAT
THE GROUNDS FOR DIRECT PROTEST AND UNITED NATIONS ACTION
ARE OBVIOUS AND COMPELLING

EDWARD M GARLOCK 521 5TH AVE NEW YORK CITY
515AME NOV 26.

374.84A/11-2556

CS/F

FILED
DEC 11 1955

694.84A/11-2556

December 4 1956

In reply refer to
NEA:NE

Dear Mr. Garlock:

This is in reply to your telegrams of November 25 and 29 to the Acting Secretary in regard to reports concerning mistreatment of Jews in Egypt.

The Department shares your concern about these reports. However, there have been many conflicting assertions on this matter. The Department, through the United States Embassy in Cairo, is endeavoring to ascertain the actual facts. You will appreciate that the abnormal circumstances in Egypt at present make complete reporting difficult.

You will be interested to know that in view of the nature of the reports concerning the treatment of Jews in Egypt, the Department has instructed the Embassy in Cairo to inform the Egyptian Government of its deep concern. You may be certain that this situation will be followed very closely.

Sincerely yours,



Stuart W. Rockwell
Deputy Director
Office Of Near Eastern Affairs

Mr. Edward M. Garlock,
521 Fifth Avenue,
New York City, New York.

MR
E:SRice:mfr
12/3/56

GS-CR
DEC 3 1956 P.M.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

47

UNCLASSIFIED

Action
NEA

Control: 18342
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 27, 1956
2:26 P.M.

Info
RMR

FROM: TEL AVIV
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 657, NOVEMBER 26.

SS
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SP
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IO
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P
UOP
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SCA
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SENT DEPARTMENT 657, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 123, BEIRUT 107.

CABINET SUNDAY APPROVED EIGHT POINT PROGRAM OUTLINED BY BEN GURION FOR "RESTORATION OF NORMAL LIFE GAZA STRIP AND PROMOTE WELL-BEING LOCAL POPULATION AND ARAB REFUGEES". EIGHT POINTS "WHICH HAVE BEEN OR WILL BE IMMEDIATELY UNDERTAKEN" FOLLOW:

1. IMMEDIATE RESTORATION MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN GAZA AND OTHER TOWNS IN AREA.
2. FULL COOPERATION WITH UNRWA ON PROVISION OF FOOD SUPPLIES AND ALL UNRWA'S OTHER SOCIAL SERVICES FOR REFUGEES.
3. FULL RESTORATION FISHING ALONG COAST STRIP.
4. FREE COMMUNICATION FACILITIES BETWEEN AGRICULTURAL HINTERLAND OF STRIP AND TOWNS AND VILLAGES.
5. BASIC FOOD STOCKS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE AT SUBSIDIZED PRICES FROM ISRAEL GOVERNMENT STOCKS FOR LOCAL NON-REFUGEE POPULATION.
6. MEASURES ARE BEING INTRODUCED TO FACILITATE MARKETING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE--IN PARTICULAR CITRUS AND DATES-- FROM AGRICULTURAL HINTERLAND OF STRIP AND TO ASSIST LOCAL ARAB FARMERS TO EXPORT CITRUS AND DATE SURPLUSES.
7. OPENING OF BANK AND CREDIT FACILITIES.
8. IMPROVEMENT OF WATER, ELECTRICITY AND OTHER SERVICES.

LAWSON

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NOV 27 1956
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674.84A/11-2556

PA/11-2608

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

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32
Action
NEAControl: 17990
Rec'd: November 27, 1956
8:04 a.m.Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 661, November 26, 6 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 661; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY BEIRUT 108,
PRIORITY CAIRO 124, PRIORITY AMMAN 125, PRIORITY LONDON 148,
PRIORITY PARIS 121, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

FROM HOWARD AND DAVIS

Reference: DEPTTEL 538

During November 23-25 we visited Gaza Strip without GOI escort and with freedom of movement and freedom to interview persons our choice. Talked with UNRWA, UNTSO, Baptist missions, IDF officials, Palestinians and two Egyptians. Believe following fair picture:

1. Reports of Arab deaths Khan Yunis and Rafa. Events Khan Yunis clearly occurred November 3 during resistance IDF seizure town. Unable verify Arab estimates 200-500 killed and from testimony heard by us believe them excessive.

Events Rafa occurred following rumors IDF leaving Gaza set in motion by Ben Gurion's November 9 speech. This coincided with rotation units at Rafa mistaken by populace as withdrawal. Curfew broken some looting. New troops arrived evening. Passive and active resistance to IDF roundup and screening for Egyptians/Palestinian soldiers still at large occurred November 11 and 12. Our estimate Arabs killed 30-50. Do not (repeat not) believe IDF actions exceeded military requirements of situations at Rafa and Khan Yunis. UNTSO estimate Jerusalem telegram 167 apparently based on early rumors of casualties which cannot be sustained.

2. UNRWA operations. UNRWA accomplished remarkable emergency operation as acknowledged by GOI. Present relations military government good. Food distribution proceeding normally. General program including education being overhauled on realistic basis. UNRWA believes refugee census essential and military government studying problem and expects early decision. Military government has agreed restore machinery and livestock taken from agricultural training center.

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674.84A/11-2655

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-2- 661, November 26, 6 p.m., from Tel Aviv

training center. UNRWA believes GOI will agree free transportation/loading supplies to warehouses. Question realistic exchange rate outstanding UNRWA financial problem.

3. Military government. Colonel Gaon military governor reported following: He appointed new mayor and town council for Gaza City November 23. Israel police took over most policing responsibilities in Strip November 25. To obtain cooperation of population he has; (a) ordered distribution seven kilograms flour per head to destitute; (b) permitted resumption fishing November 23; (c) ordered restitution confiscated civilian cars; (d) ordered payment wages from November 2 to all Arab Government employees and police still working. Hopes to have Red Cross channel for mail into/out of Strip by December 3. He will permit some families Christian Arabs resettle Lebanon (to be arranged Israel-Lebanon MAC) Ornel Arish.

4. Gaon says GOI will endeavor increase means livelihood local residents but doubted Strip could ever support more than 50,000. Refugees must be resettled or perpetual charity will be only alternative.

All sources agree Palestinians do not (repeat not) want Egyptian reoccupation and that if IDF leaves no hiatus should occur before United Nations military take over. Colonel Bayard estimates minimum one regiment United Nations troops would have to be on spot prevent dangerous disorders and this consistent our observations of past outbreaks.

5. Conduct of IDF troops: All UNRWA employees only outsiders with complete freedom movement from November 2 reported little or no (repeat no) looting by IDF occurred. IDF troops forbidden purchase anything in Strip and soldiers required surrender all purchased items upon departure through roadblocks. On other hand about five percent UNRWA stores and many records UNRWA schools and equipment and orange groves looted by refugees for brief period. Believe Colonel Bayard's account Israel looting in Jerusalem telegram 167 inaccurate.

Arab city life now normal on surface with freedom movement throughout Strip and curfew lifted eight to four.

LAWSON

TT:TJI/16

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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57
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Control: 18310
Rec'd: November 27, 1956
2:05 pm

Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 664, November 26, 6 pm

SENT DEPARTMENT 664 REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 127, CAIRO 128, BEIRUT 109, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

DEPARTMENT PASS ARMY, NAVY, AIR.

Following report on military situation Gaza Strip furnished Embassy officer November 24 by Gaon military governor.

OCB
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AIR

1. Screening procedures for former soldiers half completed with populations of Rafa, Khan Yunis, Dier E Belah, Gaza, and Jaljilyal cleared and five to six major centers still to be combed. No (repeat no) incidents except at Rafa where Bedouin and Egyptians mainly responsible. Estimates 800-1,000 former soldiers left and hopes to catch all remaining. Said "maybe" fifty to sixty Fedayeen still in Strip.

2. Some persons trying to reach HKJ though Israel but could not (repeat not) estimate numbers. IDF endeavoring prevent this by heavy patrols and ambushes in depth on both sides DL. Several groups in Strip trying to organize such flights and one person implicated was Rashid Shawa brother present mayor and former deputy mayor. Gaon had recently arrested Shawa and others.

3. IDF still having trouble with Bedouin camping around Rafa and in neighboring costal sand dunes. These consisted medley of about forty tribes many of them traditional bandits. Where-as ten to fifty percent rest of population surrendered arms voluntarily no (repeat no) Bedouin did so. November 22 he declared three kilometers strip along coast in dune country military area and had tried flush them out by loud speaker from plane. In last analysis however decided he would have to bring in cavalry. He said situation increasingly quiet and he had not (repeat not) had Israel casualty in 14 days.

LAWSON

TT:CC/8

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(4)
1/7/5

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File Designation 674,84A/11-2656
MEMO w/ATT
Date 11/26/56
From Bloomfield
To Wilcox

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(4)

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File Designation 674,84A/11-2656
Tel 172
Date 11/26/56
From State
To Canberra

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NSC
Authority

1/4/89
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

(4A)

December 3 1956

In reply refer to
NEA:NE

Dear Mr. Yaffe:

This is in reply to your telegram of November 26 to the Acting Secretary in regard to reports concerning mis-
treatment of Jews in Egypt. ✓

There have been many conflicting assertions on this matter and the Department, through the United States Embassy in Cairo, is presently endeavoring to ascertain the actual facts. You will appreciate that a confused situation exists in Egypt at present and that because of the restrictions arising out of the hostilities complete reporting is difficult.

However, in view of the nature of the report concerning the treatment of Jews in Egypt the Department has instructed the Embassy in Cairo to inform the Egyptian Government of the extremely bad impression a repressive policy against Jews would produce in this country and elsewhere.

Sincerely yours,



Stuart M. Rockwell
Deputy Director
Office of Near Eastern Affairs

Mr. Joseph X. Yaffe,
260 South 15th Street,
Philadelphia 2, Pa.

NEA:NE:MSRice:SWRockwell:mfr
11/30/56

ES/SCR
DEC 3 1956 P.M.

FC 674.840/11.26.56

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

November 28, 1956

NEA - Mr. Oulashin

The attached telegram to the Acting Secretary from Joseph X. Yaffe re treatment of Jews in Egypt is forwarded for reply at a suitable bureau level.

Please send copies (2) of the reply to S/S by the close of business on November 30.

M.E.M.
G.E. Mouser
S/S-RO

Attachment:

Tel dtd 11/26

LPB087

6 23

SD WU033 PD PHILADELPHIA PENN NOV 26 1956 415PME

HERBERT C HOOVER JR, ACTING SECY OF STATE

STATE DEPT

THE PHILADELPHIA JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS COUNCIL
REPRESENTING 29 CITYWIDE ORGANIZATIONS WITH 400 LODGES
POSTS AND AUXILIARIES, IS APPALLED AT NEWS EGYPTIAN
GOVERNMENT HAS PLACED EGYPTIAN JEWISH LEADERS ON
CONCENTRATION CAMPS, ORDERED DEPORTATION OF OTHERS AND
CONFISCATED THEIR PROPERTY AS ENEMY PROPERTY WE URGE THE
US GOVERNMENT DIRECTLY AND THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS TO
PUBLICLY DENOUNCE SUCH OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AGAINST
EGYPTIAN CITIZENS OF THE JEWISH FAITH AND TO TAKE ALL
POSSIBLE MEASURES TO FREE IMPRISONED JEWS AND PROPERTY
AND TO PREVENT ANY FUTURE THREATS TO JEWS IN EGYPT OR
OTHER ARAB LANDS SUCH ACTS BY EGYPT ARE FURTHER PROOF OF
ITS CONTEMPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
WORLD OPINION THE US MUST SET ITS POSITION CLEAR BEFORE
THE WORLD AS IT HAS ON ALL OTHER OCCASIONS WHEN HUMAN
RIGHTS AND HUMAN BEINGS WERE THREATENED BY FOREIGN
LEADERS

JOSEPH X YAFFE PRES 260 SOUTH 15 ST PHILADELPHIA 2 PA 608PME..

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DEC 7 - 1956

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674.84A/11-2656

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R.M.R.
D.C.B.
1/17/58

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

~~DB~~
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44
Action

Control: 20497
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 30, 1956
5:30 AM

NEA
Info
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FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 687, NOVEMBER 29

SENT DEPARTMENT 687, REPEATED INFORMATION BEIRUT 111, CAIRO 130.
RE EMBTEL 661.

COMMUNIST KNESSET MOTION TO DEBATE ARAB DEATHS POST SINAI CAMPAIGN INCIDENT AT RAFA WAS DEFEATED NOVEMBER 28 BY VOTES ALL OTHER PARTIES. BEN GURION DESCRIBED INCIDENT ALONG LINES EARLIER GOI EXPLANATIONS AND GAVE CASUALTY FIGURE AS 48 DEAD, NUMBER WOUNDED. BEN GURION CALLED COMMUNIST MEMBERS KNESSET "TRAITORS, HOOLIGANS AND ENEMY AGENTS", AND ANIMOSITY HIS ATTACK HAS BEEN INTERPRETED SOME QUARTERS AS PRESAGING OUTLAWING OF OR REGAL ACTION AGAINST PARTY.

LAWSON

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574.84A/11-2953

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NOV 30 AM 10 11

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AIR POUCH

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

674.84A/11-2956

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TEL AVIV

297

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

November 29, 1956

DATE

REF :

71 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	IN F O
	NEA-4 12/8	AMK-2 OLI-8 IO 4 EUL-5 FE 4 ARA 4 CIA-12 USIA-10 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3

SUBJECT:

GOI Invitation to Chiefs of Missions to Visit Gaza Strip.

In the early part of the week, the Israeli Foreign Ministry extended invitations to all Chiefs of Missions of the diplomatic corps in Israel to participate in a conducted tour of the Gaza Strip on November 23, 1956. This was the first occasion on which the Israel Government had indicated it would approve diplomats accredited to Israel going into the Strip. Two previous supervised visits by military attaches had been permitted.

Chiefs of Missions conferred among each other as to the propriety of accepting this invitation, in view of the fact that it might be interpreted as lending status to Israel's occupation of the Strip or condoning Israel's conquest. Ambassador Lawson and the British Ambassador decided to decline the invitation, and the same decision was arrived at by Chiefs of Missions of Australia, Brazil, among others. Swedish and Swiss Ministers sought instructions which were not received in time to permit their accepting.

According to Yedioth Hayom (independent) for November 26, the tour was something less than a success. Only nine diplomats made the trip and these were: The Argentine Ambassador, Ministers of Mexico and Uruguay, the Charges of Burma, Greece, and Ethiopia, and Secretaries of the Embassies of France and Italy. The Yedioth Hayom story concluded ~~however~~ that this small turn-out was due to the fears described above.

For the Ambassador:

William L. Hamilton, Sr.
William L. Hamilton, Sr.
First Secretary of Embassy

Dept send copy to AmEmbassy Cairo.

RDD
RDDavis:jl
REPORTER

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Rpt w/ATT
Date 11/29/56
From McLaughlin
To _____

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1/4/89
Date

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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31-L

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Action

Control: 20863

NEA

Rec'd: November 30, 1956
11:55 p.m.

Info

FROM: Alexandria

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 257, November 30, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 257 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 76

Re EMBTEL 1597 November 20, 1609 November 21, 1653 November 24

Notwithstanding assurances given Swiss by GOE to effect it was not government policy expel British and French residents from Egypt reports from variety reliable sources continue to come into effect local police still involved in active campaign to force departure thru intimidation. British French and Jews continue to be approached during late night or early morning hours and told to sign statement they desire depart Egypt or risk variety penalties including imprisonment, bodily harm, etc and other reprisals unspecified. Many who would otherwise have remained Egypt are departing leaving all worldly goods behind.

WASHBURN

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1956 NOV 30 PM 4/11

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D.C.B.
1/17/58*

INCOMING TELEGRAM

AB

Department of State

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CORRECTION

**CORRECTION ISSUED
DECEMBER 5, 4 A.M.**

Action

Control:

2164

Rec'd:

December 4, 1956
5:18 p.m.

NEA FROM: TEL AVIV

Info RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 699, December 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

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This SECRET message received as one section message
should be corrected to read section one of three.

FW 674.84A/12-355

674.84A/12-356

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CORRECTION

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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47-41

SECRET

Action

Control: 2164

NEA

Rec'd: December 4, 1956
5:18 p.m.

Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 699, December 3, 5 p.m. (Section I of III)

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 699, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 129, BEIRUT 112, CAIRO 132, DAMASCUS 84, PARIS 127, LONDON 153, ROME 76, MOSCOW UNNUMBERED.

Prime Minister invited me to his Jerusalem residence Sunday afternoon for "little talk in informal atmosphere". Talk lasted hour and covered following: 1. Rhetorical questions to US thinking on Israel's principal preoccupations in wake of withdrawal foreign forces from Egypt;

2. His conception Nasser's resurgence and probable moves hence forward, and

3. Probable development Soviet policy and actions in ME.

1. US views on principal Israel preoccupations: by way of introduction Ben Gurion emphasized influence President's letter had in persuading him to agree to withdraw IDF from Sinai. He implied his alacrity in acquiescing entitled him to answers following questions:

How was freedom of navigation Suez to be guaranteed, once Canal is cleared, if Hammarskjold has agreed that Nasser can remove UNEF at will?

If Canal is not under protective control UNEF, what guarantee is there Nasser will not block it again, not only against Israel but physically block it if he is told to do so by Soviets or if he wishes to blackmail west?

For first time Israelis enjoying freedom of passage ships and aircraft over Aqaba. For time being this also means free passage for other countries seeking link between Asia and Europe as alternative to Suez.

What guarantees are there Israel can maintain this vital freedom if she withdraws her troops from area?

How is

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-2-699, December 3, 5 p.m. from Tel Aviv

How is Nasser to be prevented from blocking it again if he wishes?

How can Israel be assured Sinai will not be used again as base for attack on Israel either by land or air?

What is to prevent Egypt from building up tremendous attack forces there again in implementation declarations she made only today to continue efforts to destroy Israel?

2. Nasser's resurgence: His portrayal of Nasser covered many points he has made in past but with following additions or new underscoring.

Despite Nasser's protestations of adherence to western democratic principles, his eagerly expressed desire for good relations with US, and his alleged refusal to accept Soviet domination, there has been no fundamental change in his ambitions, reliance on intrigues and machinations, or his basic attitudes towards US and west. He is working against west in Arab countries and establishing close associations with Soviets through Syria until such time as he can openly resume his partnership with Russia. Ben Gurion said he was very much afraid Nasser will be successful in convincing US and others who may have no conception of his mastery of deceit. He feared we did not understand Arab mind-difference between artistry of Arab lying and blatant crudeness of Communist lying which was transparent to anyone.

I expressed genuine doubt any country which had already experienced Nasser's unreliability would again be taken in. Ben Gurion replied he understood there was differences of opinion in Department as well as USUN as to how Nasser should be handled.

He said Nasser would move by phases, first insisting on British and French withdrawal from Egypt; then ousting UNEF, then demanding Israel's evacuation of Sinai and areas adjacent to Gulf of Aqaba, followed by campaign to win friends and obtain much needed economic assistance from US.

LAWSON

MGG/HSO/5

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DEC 18 1956

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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SECRET

32
ActionControl: 3571
Rec'd: December 6, 1956
8:29 a.m.1
14NEA
Info
RMR
FROM: Tel Aviv
TO: Secretary of StateSS
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NO: 699, December 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 699; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 129,
BEIRUT 112, CAIRO 132, DAMASCUS 84, PARIS 127, LONDON
153, ROME 76, MOSCOW UNNUMBERED

1956 DEC 6 PM 8:20

MESSAGE CENTER
NEA

3. Probable development Soviet policy and actions in ME. Confirmation of substantial shipments of Soviet arms to Syria and persistent false accusations by both Syria and Russia of British, French and Israeli troop build-ups on Syrian border made him apprehensive Soviets had some definite aggressive plan affecting Israeli's security. Further evidence such intent was contained in Bulganin's letter attacking Israel, IZVESTIA's "very disturbing article" along same line (Moscow's 1345 to Department) and reports he said he had from Israeli Legation in Moscow about Khrushchev's statements to diplomats that Israel could be wiped out with only few rockets sent from Russia Ben-Gurion said he was worried more by intent than threat because there were easier ways to accomplish same result. He said he did not take threat of Soviet "volunteers" seriously, having regarded it as hoax from very beginning. In his view it was part of cover for real plans of building-up military supplies in Syria utilizing it as ME base instead of Egypt for time being.

"Of course I have no knowledge how Soviets will operate but I believe one of their first moves would be to subject Israel to heavy bombing, small in terms of Soviet thinking but very large in Israel's". He returned several times to persistence of Soviet-Syrian accusations of Israel troop concentrations on Syrian border despite categorical denials by UN observers. He interpreted their repetition as indicating some plan of military action has been devised for future use by Soviets in conjunction with Syrians.

I expressed doubt as to his conclusions based as they were on two points mentioned. I referred to strong US

statement

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374.87/12-353

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SECRET

-2- 699, December 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE) from Tel Aviv

statement against introducing "volunteers" into area, and pointed out we had taken lead in promoting UN resolutions against further introduction of arms to ME. I pointed up fact that after Soviet propaganda threatening to send volunteers to Egypt and Syria, Soviets had completely abandoned line. It seemed to me recent propaganda line on military build-up in Israel-Syrian border possessed even more of "war of nerves" flavor and might well fade out in due course. Furthermore, I said, I had not yet seen any evidence sizeable build-up Soviet supplies in Syria and specifically had seen nothing indicating that Soviet planes had been seen on Syria airfields. He admitted Israel had been unable to locate any such planes. In any event, he felt for moment at least, Soviets were definitely utilizing Syria as area penetration channel and that developments to date indicated serious threat to Israel's security.

Turning to our statement supporting integrity Baghdad Pact countries, he said Soviets would interpret statement's failure to mention Israel and Lebanon as expression of indifference to their fate. I argued such interpretation would be entirely unreasonable and illogical; and obviously contrary to any intent by US. Statement was addressed to specific and clearly defined area with no more reason Lebanon or Israel should have been included than any other country in ME. He admitted logic this view but said this would not change Soviet interpretation pytk* described Lebanon as small country courageous enough to defy Soviet-supported Nasser. This defiance brought about definite order from Nasser to his agents to assassinate President Chamoun at same time. Egyptian agents were instructed to assassinate Nuri Said. Nasser might also try to incite Moslems against Lebanese Christians.

While assassinations and internal disturbances might suffice against Lebanon, strong military action would be required to wipe out Israel. "They know it would do no good to assassinate me as principle of democracy and freedom would continue here as long as there was an Israel". Accordingly he thought Soviets would depend on saturation bombing, immediately wiping out Israel's air bases and air force.

LAWSON

MS:DT

*As received. Verification upon request.

SECRET

DEC 18 1955

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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41

SECRET

Action
NEA

Control: 3064

Rec'd: December 5, 1956
3:55 p.m.Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 699, December 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE OF THREE)

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SENT DEPARTMENT 699, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 129, BEIRUT 112, CAIRO 132, DAMASCUS 84, PARIS 127, LONDON 153, ROME 76 MOSCOW UNNUMBERED.

He said Syria was completely under domination of Nasser who, at this moment, was using Syria against US and west while his own cabinet and Egyptian press were instructed to appear friendly to US. Quwwatly and Colonel Sarraj were directly under Nasser's order. To same extent he felt Nasser was directing Jordan's policies.

He concluded his conversation by saying if US was not willing make public statement warning Soviets against attack on Lebanon and Israel as it had in case of Baghdad Pact powers secretary might call in Soviet Ambassador and make this point clear to him. I told him I would pass his questions and views to Department which would find them of interest although I could not assure him of specific replies in terms of US policy. As he knew our basic policy is to help in every way to settle Suez problem, settle Israel-Arab issues and bring peace to area and we meant peace with justice. Policy pertaining to each of his points might be under formulation and subject to future events and developments in which he had already agreed was very complex accumulation of factors. He had remarked that his comment was limited to viewpoint obtained within area and although he had long and close associations with regional problems he had said he could not undertake assess policies or recommendations involving other areas. Therefore he had indicated awareness that US had to consider many related factors of global nature. He agreed saying "never in history has so much depended on one power and I suspect one man. His decision will take courage". He repeated his confidence in President and his belief President's sincere desire to find just solution to area's difficult problems.

Comment.

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Ben Gurion was more composed and quiet than in some

time

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584A.74/12-353

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Destroyed in RM/R

COPY No(s)

SECRET

-2- 699, December 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE OF THREE) from Tel Aviv

time. I feel his purpose was to put his thoughts on record and to justify his request answers to this questions: first, by virtue his cooperation with Hammarskjold who, he said, had requested him to withdraw IDF, so work could begin clearing Canal, and to allow international force to enter area vacated by IDF. Responsive to Hammarskjold's request he had instructed Dayan to move troops back some 30 miles from Canal (I gathered Dayan was not too happy with suggestion); second, because US pressures were also in large part responsible for his decision to withdraw Israeli troops in first place. I had anticipated this argument as logical from tactical standpoint (EMBTEL 614). However, while US pressure was certainly most powerful agent, fear of expulsion from UN and Israel's isolation were almost equally strong incentive factors.

While his comments coincide very nicely with line Eban and Golda Meir are now pushing, I believe him genuinely worried (1) over Nasser and his ability to deceive US and emerge victor, (2) that Israel may find itself facing same or even greater threats to her security than before Sinai campaign. Although he spent sometime discussing them, I have impression he was less worried about Soviet-Syrian threat and US statement in support of Baghdad Pact countries integrity which overlooked Israel (and Lebanon).

I doubt he expects definite replies to his question but probably hopes for some general state containing reassurance that these and other matters are in our minds as we study overall solutions for area. Obviously he would welcome any suggestion as we are prepared to make that our long term objectives if successful, would obviate most all fears he raised in his questions.

LAWSON


PAL:SJL

Note: Message delayed in transmission.

SECRET

DEC 21 1956

DEC 18 1956



THE FALCON'S WING PRESS

FALCON'S WING PRESS BUILDING
INDIAN HILLS, COLORADO
NATIONAL 9-4400

1036 DEC 4. 28, 1958

THE WHITE HOUSE

Nov 29 3 09 PM '56

RECEIVED

The President of the United States of America
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

In these days of grave and recurring crises it is the spiritual obligation of every devoted citizen of our country to bring to the attention of the President, who is ultimately responsible for the country's policies at such times, any information of a vital nature that may come that citizen's way.

Several of the boys studying at the Golden School of Mines in Colorado are from the Near East, and naturally receive letters from relatives and friends. The following information came to the notice of the undersigned in that fashion:

When, during the course of the first days of the undeclared war against Egypt by Britain and France, their planes bombed Al Maza airfield in Egypt, one of the Egyptian civilian mechanics managed to bring one of those planes down. It was noticed with great surprise by the airfield personnel that the plane was neither British nor French, but NATO. This instance was multiplied.

Mr. President, this is a very serious report; for it contradicts what the British government said about not having had to consult us or the UN in advance of its aggression against Egypt.

There was a very stern legal and moral obligation to consult us when NATO arms were used, for which we had helped pay and over which we had some definite say.

How can we hope to effectively answer Communist aggression in Hungary and other helpless nations if there is such moral turpitude as well as the most thinly concealed disrespect for us and our legal and moral rights, on the part of two nations supposed to be upholders of justice, liberty and democracy? Why are the Algerians who also wish their freedom called "terrorists" while the Hungarians who with equal right killed the Red secret police are called patriots? Is it not time for the United States openly to declare itself on the side of all peoples who wish to be safe from aggression by colonial powers, whether those powers be of the West or the East? We ourselves are the great nation we are only because we were able to fight successfully against colonial oppression and exploitation by England. It is time we took advantage of the great moral prestige which has accrued to us by your stand, Mr. President, in this crisis. The Al Maza report is gravely significant.

Yours very sincerely, *C. A. Muses*
Dr. C. A. Muses, Editor

cam/zb

674.34A/1 -

CS/J

674.34A/11-28-56

move
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

ROUTE SLIP

(To Remain With Correspondence)

TO Mr. Fisher Howe
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of State

17-86
PROMPT HANDLING IS ESSENTIAL.
WHEN DRAFT REPLY IS REQUESTED
THE BASIC CORRESPONDENCE MUST
BE RETURNED. IF ANY DELAY IN
SUBMISSION OF DRAFT REPLY IS
ENCOUNTERED, PLEASE TELEPHONE
OFFICE OF THE STAFF SECRETARY.

Date November 30, 1956

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

ACTION:

Comment _____
Draft reply _____
For direct reply _____
For your information _____
For necessary action _____
For appropriate handling ☒ _____
See below _____

Remarks: _____

By direction of the President:

A. J. Goodpaster
A.J. GOODPASTER
Staff Secretary
John

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE SLIP

DATE

1/7/57

TO:	NAME OR TITLE	ORGAN. SYMBOL	ROOM NO.	BLDG.	INITIALS	DATE
1.						
2.	Miss Peterson	SEV	3305	SA-20		
3.						
4.						
5.						

<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTE AND FORWARD
<input type="checkbox"/>	AS REQUESTED	<input type="checkbox"/>	NOTE AND RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PER CONVERSATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	FOR YOUR INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	INITIAL FOR CLEARANCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	SEE ME
<input type="checkbox"/>	NECESSARY ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE

REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING

I suggest that the following be inserted at the beginning of paragraph 2 of your letter to Mr. Muses.

It should be noted that there is no "NATO marking" of aircraft and that equipment supplied by the United States for the defense of the NATO area carries only the marking of the country using the equipment. As regards this equipment,

FROM (NAME AND ORGANIZATION)

Richard Straus, RA

ROOM NO. AND BLDG.

7002, N.S.

SIGNATURE

PHONE NO.

2980

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

(7786)

December 3, 1956

SEV - ~~Mr. Meagher~~ - *PCB*

Forwarded for appropriate action is the attached letter to the President from Dr. C. A. Muses concerning the use of NATO planes against Egypt.

May we have two copies of the reply?

RK

Roger Kirk
S/S-RO
Ext. 4154

Att: As stated - dtd 11/28/56

PUBLIC SERVICES DIVISION
CHIEF OF DIVISION

DEC 3 - 1956

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 15 1957

Dear Dr. Muses:

The White House has asked us to reply to your letter of November 28 to the President concerning the reported use of NATO military equipment in the Middle East conflict. We appreciate your interest in writing the Government concerning this matter, and trust you will excuse the delay in this reply.

It should be noted that there is no "NATO marking" of aircraft and that equipment supplied by the United States for the defense of the NATO area carries only the marking of the country using the equipment. Regarding this equipment, you may be interested to know that upon the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East, the American Embassy in London reminded the British Minister of Defense of the provisions of the Military Defense Assistance Agreements between the two countries with respect to military equipment provided by the United States to Great Britain under these agreements. It was pointed out that under these agreements such equipment is to be used only for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area. The importance of strict observance of these provisions was emphasized, and similar representations were made to the French Government.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

John P. Meagher
Chief
Public Services Division

Dr. C. A. Muses, Editor,
"The Falcon's Wing Press",
Falcon's Wing Press Building,
Indian Hills, Colorado.

P:SEV:CPeter:bt

1/8/57

Info. from ND RA EUR/P

CC: S/S-RO (2)

Previously cleared by
RA - Mr. Shaw

100-77454-11-2856

BARRATT O'HARA
2D DISTRICT, ILLINOIS

WASHINGTON ADDRESS
1408 HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.

4858

MEMBER COMMITTEE ON
BANKING AND CURRENCY

MARIE CROWE
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

ACTION
is assigned to

December 3, 1956

Answer written Dec 12 - 1956

December 18 1956

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing you because of the great concern of the people of this congressional district, without regard to party or other division, in the reported plight of persons of the Jewish religion in Egypt.

The report that thousands of Jews had been ordered immediately to leave Egypt taking with them only one suitcase and twenty Egyptian pounds, leaving all else behind, is certainly disconcerting to all our people. But this becomes insignificant in comparison with the report that from every Jewish family in Egypt one member has been taken as hostage by the Egyptian authorities and that the families from which they have been wrested have to this day received no tidings of their whereabouts.

The people of this congressional district are not hesitating to pass upon the accuracy of these reports, which do come however from sources that command their respect. What appeals to them as good common sense, as well as consistent with the sense of American humanitarianism, is that the reports immediately should be investigated by a disinterested party. Such a party it seems to the people of this district is furnished by the set-up of the United Nations.

The proposal that our country should approve and vigorously support a resolution before the General Assembly of the United Nations to this end has been widely discussed by the people of this congressional district in position of leadership, and has been universally approved. I thought that this report on the thinking of the people of this congressional district would be helpful to you in reaching a decision, we hope will be favorable, to use the high prestige of your office in effecting the adoption of such a resolution.

Cordially and sincerely,

Barratt O'Hara
Barratt O'Hara, H. C.

This letter (and its
enclosures, if any) micro-
filmed for RCR records

The Honorable John Foster Dulles,
Secretary of State,
U.S. Department of State,
Washington 25, D. C.

674.84A/12-656

A/39

674.84A/12-656

DC/R	39
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE	
Rev	
Cat	

1956 DEC 10 PM 4 319290
CURRENT RECORDS
BRANCH

December 15 1956

In reply refer to
UNP 674.84A/12-656

Dear Mr. O'Hara:

Your letter to the ~~Secretary~~ of December 6, 1956, concerning reports of mistreatment of Jews in Egypt, has been ~~referred to our~~ ^{reference} ~~received~~.

The President and the Secretary share the concern of your constituents and yourself over these reports. The Department of State is seeking on a continuing basis to obtain an accurate picture of the situation in the light of the many conflicting assertions in this matter. The abnormal circumstances arising out of the hostilities in Egypt have made complete reporting on events there difficult.

You will be interested to know that the American Embassy in Cairo has been instructed to inform the Government of Egypt of the deep concern of the United States Government over the reports which have been received. You may be certain that developments in this situation will be closely followed with a view to determining in what further and appropriate manner the United States Government may take action designed to be helpful.

I appreciate having you convey the feeling in your congressional district that the United States should approve and vigorously support a resolution in the United Nations calling for an investigation of the reports concerning the plight of persons of the Jewish religion in Egypt. I can assure you that the Department will continue to consider carefully any steps, within and outside the United Nations, that may be appropriate and feasible in light of developments.

Sincerely yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
Barrett O'Hara,
~~United States~~
House of Representatives.

DC/R
Anal. 6 ID
Rev. Co
Cat. SK

Concurrence: NE - Mr. Hoffacker (in substance)

December 1 1956

S/S-CF

DEC 18 1956 P.M.

DEC 18 1956

674.842/12-656

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

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1956 DEC 8 PM 3 54

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RPTD INFO: Amcongen Calcutta 294

Origin

Info:

Embtel 724 000

As Senator elect Javits requests info be brought
attention Israeli Prime Minister suggest you transmit
message as quoted Embtel 724.

*Horner
alling*

DULLES

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674.84A/12-856

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Anal 16

Rev

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:FWilkins:mgw 12-8-56

Telegraphic transmission and
Classification approved by:

Fraser Wilkins

Clearances:

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J. J. PERLING

*Public Relations*POST OFFICE BOX 326
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE

December 8, 1956

Hon. Stuart W. Rockwell,
Deputy Director,
Office of Near Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

FM/R
Central
Files

Dear Mr. Rockwell:

Your letter, dated November 29, replies to mine which, three weeks earlier, I had addressed for thr personal attention of Mr. Dulles. In the most friendly spirit I am constrained to protest against this "brush off" so common in Washington.

First of all, there seems to be a most undemocratic concept among high officials that, after an election, "ordinary" citizens are neither to be seen nor to be heard. "Just leave everything to us higher-ups, in the sacred echelon of titled officials, and consider that you of the hoi polloi aren't to meddle." It wasn't always thus: in the early days of the Republic all Federal officials welcomed the opinions of their compatriots; that eagerness to obtain viewpoints made America great.

Now, there was that UNIMPORTANT man named Thomas Jefferson. I term him unimportant, because now from the White House down his concept of government is disdained. What was Jefferson's concept? It is stated in a letter to Patrick Henry: "When the interest of our country....may be affected....it would hardly be deemed an indecent liberty in the most private citizen to offer his thoughts to the consideration of the Executive" -- or any other, including the Secretary of State, Jefferson being the first.

It may be said that official business has grown, that the Secretary now hasn't as much time as Jefferson. But then the Department of State had only three employees, and no typewriters!! And, in that era, there were vital problems.

Now, I want to know whether the Secretary himself saw my letter. And, with utmost respect, I want to ask also why you yourself (who since 1948 have not solved the Israel Jordan problem or brought peace in Palestine) dismiss so disdainfully a plan which does promise a lasting solution.

Sincerely,

JJPERLING

JJP/er

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Rev	
Cat	

576.24A/12-855

C5/F

674.8/12-856

December 11 1956

In reply refer to
NEA:NE 674.84a/11-2356

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Central
Files

Dear Mr. Perling:

I have your letter of December 8. You ask whether the Secretary himself saw your letter of November 23. I believe that he did not, since he was away from the Department at the time it was received. In his absence the Office of Near Eastern Affairs was directed to reply.

With regard to my letter of November 29, I am sorry this produced such an unfavorable reaction. I assure you that my intention was to outline some of the current considerations and anticipated future steps involved in the Near East problem, and to indicate, in this connection, how timely your suggestion was.

Sincerely yours,



Stuart W. Rockwell
Deputy Director
Office of Near Eastern Affairs

Mr. J. J. Perling,
Post Office Box 126,
Wilmington, Delaware.

NEA:NE:SWRockwell:tnm 12/11/56

EX-103 CR
DEC 11 1956 P.M.

EW 674 84a/12-856

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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6723
DECEMBER 11, 1956

2:14 PM

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RMR

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 736, DECEMBER 11

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SENT DEPT 736 RPTD INFO CAIRO 135

JERUSALEM POST MIL CORRESPONDENT CONFIRMED DECEMBER 11 THAT IDF HAD LEFT BEHIND MINE-FIELDS IN SINAI. PAPER SAID THAT CHARTS AND PLANS OF MINES TURNED OVER REPRESENTATIVE OF GENERAL BURN DECEMBER 7.

OCB
USIA
CIA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

AS ONE ASPECT OF GENERAL EDITORIAL CONCERN EXPRESSED OVER POSSIBILITY SINAI WILL BE CONVERTED TO "BASE OF AGGRESSION", SOME NEWSPAPERS SUPPORT IDF "SCORCHED EARTH" WITHDRAWAL.

LAMERCHAV (ACHDUT AVODA) DECEMBER 9: "UNDER ISRAEL SINAI PENINSULA COULD HAVE IN PARTS BECOME INHABITABLE AREA, PEACEFUL AND CULTURED. IF, HOWEVER, IT IS NOT TO REMAIN IN ISRAEL'S HANDS, IF IT CANNOT SERVE PEACE, IT SHOULD BE TURNED INTO NO-MAN'S LAND, REFERRED USELESS FOR SPEEDY MILITARY REHABILITATION.

"EVERY PEACE LOVER IN THE AREA AND THE UN SHOULD BE SATISFIED WITH WHAT ISRAEL HAS DONE IN THE SINAI. BY DESTROYING MILITARY INSTALLATIONS SET UP FOR AGGRESSION- ISRAEL HAS SERVED PEACE AND SECURITY IN AREA, AS WELL AS AIMS OF THE UN."

HATZOFEH (MIZRAHI) DECEMBER 10: "IT IS HARD TO UNDERSTAND GENERAL BURNS' CHAGRIN AT "SCORCHED EARTH" LEFT BEHIND IN SINAI DESERT; THIS IN ORDER ENSURE STATE A MEASURE OF PROTECTION AGAINST EGYPTIAN PERFDY."

LAWSON

TJI

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574.84A/12-1156

674.84A/12-1156A

J. J. PERLING
Public Relations

POST OFFICE BOX 326
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE

December 14, 1956

PERSONAL & URGENT

Hon. Stuart W. Rockwell,
Office of Near Eastern Affairs,
State Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rockwell:

Your letter, dated December 11, is totally unconvincing. My letter to the Secretary was enclosed in an airmail envelop marked "PERSONAL"; it was a flagrant violation of a citizen's privacy to open it, and an inexcusable presumption to keep from the Secretary the plan which was intended solely for his own consideration and appraisal.

I knew the Secretary was then in Florida; that is why the envelop was marked "Please Forward". It smacks of Krock's indictment that "Indians" in the State Department sabotage any idea which they themselves do not approve. Otherwise, why wasn't my letter given to Dulles upon his return from Florida?

*** Once again, Mr. Rockwell, I insist that my letter be handed to Mr. Dulles upon his return from Paris and that I be honestly informed when this is done. Since you have been the apologist for the diversion of my letter, it is your obligation to do this. In the absence of proof that Mr Dulles has my letter, I shall ask the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to investigate what seems to be in the State Department a greater interest in self aggrandisement than a desire to serve the Nation. How else can this incident be interpreted? Here is a practical plan, a plan that promises a permanent peace in the Near East (if Eisenhower's prestige and Dulles' diplomacy can effect it) and you pigeonhole it because it did not emanate from your own esoteric echelon of "diplomats."

If this letter reflects an emphatic protest against such procedure, it is meant to do just that. It is a slight to any citizen, and an insult to the Secretary himself, for his subordinates to arrogate to themselves the determination of foreign policy.

Sincerely,

J. J. PERLING

JJP/er

674.84A/12-14 456 C3/PC

file

app

J. J. Perling

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

31

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Control: 11103
Rec'd: December 18, 1956
5:34 a.m.

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 750, December 17, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 750, CAIRO 136, AMMAN 132, DAMASCUS 86,
BEIRUT 114, USUN 24.

Foreign Ministry advises Embassy it will charge Egyptians with violation of UN's November 2 resolution, in letter addressed either to SC or UNGA president, for dynamiting in which tractor driver was killed on citrus estate 15 kilometers north of Petah Tiqva at Tel Mond Saturday night. Incident is first which has taken Israeli life since before Sinai campaign.

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

Victim was mortally wounded by blast which completely demolished house and inflicted minor wounds on his six year old daughter. Leaving site of explosion, marauders reportedly threw two hand grenades into room of worker on nearby Kibbutz who was not (repeat not) injured in blast.

According to today's press, which gave incident voluminous front-page and editorial attention, police followed tracks of three men in direction of Jordan border, which at this point is less than 10 kilometers away.

Almost without exception, Hebrew newspapers this morning said incident must be brought to SC's urgent attention either as an "act of war" or as returning situation to status quo ante re Fedayeen activity. In typical comment Imerhav (Ahdut Avodah) said "gravity of situation must be pointed out to SC as danger to whole zone. Israel must insist same force which ordered her retreat from Sinai order Arab leaders to put end to their aggression, if new flare-up is to be avoided comment: On Embassy questioning, Foreign Ministry dismissed possibility incident was perpetrated by disgruntled Palestinian bent on act of personal vengeance. Ability SF marauders to penetrate compound in which demolished building is located and effectiveness of charge. Ministry said pointed to operation by trained commandos. Furthermore, police experts saw familiarity in manner of laying charges at Tel Mond to recent incidents where tractors have hit mines and railroad trackage blown up, etc., in scattered parts of country. Foreign Ministry official professed to believe these recent incidents were work of different individuals or bands

but all,

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-2- 750, December 17, 1 p.m. from Tel Aviv

but all, whether operating from Lebanon, Syria, or Jordan, under Egyptian direction.

He recalled Cairo radio less than two weeks ago had announced Egyptian plans to renew and greatly expand Fedayeen activity in Israel this winter. Only yesterday, he added, Cairo radio had boasted that Fedayeen activity against Israel had been renewed on enlarged scale.

Embassy assures incoming will be handle of complaint Foreign Ministry official said is now under preparation.

LAWSON

MS:VMM/7

CONFIDENTIAL

AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

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(Security Classification)

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMCONGENERAL, JERUSALEM

91

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

December 17, 1956

DATE

REF : Congen Despatch 85, December 4, 1956

13 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION NEA-4	DEPT. IN F O	RM/A-2 CL-8 IC-4 D-1 USON-1
	REC'D 1-2	OTHER CIA-12 USIA-10 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3 OSD-4	

SUBJECT: Activities of the MACs during the Period 24 through 30 November 1956

A copy of the substantive parts of the weekly reports prepared by the Mixed Armistice Commissions of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization which summarize their activities for the period 24 through 30 November 1956 is enclosed.

William E. Cole
William E. Cole
American Consul General

Enclosure

Copy of Parts of MAC Weekly
Reports for 24 through 30 November 1956

Copy sent Amman, Tel Aviv

Department pass to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus

HKMiller/hkm
REPORTER

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1957 JAN 4 AM 10 39

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COPY

The following is a summary of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions for the period 24 November to 30 November 1956.

EGYPTIAN - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

Conditions in the town of Gaza are very quiet. Refugees are cutting off trees in the area for firewood without any hindrance from the Israelis. It is understood that the reason for this activity is due to the fact that the Israelis have apparently instructed the kerosene dealers to charge in Israeli currency (two Israeli pounds per four gallon can) and that the people do not wish to convert their money. The inhabitants still have hopes that the United Nations will take over the administration of the Gaza Strip.

U.N. vehicles remain restricted to the compound. However, one to two vehicles make administrative trips to UNRWA and to the town daily.

UNTSO continues to furnish communications and clerical support to UNRWA.

Complaints and investigations

Nil.

HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The situation remained quiet but tense along the HJK-Israel demarcation line during the period under review.

The Senior Delegates met in the office of the Chairman on 26 November for an informal conversation. Few matters were discussed in detail, but the delegates were less tense than at the previous informal meeting held on 19 November 1956.

A Sub-Committee meeting held on 26 November, the first since 5 November - discussed missing persons, property and other problems incidental to the maintenance of the G.A.A.

The Jordanian Delegation submitted 44 complaints: 2 alleging firing across the demarcation line; 42 alleging overflights. There were no casualties. No investigations were carried out.

The Israeli Delegation submitted no complaint.

Outstanding complaints: HJK-1,109; Israel-349; Total-1,458

UNMOs have visited the Israel side of the demarcation line between Jerusalem and Afula almost daily since 22 November. They have seen no British or French troops and no indication of offensive preparations by the Israelis.

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ISRAEL - LEBANESE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The Israeli Delegation submitted 2 complaints: 1 written complaint alleging that on 26 November 1956 a tractor of the Malkya settlement ran over a mine at MR 2004 2801 and was slightly damaged; 1 verbal complaint alleging that during the investigation of the first complaint on the morning of 27 November 1956 a truck ran over a mine at MR 2000 2790. A joint investigation was held. Outgoing tracks leading into Lebanese territory were seen - possibly the tracks of the people who had laid the first mine. With regard to the second mine, which had exploded on a road, no tracks could be found.

The Lebanese Delegation submitted 1 written complaint alleging that on 24 November 1956 two jet planes coming from Israel overflew Labouna (MR 1643 2777) and Marsh Bayada (MR 1673 2853) then returned to Israel.

ISRAEL - SYRIAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

Tension has mounted again during the period under review, following the Syrian complaint to the General Assembly that Israeli, French and British troops were massing along the Jordanian and Syrian demarcation lines. Inspections carried out by UNMOs on both sides of the Israel-Syrian demarcation line have revealed that there is no indication that troops are being massed along the demarcation line for an aggressive purpose, and the forces involved appeared to be deployed defensively.

On 29 November, the Syrian Delegation submitted a verbal complaint alleging that at least two Israeli soldiers had penetrated into Syrian territory some seven kilometres, during the night of 28/29 November, with the obvious purpose of tapping military telephone line near the village of Massaade, and that one of the soldiers had been found dead next morning, apparently killed by a booby-trap. Investigation revealed that an Israeli had been killed, probably accidentally, whilst installing a booby-trapped remote-controlled radio transmitter for the purpose of tapping military telephone line 700 metres north of Massaade. However, the Israeli Delegation denied that any Israeli soldier had crossed into Syria and refused to accept the body. The body was buried in Syria in the presence of UNMO.

The Senior Israeli Delegate has not as yet given guarantees to the Chairman concerning the safe use of Banat Yacoub Bridge.

No routine inspection was made in the central sector of the Demilitarized Zone on the site of the Jordan River Project.

The Israeli Delegation submitted 3 complaints alleging overflights.

The Syrian Delegation submitted 3 complaints: 1 alleging overflight; 1 alleging an Israeli penetration inside Syrian territory; 1 alleging an Israeli attempt to tap a Syrian military telephone line inside Syria.

Outstanding complaints: Israel, 624; Syria, 735; Total, 1,359.

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Control: 12264

Rec'd: December 19, 1956
2:09 p.m.

FROM: Damascus

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1495, December 19, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1495, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 146, BAGHDAD 154, BEIRUT 406, CAIRO 155, TEL AVIV 95, ANKARA 81, LONDON 231, PARIS 202, TEHRAN, KARACHI UNNUMBERED.

Stating he inquiring on behalf Foreign Minister Bitar, Kayyali of Foreign Office December 19 asked Embassy Officer:

(1) Whether it true as Foreign Minister had heard that US now planned press for internationalization of Gaza Strip.

(2) Whether reports sent by Foreign Minister that both Secretary and Under Secretary of State had told representatives of Baghdad Pact countries that US did not intend to join Pact now were true.

Embassy officer replied Embassy had no information either confirming or belying report of alleged US position on Gaza; and Embassy had seen report that Department had informed BP country representatives that US not intend join at present, which consistent with US position since creation of Pact.

Kayyali said Syrian Embassy Washington to be instructed inquire of Department re US position on Gaza.

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*Handled by Tel
12/26/56*

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Origin

Info:

You may tell Kayyali (Embtel 1495) we have not been pressing for internationalization of Gaza Strip and we continue to support Baghdad Pact although not joining now.

You may also say we see no relationship (Embtel 1506) between question of IPC pipeline and withdrawal Israeli forces from Gaza.

(Embtel 1509)
You may also say many QUOTE plans UNQUOTE such as that in ECONOMIST have been printed recently and appear to be press speculation without official status.

Dulles

(CW)
"DULLES"

674.84A/12-1956 CS/REG 12-1956

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Drafted by:

12/26/56

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA: NE: WLE: greton/ELWaggoner: tmm

NE - Fraser Wilkins

Clearances:

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DEC 26 1956 P.M.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 12/19/56

SUBJECT: Research on Status of Tiran and Sanafir; Arms for Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Faisal Hegelan, Saudi Arabian Embassy

Mr. David D. Newsom, NE

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Mr. Newsom handed Mr. Hegelan some rough notes prepared by the research area of the Department concerning the status of the islands Tiran and Sanafir. (Copy attached to original of this memo). These had been prepared at the request of Azzam Pasha who has been delegated by King Saud to study this question.

In answer to a question on the status of Saudi Arabian arms requests, Mr. Newsom said he hoped it might be possible to answer soon on this matter. He explained that the United States had to move carefully on such matters in order not to affect adversely steps being taken to improve the general area situation.

Mr. Newsom said, also, he hoped that another message on Dhahran would be sent soon to the King.

Mr. Hegelan also reiterated the usual Saudi Arabian arguments against the Baghdad Pact.

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NEA:NE;DDNewsom:md
12/27/56

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The Gulf of Aqaba

The Gulf of Aqaba (termed the Gulf of Eilat, or Elath, by Israel) is a long, narrow arm of the Red Sea bordered by Egypt (Sinai Peninsula), Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. It is approximately 100 miles in length extending in a NNE-SSW direction, with widths varying between 7 and 17 miles. The gulf is deep and almost without reefs. At its head there is a shallow step, then an abrupt descent to about 2,160 feet; 4,600 feet is reached half-way down the gulf, while the floor shallows again to 2,400 feet abreast of Ras (Cape) Fartak, near the entrance.

During the period of the Ottoman Empire the Gulf of Aqaba was clearly a territorial bay, for it was surrounded on all sides, including the entrance, by Turkish territory. A question arose in 1906 between the Ottoman Government and the Khedive (Viceroy) of Egypt, who was nominally subject to the Ottoman Sultan, but de facto under a British protectorate, with respect to the administrative boundary between Egypt and Palestine. The Turks wished to include the northern Sinai Peninsula in the Palestine governorate. At British insistence, however, the entire Sinai Peninsula came to be included in Egypt.

With respect to the sovereignty of the islands of Tiran and Sanafir, certain foreign atlases indicate the islands as belonging to Saudi Arabia. Egypt, however, occupied them in March 1950.

By the treaty of San Remo, April 25, 1920, Palestine, including Transjordan, became a British mandate. The boundary between Egypt and this mandate gave rise to no dispute; however the question of the boundary between Saudi Arabia and the mandate did give rise to some disagreement. The Treaty of Friendship between the United Kingdom and the Hejaz, Nejd and dependencies, signed at Jidda, May 20, 1927, has appended thereto an exchange of Notes, dated May 19-21, 1927, which deals with the boundary question.

The treaty of Jidda, including the exchange of notes appended thereto, was extended indefinitely by an agreement of October 3, 1943. Thus an exchange of notes between the Saudi Arabian and the United Kingdom Governments, effective as of that date, reads in part as follows:

Saudi Arabia: The Treaty of Jedda concluded on 18th Zul Qa'da, 1345, corresponding with 20th May 1927, between His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia (the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and Dependencies) and His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, shall as from the 4th Shawwal, 1362, corresponding with 3rd October, 1943, be automatically prolonged for successive periods of seven solar years unless either of the two High Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other six months before the expiration of any of the said periods of seven solar years of his intention to modify or terminate the Treaty.

United Kingdom: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note...of 3rd October, 1943...(and) to confirm that the Government of the United Kingdom accept this proposal and that this Note, together with your Excellency's Note, constitute a binding agreement between our two Governments which shall come into force from today's date.

Thus the town of Aqaba came to be a part of the Palestine mandate, in the area which is today Jordanian territory, rather than a part of Saudi Arabia.

It is clear that Saudi Arabia is the undisputed coastal sovereign along the east coast of the Gulf of Aqaba from a point a few miles south of the town of Aqaba to the mouth of the Gulf. There is no documentary evidence available here on the nature or extent of Saudi claims to the islands

islands of Tiran and Senafir at the entrance to the gulf, which were uninhabited until occupied by Egypt in 1950.

Thus Egypt became sovereign over the entire west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba, and Saudi Arabia of the east coast thereof. However there remained a small coastal strip of about 7 or 8 miles, situated on a truncated bay about three miles wide at the extreme head of the gulf, which appertained to the Palestine mandate.

When the Palestine mandate was divided into two parts, Palestine proper and the Amirate of Transjordan, the line separating them followed the Jordan River south to the Dead Sea, thence through the center of the Dead Sea, and thence down the center of the Wadi al-Arabah to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. This boundary along the Wadi al-Arabah constitutes the armistice line between Jordan and Israel. Jordan's coastal strip, from the Wadi al-Arabah to the Saudi frontier, measures about $3 \frac{1}{2}$ miles, and contains the Jordanian port of Aqaba.

With respect to jurisdiction over water areas in the Gulf of Aqaba, both the Saudi Arabian and the Egyptian Governments have enacted legislation which extends the territorial sea of their respective states beyond the three-mile belt of coastal waters. Thus Saudi Arabia, by Decree #6/4/5/3711 of May 28, 1949, has defined the territorial sea of the kingdom as follows:

Article 5. The coastal sea of Saudi Arabia lies outside the inland waters of the Kingdom and extends seaward for a distance of six nautical miles.

Article 9. With a view to assuring compliance with the laws of the Kingdom relating to security, navigation, and fiscal matters, maritime surveillance

may be exercised in a contiguous zone outside the coastal sea extending for a further distance of six nautical miles and measured from the base-lines of the coastal sea, provided, however, that nothing in this article shall be deemed to apply to the rights of the Kingdom with respect to fishing.

The Egyptian legislation concerning territorial waters is contained in a decree of January 15, 1951 (Official Gazette, Vol. 78, No. 6, January 18, 1951). Article 5 of this decree is identical with Article 5 of the Saudi decree; Article 9 of the Egyptian decree rectifies an ambiguity in the Saudi decree, for it reads the same as the Saudi decree up to the phrase "extending for a further distance of six nautical miles" where it continues:

beyond the six nautical miles measured from the base-lines of the coastal sea; but no provision of this article shall affect the rights of the Kingdom of Egypt with respect to fishing.

Since both Israel and Jordan each control a very narrow coastal strip fronting on the three-mile-wide bay at the head of the gulf, the territorial seas of these states, both of which claim the traditional three-mile limit of territorial waters as a result of their former British status, overlap. (Israel in 1950 cited the Ordinance of March 29, 1945, Article 2, published in the Palestine Gazette, number 1400, of April 2, 1945, wherein the territorial waters of Palestine was asserted to be three nautical miles, as the Israeli position with respect to the territorial sea.

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FROM: TEL AVIV

MESSAGING
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DEC 22 1956
4:41 PM

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 767, DECEMBER 20, 6 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 767, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 133, BEIRUT 116, CAIRO 137, DAMASCUS 87, PARIS 130, LONDON 156, USUN 25.

DECEMBER 19 BEN GURION TOLD KNESSET CATEGORICALLY "IN NO EVENT AND IN NO MANNER WILL ISRAEL AGREE TO RETURN OF EGYPTIAN INVADER" TO GAZA STRIP. BRIEF STATEMENT WAS IN REPLY TO QUERY BY EX-PALMACH COMMANDER ALON (AHDUT AVODA) REGARDING APPARENTLY ERRONEOUS REPORTS PUBLISHED HERE OF EBAN STATEMENT DECEMBER 17 IN NEW ORLEANS. EBAN QUOTED LOCALLY AS SAYING ISRAEL DID NOT "CLAIM" GAZA FOR ITSELF BUT WOULD NOT PERMIT ITS RETURN TO EGYPTIANS. ALON WHO HAS STEADILY OPPOSED EVACUATION IDF FROM CONQUERED TERRITORY WANTED ASSURANCE THIS NOT ACTUALLY ISRAEL POLICY. BEN GURION SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN TEXT EBAN TALK BUT NO ONE AUTHORIZED TO SAY ANYTHING FOR GOVERNMENT ON GAZA QUESTION BEYOND STATEMENT (QUOTED ABOVE) THAT EGYPTIAN RETURN IMPERMISSIBLE.

BEN GURION STATEMENT IS FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT OFFICIAL GOI POLICY ON GAZA. HITHERTO BEN GURION CAREFULLY AVOIDED REFERENCE TO QUESTION AND IT SEEMS CLEAR HE FEELS HIS NOVEMBER 8 LETTER TO PRESIDENT AND GOI'S SUBSEQUENT TECHNICAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH UNITED NATIONS REFER ONLY TO SINAI. STATEMENT ONLY CLARIFIES WHAT OBVIOUS FROM BEGINNING: THAT GOI WOULD STRONGLY OPPOSE RESTORATION EGYPTIAN CONTROL OF GAZA. LEFT OPEN IS ENTIRE QUESTION OF WHAT ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITION WOULD BE DESIRED BY OR ACCEPTABLE TO GOI...WHETHER ANNEXATION OR SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL.

FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL TOLD EMBASSY ALON QUESTION NOT PRE-ARRANGED BUT WELCOMED BY BEN GURION. QUESTION DOUBTLESS NOT UNEXPECTED HOWEVER SINCE ALON'S REACTION TO SUGGESTIONS OF WITHDRAWAL EASILY PREDICTABLE.

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-2- 767, DECEMBER 20, 6 PM, FROM TEL AVIV

GOE ALSO ISSUED YESTERDAY TWO STATEMENTS RE. IT CONTAINED RELEVANT PORTIONS EBAN'S DECEMBER 17 SPEECH IN NEW ORLEANS QUOTING HIM AS SAYING "WHATEVER FINAL OUTCOME OUR DISCUSSIONS ON FUTURE OF GAZA AND ITS REFUGEE POPULATION, ONE THING CERTAIN. THERE CAN BE NO EGYPTIAN RETURN TO TERRITORY WHICH NEVER WAS EGYPTIAN." EBAN ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE SAID GOI'S FINAL POSITION ON GAZA YET TO BE ANNOUNCED.

OTHER STATEMENT (ISSUED BY PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE) CALLED HANSON BALDWIN REPORT THAT BEN GURION PROPOSED UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER BE APPOINTED FOR GAZA STRIP "INCORRECT". ACCORDING STATEMENT BEN GURION MENTIONED VARIOUS PROPOSALS (INCLUDING THIS) WHICH HAD BEEN PUT FORTH IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES FOR SOLUTION STATUS GAZA STRIP.

HEBREW PRESS HEADLINED BEN GURION REPLY TO ALON AND EDITORIAL COMMENT GENERALLY FAVORABLE TO THIS CLARIFICATION OF GOI POLICY. HAARET (INDEPENDENT) ADDED BEN GURION'S REFERENCE TO UNITED NATIONS CONTROL IN BALDWIN INTERVIEW ONLY SHOWED ISRAEL READY CONSIDER ANY PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD PREVENT RETURN EGYPTIANS. HERUT ANFLAMERCHAV (AHDUT AVODA) STRONGLY ATTACKED IDEA OF UNITED NATIONS CONTROL WITH LATTER ALSO, POINTING OUT IDF COULD NOT BE WITHDRAWN FROM SHARM ES SHEIK.

POLITICAL COLUMNIST IN HABOKER INDICATED BOTH MAPAM AND AHDUT AVODA WANT KNESSET DISCUSSION OF THE GAZA PROBLEM WHILE MAPAI EXPLAINS BEN GURION STATEMENT AS REACTION TO "DIRECT AND INDIRECT UNITED STATES PRESSURE THROUGH HAMMAR-SKJOLD" FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL BEHIND ARMISTICE LINES.

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Rec'd: December 20, 1956
12:56 p.m.

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FROM: Damascus.

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1506, December 20, 5 p.m.

December 20 Kayyali of Foreign Office said Zeineddine had been "informally approached" regarding alleged US proposal guaranteeing compliance by Israel with UN resolutions in respect withdrawal from Gaza if Syria would assure prompt repair and resumption operations IPC pipeline.

Embassy official disclaimed knowledge any US proposal concerning pipeline and Gaza questions. Though saw no (repeat no) reason make an issue of it expressed personal view Syrian (#) to IPC remains irrespective problems between Egypt and UK-France-Israel.

Kayyali asked that Department be queried regarding alleged US proposal.

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SW:DTT/14

Omission. Correction to follow.

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CORRECTION ISSUED

12/21/56 1:50 p.m. IMS

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Rec'd: December 20, 1956
12:56 p.m.

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FROM: Damascus -CORRECTED COPY

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1506, December 20, 5 p.m.

December 20 Kayyali of Foreign Office said Zeineddine had been "informally approached" regarding alleged US proposal guaranteeing compliance by Israel with UN resolutions in respect withdrawal from Gaza if Syria would assure prompt repair and resumption operations IPC pipeline.

Embassy official disclaimed knowledge any US proposal connecting pipeline and Gaza questions. Though saw no (repeat no) reason make an issue of it expressed personal view Syrian obligation to IPC remains irrespective problems between Egypt and UK-Israel.

Kayyali asked that Department be queried regarding alleged US proposal.

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12/20/56*

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EMBTEL 1506 (Garbled)

Department has made no "informal approach" to Zeineddine linking Gaza and IFC pipeline matter. Earlier this week Duce of Aramco informed Department he had had conversation with Zeineddine during which latter had connected two matters. Kayyali might be so informed without involving Duce by name.

Dulls

(RA) DULLES

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